P 241629Z JUN 05
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8433
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L  BEIRUT 002068 
 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DANIN/POUNDS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2015 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PHUM PINR
SUBJECT: MGLE1:  LEBANON'S NEW PARLIAMENTARY LEADERSHIP 
 
Classified By: JEFFREY FELTMAN, AMBASSADOR.  REASONS PARA 1.5(c) 
 
¶1.  (C) Four major personalities will dominate the new 
Parliament.  These leaders -- Saad Hariri, Walid Jumblatt, 
Hassan Nasrallah, and Michel Aoun -- have the votes and the 
voices they need to push for -- or to block --change.  The 
men and women who counsel these figures will be among our 
chief interlocutors as we press our agenda of Lebanese 
reform, and compliance with UNSCR 1559. 
 
The Son Ascendant 
-------------------- 
 
¶2.  (CN/F)  Assuming he can maintain some internal coalition 
discipline, Saad Hariri will lead a bloc of 72 deputies -- an 
amalgam of his own Future Current (with 35 of the 72 seats), 
Walid Jumblatt's Democratic Gathering, what remains of the 
"Christian opposition," and other "Bristol" allies.  He will 
also wield the power of the Sunni street to name the new 
Prime Minister.  The people around him are companions of his 
murdered father; they are also the Saudis and Lebanese who 
make up a large part of his financial base.  Hariri's 
Christian allies range from the militantly Christian Lebanese 
Forces to former MP Ghattas Khoury, an ally of Rafiq Hariri 
and who loyally stood down from the Hariri slate of 
candidates in response to entreaties that the Hariri slate in 
Beirut include the "more Christian" Solange Gemayel.  Among 
the advisors whom Saad Hariri inherits are the following 
figures, most of whom surrounded his father in various 
governments. 
 
--  Economics:  Saad himself has announced he is eager for 
economic reforms.  Ghazi Youssef, an American citizen, is 
listed as chief among Hariri's economic advisors.  As Head of 
the Higher Privatization Council, Youssef participated in the 
drafting of Beirut's Paris I and II financing packages. 
Fouad Siniora, former Finance Minister and Hariri family 
advisor, is the real force behind Hariri,s economic plans, 
though.  Siniora was the architect of the never-adopted, 
reform-minded 2005 budget proposal submitted during the 
Hariri government,s last days in office, last October.  This 
budget is being viewed as Hariri,s agenda for reform. Saad 
and his advisers are capitalists in the Saudi mold who are 
likely to continue the Hariri tradition of reliance on the 
private sector.  Standing in his way are Hariri's difficult 
relationship with Amal leader Nabih Berri, and potential 
resistance from President Lahoud. 
 
--  Politics:  Salim Diab, a businessman, will be influential 
in Hariri's political apparatus.  He was first elected MP 
during 1996 under a Rafiq Hariri government, but reportedly 
decided a year later that he was not fit for the job and 
resigned.  Diab clashed with Rafiq Hariri in 1997.  When 
Rafiq Hariri supported a popular amnesty law that threatened 
to pardon convicted drug dealers and smugglers, Diab strongly 
opposed the legislation.  Although Diab refused to submit to 
Hariri's pressure, the two men maintained a close friendship. 
 Another advisor, Johnny Abdo, is a French and U.S.-trained 
professional soldier with a long history with the Hariri 
family.  Rafiq Hariri once suggested his name as a 
presidential candidate to replace then President Amin 
Gemayel.  In 1983, Abdo resigned from the army to accept an 
appointment as Lebanese Ambassador to Switzerland.  In 1989 
he was appointed to France, and has spent most of his time in 
Paris since then.  Abdo is a fervent opponent of President 
Emile Lahoud and the Syrians.  He is particularly close to 
Rafiq Hariri's widow, Nazik Hariri. 
 
Jumblatt: The perennial princeling 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Walid Jumblatt returns to legislative politics with 
a new alliance with Saad Hariri, and old loyalties with his 
Druze constituency.  Now, he returns with credentials as the 
leader who could approach Hizballah and bring the Shia bloc 
of votes over to Druze-Sunni causes (specifically, in the 
Baabda-Aley elections).  He is outspoken, recently, in his 
opposition to UNSCR 1559, and he resists (at least in public) 
disarming Hizballah.  However, some Shia sources question the 
viability of an enduring alliance between Jumblatt and 
Nasrallah.  The people closest to Jumblatt include new faces 
like Faysal Sayegh.  Sayegh was previously governor of the 
South and an IV grantee.  The young Druze has announced his 
intention to support reforms in all sectors of the society. 
As a provincial governor, Sayegh saw at first hand the 
corruption of standard politicians like Nabih Berri.  He 
bemoaned the fact that both Lahoud and Berri, whom  he saw as 
real barriers to reform, would likely return to their 
positions.  Sayegh insisted that Walid Jumblatt, for all his 
infamous maneuverings, is committed to progressive change. 
 
