This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003725 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV, PM 
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO) 
OSD FOR OSD/ISA (POWERS) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM OVIP TH PSI
SUBJECT: SECRETARY RUMSFELD'S MEETING WITH THAI PRIME 
MINISTER THAKSIN 
 
REF: BANGKOK 3074 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld met on June 6 
with Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra at Government 
House in Bangkok.  Secretary Rumsfeld 1) encouraged Thailand 
to endorse the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
Statement of Principles; 2) sought PM Thaksin's insights into 
the nature of the violence in southern Thailand; 3) asked 
Thailand to consider a humanitarian assistance contribution 
to Iraq; 4) enquired into the situation in Burma; and 5) made 
the case for Thailand to purchase the F-16 over its 
competitors.  PM Thaksin 1) thanked the U.S. for its 
assistance following the tsunami; 2) asked to strengthen 
intelligence cooperation about southern Thailand; 3) said 
that his Foreign Minister was traveling to North Korea and 
that he might follow; 4) thought that China would avoid a 
collision over Taiwan because that would harm its economy; 5) 
suggested that Thailand would endorse the PSI if other ASEAN 
partners would; and 6) said that Thailand would consider a 
humanitarian deployment to Iraq if it could be done without 
alienating the Muslim South.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Post-tsunami military cooperation: Prime Minister 
Thaksin thanked the Secretary for U.S. assistance following 
the December 26, 2004 tsunami and highlighted the excellent 
cooperation between the U.S. and Thai militaries following 
the disaster, especially the use of Utapao Naval Air Station 
as a regional hub for recovery efforts.  The Secretary 
commented that the successful cooperation was the fruition of 
50 years of joint U.S.-Thai training.  Thaksin said that he 
appreciates the President's designation of Thailand as a 
Major Non-NATO Ally, noting the importance that Thailand 
placed on its relationship with the U.S. 
 
¶3.  (C)  The Proliferation Security Initiative:  The 
Secretary raised the importance of cooperative efforts to 
 
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stop weapons proliferation, highlighting the importance of 
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as a key 
initiative.  The Secretary urged Thailand to endorse the PSI 
Statement of Interdiction Principles (SOP).  Thaksin said 
that the RTG agrees with the SOP in principle.  However, he 
said Thailand would like to see other ASEAN nations besides 
Singapore endorse PSI and that he would work with other 
regional leaders on the issue.  Foreign Minister Kantathi 
Suphamongkhon promised he would remain engaged on PSI. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Unrest in Southern Thailand:  The Secretary asked 
the Prime Minister for his assessment of the current 
situation in the far South of Thailand.  Thaksin said it is 
important to put the ongoing unrest in historical context, 
noting the region's long history of violence.  Thaksin said 
that militants use the region's history and religious 
differences to indoctrinate youth to commit violence. 
Admitting that the RTG had been "negligent" in meeting the 
educational needs of the Muslim population in the South, 
Thaksin said the RTG is working to increase non-religious 
educational opportunities for Muslims.  The RTG has also 
begun to arrest some of the leaders behind the violence.  He 
said that the Thai government would be patient and follow the 
rule of law.  Thaksin believes that the media in Bangkok is 
exaggerating the level of violence in the south.  The Prime 
Minister said the RTG's assessment remains that there is no 
"outside influence" in southern Thailand and the issue is a 
purely domestic matter.  Thaksin said that while the current 
intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and Thailand is 
good, it could be strengthened.  The Secretary said he would 
work to raise the level of cooperation on intelligence. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Future Thai contribution to OIF:  The Secretary 
inquired about the possibility of a third Thai deployment to 
Iraq.  Thaksin said they were considering how to respond to 
the U.S. request for an additional Thai deployment.  The 
Prime Minister said that any deployment would have to be 
characterized as "humanitarian."  He said the RTG has to 
consider the impact of a future deployment on the situation 
in southern Thailand, noting the sensitivities of southern 
Muslims to Thai involvement.  SecDef said he understands the 
sensitivities but reiterated his hopes that Thailand would 
consider a humanitarian contribution. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Situation in Burma:  The Secretary asked Prime 
Minister Thaksin for an update on Burma.  Thaksin reminded 
the Secretary of the 2,400-kilometer border Thailand shared 
with Burma, suggesting it influences every aspect of 
Thailand's relations with its neighbor.  He complained that 
Thailand is already dealing with over one million illegal 
Burmese migrants and an influx of narcotics.  Thaksin said 
that the RTG continues to attempt to engage the SPDC -- and 
that he had met with the leadership of the SPDC during a 
visit to Rangoon in 2004 -- but has found the regime 
especially unresponsive since the removal of Khin Nyunt as 
Prime Minister.  Thaksin said Thailand's goals vis-a-vis 
Burma are the same as the U.S., but the reality of Thailand's 
border with Burma precludes the RTG from pursuing the same 
strategy.  Thaksin said he has been quietly urging the PRC 
leadership to become more engaged on Burma and that -- behind 
closed doors -- the Chinese have taken a tougher line with 
the Burmese, urging reform. 
 
¶7.  (C)  China's role in the region: Thaksin said the PRC 
continued to grow in influence economically and militarily in 
the region.  Thaksin predicted the Chinese economy would 
experience 3-4 more years of growth before a slowdown.  On 
Taiwan, Thaksin opined that the PRC would continue to avoid 
the use of force in the Taiwan Strait.  Thaksin said his 
impression from regular contact with the PRC is that its 
leadership is very calculating in its decision-making, 
especially if related to energy and military power. 
 
¶8.  (C)  North Korea:  Thaksin reported that he had met with 
Kim Young Nam, President of the DPRK Supreme People's 
Assembly Presidium, on the margins of the April 22-23 
Asia-Africa Summit in Indonesia and that they had discussed 
the possibility of Thailand playing a mediating role with 
North Korea.  Thaksin said that he was dispatching Foreign 
Minister Kantathi to Pyongyang July 8-12 to meet with the 
DPRK leadership (reftel).  Thaksin said that, depending on 
the outcome of the Foreign Minister's visit, he might 
personally travel to North Korea to meet with Kim Jong Il. 
Secretary Rumsfeld highlighted the threat posed by North 
 
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Korea's propensity to sell its WMD technology. 
 
¶9.  (C)  F-16s:  Secretary Rumsfeld urged the Royal Thai Air 
Force to purchase the F-16 during its modernization effort. 
Thaksin said his primary concern is the impact of the 
purchase on Thailand's current account deficit, which would 
not be impacted by a barter trade.  Thaksin said that he 
understood that Lockheed Martin was ready to propose a barter 
trade agreement, and that the RTAF preferred the U.S. F-16. 
Thaksin indicated that the Swedish and Russian governments 
are also making strong sales pitches to select either the 
Swedish Gripen or Russian SU-30 aircraft.  Thaksin suggested 
a decision on the procurement might be made before September. 
 
 
10 (C)  India:  Thaksin said he is impressed by India's 
performance in producing 300,000 engineering graduates per 
year.  Thailand has an MOU on joint naval patrols with India. 
 SecDef highlighted the growing U.S. relationship with India, 
which also includes joint exercises. 
 
¶11.  (U) SecDef has not reviewed this cable.  Released by ASD 
Rodman 
BOYCE