This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 004028 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/BCLTV, USPACOM FOR FPA HUSO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2015 
TAGS: PREL PREF PHUM PBTS TH BM BURMA
SUBJECT: THAI MFA OFFICIAL: NO CHANGE IN POLICY TOWARD SHAN 
BUT RESPONDING TO BURMESE PRESSURE 
 
REF: A. CHIANG MAI 156 
 
     ¶B. CHIANG MAI 113 
     ¶C. CHIANG MAI 109 
     ¶D. RANGOON 697 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert J. Clarke, Reason: 1.4 (b) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  The Burma desk officer at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated that despite the Royal Thai 
Government's (RTG) pushback of approximately 450 Shan 
refugees to the Burmese side of the border last week, there 
is "no change in Thai policy" in providing temporary 
protection and humanitarian assistance to people of any 
ethnic origin along the Thai-Burma border.  The RTG has found 
no evidence of reported chemical weapons use by the Burma 
Army against ethnic Karenni fighters in February.  The 
current overall relationship between Thailand and Burma 
remains strained.  The MFA expects the Burmese government to 
announce their decision about whether or not they will assume 
the ASEAN chairmanship in 2006 at the ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting in Vientiane, Laos in late July.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) In response to the reported relocation of some 450 
Shan refugees the week of June 6 reported in Reftel A, 
PolCouns and Poloffs met with Minister Counselor Damrong 
Kraikruan, Burma desk officer at the Thai MFA.  Damrong 
confirmed that this group of Shan were pushed back and said 
that the action was requested by the SPDC at a Thai-Burma 
border committee meeting earlier this year.  At that meeting, 
Damrong reported, the SPDC had presented a list of 25 sites 
on the Thai side of the border where the SPDC claimed 
"insurgents" were being harbored.  The RTG disagreed with the 
Burmese characterization of most of these locations and 
agreed to it only in connection with Doi Tai Laeng, which is 
located in Mae Hong Son Province, approximately 110 
kilometers from the town of Mae Hong Son.  According to 
Damrong, the complete list of "insurgent locations" provided 
by the SPDC included refugee camps such as Mae La and Nu Pho 
camps, located in Tak Province, and people who clearly did 
not fit into a category of "insurgent."  Damrong said that 
the RTG rejected any relocation of established refugee camps 
along the border, and agreed to relocate only part of this 
one group of Shan and no others.  In this case, Damrong said, 
the RTG felt it had to respond to the SPDC request, ask the 
Shan to relocate on the Burmese side, and inform the SPDC 
that the "insurgents" were on Burmese soil.  He said that the 
RTG did not consider any of the Shan who had moved to be in 
any danger.  Damrong claimed that the school and temple at 
the old site on the Thai side are still open and that all of 
the children, including some orphans are still on the Thai 
side.  (Note: It is unknown by Post how many bona fide Shan 
orphans are among this group.  Some of the children claimed 
as orphans could actually be children who have one or both 
parents still living inside Shan state or elsewhere, as in 
many Burmese refugee camps.  End Note.) 
 
¶3. (C) Damrong said that the RTG will permit the Shan (or any 
others) to re-enter Thailand if fighting breaks out.  Damrong 
noted that when there was fighting between the Wa and Shan 
during the Songkran water festival in April this year,  PM 
Thaksin had instructed the MFA to tell the SPDC that the RTG 
would allow temporary refuge and humanitarian assistance to 
anyone fleeing fighting.  This policy is still in effect, 
according to Damrong. (Note:  At the June monthly meeting of 
Burma border NGOs in Bangkok, an NGO representative noted 
that 896 Shan who were reportedly fleeing fighting had 
entered Fang District in Chiang Mai Province in May.  End 
Note.)  According to Damrong, the MFA and the office of the 
PM had decided not to respond publicly to criticism about the 
pushback of the Shan.  Only the Third Army Deputy Commander, 
Manas Paorik was making public statements, as noted in Reftel 
¶A.  (Note: The regional office of the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) generally does not engage the RTG on 
Shan refugees under the terms of UNHCR's 1999 Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) with the Thai government.  UNHR Regional 
Representative Hasin Utkan told Refcoord on June 7 that he 
had nevertheless expressed concern about the Shan pushback to 
the MFA. End note.) 
 
