This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 005752 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL CO PBTS CODEL
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA: CODEL DAVIS MEETS WITH PRESIDENT URIBE 
 
Classified By: Charge Milton K. Drucker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  CODEL Davis met with President Uribe on June 
2 during a brief visit to Bogota (septel).  CODEL Renzi, on a 
separate trip, also attended. Uribe thanked the group for 
U.S. support, outlined the improved security situation, and 
briefly described Venezuela's approach to the FARC.  Uribe 
underscored his concern that more progress had not been made 
militarily against the guerrillas, that high value targets 
had not been captured, and that Colombian public forces had 
not been able to rescue U.S. and Colombian hostages.  As a 
result, he planned to undertake a comprehensive review of 
Plan Patriota.  To address criticism from some in the U.S. 
Congress that the GOC focused more on a military solution 
over a peace process, Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA) suggested Uribe 
enlist the help of a outside group such as the Carter Center 
or U.S. Institute for Peace to validate his efforts and send 
a message that Colombia was willing to pursue progress on all 
fronts.  Uribe agreed to welcome a group into the process 
"the U.S. trusted."  Uribe said if he could not run for 
re-election, he would support the candidate who "inspired 
hope" and stayed closest to his "main line issues."  In 
response to a question on what further assistance he could 
use, Uribe said he needed to expand the spray program and 
increase support for manual eradication.  Minister of Defense 
Uribe requested U.S. advice on how to do a better job 
capturing guerrilla leaders.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) On June 2, Representative Tom Davis (R-VA), Chairman 
of the House Government Reform Committee, Rep. Frank Wolf 
(R-VA), Rep. Candice Miller (R-MI), Rep. Dutch Ruppersberger 
(D-MD) and Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D-NY) met with President 
Uribe for over an hour.  Rep. Rick Renzi (R-AZ) and Rep. Mike 
Rogers (R-MI) were also present.  The CODELs were accompanied 
by Ambassador and polcouns (notetaker).  Uribe was 
accompanied by Minister of Defense Jorge Alberto Uribe and 
Vice Foreign Minister Camilo Reyes. 
 
¶3. (C) Uribe opened by thanking the President Bush and the 
Congress for their political and financial support.  With the 
help of the United States, he said, Colombia had made great 
strides.  U.S. support was crucial for Colombia's success 
against terrorism. 
 
¶4. (C) Rep. Davis asked for the President's views on Chavez, 
Venezuela and FARC activity along the Colombian-Venezuelan 
border.  Davis said the CODEL arrived from Venezuela earlier 
in the day and GOV officials were complaining about Colombian 
problems spilling across the border.  Uribe responded that 
kidnappings were increasing on the Venezuelan side of the 
border and decreasing in Colombia's  Norte de Santander 
Department and other border areas.  He noted improvements in 
relations with GOV legal authorities, citing the extradition 
to Colombia of FARC leader Gentil Alvis Patino (aka 
Chinguiro).  Uribe had expected a long, drawn out legal 
process but was surprised the GOV moved on the GOC 
extradition request so quickly.  Amb noted that pressure to 
extradite Chinguiro came from not only from Colombia, but 
also from Brazil and Spain. 
 
¶5. (C) Uribe said he remained convinced that FARC and ELN 
guerrillas continued to hide in Venezuela.  While Chavez did 
not directly protect them, it was clear there were FARC/ELN 
sympathizers among his followers.  Uribe underscored that the 
best way to deal with these guerrillas was to tell Chavez 
where they are and then pressure him to go after them. 
 
¶6. (C) In a follow-up question, Rep Davis asked about the 
military situation and whether the FARC was indeed weaker. 
Uribe said "we are winning but need to stay the course."  The 
overall security situation had improved dramatically.  When 
he took office in 2002, 66 per 100,000 inhabitants were being 
assassinated.  In 2005, only 15 had been killed.  If the 
current trend continued, the total for the year would be 
30-35.  In 2002, 160 trade union activists were killed and in 
2005, only three.  In 2002, 11 journalists were killed and in 
2005, only two.  In 2001, there were 3050 kidnappings.  In 
2005, 280 so far.  In 2002, Bogota endured weekly bombings. 
In the last year and a half, there had not been one. 
 
