This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 001484 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR MOPS IZ IT UNSC IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: IRAQ: ITALIANS LEND SUPPORT TO AMB JONES' 
INTEGRATED APPROACH 
 
REF: STATE 72185 
 
Classified By: Pol M/C Tom Countryman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Senior diplomatic officials told Senior 
Advisor and Coordinator for Iraq Policy Ambassador Richard 
Jones during his April 22 visit to Rome that Italy intends to 
continue its engagement in stabilization efforts in Iraq. 
They were optimistic that the current political stalemate, 
though worrisome because of the tight schedule, would be 
solved, but stressed the need to include the Sunnis.  The 
officials pressed for an enhanced UN role in the political 
process and stressed the need to help the Iraqis better 
disburse economic aid.  Finally, they reiterated the Italian 
position that troop withdrawal should be based on security 
conditions on the ground. End summary. 
 
Favoring an Integrated Approach 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassador Jones (accompanied by Assistant Matt 
Fuller, EUR/ERA Deputy Director Karen Volker, and Embassy 
Rome staff) met with MFA Iraq Task Force Director Luigi 
Maccotta, Deputy Task Force Director Damiano Francovigh, NATO 
Office Director Giovanni Brauzzi, and Middle East Development 
Assistance Office Director Federica Ferrari-Bravo on April 21 
to explain his mandate and US policy priorities and concerns 
in Iraq.  Maccotta said that Italy agrees with the need for 
an integrated approach that includes security, political, and 
economic aspects, which are mutually reinforcing.  However, 
the current stalemate in forming a new government shows that 
inclusion of all ethnic groups is not occurring, and this 
could lead to more violence.  We need to give the Sunnis a 
reason to renounce violence, he said. 
 
¶3. (C) At a dinner hosted by the Ambassador the same evening 
for Ambassador Jones and visiting Italian Ambassador to 
Baghdad Gian Ludivico De Martino, Middle East Bureau Director 
General Riccardo Sessa said that Italy was in "full 
immersion" with its partners (the US, UK, UN) in Iraq and 
that we are finally beginning to face a success story.  We 
need now to look forward to identify issues where we can help 
to support the Iraqis to prepare for their future.  We need 
engagement, Sessa said, not statements. 
 
¶4. (C)  Maccotta said that Italy strongly supports the 
planned international conference on Iraq, which would 
demonstrate international solidarity. At dinner, Sessa 
reminded Ambassador Jones that FM Fini, in discussions with 
Secretary Rice, had offered to host the conference.  He 
 
SIPDIS 
stressed the need for a clear sense of the conference's 
purpose and the need to involve regional actors.  He warned 
that some may raise "exit strategies" at the conference and 
that careful preparations are needed.  Maccotta agreed, 
noting that there were expectations that the conference would 
yield an announcement of MNF withdrawal. Italy's position, he 
said, remains the same:  conditions-based disengagement.  We 
do not know how long we still stay, Sessa added, and we can 
not fix a date, because it depends on the situation on the 
ground. 
 
¶5. (C) Sessa also stressed the role of regional actors, 
including Syria and Iran, that can not be excluded because of 
issues like border controls.  He repeated his by now familiar 
theme that the US should use partners like Italy to dialogue 
with these countries.  He also supported Cairo's initiative 
to hold a PrepCom; the key, he said, is to demonstrate to the 
Arab world that the political process in Iraq is not another 
US effort to "impose its model." 
Diplomatic Advisor to PM Berlusconi Francesco Talo, also 
present at the dinner, agreed, adding that the international 
conference should be put in the framework of UNSCR 1546.  A 
wider mandate, he explained, helps with perception problems. 
Central European countries also could play a greater role, he 
suggested, especially in terms of debt forgiveness. 
 
Supporting the Political Process 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) On the political process, Maccotta noted that, unlike 
with the January 30 elections, the possibility for a 6-month 
delay in signing a constitution is written into the TAL. 
That said, he agreed that it was better not to publicly 
accept such a delay up front, but instead to keep up the 
pressure to stick to the current schedule.  He opined that 
 
 
the current political stalemate was due to political 
maneuvering aimed at getting rid of al-Jafari.  He stressed 
the need for the political process to be seen as a domestic 
effort, with international assistance provided only upon 
request, in order to be legitimized in the eyes of the Iraqi 
people, noting that the Iraqis had not yet asked the UN for 
help.  He agreed with Ambassador Jones that the Iraqis needed 
to begin the constitutional process as soon as possible, 
starting with a request for UN assistance. 
 
