This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001159 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AG MO WI
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN 
RAPPROCHEMENT WITH BELKHEIR; CAUTIONS ABOUT SYRIA 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman; reasons 1.4 (B)(D) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) During June 5 meeting on other issues (septel), 
Presidential Chief of Staff Belkheir said both Morocco and 
Algeria were making efforts to send positive signals to the 
other, proceeding with plans for Prime Ministers Ouyahia and 
Jettou to meet in Rabat June 21-22, and hoping to re-energize 
the mixed commission process, with a view to re-opening the 
Moroccan-Algeria border later this year.  Ambassador said we 
welcomed these positive signals and noted that we would 
shortly be demarching both capitals to express concerns about 
a series of earlier, negative events and urge renewed efforts 
to improve relations.  Turning to Syria, and using very frank 
language, Ambassador flagged our strong concerns about 
Syria's unacceptable behavior, which was so clearly against 
the wishes of the international community for peace, 
democracy, and stability in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine.  He 
cautioned that in defending Syria so actively in New York and 
elsewhere, Algeria often seemed to be well outside mainstream 
Arab opinion.  Such a posture risked creating negative 
perceptions of Algeria.  Belkheir said he would brief 
President Bouteflika on concerns expressed by Ambassador. 
(End Summary) 
 
MOROCCO AND ALGERIA SENDING POSITIVE SIGNALS 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) During a June 5 meeting on other issues, Presidential 
Chief of Staff Belkheir said both Morocco and Algeria were 
making efforts to send small, but important, positive signals 
to each other with a view to improving relations.  The 
Algerian side saw as very positive the Moroccan statement 
responding to President Bouteflika's congratulatory letter to 
the Polisario because, according to Belkheir, it was "the 
very first time" Morocco had explicitly acknowledged the 
Western Sahara issue must be resolved within a UN (as opposed 
to bilateral) framework.  Algeria had in turn responded with 
a public statement (by Minister of State and former FM 
Belkhadem) welcoming Morocco's recognition that the UN was 
the appropriate framework for resolving the Western Sahara 
dispute. 
 
¶3. (C) While disappointed by the King's decision not to 
participate in the May 24-25 Arab Maghreb Union Summit in 
Tripoli, Algeria had positively noted Morocco's willingness 
both to participate in the summit at Foreign Minister level 
and to proceed with participation in the Algiers 
International Trade Fair.  In another positive signal, 
Algeria had immediately agreed to a Moroccan request to 
permit overland travel by over a hundred performers coming to 
perform at the Moroccan Pavilion gala. (In the end, they 
decided to come by air.  The Moroccan gala was attended by 
Belkheir and at least ten ministers, including the foreign 
and finance ministers, and thus a clear signal of a desire to 
get rapprochement back on track.) 
 
BELKHEIR REAFFIRMS THE GOAL IS REOPENING THE BORDER 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶4. (C) Belkheir also drew attention to Bouteflika's televised 
visit to the Moroccan pavilion, where a mock-up of a new 
hotel complex being built on the coast near the 
Algerian-Moroccan border was displayed.  While viewing the 
mock-up, Bouteflika said that "50 per cent of the rooms 
should be reserved for Algerians."  Belkheir implied this was 
a deliberate signal about the president's intentions of 
reopening the border.  In this regard, and in response to 
Ambassador's direct question, Belkheir confirmed that the 
June 21-22 Rabat meetings between PM Ouyahia and PM Jettou 
would proceed as planned.  These meetings would aim to 
re-energize the mixed commission process and resolve 
outstanding border issues.  If agreement could be reached on 
these issues, including agreement on increased cooperation to 
combat the growing and very worrisome cross-border drug 
trade, Belkheir volunteered, this would lead to the opening 
of the border.  He did not indicate the time frame for such a 
move and Ambassador decided not to press, but the impression 
he left was that it could be sooner rather than later (i.e., 
some time this summer). 
 
