This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TUNIS 001081 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/MAG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2015 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM TS MEPI
SUBJECT: LEGAL OPPOSITION LACKS POLITICAL SKILLS, PUBLIC 
SUPPORT, BUT ISLAMISTS ARE NOT THE ANSWER 
 
REF: TUNIS 981 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Hudson for reasons 
1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary. Although results of the May 8 local 
elections showed a ten per cent gain in the number of 
municipal seats held by Tunisian opposition parties, none of 
these parties, either alone or in a coalition, have any 
significant, measurable amount of public support.  In 
discussions during a series of meetings and lunches the 
Ambassador held with opposition party members in the past 
several weeks, it was clear that while opposition sentiment 
exists in Tunisia, it is not translated into the political 
arena.  Effective tactics employed by the ruling RCD party to 
limit opposition activity are certainly part of the problem, 
and party members offered several examples of these.  But it 
is also true that the opposition parties in Tunisia remain 
deficient on at least three counts: Lack of a clear ideology, 
lack of platform, and lack of organization and political 
expertise.  As in other Arab states, Islamists probably 
retain the best organizational and ideological pull 
politically, but few middle-class Tunisians are eager to see 
their return to the scene. Developing the traditions and 
institutions of true political activity will be key to 
promoting reform in Tunisia.  End Summary. 
 
Small opposition gains --but what does it mean? 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶2.  (C) Official election results show a ten per cent 
increase in opposition presence on municipal councils since 
the last local elections in 2000.  The so-called "loyal" 
opposition (MDS, PUP, UDU, PSDL) who are generally supportive 
of President Ben Ali and the RCD, ran in more municipalities 
than in 2000 and won six per cent of the seats (268 out of 
4,366 total).  But according to opposition party members, 
government authorities continued to maneuver to limit 
opposition participation.  For example, the Ministry of 
Interior, (responsible for administering municipal 
elections), validated all lists of candidates submitted by 
the ruling Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) but rejected 
25 per cent of Social Democratic Movement (MDS) lists, a 
third of Popular Unity Party (PUP), United Democratic Union 
(UDU), and Liberal Social Democratic Party (PSDL) lists.  The 
Ministry rejected all of the "independent" opposition 
lists--i.e. Et-Tajdid (ET) and Democratic Progressive Party 
(PDP) and Democratic Forum for Work and Liberty (FTDL). 
 
¶3.  (C) An independent source provided Poloff with 
additional, credible examples of other tactics allegedly 
employed by authorities during the campaign, such as: An 
independent candidate being detained by security police and 
held until he agreed to withdraw his name, thus invalidating 
the entire party slate; reports that another candidate went 
into hiding until after the end of the election to avoid 
pressure from ruling party members; a report that in Sousse, 
a Ministry of Interior official refused to accept an 
independent list until the governor was present.  The 
governor arrived four minutes after the deadline for 
submitting lists and the official rejected it. 
 
¶4.  (C) These tactics by authorities without a doubt act to 
limit the success of opposition parties, who never gain more 
than the 20 percent of the seats reserved for them by law. 
But the success of political opposition here is stymied by 
other factors as well.  In a series of pre-election meetings 
the Ambassador held with opposition party leaders, we offered 
party representatives not only an opportunity to air their 
grievances with the system, but a chance to describe their 
platform and approach to the electoral campaign.  Party 
leaders tended to be older, European-educated, and 
well-spoken advocates of human rights.  Lacking, however, 
were basic elements of the party as an institution.  We were 
struck by their inability to articulate an ideology, put 
forward a credible party platform, broaden membership, 
communicate a message, or conduct outreach. 
 
¶5.  (C) The result is that none of the opposition parties has 
built a grassroots following  separate from the ruling party. 
 Indeed, it is the "loyal" opposition-- MDS, PUP, UDU, and 
PSDL -- all of which support President Ben Ali and accept 
dominance of the RCD, which make the most gains in Parliament 
and locally, apparently by tacit agreement with the RCD 
leadership.  Neither the loyal nor independent opposition 
offer much in the way of thoughtful criticism of the Tunisian 
internal situation, focusing mainly on RCD injustices and 
criticism of U.S. policy in the region.  The independent 
parties often resort to boycotting elections in protest, 
which further limits their visibility and popular standing. 
The unregistered opposition parties, like the Tunisian Green 
Party and the Communist Workers Party (POCT), are more direct 
in their criticism of specific internal policies; however, 
they have even smaller popular support and are banned from 
participating in the electoral process.  A telling sign of 
which direction the opposition is headed is the fact that, 
despite repeated Embassy requests, no opposition leader could 
introduce us to young members or the "youth wing" of his 
party. 
 
