This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 001314 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCRM PINR EAID HA
SUBJECT: OPPORTUNITY AND STABILITY IN CAP HAITIEN 
 
¶1.   Summary.  Ambassador Foley visited Cap Haitien on April 
20-21 to meet with political, religious and economic leaders, 
as well as U.S. citizens in the region.  Optimism prevailed 
on security; Cap Haitien is stable and has seen no political 
violence in recent months.  Chilean MINUSTAH forces deployed 
in Cap Haitien have good control of the city and excellent 
relations with local police.  The Ambassador saw firsthand 
the extent to which the Haitian political system is set up to 
neglect provincial needs while concentrating wealth and power 
in Port-au-Prince.  While funds and equipment for road 
projects, infrastructure improvements and elections are 
slowly being dispersed in the capital, little to no impact is 
being felt in Cap Haitien.  Similarly, Cap Haitien's leaders 
are worried about the state of the Haitian National Police, 
who are underequipped and small in numbers.  Because security 
is not as grave a concern in Cap Haitien, opportunities for 
investment appear more promising there.  End Summary. 
 
   ¶2.   On April 20, the Ambassador traveled from 
Port-de-Paix to Cap Haitien, where he was met by a 
disproportionately large delegation consisting of IGOH 
officials, UN CivPol HNP, UN civil affairs, and Chilean 
soldiers.  Delegue Wilbert Joseph accompanied the Ambassador 
to the town of Milot, where he provided a guided tour of the 
ruins of the Palace of Sans Souci and the Citadel La 
Ferriere, two of Haiti's most impressive national monuments. 
Joseph was the first of many to request the establishment of 
an Embassy presence in Cap Haitien, either in the form of a 
Consular Agent, an Honorary Consul, an American institute or 
some regular and frequent visitation by an officer from the 
Embassy.  The sentiment of those in Cap is that Embassy 
interest in the region would compel GOH interest as well. 
(Note: In fact, the Embassy is a frequent visitor to Haiti's 
second city). 
 
¶3.   In Milot, the Ambassador visited Radio Kayimit, one of 
many Haitian community radio stations that receive 
programming and equipment through USAID's community radio 
network.  What seemed to be every last resident of Milot was 
assembled around the station to hear the live broadcast of 
the interview, in which the Ambassador spoke about the need 
to seek unity and move towards elections peacefully.  Public 
Diplomacy then made copies of the interview for distribution 
throughout the community radio network.  (Comment: Milot's 
previous mayor, Moise Jean-Charles, is reportedly still 
politically active in the region.  A firebrand Lavalas 
supporter, his protesting led to the cancellation of the 
massive "Sailing into History" cruise last summer.  While the 
situation in Milot and Cap Haitien appeared calm and stable, 
Jean-Charles casts a long shadow, and his name was on the tip 
of many tongues when describing security in the region.  On 
April 25, Jean-Charles made his own radio address criticizing 
the Ambassador for claiming Aristide was part of the past at 
a press conference on April 21, and Lavalas also organized a 
demonstration in Cap Haitien on May 9, announcing that they 
will continue to call for the ousted president's return.) 
 
¶4.   Throughout the visit in Cap Haitien, the strong 
performance and professionalism of the Chilean forces and 
CivPol contingent were evident.  Chilean Commander Tulio 
Rojas provided an excellent briefing, which outlined not only 
the MINUSTAH and HNP footprint in the North but also the 
presence of several armed bands operating in small towns 
outside Cap Haitien (septel).  While Rojas did not view these 
bands as a threat to stability, he said that MINUSTAH 
nevertheless plans to bring them in or force them to disarm. 
Though likely motivated more by power or hunger than 
politics, he described these bands as "chimeres".  He said 
that MINUSTAH had control of Cap Haitien and that no threat 
existed of a reemergence of armed extra-governmental forces 
in the city. 
 
¶5.   According to Rojas, no "no go" zones existed in the 
city, though some neighborhoods were more volatile than 
others, and many neighborhoods were controlled by bosses who 
had not yet welcomed MINUSTAH on their own turf.  MINUSTAH 
Head of Regional Office Javier Hernandez affirmed that 
Lavalas partisans felt they could safely march and organize 
because of the UN presence.  At the same time, some Lavalas 
leaders were still demanding the physical return of Aristide, 
the disarmament of ex-military, the release of all political 
prisoners, reparations to harmed Lavalas partisans and the 
punishment of human rights violators.  Rojas knew of no 
powerful political parties other than Lavalas in Cap. 
 
