This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 005510 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2015 
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PHUM PTER CO FARC
SUBJECT: FARC PROOF OF LIFE: MILITARY ATTACKS YIELD 
POLITICAL GAINS 
 
REF: BOGOTA 3233 
 
Classified By: Charge Milton K. Drucker, reasons 1.4 (c) and (d) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (S/NF) Violence orchestrated by the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) continues at increased levels in 
2005 and aims to chip away at public support for President 
Uribe's tough stand against the guerrillas.  The FARC's 
activities have not affected the COLMIL's military campaigns 
against the FARC, but rather form a pre-election tactic to 
undermine the Uribe Administration's Democratic Security 
Strategy and military Plan Patriota offensive.  The FARC 
began sporadic low-level attacks in January 2005 (reftel) and 
have continued them in April and May against military and 
civilian targets of opportunity.  In addition, the FARC have 
attempted to resuscitate ties to the international community 
which were left weakened in 2004, in particular with 
Venezuela and Ecuador.  Although the strategy has not yet 
affected Uribe's public support numbers significantly, 
continued attacks are likely to raise doubts about Uribe's 
tactics with the guerrillas.  End Summary. 
 
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Failures of 2004 Lead to Rebound 
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¶2. (S/NF) The FARC Secretariat, the group in charge of the 
guerrilla's long-term strategy, gave orders to their fronts 
in early 2004 to avoid engaging the military during the Plan 
Patriota offensive.  Throughout 2004, the FARC reduced its 
domestic attacks and international outreach while maintaining 
business at a somewhat reduced tempo both as a result of the 
Secretariat's orders and COLMIL efforts to push the FARC to 
 
SIPDIS 
the defensive.  As a result, President Uribe enjoyed strong 
public approval ratings and the Colombian public began to 
endorse Uribe's "strong hand, open arms" policy.  However, in 
December 2004 and January 2005, the FARC leadership 
reconsidered its position over the course of several 
high-level meetings.  Secretariat officials concurred that 
FARC passivity and military defeats in 2004 had put it on the 
defensive militarily, allowed interruption of its narcotics 
business, and led to a loss of influence domestically and 
internationally.  This strategic reassessment and 
congressional passage of legislation allowing Uribe to seek a 
second term (currently under review by the Constitutional 
Court), prompted the Secretariat to issue new orders to 
escalate military offensive attacks.  In particular, the FARC 
focused on reestablishing itself internationally and 
domestically with hopes of reclaiming lost influence and, 
ideally, diminishing support for Uribe. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) To realize the Secretariat's strategic goals for 
2005, FARC fronts have taken action to (1) demonstrate FARC 
military prowess and undermine Uribe's Democratic Security 
Strategy; (2) frighten the Colombian electorate through 
terrorist activities against military outposts and Colombian 
cities; and (3) redouble international fundraising, image, 
and influence activities.  If the FARC manages to implement 
this three-prong strategy, it hopes to counter Uribe's 
successes and press the electorate towards a more 
conciliatory candidate. 
 
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Striking Back at the Military 
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¶4. (C) The FARC's first response is against the Colombian 
Armed Forces.  Plan Patriota Phase 2B, initiated in early 
2004, is the largest coordinated military campaign in 
Colombian history.  Its main target is to attack FARC 
strongholds and claim territory that the FARC have controlled 
for decades.  Plan Patriota enjoyed early successes and 
diminished the FARC's military capacity.  In response, the 
FARC has initiated clashes, ambushes and offensives against 
select military targets in 2005.  On May 3, for example, 
three officers from Colombia's National Police were killed 
when they confronted a group of FARC guerrillas from the 50th 
Front. The guerrillas were attempting to put up an illegal 
roadblock on a stretch of the highway linking Ibague and 
Cajamarca, Tolima Department.  A civilian was also killed in 
the crossfire and three other policemen were injured.  The 
attack was the first of three attacks against military or 
police in May alone.  In the Plan Patriota area, the military 
has increasingly found booby-trapped FARC camps and more of a 
willingness to attack targets than in 2004. 
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Counteroffensive to Frighten Population 
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¶5. (S/NF) In addition to an increase in military activity, 
the FARC is working to hit media-worthy targets to inspire 
fear in the population.  Although the attacks pose little 
military threat, the political impact and media coverage 
reinforces the guerrilla's ability to fight back.  For 
example, the FARC attacked a town hall during a city council 
meeting in Puerto Rico, Caqueta Department on May 24, killing 
six municipal councilmen and an official, wounding many 
others.  In 2003, Puerto Rico went from being a FARC 
stronghold to a headquarters for an Army company, and the 
attack effectively reasserted the FARC's ability to reach 
residents and attack despite the Colombian government 
presence.  The attackers fled without being arrested. 
 
¶6. (C) The FARC's attacks also undermine Uribe's highway and 
infrastructure security strategies.  On May 14, the FARC 
established a roadblock in La Quiebra, Antioquia Department 
and stopped eight buses and several trucks for eight hours 
and told them it was an armed strike.  Fourth Brigade troops 
regained control of the road, but local transport companies 
reported they would not dispatch vehicles to towns in 
southeastern Antioquia.  In addition, the FARC were suspected 
of bombing nine electrical towers in the Atlantic Coast 
region over Memorial Day weekend.  The bombings caused 
widespread power outages in the area and took several days to 
repair.  Leading daily El Tiempo noted that there had never 
been so many towers targeted in such a short span of time, 
thus raising fears about the government's ability to protect 
infrastructure. 
 
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International Outreach 
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¶7. (S) Despite three high-profile international FARC arrests 
since January 2004, the FARC resumed efforts to strengthen 
ties to Venezuela and Ecuador.  Venezuela's "Bolivarian 
Circles" and revolutionary rhetoric continue to be targets of 
opportunity for FARC leadership to exploit to 
internationalize the conflict.  In addition to providing 
safe-haven (including official Venezuelan identity cards), 
Venezuela has become a major supplier for FARC camps in 
southern Colombia, likely with the tacit acceptance of the 
Venezuelan government. 
 
¶8. (S/NF) Intelligence sources also indicate that the FARC 
has plans to sway the upcoming Ecuadorian elections and fund 
a FARC-friendly candidate.  If those attempts prove 
successful, Ecuador's occasional extraditions (e.g. Simon 
Trinidad) and attempts to prevent additional FARC migration 
would be reversed.  The FARC also insist that the Ecuadorian 
government has an ongoing agreement to protect FARC members 
-- an agreement that the current administration rejects. 
 
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Prospects for Success 
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¶9. (S) Comment: The FARC strategy for 2005 aims to affect 
political decisions and public opinion.  To that end, the 
group has been and will probably continue to make an impact. 
The public is growing concerned by the seemingly random, high 
profile attacks and the government does not have sufficient 
resources to be able to defend every potential target against 
attacks.  Uribe's recent dip in opinion polls may be 
attributed in part to recent FARC attacks.  Ongoing attacks 
could chip away at the public support, currently at 60 
percent, for Uribe's policy towards the guerrillas.  End 
comment. 
DRUCKER