Is there any room for non-secular opposition? 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Although Ben Ali effectively rid Tunisia of any 
remnants of the Islamic En-Nahdha party more than a decade 
ago, many agree that Islamists and former En-Nahdha 
sympathizers retain the organizational and ideological 
elements that gave the party its strength in the late 80s. 
(NB: In 1989, En-Nahdha as an independent party received 17 
percent of the vote.) Tunisian law on association clearly 
bans the formation of political parties on the basis of 
religion, and there is no evidence that an Islamic party has 
re-emerged here, even underground.  However, the concept of 
Islam as a popular, galvanizing force is slowly creeping back 
into Tunisia's political environment.  A member of Et-Tajdid 
said he believed Islamists, possibly former En-Nahdha 
adherents, are currently active within Tunisia on the fringe 
of the opposition movement and are targeting mosque-going 
youth. This is not lost on the independent opposition, who 
while firmly secular and leftist in orientation, have 
reportedly reached out to Islamists, including former members 
of En-Nahdha to broaden their support.  PDP Secretary General 
Chebbi told the Ambassador that he recently met with 
En-Nahdha officials outside of Tunisia, and ET Secretary 
General Harmel indicated he would not rule out some sort of 
accommodation with Islamists in order to bolster his party's 
activities.  Nonetheless, echoing comments we hear from GOT 
officials, including Ben Ali, Chebbi and Harmel were wary of 
U.S. outreach to moderate Islamists in Iraq and elsewhere, 
and were critical about Shia political gains in Iraq. 
 
COMMENT: 
 
¶7.  (C) There is no question that the Islamists as organized 
politically by En-Nahdha retain some attraction for a sector 
of Tunisians.  En-Nahdha's stamp has never been thoroughly 
erased in some of the lower and lower-middle class 
neighborhoods throughout the country, and it is probably true 
that based on organization alone an Islamist party would 
likely do well in a freely contested election.  But our 
conversations with middle class and certainly official 
Tunisians continue to show a wariness--even revulsion---at 
the prospect of allowing Islamists to return to the scene in 
Tunisia.  Moderate political Islam has not been widely 
accepted as a concept here. 
 
¶8.  (C) How to move forward?  As is often stated, Tunisia has 
many of the building blocks of a modern state and a working 
democracy: A homogeneous, mostly well-educated population, a 
good communication system, a clear division among 
governorates.  The lack of political will by the leadership 
to allow true competitors into the ring is of course the main 
obstacle to democratic change in Tunisia.  But 
personality-based opposition parties who present no clear 
alternative to the RCD do little to help matters.  Until the 
political decision is made to share power, it will be 
important to focus our reform efforts on developing the 
traditions and institutions of basic political/civil society 
activity to the fullest extent possible, while continuing to 
monitor and press for greater freedom of speech and 
expression.  One problem will be convincing opposition 
parties of the need for their own professional development; 
while all could benefit from IRI, NDI, and Freedom House 
programs, for example, none expressed great interest in party 
training as described by former Assistant Secretary Craner. 
 
¶9. (C) A possible vehicle, or future local partner could be a 
proposed "Arab Partnership Democracy Center," discussed in 
Tunis in April by representatives from human rights 
organizations from Tunisia, Qatar, Yemen, Algeria, and Iraq. 
As described by the Tunisian regional representative for 
Freedom House, Mohsen Marzouk, the Center would be regional 
and would seek to develop "capacity and expertise" in 
democratic practices, encourage dialogue between political 
decisionmakers and civil society, and "disseminate the 
culture and practice of democracy."  As of now, the Arab 
Institute for Human Rights (IADH) in Tunis and the Human 
Rights Committee of Qatar have agreed to help establish the 
Center. 
HUDSON