This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

011412Z Jun 05

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003086 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2025 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS TU
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL ON FONMIN GUL, MAY 26 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: E.O. 
12958 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1, (C) Summary: Attempting to portray bilateral relations as 
"special", FonMin Gul used the beginning of the Ambassador's 
farewell call to remind the assembled press that relations 
have passed through difficult periods.  During the meeting 
Gul expressed clear concern that the renewed PKK insurgency 
may bring a reaction from the Turkish State that affects 
ruling AKP's ability to govern.  In answer to Gul's private 
query about apparent sentiment in Washington against Gul's 
closest foreign policy collaborator Ahmet Davutoglu, the 
Ambassador noted USG perplexity and concern at the apparent 
anti-Western drift in GOT policy.  Washington will want to 
see and hear a clear sense of direction from PM Erdogan and 
Gul during their early June visit.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (U) Using the opening of the Ambassador's farewell call 
for a statement in front of the TV cameras, Gul made a point 
of characterizing the bilateral relationship as a "special 
one".  Adding that the relationship had passed through 
"misunderstandings" and "difficulties in communication", Gul 
praised the Ambassador for his contribution to the 
relationship. 
 
¶3. (C) With the press gone, Gul asserted that difficulties 
had been merely conjunctural.  Turks are not anti-American. 
There is no ground to believe that Turkey suffers from 
anti-Semitism, he continued.  One should look at Turkish 
history.  "There was no anti-Semitism then, so how could 
there be any now," he asked. 
 
¶4. (C) Tacitly admitting that Turkey has changed its Iraq 
policy to bring it more into line with realities on the 
ground, Gul sought to underscore how closely Turkey and the 
U.S. are working together.  Acknowledging in a flat tone that 
the U.S. is encouraging Iraq to have good relations with 
Turkey, Gul stated that Turkey wants another "democratic 
Muslim" country in the region.  Iraq's leaders are courageous 
and Jafari had a most successful visit to Turkey; at the same 
time Turkey used the recent neighbors meeting in Istanbul as 
a platform not to criticize Iraq but to show support. 
 
¶5. (C) PM Erdogan had a good visit to Palestine and Israel, 
Gul added.  The Palestinians are taking courageous decisions 
and Turkey is also encouraged that the U.S. is now devoting 
more time to the question. 
 
¶6. (C) BMENA is one of the most important areas for 
cooperation, Gul averred, with real work going on and 
intellectual debates reflecting how much the region is 
learning from Turkey, which has held the first conference of 
NGOs from Islamic countries.  Gul described his own speech at 
the conference as a very straightforward call for reform. 
Meetings will continue in Istanbul under the 
Turkey-Italy-Yemen aegis. 
 
¶7. (C) NATO solidarity continues very well.  Erdogan made a 
very good visit to Afghanistan and Turkey will increase its 
assistance as a result.  On Cyprus, thanks also to the 
Ambassador's behind-the-scenes work, Turkey has the high 
ground.  But expectations are high in the north and U.S. 
support remains necessary. 
 
¶8. (C) In response, the Ambassador underscored the 
extraordinary professionalism of the career MFA officers. 
Courageous leadership from the top on Cyprus had also been 
important.  President Bush puts great stock in leadership; 
those elected to high office are there for a reason and have 
an obligation to lead boldly and with vision.  In this 
regard, the President will want to hear Erdogan's and Gul's 
assessment of where Turkey is headed and what they see as the 
challenges ahead since the period in front of the AKP 
government will be even more challenging than the period to 
date. 
 
¶9. (C) Economy Minister Babacan's appointment as chief 
negotiator with the EU would be important as an outward sign 
of preparations for the Oct. 3 start date, the Ambassador 
continued.  But it appeared Babacan was caught off guard by 
the suddenness of the announcement; the evening before, 
Babacan had told the Ambassador he thought he'd be chosen for 
this politically corrosive job only if Erdogan wanted to 
ensure an end to his political career.  Gul laughed 
nervously. 
 
¶10. (S) The Ambassador then raised the PKK (in leaking the 
contents of the meeting to the press, Gul's office claimed 
Gul had raised the issue).  In his farewell call on CHOD 
Ozkok May 25, the Ambassador had noted that the U.S. is 
providing real-time assistance in combatting the PKK in 
southeast Turkey.  The trilateral talks remain a vehicle for 
cooperation.  Gul replied that the resumption of PKK 
operations worries him.  If terrorism increases, the 
resulting crackdown by Turkish security services could affect 
the AKP government's ability to continue reforms.  Gul added 
that he had recently cautioned a group of politicians from 
the southeast (i.e., Kurds) to pay attention to the 
sensitivities of the Turkish authorities, since it was 
essential not to let the reform process be caught up in 
controversies over perceived support for the PKK. 
 
¶11. (C) Gul turned to Central Asia.  Admitting that Turkey 
had not paid attention to the need for democratization in the 
area, he acknowledged the need to support core democratic 
values and promote democracy, transparency, and human rights. 
 His recent visit to Kyrgyzstan had been fruitful; he had 
encouraged the new Kyrgyz leadership to compensate for the 
country's lack of natural resources by making the country a 
center of democracy and thus comparably attractive to 
Singapore or Dubai.  The Ambassador noted the close 
consultations between the State Department and MFA on 
Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia in general.  Democratization is a 
tough, obstacle-filled road, but one must persist. 
 
¶12. (C) Gul turned edgy as he asked the Ambassador to remain 
behind for a one-on-one, and refused to look up as notetakers 
filed out.  He then expressed concern at the raising of some 
think-tank voices in Washington against Ahmet Davutoglu, the 
Prime Ministry's chief foreign policy advisor, whom Gul had 
appointed and who is the promoter of the concept of multiple 
alternatives known as "Strategic Depth".  Why are these 
voices calling for Davutoglu to be removed?  He is not 
against relations with the U.S., Gul asserted. 
 
¶13. (C) The Ambassador replied that no one in the USG has 
personalized the question against Davutoglu.  His own 
relations with Davutoglu are fine.  The USG is not angry. 
The problem is broader and more serious.  When Davutoglu 
talks about Turkey being a global player with a 
multidimensional policy, it creates concerns about how 
strongly Turkey is committed to rooting itself in the West, 
in Europe. 
 
¶14. (C) Turkish leaders called terrorists in Fallujah 
martyrs, the Ambassador noted.  The same leaders deprecated 
the Iraqi elections beforehand and then initially criticized 
the results.  Then there is the mass appeal of scurrilous 
anti-U.S. novels like "Metal Storm" and the apparently 
subsidized publishing of "Mein Kampf". The government has 
condoned anti-missionary sentiment.  He noted the violent, 
nationalist character of disturbances in Trabzon and 
elsewhere and police beatings of women participating in 
International Women's Day-related demonstrations. The AKP 
government belatedly and perfunctorily expressed public 
support for the relationship and then only after the Turkish 
General Staff leadership had strongly supported the 
relationship.  These elements have combined to raise 
questions in people's minds in Washington.  As a result of 
Turkey's actions, senior U.S. officials are asking where the 
AKP government is taking Turkey.  People in Washington need 
to see and hear how the AKP leadership will move Turkey 
forward. 
 
¶15. (C) Gul exited the meeting visibly rattled and, holding 
himself apart from the waiting group of Turkish and American 
diplomats, refused to shake hands.  A journalist who 
interviewed him subsequently later described to the 
Ambassador how defensive Gul was during her interview. 
 
EDELMAN