This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PORT AU PRINCE 001460 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
DEPT FOR DS/IP/WHA 
DS/DSS/ITA 
DSERCC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC HA MINUSTAH
SUBJECT: MINUSTAH SCALING DOWN OPERATIONS IN STILL VOLATILE 
CITE SOLEIL 
 
REF: PAP 1353 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Foley, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: MINUSTAH military leaders provided Core Group 
members an update of the situation in Cite Soleil on May 20. 
The presentation was notably void of achievement and 
indicated force rotations would oblige MINUSTAH to scale back 
their footprint in the zone at a time when the area has 
become the anarchic core of Port-au-Prince criminality. UN 
representatives also reported on the Neptune situation and 
proposals for the renewal of MINUSTAH's mandate. End summary. 
 
 
Overview of MINUSTAH Operations in Cite Soleil 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2. (C) MINUSTAH military Deputy Commander Lugani presented a 
summary of MINUSTAH operations in Cite Soleil where anarchy 
seems only to have increased since MINUSTAH returned in force 
last March. Lugani admitted that "Operation Liberte" in 
December 2004 had reached but failed to maintain its 
objective to re-take the two police stations in the slum and 
re-establish state authority there. As a result, gang 
violence continued and the humanitarian situation 
deteriorated. In response, MINUSTAH began "Operation Raised 
Sun" on March 31, establishing 3-4 permanent, static 
checkpoints and 8-10 roving checkpoints surrounding the 
neighborhood. They also blocked other principal entry points 
into Cite Soleil from Route Nationale #1 with containers. 
Beginning the week of May 23, however, MINUSTAH was switching 
to "Operation Bay Espwa" ("Give Hope"), consisting of a 
significantly reduced number of three checkpoints, fewer 
troops, a total blockade of a section of Route Nationale #1 
and more humanitarian missions. 
 
¶3. (C) MINUSTAH military officials repeatedly insisted that 
the new operation was based on the decision of the HNP to 
block Route Nationale #1 in an effort to reduce carjackings 
in the area and elsewhere. The HNP said that gangs were using 
armed children to hijack cars along this road and then 
escaping with the vehicles into the small streets leading 
directly into Cite Soleil. By blocking a stretch of road that 
has been the site of numerous carjackings and is the main 
conduit into and out of Cite Soleil, the HNP (and MINUSTAH) 
claim they can put a stop not only to carjackings along that 
particularly dangerous corridor, but throughout the city as 
well by preventing car thieves from driving their spoils back 
into the narrow Cite Soleil alleyways where most stolen 
vehicles have thus far been taken. CIVPOL and HNP units 
(rather than MINUSTAH military troops as before) are 
stationed at checkpoints on both ends. Lugani said that since 
the road was blocked, the number of incidents in the area had 
fallen from roughly 20 per day to only 1-2 per day. 
 
¶4. (C) Lugani's list of MINUSTAH accomplishments thus far in 
Cite Soleil was paltry: 1) a permanent MINUSTAH presence in 
the area, and 2) the establishment of checkpoints. He 
acknowledged somewhat belatedly that one reason for the 
switch to a lower-stance in Operation Bay Espwa was that 
MINUSTAH was in the process of rotating most of its troops 
and therefore had to pull back from the previous footprint 
there. After six weeks, MINUSTAH's to do list was much longer 
than the accomplishments: 1) gain more intelligence, 2) 
increase patrols inside Cite Soleil, 3) control Route 
Nationale #1, 4) improve cooperation with the HNP, and 5) 
begin civic affairs activities, including the establishment 
of a registration center in Cite Soleil. 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador Foley reminded Lugani that the original 
objective of the mission was to root out the gangs based in 
Cite Soleil who posed a threat to the elections process. He 
asked Lugani what the plan was for returning to that initial 
aim. Lugani said that the troop rotation would be complete by 
early June and MINUSTAH would again scale up with a new 
operation, with even greater assistance from the HNP. But he 
added that the terrain in Cite Soleil was difficult no matter 
how many troops are involved since they possessed only two 
(Peruvian) armored vehicles capable of navigating the narrow 
passageways of the district. (Comment: Apparently MINUSTAH 
remains unwilling to conduct operations on foot. End 
comment). 
 
