This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TUNIS 001045 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR NEA/PI, NEA/MAG (LAWRENCE) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2015 
TAGS: PREL KDEM KMPI ECON PGOV KPAO AMGT TS WSIS
SUBJECT: TUNISIA - DEMOCRATIC REFORM STRATEGY TO SUPPORT 
FREEDOM AGENDA 
 
REF: STATE 80607 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Hudson for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
¶1. (C) Tunisia has a lot of things going for it as a country, 
but the speedy clip of political liberalization is not one of 
them.  The good news about Tunisia is that there is no 
organized extremist opposition that we know of.  The bad news 
is that there is no organized opposition of any kind. 
Although theories abound regarding who really runs the 
show-President Ben Ali's extended family, powerful advisers 
in the presidential palace? -our analysis is that ultimately 
Ben Ali calls the shots. The way to change Tunisia is to 
convince President Ben Ali to take the steps that would allow 
for true political reform. 
 
¶2. (C) It is our consensus (and one that is increasingly 
shared by the EU and other embassies) that progress in two 
key areas would make all the difference to the pace of 
political reform: freedom of expression and freedom of 
assembly.  With truly free media and unfettered access to the 
Internet, Tunisia's highly educated population would soon 
spark international debate that would erase the current 
apathy of Tunisians about their political system and spur 
demands for change.  If, in addition to saying and writing 
whatever they want, Tunisians were free to gather as they 
please, real opposition political parties headed by genuine 
and competitive candidates would inevitably emerge. 
 
¶3. (C) The way to there from here is through President Ben 
Ali.  In power for almost 18 years, he has shown no 
compunction about cracking down on anything that could be 
conceived as a threat to his continued longevity in office. 
He is also fond of speaking loud and long about democracy 
while fully controlling the political process.  He must be 
convinced that to continue in this way is not in his or 
Tunisia's long-term interest, and that we can help him change 
direction.  Our message to him should be that while we do not 
seek regime change, we expect real transition to democracy. 
We must make clear to him that U.S. policy goals and regional 
realities will no longer tolerate the "Tunisian timetable" of 
reform touted by the GOT.  The core of our message is that at 
the end of the current five-year term to which Ben Ali was 
elected in October 2004, Tunisia should be a country in which 
real candidates are ready to run in real elections. 
 
¶4. (C) What we would like to do: 
 
Within one year: 
---------------- 
 
a. Freedom of Expression: The World Summit on the Information 
Society (WSIS), held in Tunis in November of this year, gives 
us an excellent opportunity to make progress on the issue of 
freedom of expression.  We should make clear to Tunisia via 
very high-level U.S. political engagements that our 
cooperation in helping Tunisia shine as a host (which is 
extremely important to the government) and achieve its goals 
will depend entirely on progress in loosening up state 
control of what can be said and written.  Specifically, our 
measures of progress or milestones for the GOT will be: 
 
-- Unblock websites 
-- Accept pending applications for new publications (many 
have languished for years) 
-- Allow "e-papers" to publish in Tunisia (related to first 
item above) 
-- Institute a transparent process for authorizing private 
broadcast media, including allowing Radio Sawa to open an FM 
station in Tunisia 
-- End police/judicial harassment of outspoken individuals 
 
b.  Freedom of Assembly: 
--Authorize independent NGOs to operate 
--Allow EU funding for the Tunisian League of Human Rights to 
go forward. 
 
Within two years: 
----------------- 
 
a.  Freedom of Expression: 
 
-- Tunisia shoots up the chart in Reporters Without Borders 
and other rankings of freedom of expression. 
-- Independent publications and broadcasters reflect a 
variety of opinions on political issues. 
 
b.  Freedom of Assembly 
 
-- New political parties register and begin to work openly 
toward participation in the 2009 parliamentary and 
presidential campaign. 
 