¶7. (C) Uribe stressed that, while the statistics were 
encouraging, he remained concerned that more progress had not 
been made militarily.  He planned to institute a permanent 
review of military operations.  In the short term, with the 
assistance of SOUTHCOM, he was going to thoroughly review 
Plan Patriota, to assess what had gone right and how to 
correct what had not.  He expressed particular concern about 
the lack of progress in Narino and Cauca Departments and the 
borders with Brazil and Venezuela which were primarily 
jungle.  He also said he wanted the review to focus on high 
value targets (HVTs) and the three kidnapped Americans.  On 
the former, he needed to understand why COLMIL had failed to 
capture HVTs.  On the latter, he was disappointed that no 
clear opportunities had emerged to rescue the U.S. hostages 
or the 70 Colombian citizens the FARC held. 
 
¶8. (C) Rep. Wolf agreed that the guerrillas -- the FARC in 
particular -- were Uribe's major problem.  Nonetheless, many 
of his colleagues in the U.S. Congress were concerned the GOC 
was focusing on a military solution and ignoring the peace 
process.  He often sat in hearings and listened to colleagues 
complain about COLMIL's alleged human rights violations and 
other issues.  He asked Uribe whether it made sense for the 
GOC to involve an outside group in the peace process -- a 
special envoy, the Carter Center, the U.S. Institute for 
Peace -- to act as a broker, a mechanism successfully 
deployed in other conflict situations.  Wolf believed 
Congressional criticism would diminish if the GOC accepted 
the involvement of a third party, sending a clear message 
that Colombia was willing to open itself up to the 
international community and do everything possible to achieve 
movement with the guerrillas.  A respected third party could 
validate what Uribe was already doing. 
 
¶9. (C) Uribe said he was not opposed to the idea, but 
maintained that the situation in Colombia was unique to other 
experiences in Latin America.  In the past, insurgents fought 
against dictatorships on the continent.  In Colombia, they 
are fighting against a strong, legitimate democracy. 
Although past peace processes did not focus on the promotion 
and protection of human rights, he had made it an integral 
part of his democratic security policy.  That said, he 
encouraged Rep. Wolf to pursue the idea and would welcome a 
group "the U.S. trusted" to engage. 
 
¶10. (C) Rep. Maloney noted that everyone she had met on the 
trip was complimentary of the President but also expressed 
concern he was not taking enough precautions for his own 
security.  Uribe, visibly touched by the comment, said 
because Colombia had 52 percent poverty and 12 percent 
unemployment (down from 20 percent when he took office), it 
was difficult to legitimize the government.  His mission was 
to convince people democratic institutions deserved the 
people's confidence.  As a result, he sought out 
opportunities to interact with as many citizens as he could 
"to "walk with them."  He knew it involved risk but had to 
take it.  He expressed appreciation for the great efforts of 
his (U.S. supported) security team and gratitude to the U.S. 
for helping keep him and his family safe. 
 
¶11. (C) Rep. Ruppersberger asked Uribe what we would do to 
keep the momentum going and his legacy alive if he could not 
run for re-election?  Uribe responded that he would support 
the candidate who "inspired hope" and stayed closest to his 
fundamentals, his "main line issues." 
 
¶12. (C) Rep. Miller told Uribe she hoped he could run for 
re-election. (Note: the Constitutional Court will likely 
render its verdict on legislation approving presidential 
re-election in September or October.  End Note.)  She 
stressed that after September 11, the U.S. looked around to 
find allies in its fight against terrorism and immediately 
found President Uribe.  She expressed the gratitude of the 
U.S. Congress.  Noting the financial constraints of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, she expressed the hope that Congress 
could do more to help Colombia, and asked Uribe what more he 
needed? 
 
¶13. (C) Uribe said he needed perseverance.  And for that, he 
needed the support of the Colombian people and the 
international community.  So far, the only practical support 
came from the U.S.  From the others came mostly rhetoric.  We 
have to stay the course, he said, and he hoped the U.S. would 
stay on it with him.  With that and the courage of the 
Colombian people, we can win.  To respond directly to Rep. 
Miller's question,  Uribe said he wanted to provide more 
results.  He had asked the Secretary for a new spraying base 
to expand the spray program.  The additional technical 
support would allows him to spray more faster.  He also 
wanted to see more manual eradication.  MOD Uribe said 
COLMIL's top priority was to capture high value targets, and 
he welcomed U.S. advice.  Rep. Davis said he and his 
colleagues would work to get the resources Uribe needed to 
complete the job. 
DRUCKER