¶6.   Similar to Port-de-Paix, Cap's leaders were concerned 
about the underequipped Haitian National Police.  UN CivPol 
estimated that the HNP in the Northern department had one 
weapon for every three officers, with even fewer bullets. 
Morale in the HNP was low, their exposure to danger was high, 
and the public had little faith in them at present. 
 
¶7.  The Interim Mayor of Cap Haitien, Aspil Fleurant, a 
banker by trade, said he was fed up with public service and 
longed to return to private life.  His main preoccupation was 
with the state of the HNP and the infrastructure in Cap.  He 
and Ralph Dominique, the HNP Director for the Northern 
Department, both reiterated the need for a "minimum amount of 
resources" - vehicles, bullet-proof vests, uniforms (but 
notably not weapons). 
 
¶8.   Echoing his counterparts in Port-de-Paix, Fleurant 
stated that he feels the provinces are forgotten and 
neglected by the capital.  If he had a grader, a front-end 
loader, a trash truck and a backhoe, he could greatly improve 
conditions in the city.  He noted that American Airlines has 
already agreed to begin flying to Cap once the airstrip is 
lengthened and rehabilitated, but no money was forthcoming 
from Port-au-Prince for that project.  The Ambassador 
promised to follow up on that with the IGOH.  Fleurant also 
noted what he called a great indifference to improving life 
in Cap on the part of its citizenry, for which he could offer 
no explanation, other than to say that Haiti has not yet 
restored the authority of the State. 
 
Business Leaders See Opportunity, Peace In Cap -- 
 
¶9.   In a dinner with the Ambassador, business leaders said 
that the drug trade in Cap Haitien has decreased.  Nick 
Bussenius, Amcit warden and hotel owner, said that he noticed 
fewer traffickers moving through Cap Haitien.  Natacha 
Barrella, a travel agent, said that her business was down 
because the wives of drug traffickers are traveling less. 
However, the group agreed that the drug trade remained strong 
and that traffickers made little effort to hide their 
activities.  Both the Chilean and CivPol commanders stated 
that their forces receive frigid and inhospitable reactions 
from workers in the port when they conduct operations there. 
 
¶10.  The group repeatedly returned to the theme that Cap 
Haitien has great development potential, but is largely 
ignored by the central government.  As such, they were 
focused more on local than national elections.  However, the 
business community in Cap Haitien planned to support a 
candidate in the second round of the national elections. 
They also agreed that Cap Haitien was significantly more 
secure than Port-au-Prince.  All of them expressed reluctance 
to visit Port-au-Prince, saying that when they have to go 
they make their visits as short as possible.  They also 
voiced frustration with the international community's posture 
towards Haiti, which fixated on insecurity in Port-au-Prince 
while ignoring stability in Cap, thereby discouraging 
investment outside the capital. 
 
¶11.       In this vein, they requested a stronger Embassy 
presence in Cap Haitien.  Ultimately, they would like to see 
a return to permanent US representation there, but they were 
willing to settle for a regularly scheduled visit from the 
Embassy.  They also requested that the Ambassador push the 
EU, Taiwan, and IDB on roads projects planned for the north 
but not yet underway, as well as the IGOH on the long-planned 
airport development project that has seen no action. 
 
¶12.   COMMENT.  The same themes appeared throughout 
Ambassador Foley's visits to Cap Haitien and Port-de-Paix 
(septel).  The central government and the international 
community ignore the provinces.  The HNP has no equipment, 
while narcotraffickers are operating with impunity in the 
Northern claw.  Due to the deteriorating infrastructure, the 
most convenient commercial option is smuggling and contraband 
from the United States and the Dominican Republic. 
Ironically, neglect from the capital appears not necessarily 
to be such a bad thing.  The Northern coast is lush and green 
in many places, and appears to enjoy a better quality of life 
among its poorest citizens than the poor in Port-au-Prince. 
Cap Haitien is closer to the United States, the free trade 
zone in Ouanaminthe (septel) and the central plateau (Haiti's 
breadbasket) than Port-au-Prince.  That, coupled with its 
relative distance from the power-dominated and violent 
politics of Port-au-Prince, would seem to make it an ideal 
target for growth and investment.  Post will explore options 
on establishing a more regular presence in the region, as 
well as follow up on the various road and infrastructure 
projects which are currently still inactive.  END COMMENT. 
GRIFFITHS