¶5. (C) Washington support we need to do this: 
Essentially only political.  Tunisia is not a poor country, 
and plenty of capable Tunisians are ready if given the 
chance.  We are thus eager to take a more forward-leaning and 
aggressive posture on political reform in Tunisia but would 
require the following commitment from Washington to do so: 
 
a.  Engagement: To convince a proud, moderate, entrenched 
government to change its ways, we'll have to change ours. 
For understandable reasons, Tunisia is the country that is 
the afterthought in North Africa.  Tunisia is already on 
board with U.S. goals in many areas, the stakes are certainly 
greater elsewhere, and the pace of change more exhilarating, 
perhaps, in countries that have farther to go than Tunisia 
would.  Yet it does not escape the GOT's notice that 
high-ranking American visitors find the time to visit 
Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt, and find polite excuses 
about why they'll have to skip Tunisia this time. Given its 
"dodge the bullet" strategy, that suits the GOT just fine. 
High-level visits to drive home our message are essential to 
our hopes that Tunisia will hear it and act on it. 
 
b.  Consistency: The Tunisians have mastered their talking 
points and rarely stray from them in any encounter.  To be 
successful in engaging them, we must do the same.  We cannot 
allow them their tactic of complaining that one interlocutor 
or another has simply got it in for them, and that the person 
in front of them is different in that s/he understands 
the--positive, of course--"reality" of the GOT's policies or 
actions.  If we pursue this strategy, we must disabuse them 
of this notion by ensuring that our approach and talking 
points are consistent in all encounters with GOT 
representatives. 
 
c.  Convince the G-8, EU, and especially France, that our 
approach is the best policy for Tunisia (see para 8 below). 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Programs we need that could help us get there: 
 
Two main programs, one each in the areas of freedom of 
expression and freedom of assembly, would serve as the 
springboard for other eventual programs.  In fact, this is a 
combined policy/program tactic, since we are likely to 
encounter pushback from the GOT on pursuing these program 
ideas.  Thus, it will take a sustained political push just to 
get the programs up and running.  Only then, can we hope for 
programmatic returns.  For that reason, we believe pushing 
only two straightforward programs is more desirable than 
presenting a long wish list that the GOT can delay through 
its bureaucracy while pretending to be accommodating.  There 
is no point in working on elections, for example, when 
candidates and parties cannot say what they want, or even 
meet as recognized political entities.  Electoral programs 
are for later. 
 
For now: 
 
a. A MEPI media training program exclusively devoted to 
Tunisia.  This program would require a full assessment of 
what needs to be done and a strong package of programs to get 
there. 
 
b.  A MEPI training program designed to strengthen freedom of 
assembly and, ultimately, training for political parties. 
This would involve opening an IRI or NDI office in Tunisia. 
 
¶7. (C) What we stand to lose: 
 
The caveat emptor section of this strategy is a short one, 
but must be highlighted.  The Ben Ali government has shown 
time and again that it takes public criticism very, very 
badly.  For example, the GOT withdrew its ambassador from 
Washington in 2004 over the inclusion of Tunisia in a list of 
countries criticized by the Department in its World Press 
Freedom Day statement.  Therefore it is probable that 
aggressive criticism and demands for political change on our 
part will be met with "retaliatory" measures in areas of 
importance to us.  Our excellent historic military ties with 
Tunisia and our sometimes sporadic (if currently improving) 
but important counterterrorism cooperation could suffer. 
Tunisia's moderate stance and behind-the-scenes help on 
issues like Iraq and the peace process (including stated 
plans to allow an Israeli diplomatic presence back in 
Tunisia) might vanish. 
 
¶8. (C) What others are doing: 
 
Key to Ben Ali's calculation on the need to change will be 
whether he is feeling the heat from others, particularly the 
EU and France.  Through the Barcelona Process, Tunisia has 
committed to economic and political reforms that are supposed 
to be finalized in 2008.  The Tunisians have brashly refused 
to implement some of these reforms, even at the cost of 
millions of dollars in cash transfers and technical 
assistance.  To date, the EU has largely acquiesced in the 
face of this Tunisian backsliding, mainly because its number 
one priority is guaranteeing Tunisian cooperation on 
controlling emigration to Southern Europe.  Part of our 
challenge in Tunisia will be to bring the EU and G-8 on board 
regarding a tougher message on political reform.  This would 
prevent the Tunisians from parrying our message by claiming 
that their EU agreements prove their commitment to reform. 
The EU is important, but France is key.  Ben Ali has 
calculated so far - rightly in our view - that Paris, and 
President Chirac in particular - definitely favor stability 
over democracy.  As long as that holds true, it will lessen 
the impact of our efforts.  Getting Paris to change its tune, 
or at least demonstrate constructive ambiguity, would ratchet 
up the pressure considerably. 
 
¶9. (U) Post has had a DCM-chaired MEPI committee from the 
beginning.  We will institute quarterly reports, in addition 
to our other MEPI reporting. 
HUDSON