¶6. (C) Ambassador Foley also reminded Lugani about the 
importance of communication and transport links within the 
port and warehouse district where, for example, the Embassy's 
GSO Warehouse had become practically inaccessible, and where 
much commerce was conducted. Lugani reported that MINUSTAH 
had received several letters from businesses associated with 
the Terminal Varreau and the warehouse district asking for 
greater MINUSTAH security and claiming that insecurity (and 
now the complete blockade of the main transport artery, Route 
Nationale #1) was preventing employees from conducting their 
work (septel). He said MINUSTAH had met with roughly 40 
concerned business leaders to discuss the issue on May 18 and 
was continuing to work with the group and study ways to 
ensure better security in the area. He said the most 
challenging issue was maintaining safe access to Terminal de 
Varreau. 
 
¶7. (C) Lugani finished by briefly describing "Operation 
Mariela" in Bel Air, in which MINUSTAH troops (who 
temporarily lost control of the zone following the February 
28 pro-Lavalas protest) re-took control of the area 
(uncovering several stashes of HNP uniforms, marijuana and 
9mm guns) and re-established street cleaning and medical aid 
programs. He added that the joint CIVPOL-HNP anti-kidnapping 
cell was up and running, and that "reported" kidnappings had 
declined from 14 in April to 3 in May. The cell had concluded 
that none of the kidnappings it had investigated had any 
political motive involved. He said that a group of HNP 
officers that had been arrested for allegedly participating 
in several kidnappings remained under investigation by the 
HNP and that CIVPOL was monitoring the investigation. 
 
Human Rights Report on Neptune, Chamblain 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) MINUSTAH Human Rights Representative Thierry Fagart 
told the Core Group that the IGOH was pressuring the justice 
system to move more quickly on the Neptune case. He said the 
judge in the La Scierie case had begun to interview witnesses 
(ex. Jocelyn Pierre and Calixte Delatour, Police Chief and 
Justice Minister respectively at the time of the La Scierie 
events), and that President Alexandre had told justice 
officials on May 19 that they must resolve the situation. At 
the same time, Fagart warned the Core Group that there was 
good reason to believe that Louis Jodel Chamblain might be 
freed even sooner following the May 3 decision by the Supreme 
Court to annul part of the Raboteau case (reftel). (Note: The 
Chief Judge of Port-au-Prince heard Chamblain's appeal on May 
19 and ordered that Chamblain remain in prison. End note). In 
what Valdes labeled "the understatement of the year," Fagart 
concluded that it was evident that the justice system was 
under the influence of "some bad characters." Valdes added 
that there were rumors suggesting that Neptune and Chamblain 
might be freed at the same time, in order (in theory) to help 
the IGOH to minimize recrimination on both sides. (Note: 
Valdes joined Ambassador Foley and visiting Ambassador Andrew 
Young for a visit to Neptune on May 21. Neptune agreed to 
cooperate and as of the morning of May 25, Neptune arrived in 
St. Marc via MINUSTAH escort to answer questions before the 
judge. End note). 
 
MINUSTAH Mandate Renewal 
------------------------ 
 
¶9. (U) Valdes updated the Core Group on proposals to renew 
MINUSTAH's mandate. He said he had already submitted a 
document to the Security Council (SC) on the situation in 
Haiti and that he was traveling on May 23 to New York to talk 
to donor countries and discuss mandate renewal with SC 
members. He said he expected the SC to request increasing the 
number of MINUSTAH troops by 800 and CIVPOL by 275 in advance 
of elections. He also said he was hoping for a one-year 
renewal in order to leave no doubt regarding the mandate 
during the elections. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) The situation in Cite Soleil demands more attention 
from MINUSTAH rather than less, and while the troop rotations 
are unavoidable, we fear that MINUSTAH still has no coherent 
plan for securing the important industrial zone, not to 
mention achieve its original objective of rooting out the 
gangs deep inside the slum who pose a threat to the 
transition process. We have already pressed MINUSTAH strongly 
regarding our dissatisfaction with the scope and efficacy of 
their tactical strategy in and around Cite Soleil. However, 
the hope that an increase in troop levels and the prospect of 
a more agile and equipped HNP presence may eventually achieve 
results remains just that - a hope, one which flies in the 
face of MINUSTAH's record of passivity and avoidance. End 
comment. 
 
FOLEY