Aoun: The man on horseback 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  Michel Aoun will enter parliament with a 
significant minority of deputies loyal to him.  The former 
General began his campaign as an anti-confessional force, 
only to be crowned by voters as the, "strong leader of the 
Christians."  The modest number of Muslim deputies elected 
with him will reinforce his image as a Christian leader among 
the population.  Along with his former comrades in arms, 
Aoun's brain trust includes a number of U.S.-trained 
businessmen operating around the world.  Michel De 
Chadarevian is the head of the political committee of Aoun's 
Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) political party.  He first 
joined the FPM during 1988, when General Aoun was appointed 
acting Prime Minister.  De Chadarevian acted since then as 
the principal coordinator between the FPM and foreign 
embassies.  De Chadarevian worked extensively on the 
political reform program of the FPM called the "Alternative." 
  Sami Nader, Aoun's son-in-law, is one of the drafters of 
Aoun's reform package.  Nader is a businessman with 
experience in large-scale corporate mergers.   The 
professionalism of Aoun's team was reflected in the flashy 
program his Free Patriotic Movement distributed before and 
during elections. 
 
The Lords of the Lebanese Shia 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  Hassan Nasrallah is among the leaders, along with 
Nabih Berri, of a 35-member Hizballah-Amal-plus allies 
delegation in the Parliament.  Hizballah has announced its 
intention to participate in government .  There is not yet 
open speculation about which ministries Hizballah might seek 
to head.  Hizballah's chief preoccupation will be slowing, or 
halting, implementation of  UNSCR 1559 with its call for 
disarmament of militias.  Local observers have quoted 
Hizballah leaders as saying they are entering government to 
defend their armed struggle.  Economic reform and 
administrative reform  are not on any published Hizballah 
agenda.  However, within the Parliament, Hizballah deputies 
have always played the role of dissenters.  Hizballah 
operates a "Center for Research and Studies" that publishes 
all the movement's policy documents.  There is a strong 
moralist current in Hizballah's policies that would seem to 
allow the Shia organization to support reforms that attack 
corruption and support the rights of the Lebanese to good 
governance. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Amal Leader Nabih Berri, in his present mandate as 
once and perhaps future speaker of Pparliament, owes his 
parliamentary seat to Hizballah.  His debt to Hassan 
Nasrallah may be in fact so great that Berri -- or so the 
optimists hope -- has become irrelevant as a political actor. 
 The Speaker is beset by accusations of corruption on all 
sides.  He is targeted by the opposition as the chief barrier 
to reform.  Leading Christian politicians, and even some 
moderate Sunnis such as Tripoli MP Mosbah al-Ahdab, are 
calling for Berri's removal.  Opponents of Berri reject 
concern for Shia sensibilities as a reason to re-elect the 
Speaker.  Their logic runs that the Shia are due a blow to 
their body politic, given that the Sunnis lost Hariri and the 
Christians were forced to compete under the 2000 election 
law.  Thus, why should the Shia escape this process unscathed? 
 
¶7.  (C) Berri's closest advisor on all issues appears to be 
his younger brother Mahmoud.  He is a French-educated former 
professor of political scienc.  He is charming and well 
spoken.  But he has nt shown the substance, or even 
creativity, of moe experienced Lebanese politicos. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Commnt:  The chief tests for reform will be the 
batte surrounding election of a new Speaker (which coul 
mean a return of Berri), composition of the newCabinet, and 
the Presidency.  Berri's supporterswill make the case that 
he is powerful enough toreform the political landscape, and 
even his ownparty.  However, the fact that Berri is worried 
aout international pressure to have him removed woud seem 
to indicate weakness rather than strength  Ideas and good 
advice are plentiful in Lebanon   But reform of political 
and economic structurs has always taken a back seat to 
sectarian maneuering and the pursuit of personal interests. 
Endcomment. 
 
 
FELTMAN