¶7. (C) Sessa echoed Maccotta's statements on the need for the 
national reconciliation of all ethnic groups and for the 
inclusive nature of the constitutional process.  To help the 
institution-building process, he said, Italy is sending 6-7 
more civilians to help with new ministries.  Talo noted that 
Italy is currently offering a third training course in Italy 
for Iraqi journalists -- a double-edged sword, he noted 
wryly, but one that helps with perception problems. 
 
¶8. (C) On the EU rule of law initiative, Maccotta said that 
Italy will play a leading role, sending an expert on 
penitentiary systems to Baghdad and offering two courses in 
Italy. Italy likes the idea of keeping things close to the 
people and empowering local government, and, since Italian 
forces are in the Dhi Qar province, he said, that is where 
Italy will focus. 
 
Providing Economic Assistance 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Sticking with the integrated approach theme, Maccotta 
stressed that job creation and improving governance capacity 
are necessary to improve the security situation.  He 
commented that a lack of governance capacity in Iraq is one 
reason for the slow disbursement of reconstruction aid. 
Regarding debt relief, Italy, he said, had already presented 
the Iraqi government the text of an agreement to forgive 80 
percent of Iraq's official debt to Italy ($3.4 billion 
including accumulated interest) in accordance with the Paris 
Club agreement.  Maccotta noted that Iraq had requested a 
higher level of forgiveness, but Italy simply does not have 
the budget to forgive more.  Italy has, however, lowered the 
interest rate on the remaining balance.  Once the official 
debt agreement is done, Maccotta said, Italy would try to 
resolve the issue of outstanding commercial debt, which 
totals approximately $3 billion, making Italy one of Iraq's 
largest commercial creditors. 
 
...and Doing Its Part on the Security Front 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) On security issues, Brauzzi emphasized the need to 
give back to the Iraqis the security aspects of stabilization 
efforts.  He noted that, out of a 26-member NATO Alliance, 
Italy alone will provide trainers for three of four training 
modules in the NATO training mission, in addition to 
providing money for the NTM-I trust fund (Note: 500,000 Euro, 
300,000 of which is earmarked for training inside Iraq). 
NATO, however, is not providing force protection for the 
trainers, he added, asking whether MNF planned to help. 
Paradoxically, he said, Italy's troops are based in a less 
troublesome area of Iraq, but Italy can not withdraw its 
troops because of the slow pace of training Iraqi security 
forces.  If we are unable to demonstrate that we can train 
the Iraqis in a relatively secure area, he asked, how can we 
convince anyone that we can do it in more dangerous areas? 
Finally, he argued that the review of MNF-I under UNSCR 1546 
by June 8 offered an opportunity to get a renewed blessing of 
the coalition's troop presence in Iraq. 
 
¶11. (C) Brauzzi lamented the fact that the portion of MNF 
protection devoted to the UN was so far dormant, and said 
that an increased UN presence would make it necessary to 
implement this role.  Finally, he noted the "domino process" 
of countries like Ukraine and Poland withdrawing their 
forces, saying that many in Europe were now looking to see 
what Italy would do and stressing the need for close 
consultations with coalition partners. 
 
¶12. (C) Responding to the issues Brauzzi raised, Ambassador 
Jones said that if MNF-I forces were used for force 
protection, that would take away from other missions.  We can 
hire force protection services, he said, but we can not hire 
someone to fight insurgents.  On the Polish and Ukrainian 
troop withdrawals, he said that Iraqi forces will have to 
 
 
take up the slack.  He reiterated Secretary Rice's insistence 
that such decisions be done in consultation with partners, 
and said that preferably any decrease in support in combat 
roles would be balanced by an increase in support for 
security training.  Finally, he said that progress on 
drafting the constitution would lead to progress on the 
security front. 
 
¶13. (U) Ambassador Jones has cleared this cable. 
 
BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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 2005ROME01484 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL