This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 001356 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
DEPT FOR DS/IP/WHA 
DS/DSS/ITA 
DSERCC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC HA
SUBJECT: HAITIAN POLICE CHIEF ON U.S. DONATED WEAPONS, 
INSECURITY AND THE CAP HAITIEN COAST GUARD STATION 
 
REF: A. PAP 1279 
 
     ¶B. PAP 1294 
     ¶C. PAP 447 
 
Classified By: Charg d'Affaires Douglas M. Griffiths, reasons 1.4 (B) a 
nd (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Haitian National Police (HNP) Director 
General (DG) Leon Charles told Charg Griffiths on May 9 that 
he was working to withdraw 21 long-guns donated by the USG in 
August 2004 from use and hand them over to U.S. custody. He 
requested, however, to maintain a handful of the weapons in 
secure HNP storage for HNP Directorate protection. Charles 
also reported that regular units were responsible for the 
shooting deaths of four individuals on April 27. CIMO was not 
active in the area. While encouraged by recent HNP successes 
in liberating kidnap victims and arresting suspects, he 
feared the insecurity would continue as long as MINUSTAH 
failed to establish control in the gang strongholds of Cite 
Soleil and Bel Air. Charles also agreed to an arrangement 
allowing shared use of the Haitian Coast Guard (HCG) base in 
Cap Haitien with CIVPOL. End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Following up on a request by DAS Farrar that Charles 
withdraw from use the long-guns that were distributed to the 
HNP in August 2003, CDA Griffiths reiterated that it was very 
important that those arms be secured in USG possession 
promptly. Charles said that he had already secured 6 of the 
long-guns (M-14s) and was in the process of turning them over 
to the Police Academy bunker that is maintained by the USG. 
Charles explained that the weapons were vital to policing 
efforts and asked if it were possible to maintain 8 of the 
arms (Uzis) in the DG Headquarters for personal security 
purposes. CDA Griffiths acknowledged potential resistance by 
operational units to hand over their weapons and pledged that 
the U.S. would soon deliver two armored vehicles to the HNP 
to assist the affected units. But he maintained that it was 
imperative that the M-14s be quickly secured in the bunker 
while the Uzis were secured personally by the DG. He asked 
Charles to give a full accounting as soon as possible. (Note: 
Embassy Police Liaison reported on May 12 that 12 of the 13 
M-14s were in storage at the DG headquarters awaiting 
transport to the bunker. The DG said he had accounted for the 
8 Uzi's and was waiting for further instructions. End note). 
 
¶3. (C) CDA Griffiths asked Charles about his knowledge that 
CIVPOL troops had recently refurbished and occupied the 
Haitian Coast Guard (HCG) base in Cap Haitien despite plans 
by the USG to upgrade the station for use by the HCG. Charles 
said he was told by the Departmental Director for the North 
and the Coast Guard Director that CIVPOL had a prior 
agreement with the U.S. Embassy to refurbish and utilize the 
station for a base and that he accepted the arrangement based 
on his belief that the U.S. Embassy had already agreed to the 
deal. CDA Griffiths clarified that the USG had not/not given 
prior approval to CIVPOL. Charles said that had he known in 
advance, he would not have supported CIVPOL use of the 
station, but suggested that given the fact that CIVPOL had 
already invested in improvements, the important issue was 
simply to ensure an appropriate work space for the HCG. He 
added that co-location of CIVPOL and the HCG on the base 
would have certain benefits in terms of training and 
oversight. Charles also insisted that the HCG would benefit 
from the much-improved facilities once the UN leaves Haiti. 
The Charg said that the USG would consider using funds 
allocated for base refurbishment to construct additional 
space for the HCG, which would allow CIVPOL and the HCG to 
co-locate on the base. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Charles then gave an updated recount of the incident 
on April 27 during which four people were killed in the 
vicinity of a pro-Lavalas demonstration near MINUSTAH 
headquarters (Note: this new account of the incident is in 
line with his previous description of events to DAS Farrar on 
April 29 (ref A). End note). He said that CIMO units were not 
involved in the shooting. Instead, regular police officers 
from the Canape Vert and Port-au-Prince stations were 
pursuing two groups of bandits in the area. Police exchanged 
gunfire with one group that had been attacking pedestrians 
and vehicles near the demonstration, resulting in the deaths 
of two suspected bandits, while simultaneously another police 
unit confronted a truck carrying a group that had fired at 
the Hotel Christopher, killing another two suspects. Charles 
said that both incidents occurred after the demonstration had 
already finished. CDA Griffiths stressed that it was 
important to issue a complete report of the incident. He 
noted that in the United States police officers were 
generally moved to desk jobs after being involved in a 
shooting, pending an investigation. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In response to the recent spate of kidnappings in 
Port-au-Prince, Charles highlighted the creation of a joint 
MINUSTAH-HNP Anti-Kidnapping team and operations on May 7-8 
by the HNP that succeeded in liberating 3 kidnapping victims 
and arresting 15 suspects allegedly responsible for many 
recent kidnappings (ref B). He explained that most of the 
suspects arrested were ex-prisoners who escaped in the prison 
break on February 19 (ref C) and were also involved in car 
theft rings in the city. Charles said that of the roughly 25 
kidnappings that had been reported recently to the HNP, 14 of 
the victims had been held in safe houses located in the Bel 
Air district of Port-au-Prince where police presence is 
scarce. (Note: the HNP subsequently arrested several more 
suspected kidnappers and freed two additional hostages in two 
separate raids during the night of May 10. End note). 
 
