This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002430 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KISL PINR IZ
SUBJECT: A STRUGGLE FOR THE MIND OF MUQTADA AL-SADR 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 317 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 435 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David M. Satterfield 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Sadrist advisors Hamid al-Sharifi and Saayid 
Imad Kelanter told PolOff June 7 that there is an ideological 
struggle between two distinctly different Sadrist camps over 
the conduct of relations with the Iraqi Transitional 
Government (ITG) and the Coalition. Both men asserted that 
Political Advisor Shaykh Ali Semaysim is looking to regain 
his prominence over the political strategy for the Sadrist 
movement and may be willing to reengage with the ITG and the 
U.S.  They key issue remains Sadr militia detainees held by 
the Coalition.  They urged the U.S. to put their trust in 
Shaykh Ali Semaysim and that the relatively low level 
intermediaries that the ITG and Coalition are now dealing 
with on this issue are followers of Sadrist rival Qais 
Khazali, an outspoken anti-Coalition advisor to al-Sadr.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------- 
A TALE OF BETRAYAL AND MISTRUST 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (S) In a June 7 meeting at independent politico Saad 
Jabor's residence, Sadrist advisors Hamid al-Sharifi and 
Saayid Imad Kelanter told PolOff that Shaykh Ali Semyasim 
felt betrayed by broken promises made by Qassim Daoud and the 
Allawi government over the issue of detainees.  Kelanter 
emphasized that Shaykh Semaysim took many risks in meeting 
Daoud as well as the Charge in January as reported in the 
reftels.  The lack of any progress on the detainee issue, 
according to Kelanter, greatly undermined Semaysim's 
influence over Muqtada al-Sadr's camp and made future 
meetings with the Coalition and the ITG impossible.  He 
claimed that their experience with allegedly corrupt and 
ineffective IIG officials had deepened al-Sadr's suspicions. 
 
¶3. (S) Kelanter alleged that Qais Khazali now has a huge 
influence over al-Sadr.  He said that money, weapons and 
trained men from Iran provide Khazali with influence over 
al-Sadr.  Kelanter said he is aware of the ongoing 
discussions by U.S. and ITG representatives with lower level 
Sadrists over the detainee issue and argued that these 
individuals (without naming anyone in particular) answer to 
Khazali.  PolOff said political discussions should be led by 
the ITG with the Coalition providing information as needed. 
Both men claimed that Semaysim is willing to reengage and 
they hope to arrange a meeting in the near future. 
 
¶4. (S) Kelanter said that progress on the detainee issue with 
"tangible" benefits facilitated by Semaysim would improve his 
standing with al-Sadr and allow him to move his more moderate 
political agenda.  (NOTE: Sadrist Shaykh Moussa al-Saadi told 
PolOff on the same day that they have tentatively agreed to 
meet representatives from the Prime Minister's office to 
further discuss the issue of detainees on June 12. END NOTE). 
 He said that Semaysim hopes to complete the process of 
pulling the Sadrist movement into the political process by 
forming a separate, official political movement with its own 
separate list of candidates for the next elections.  Kelanter 
asserted that they already have a list of potential names 
that they hope to present to Prime Minister Jafari in the 
hopes of gaining "legitimacy" in the eyes of the political 
establishment.  He asked for a U.S. opinion of a Sadrist 
political party.  PolOff responded by saying that the U.S. 
always encourages wider political engagement by those who 
have foresworn violence and reiterated that we do not choose 
sides among competing political forces. 
 
¶5. (S) Al-Sharifi asked PolOff for material support to help 
improve Semaysim's position.  He said that cell phones, an 
armored vehicle and travel outside of Iraq would greatly 
improve Semaysim's stature and expand his outlook by seeing 
the outside world.  PolOff said neither Semaysim, nor any 
other Iraqi politician should make his way by depending on 
such support, but noted our willingness to engage. 
 
--------------------------- 
MUC-BADR CORPS NEGOTIATIONS 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6. (S) On the issue of ongoing Sadrist-facilitated 
negotiations between the Muslim Ulema Council (MUC) and the 
Badr Corps over accusations of Badr collusion in the deaths 
of Sunni clerics, al-Sharifi predicted the Badr Corps would 
never accommodate the MUC.  Al-Sharifi said that any 
negotiated agreement between both sides would look like a 
victory for al-Sadr, which is precisely what the Badr Corps 
and the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq 
(SCIRI) do not want.  He said Badr and SCIRI see the Sadrist 
camp as their main challenger for influence. 
 
¶7. (S) COMMENT: Al-Sharifi and Kelanter's assertions had the 
feel of desperation and tend to substantiate rumors of 
Semaysim's reduced influence within the Sadr movement.  The 
detainee issue, while materially important to the rank and 
file Sadrists and the militia, is evidently being played as 
an internal issue within the Sadrist camp to demonstrate 
authority and influence.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶8. (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK 
minimize considered. 
Jeffrey