U.S. SUPPORTS CONTINUED RAPPROCHEMENT 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador welcomed the positive signals each side now 
seemed to be sending the other and reaffirmed our strong hope 
that a renewed process of rapprochement could lead to a 
reopening of the border.  We had frankly been very concerned 
and disappointed by the recent series of events -- the 
Polisario letter, the King's withdrawal from the summit, the 
cancellation of the summit, and Morocco's violent suppression 
of Sahrawi demonstrations -- and would shortly be delivering 
demarches both in Rabat and Algiers expressing our concerns 
and urging renewed efforts to advance Moroccan-Algerian 
rapprochement.  It was encouraging to see that both sides 
seemed to recognize their interest in getting things back on 
track. 
 
AMB:  SYRIA FACILITATING INFLUX OF TERRORISTS 
AND SUPPORTING INSURGENTS IN IRAQ 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Ambassador then turned to Syria, noting that in his 
June 2 meeting with visiting SACEUR General Jones, President 
Bouteflika had spoken positively about recent Syrian actions, 
including the withdrawal of its forces from Lebanon and the 
impetus the Baath Party Congress would give to the reform 
process.  Bouteflika, Ambassador noted, had also spoken about 
Syrian concerns that the U.S. was seeking to destabilize the 
regime, and had seemed unclear as to why we taking a hard 
line against Syria.  Ambassador explained that we were not 
against Syria per se.  We were against its unacceptable 
behavior. 
 
¶7. (C) Syria was directly working against goals broadly 
shared by the international community, Ambassador continued. 
In Iraq, it was providing a support base and safe haven for 
insurgent groups, facilitating the flow of terrorists as well 
as arms and money, into Iraq from recruiting networks in the 
region, including in Algeria, and directly undermining 
efforts to stabilize the situation, proceed with 
reconstruction, and build a democratic state in which Iraqis 
were truly sovereign.  Was Syria really helping the 
terrorists this way, Belkheir asked with apparent sincerity, 
to which Ambassador replied "absolutely, and without doubt." 
 
SYRIA ALSO WORKING AGAINST 
LEBANON AND ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Syria's record on Lebanon was no better, Ambassador 
continued.  While Syria had withdrawn uniformed troops, it 
had not withdrawn its intelligence services, and was in fact 
setting up new intelligence offices in various parts of the 
country.  Many Lebanese were concerned that Syria was trying 
to destabilize the country and, while there was as yet no 
proof of responsibility, there were widespread suspicions, 
including within the senior Lebanese leadership, that Syria 
was behind the recent assassination of an influential 
anti-Syrian journalist.  It is true that Syria has taken a 
few positive steps to address international concerns in both 
Lebanon and Iraq, but they have tended to conform to previous 
Syrian behavior.  That is, they take a small step here and 
there, in hopes of diminishing and deflecting international 
attention, while not changing their basic negative behavior 
or orientation.  On the Palestinian issue, Syria was 
similarly directly undermining efforts to advance a peace 
process by its active support of Palestinian rejectionist 
groups.  When the entire world was hoping to seize the 
current hopeful moment to achieve peace and a democratic 
Palestinian state, Syria was working in the opposite 
direction. 
 
WE DON'T UNDERSTAND WHY ALGERIA IS 
ALWAYS DEFENDING SYRIAN BEHAVIOR 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Ambassador, noting he would speak with candor as 
always, said we frankly did not understand why Algeria was 
always protecting and defending Syria, particularly at the 
UN, when Syria's actions were so clearly contrary to the 
wishes of the international community in Iraq, Lebanon, and 
Palestine.  We understood that Algeria, as the member of the 
Security Council representing Arab interests, had to reflect 
or at least take those interests into account.  Our problem 
was that Algeria was not simply representing mainstream Arab 
interests.  Instead, it was taking positions well to the left 
of the mainstream and defending Syria in a way that no other 
Arab states were.   In effect, Algeria was associating 
itself, whether it liked it or not, with Syria's unacceptable 
international behavior.  Ambassador cautioned that this has 
been noticed in Washington and New York, and risked creating 
negative perceptions of Algeria.  Belkheir, after briefly 
speculating that perhaps Syria's behavior was linked to the 
continued occupation of the Golan, said he would brief 
President Bouteflika on the Ambassador's comments and 
concerns. 
ERDMAN