This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000525 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, DRL, RM, L, AND H 
PASS TO USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2014 
TAGS: EAID PREL PHUM KDEM BM NLD
SUBJECT: USING ESF TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY IN BURMA 
 
REF: A) RANGOON 424 B) STATE 81570 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (S) The paramount U.S. policy interest in Burma is 
promoting democracy, a objective predicated on the legitimacy 
of the 1990 elections in many U.S.-sponsored UN resolutions 
and policy statements.  Congress has earmarked millions of 
dollars in Economic Support Funds to specifically foster this 
top policy goal.  Twelve democratic parties that participated 
in the 1990 elections have requested support from the United 
States (ref A and previous).  As a once-off event, we propose 
to provide $150,000 in financial assistance to the National 
League for Democracy's social welfare programs and to the 
eleven ethnic minority parties of the United Nationalities 
Alliance (UNA) to help them maintain cooperation and 
viability in the face of increased repression. 
 
¶2. (S) This proposal would provide $10,000 worth of kyat to 
each of the eleven UNA member parties and to each of four 
NLD-affiliated social welfare programs.  As nine of these 
twelve parties have been outlawed since 1990 by the military 
regime and the three remaining legal parties are forbidden by 
the junta from receiving foreign assistance, any U.S. 
assistance in response to the parties' requests must be 
provided in kyat and in exchange for a nominal cover good or 
service.  This proposal tracks with ref A and previous; the 
only change is one additional party added to the UNA member 
list and dropping of the request to provide support to the 
NLD's Vice Chairman, U Tin Oo.  End Summary. 
 
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THE NEED 
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¶3. (SBU) Fifteen years after stunning Burma's military regime 
with their overwhelming electoral victory, the twelve 
democratic parties in question have suffered tremendous 
setbacks and repression.  Apart from the NLD, most functions 
of the other parties are handled by a small number of 
individuals on a face-to-face basis.  In most cases the party 
chairperson, vice chairperson, secretary, and/or MPs-elect 
bear most of the financial burden in addition to the personal 
risks of attempting to sustain the organizations, provide 
member support, and further Burma's broader democratic 
agenda.  The party leaders, often fired from professional 
positions or hindered in their occupations because of their 
pro-democracy affiliation, are generally poor. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Of the 485 candidates elected in 1990, as of 
February 2005, 83 have passed away.  Of these, three died in 
prison, three died shortly after being released from prison, 
and two have been assassinated.  Twelve MPs-elect are 
imprisoned and 29 are in exile (twelve in Thailand and nine 
in the U.S.).  182 have been dismissed or forced to resign 
from their parties.  A further sixteen MPs-elect are from 
parties aligned with the ruling junta.  The NLD's Vice 
Chairman, U Tin Oo, remains in house arrest. 
 
¶5. (S) NOTE: U Tin Oo's wife approached the embassy seeking 
financial assistance; the family's only source of income has 
been a rental house, but since the regime has cut the 
telephone connection Tin Oo has been unable to rent the 
property.  We have previously requested $3,000 to help U Tin 
Oo buy food and pay his utilities (ref A) by leasing his 
rental house for storage, but for simplicity's sake we have 
dropped it from this updated proposal. END NOTE 
 
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RECIPIENTS 
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¶6. (C) The UNA member parties and their regional bases of 
support follow: 
 
Arakan League for Democracy (western Burma, Rakhine State) 
 
Chin National League for Democracy (western Burma, Chin State) 
 
Democratic Organization for Kayan National Unity (eastern 
Burma, Kayah State) 
 
Kachin State National Congress for Democracy (northern Burma, 
Kachin State) 
 
Kayah State Nationalities League for Democracy (eastern 
Burma, Kayah State) 
 
Kayin National Congress for Democracy (eastern Burma, Karen 
State) 
Mara People's Party (western Burma, Chin State) 
 
Mon National Democratic Front (SE Burma, Mon State) 
Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (NE Burma, Shan State) 
 
Shan State Kokang Democratic Party (NE Burma, Shan State) 
 
Zomi National Congress (western Burma, Chin State) 
 
¶7. (C) The NLD provides very modest social services to its 
members and supporters by means of social welfare programs 
(SWP) run by party members but organizationally distinct from 
the party itself.  The SWPs provide services at the NLD party 
headquarters and on a limited outreach basis.  Like the 
ESF-funded and exile-based Association for Aid to Political 
Prisoners, an NLD SWP provides very modest support to 
political prisoners and their families.  Other SWPs fund 
modest assistance in the areas of health, education, and 
infant and mother care. 
 
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WHAT WOULD THE ASSISTANCE BE USED FOR? 
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¶8. (S) The ethnic parties, for the most part based in the 
horse-shoe of mountains that rings the Burman heartland of 
the country, are isolated from one another and far away from 
the NLD headquarters in Rangoon.  The United Nationalities 
Alliance and the broader Committee Representing the Peoples 
Parliament serve as coordinating organizations for the 
pro-democracy movement; the UNA is the ethnic parties' forum 
and the CRPP joins the UNA, NLD, and other pro-democracy 
MPs-elect.  The proposed funding would be used by the party 
leadership for transportation expenses between their home 
regions and Rangoon to attend coordination meetings at 
pro-democracy fora, for communication expenses between party 
headquarters and district offices and constituents, for youth 
wing training programs, stipends, and scholarships; to 
promote any social welfare programs the party may run, such 
as those serving mother and infant health needs of members, 
and to help allay costs of office space and equipment.  In 
short, keeping a party together as a cohesive organization 
takes resources (ask any U.S. politician); this proposal 
seeks a modest amount of money to help Burma's courageous 
democrats to keep the flame of democracy alive. 
 
¶9. (S) Assistance to the NLD's SWPs would fund nutritional 
and medicinal supplements for political prisoners, help cover 
travel expenses of their family members visiting prisons, 
provide immunizations and vitamins to infants and their 
mothers, provide education expense monies for the very 
poorest children of NLD members, and help cover emergency 
medical expenses of party leaders and other members, 
including released political prisoners. 
 
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DELIVERY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
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¶10. (S) Depending on availability and suitability, post would 
provide the assistance to a party's chairperson, vice 
chairperson, secretary, MPs-elect, or a designee of a senior 
party leader.  The recipient would provide an agreed-to 
nominal cover good or service that would vary from party to 
party depending on the circumstances. 
 
¶11. (S) As stated, nine of the twelve parties have been 
deregistered, or banned, by the regime.  They thus operate 
unofficially and with minimal written records that, if seized 
by the police, would land the leaders in prison for many 
years.  Even the NLD purposefully keeps scant records for 
security's sake.  It has, officially, stopped enrolling new 
members, maintaining party membership lists, or issuing new 
party membership cards.  Most of the party leaders have been 
in prison at least once and many have suffered severe torture 
at the hands of the regime.  They are a hardened and 
determined bunch.  They also know how dangerous written 
records, correspondence, and even telephone calls can be. 
Most party business is conducted face-to-face in small 
groups.  Thus, accountability will be limited to a signature 
of receipt of the assistance and follow-up verbal reports on 
how the assistance has been used to support party activities. 
 
 
¶12. (C) Post suggests Department provide fiscal data in an 
advice of allotment similar to Ref B, "Advice of Allotment 
ESF Funding" in which ESF funding was provided to support an 
ongoing, stealth pro-democracy training program.  Operative 
text of AOA cable could be similar to Ref B, para 10, "This 
increase provides funds for (the purpose of promoting 
inter-ethnic cooperation among democratic political parties 
in Burma." 
 
¶13. (U) Please advise soonest. 
Martinez