4.(C) Damrong opined that the Wa attacked the Shan based on 
direct orders from the SPDC as a sort of loyalty test for the 
Wa following the ouster of former SPDC Prime Minister Khin 
Nyunt.  (Note: This analysis appears to contradict both 
Chiang Mai and Rangoon sources as noted in Reftels B, C and 
¶D.  End Note.)  As for the future, Damrong stated that the 
RTG does not/not believe more fighting will break out soon. 
Damrong thinks that the annual rainy season lull in fighting 
has started.  He claimed that there are no indications of 
troop or weapon deployments that would indicate more fighting. 
 
¶5. (C) When asked about the reported use of chemical weapons 
by the SPDC in February against the Karenni, Damrong said 
that the RTG had investigated and found no evidence to 
substantiate the claims (Septel). 
¶6. (C) When asked about the overall relationship between 
Thailand and Burma, Damrong replied that it was "not very 
good."  He then gave a rather detailed analysis of the 
actions of General Maung Aye, currently Vice Chairman of the 
SPDC, and the General's negative perceptions of Thailand. 
Damrong recounted how in 1992 Maung Aye, as the Eastern 
Regional Commander of the Burma Army, nearly started a 
shooting war with the Thai Army, when troops under Maung 
Aye's command occupied Thai territory in Chumporn province. 
The Burmese Army at that time was mounting an offensive 
against the Karen national Liberation Army, which spilled 
over onto the contentious "Hill 491".  Eventually, at an 
emergency Thai Burma border committee meeting called in 
Chiang Mai to resolve the dispute, Maung Aye was forced to 
withdraw Burmese troops and suffered a perceived loss of 
face. 
¶7. (C)  Damrong said that many subsequent meetings and visits 
scheduled between RTG officials and Maung Aye were canceled 
because the Burmese General would, at the last minute, refuse 
to meet.  Maung Aye did not, in fact, visit Thailand until 10 
years later, in 2002.  Shortly after that visit, Thai and 
SPDC troops engaged in a brief border fight resulting in the 
shelling of Thai and Burmese Army positions and loss of life, 
and deepening Maung Aye's suspicions about Thailand.  Lately, 
there has been another border dispute concerning some 36 
houses on the border at Three Pagodas pass in Sangklaburi 
province.  At a border committee meeting in March this year, 
the SPDC gave an ultimatum to the Thai side to remove the 
dwellings by the end of March or the SPDC would demolish them 
(16 of the houses are owned by Thais, the rest by Burmese, 
according to Damrong).  Damrong said the negotiators spent 
some 10 hours working on this issue but in the end nothing 
happened and the villagers returned to their dwellings. 
Apparently, this inaction to follow up on the Burmese 
ultimatum had made Maung Aye furious. 
 
¶8. (C) The Thai MFA expects the SPDC to announce their 
decision about whether or not they will assume the ASEAN 
chairmanship in 2006 at the ASEAN Ministerial meeting in Laos 
in late July. It appeared the SPDC will decline the 
chairmanship this round, and that a compromise plan for when 
and how they would be allowed to assume the chair will be 
worked out. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment: The RTG pushback of the Shan in this one case 
raises concerns.  Despite Thai reassurances that those 
relocated in Burma would be allowed to come back to Thailand 
in case fighting breaks out, Post will continue to inquire 
with MFA about the plight of the Shan, particularly the most 
vulnerable, such as unaccompanied minors and the disabled. 
While the push across the border has garnered international 
NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, the Shan themselves have 
been relatively quiet about protesting the move (Reftel A). 
This incident may be a gesture by the RTG to appease the SPDC 
on a sensitive border issue while maintaining Thai 
humanitarian and intelligence relations with their close 
neighbors, the Shan. It does not appear to be the case of the 
Third Army taking matters into their own hands, as 
demonstrated by Damrong's complete knowledge and admission of 
the pushback.  Damrong was well prepared to answer our 
questions.  His comments about the overall relationship with 
Burma indicate that the MFA's recent high level of 
frustration with the SPDC is not abating.  On the matter of 
the ASEAN chair, however, his assumption that the SPDC will 
announce at the Vientiane ASEAN Ministerial its willingness 
to forgo its rotation may only be wishful thinking.   End 
Comment. 
 
¶10. (U) This message was cleared by Embassy Rangoon and 
Consulate General Chiang Mai. 
BOYCE