This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003456 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2025 
TAGS: PTER PREL MOPS PREF TU IZ PKK
SUBJECT: NON-KINETIC ACTION AGAINST THE PKK 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 2314 AND PREVIOUS 
     ¶B. STATE 110631 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S/NF) As I prepare to depart Ankara, I am leaving behind 
one serious piece of unfinished business: the PKK's continued 
and apparently unmolested and unchallenged presence in 
northern Iraq.  This problem is especially irksome because in 
recent months the PKK has resumed its active terror campaign 
in Turkey, claiming many lives (see ref a).  The President 
forthrightly told Prime Minister Erdogan June 8 in Washington 
that our soldiers' hands were full in Iraq fighting the 
insurgency and training the ISF.  I agree that kinetic action 
against the PKK is simply not our top priority at this time. 
But as ref a and many previous messages from Ankara point 
out, there are other, less dramatic steps that we and the ITG 
can take.  It is difficult to explain to Turkey's leaders why 
we have taken so few of these. 
 
¶2. (S/NF) The Turks appreciate that MNF-I has promulgated a 
fragmentary order (FRAGO) listing PKK terrorists in Iraq and 
instructing CF to pick these people up if found in the course 
of normal operations, but they also note that the FRAGO has 
resulted in zero arrests.  (NOTE: The existence of the FRAGO 
recently broke in the Turkish press. END NOTE.)  Three times 
in the last week Prime Minister Erdogan has stated publicly 
but in general terms that the U.S. and Turkey are cooperating 
in intelligence sharing against the PKK (but the Turkish 
press has paid scant attention).  With few recent actions we 
can point to, we have little to say when the Turks ask if we 
are still punishing them for their decision over two years 
ago not to allow us to use Turkey to attack Iraq from the 
north. 
 
¶3. (C) Turkey has overcome its fear and anger about the PKK 
(and the war in Iraq in general) to try to build a 
constructive policy which is supportive of Iraq's emerging 
democracy; this has been more in evidence since the Jan. 30 
elections.  The GOT's recent (albeit belated) approval of our 
request to use Incirlik Air Base as a multi-directional cargo 
hub is the latest, but by no means the only, recent 
manifestation of the Turks' improved attitude. 
 
¶4. (C) Yet as attacks and casualties mount in Turkey, the GOT 
will feel increasing pressure to take action against the PKK 
where the terrorist organization has its command and control 
structure: in northern Iraq.  FonMin Gul told the Secretary 
June 8 that PKK attacks in Turkey this year have claimed the 
lives of 144 soldiers and police (ref b).  I have said before 
that this would be a policy disaster for Turkey, but also for 
us and for the ITG as it struggles to deal with the 
insurgency and draft a constitution.  An uninvited foreign 
power taking military action in the Kurdish north is the last 
thing any of us need. 
 
¶5. (S/NF) We--and the Iraqis--need to demonstrate our 
seriousness in dealing with this seemingly endless irritant. 
A kinetic attack against the heart of the PKK is not a 
priority at this time.  But as we have suggested before, 
there are other, much less costly options available to us: 
 
FOR THE ITG: 
 
--Declare the PKK officially a terrorist organization; 
 
--Declare the Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party a PKK front 
party and close down its offices in Iraqi cities; 
 
--Issue Iraqi arrest warrants for PKK leaders known to be in 
Iraq (the leaders have already been listed in MNF-I 
lookouts); 
 
--When ISF manpower levels permit, work with UNHCR and Turkey 
to secure Makhmour refugee camp and pursue an orderly process 
for durable solutions, including repatriation. 
 
FOR THE ITG AND US TOGETHER: 
 
--Shut off PKK supply lines and (to the extent possible) 
secure the Iraqi border in areas where the PKK/Kongra-Gel is 
present; 
--Work with the ITG and KRG to encourage the KDP and the PUK 
to make statements condemning the PKK and to take steps to 
limit the movement and resupply of PKK cadres and camps; 
 
--Initiate with Turkey a joint information operation designed 
to take advantage of the splits within the PKK and to further 
weaken the organization. 
 
FOR US: 
 
--If we obtain solid intelligence that a PKK leader is close 
by our units, pick him up. 
 
--Work with Turkey on a coordinated, comprehensive diplomatic 
and intelligence approach to European countries that allow 
the PKK and/or its affiliates to operate (fundraising, 
broadcasting, other support) on their soil. 
 
--Consider once again offering assets to assist the Turks 
with border control and intelligence-gathering, but this time 
without strings that will make the Turks doubt our intentions. 
 
¶6. (C) These steps are doable and they will serve our 
interests as well as Turkey's and Iraq's.  The cost of 
inactivity will rise and we need to get ahead of this now. 
 
¶7. (U) Iraq REOs minimize considered. 
EDELMAN