¶6. (C) Charles expressed his impatience, however, with 
MINUSTAH operations in Cite Soleil and Bel Air. He said that 
MINUSTAH was still operating on the margins of the 
neighborhood and had not secured the interior sufficiently to 
meet the goal of re-establishing a police presence there. The 
longer MINUSTAH waits to move into the slum and directly 
confront gang leaders such as Dread Wilme, he said, the worse 
conditions would become for residents in the area - and for 
Port-au-Prince in general since many criminals use the slum 
as a hideout. Charles said that he had reports that Dread 
Wilme had met with Lavalas leader Gerard Jean-Juste and he 
feared that the gangs might start committing even more 
violent actions unless they were captured soon. Charles added 
that Jean-Juste sent a weekly food shipment to Wilme's area. 
In response, he said the HNP wants to be more pro-active in 
Cite Soleil and Bel Air, soliciting the cooperation of 
residents to root out the bandits. Unfortunately, MINUSTAH 
had not yet established sufficient stability in either zone. 
Charles explained that the lack of control in these 
neighborhoods endangers the entire downtown area as criminals 
run out of Bel Air shooting, often in the air, then retreat 
while MINUSTAH fires back from bases near the National 
Palace. Charles explained that criminals would continue to 
use kidnapping and armed theft to finance their movement as 
long as Bel Air and Cite Soleil remain beyond MINUSTAH (and 
HNP) control. CDA Griffiths promised to continue to pressure 
MINUSTAH to take the necessary steps to establish control in 
these areas. 
 
¶7. (C) CDA Griffiths reiterated that conditions in the 
prisons were unsustainable and that the incarceration of 
former Prime Minister Yvon Neptune continued to be a major 
problem. Charles noted that the justice system was 
responsible for overcrowding at the prisons and said that 
Neptune was failing to cooperate with overtures to assist 
him. CDA Griffiths warned that Neptune was trying to be a 
martyr and that it was imperative that the HNP prison 
authorities did everything correctly while he remained 
detained. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment: Post will continue to monitor and enforce 
compliance by the HNP in retiring the 21 long-guns from 
operational use. We will also coordinate with INL and CIVPOL 
on an arrangement for the Cap Haitien Coast Guard base that 
accommodates the HCG and takes advantage of the benefits 
co-location with MINUSTAH could bring to the HCG based there. 
Finally, Charles is correct that MINUSTAH's inability to 
regain the control of Bel Air it lost following the February 
28 shooting incident (not to mention establish a stronger 
presence in Cite Soleil) aggravates HNP efforts to confront 
the growing crime and insecurity generated by thugs 
supposedly operating out of these areas. End comment. 
 
GRIFFITHS