This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002538 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS MASS PTER IZ KDP
SUBJECT: KURDS CAN'T CONCEIVE OF LIFE WITHOUT PESH 
 
Classified By: Classified by David M. Satterfield, Deputy Chief of Miss 
 
ion, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  Key Kurdish leaders told DCM and MNF-I 
Political Military and Economic Affairs Chief on June 13-14 
they could not condone disarming the Kurdish pesh merga 
forces, or its total dissipation into the Iraqi army.  They 
realized the sensitivity of Iraq having ethnically-based 
forces, but said Baghdad must establish a solid record of 
good intentions and actions before Kurds would feel safe with 
a fully integrated army.  Some felt the pesh merga could be 
transformed into a National Guard equivalent.  The leaders 
differed on the wisdom of the pesh merga assuming a role in 
border security (Kurdish PM Nechirvan Barzani felt it would 
be almost impossible, given reservations of neighbors), and 
on concepts for depoliticizing the forces.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) DCM Satterfield and MNF-I Commander for Political, 
Military and Economic relations MG Hank Stratman discussed 
possible options for the Kurdish paramilitary force (pesh 
merga) with senior KDP and PUK officials in the Kurdistan 
Region June 13-14.  RC Kirkuk (notetaker) and DCM assistant 
also attended the meetings. 
 
Pesh to Remain until Kurds Trust Baghdad 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  KDP leader (and newly sworn in President of 
Kurdistan-Iraq) Massoud Barzani, Prime Minister of the 
Kurdish Regional Government in Irbil, and PUK leaders 
Noshirwan Mustafa, Kosrat Rasul, and Omar Sayid Ali  told DCM 
and MG Stratman in meetings June 13-14 that the pesh merga 
must remain until the Iraqi government is able to convince 
Kurds that Baghdad will not again turn against them. 
Democracy was more than words; it would take years to rebuild 
trust, given the bad blood between the Iraqi government and 
the Kurds. 
 
¶4.  (C)  For the same reason, PM Barzani said he could not 
foresee the pesh coming under control of Baghdad.  Both he 
and his uncle Massoud said any future arrangement must be 
jointly agreed between the Kurds and the central government. 
Massoud -- whose new role as president also confers command 
of a still-to-be unified pesh merga force -- said he could 
consider some kind of integration, but only within an 
established legal framework.  Pesh merga could be deployed to 
other regions, some individuals could be integrated into 
Iraqi Army units outside the north, and entire units could be 
deployed outside the region.  He was willing to discuss these 
options with Baghdad.  Other pesh merga could be retired, 
some could be moved into the regular army, some could take 
civil service jobs.  But some element must remain as pesh 
merga to maintain security. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Omar Said Ali, a senior PUK politburo member, told 
DCM that the pesh merga defended the Kurds from Arab and 
Islamic movements bent on oppressing minorities.  He said 
that the Kurds were "uncertain about the future of Iraq and 
how its army will evolve.  The Kurdish nation is small, its 
neighbors always want to control us, and quash Kurds' rights. 
 After 10-15 years, the Kurds may trust the Arabs again, and 
Iraq's neighbors, then the people might be comfortable 
without the pesh merga."  After the constitution was 
ratified, the Kurds could reassess.  The DCM stressed that 
the U.S. did not favor the "ethnicization" of security 
forces.  Ali said he understood, but the change could not 
occur now. 
 
PUK Leaders Foresee Different Options 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) DCM and General Stratman probed interlocutors on 
whether the two parties needed so many forces.  Kosrat Rasul, 
a famous PUK pesh merga commander (head of the party 
politburo executive committee) told DCM that some pesh merga 
were already serving in the Iraqi Army in Kurdistan.  Rasul 
said others could be reformed as border guards or national 
guard units.  PUK Deputy Secretary General Noshirwan Mustafa 
and Rasul also agreed that the forces could be drawn down and 
integrated into something other than a purely party 
structure, but they differed on context and approach. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Rasul defended the current pesh merga structure, 
which he said was a professionally trained force as compared 
to the Badr Corps "militia."  Perhaps the pesh merga could be 
renamed, but they could not be entirely mixed into a 
pan-Iraqi body.  Only the Kurds were able to maintain 
security in the mountains, because they knew the area. 
Furthermore, Kurds would play an anti-terrorism role, 
protecting Kurdistan, and helping the Iraqi Army when needed. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Mustafa, on the other hand, while agreeing the pesh 
could not disband, said they must cease existence as party 
militias.  The forces both take orders from party leaders, 
and are not loyal to government.  As such, they posed the 
main threat to democracy.  They stymie political dialog, as 
no one dares to speak out because the threat of arms lies 
behind all words. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Mustafa said the pesh could become like a U.S. 
national guard unit, part of the Iraqi Army, funded by 
Baghdad, but still distinct.  They must be loyal to both 
Kurdistan and Baghdad, not political parties.  Meanwhile, 
Baghdad should show the Kurds it was willing to put the Iraqi 
Army under civilian control, and keep military spending low, 
perhaps no more than 5% of the budget.  The non-Kurdish units 
of the army should not have an automatic right to enter 
Kurdistan. 
 
U.S. Protection Would Allow Pesh Reductions 
------------------------------------------- 
¶10.  (C)  Mustafa said that a U.S. presence in the north 
would allow the Kurds to draw down forces as it would 
convince the Kurds that neither the Iraqi nor Iranian armies 
would intervene in Kurdish affairs, it was a major desire of 
most Kurds.  Ali felt that the Kurds should receive some kind 
of U.S. protection similar to that provided to Israel. 
 
Kurds Fill Security Vacuum on the Borders, 
but Formal Role a Problem for Neighbors 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶11.  (C)  MG Stratman asked if the two parties would be 
receptive to the idea of pesh merga providing border security 
in the north, a move that would make non-Iraqi forces there 
redundant.  The DCM noted that such a role would be 
coordinated with Turkey. 
President Barzani said that if appropriate arrangements were 
made, a border security role might be possible.  He said the 
pesh merga were aleady filling a vacuum in the mountainous 
north. 
 
¶12.  (C)  When MG Stratman asked whether pesh merga 
deployments along the border were currently coordinated with 
the Ministry of Interior in Baghdad, which had line authority 
for this function, President Brzan sad that Baghdad has no 
capability on the northern borders.  He said the new 
constitution should work this out.  Thereafter, the KRG MOI 
or pesh merga ministry and Baghdad MOI would have a legal 
framework to determine their respective roles. 
 
¶13.  (C)  Nechirvan Barzani said that a pesh merga border 
force likely would not be accepted by Iran or Turkey.  On 
that note, he said it was important for Turkey to understand 
the Kurds were serious about fighting the PKK.  He said 
without exception Iraqi soil should not be used to harm its 
neighbors. 
 
 
¶14.  (C)  It is no surprise that the Kurds wish to retain 
some capacity to repel aggression, given their history with 
Baghdad.  How this can be resolved without unduly entrenching 
ethnic divisions nationwide remains to be seen.  In Iraq, 
where money is a frequent precursor for loyalty, perhaps 
Mustafa's option of a national guard type unit, paid by 
Baghdad yet distinct, is worth exploring further. (in Iraq, 
money is a frequent precursor for loyalty) 
 
¶15.  (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK, 
minimize considered. 
Jeffrey