This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 003521 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2015 
TAGS: PREL RS XF XI FR
SUBJECT: POLICY PLANNING DIRECTOR KRASNER DISCUSSES RUSSIA, 
ARAB WORLD REFORM, TRANSATLANTIC/MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION 
WITH FRENCH COUNTERPART 
 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso 
ns 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Visiting Policy Planning Director Stephen 
Krasner and S/P Deputy Barry Lowenkron met in Paris April 19 
with French MFA Center for Analysis and Prediction (CAP) 
Director Pierre Levy and his deputy, Philippe Errera for 
discussions of Russia's drift towards authoritarian rule; 
democratic reform in the Arab world; promoting democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law; and improving transatlantic 
and multinational cooperation.  The French offered their view 
of Putin's motivations, suggesting that he is following the 
will of Russia's domestic constituency but is still concerned 
with his image abroad.  They expressed pessimism concerning 
Russia's upcoming G-8 presidency, predicting that progress on 
ongoing projects would be slow and acknowledged 'huge' 
differences in the way EU member states deal with Russia. 
The French also pointed out differences between Europe and 
the U.S. on the Middle East saying that Europeans favor 
respecting the sovereignty of Arab states while the U.S. 
favors democratic reform even if it means forcefully changing 
regimes.  On the subject of post-conflict cooperation, the 
French said that many problems stem from a lack of clarity; 
post-conflict situations are inherently complicated but are 
rendered more so by miscommunication and differing 
understandings of commonly used terminology.  They suggested 
developing a common understanding of terminology and criteria 
so that all parties involved in post-conflict reconstruction 
have a clear idea of the circumstances that should trigger 
action, the processes that should govern how action is taken, 
the objectives of the action and the means to realistically 
measure success.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) In addition to Levy and Errera on the French side at 
the lunch were MFA Political Director Stanislas de Laboulaye, 
CAP Advisor on Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Space 
Claire Lignieres, and Center for International Studies and 
Research (CERI) researchers Pierre Hassner and Marie Mendras. 
 Poloff (notetaker) accompanied Krasner and Lowenkron. 
Krasner opened the session by asking whether the U.S., France 
and other Western nations had sufficient influence to 
leverage positive change in Russia.  Mendras responded with a 
question of her own: should the West really care whether 
Putin turns away from the democratic path internally so long 
as we secure his cooperation on external issues of importance 
to us, like Iran's nuclear program? 
 
¶3.  (C) Hassner suggested that Putin's domestic 
considerations are to some degree driving his policy choices 
in the near abroad.  He has not come to terms with the 
Ukrainian revolution and we risk continued trouble-making 
from Russia on Georgia.  The issue for us is to gauge how 
much we can push for adherence to democratic norms in Russia 
before Putin retaliates by cutting back on whatever 
cooperation he might otherwise be prepared to offer on 
external issues.  Mendras stated that the West -- including 
the U.S. during the first Bush administration and France 
under Chirac -- had been too indulgent of Putin and had not 
spoken out forcefully enough about Russian internal 
developments, including Chechnya.  She suggested that there 
are civil society leaders in Russia, especially in the 
provinces, who are unhappy with Putin's authoritarian turn. 
These can be important interlocutors for the West.  There 
are, in fact, many elites in Russia, not just the ones 
centered in Moscow and St. Petersburg around Putin. 
 
¶4.  (C) Levy noted that the GOF had begun considering how 
best to take advantage of Russia's G-8 presidency next year. 
Laboulaye said that given Russian officials' tendency towards 
Soviet-style behavior, their penchant for long, intractable 
bargaining, and their inexperience in launching initiatives 
in multilateral settings, he was not optimistic that the 
Russians' G-8 presidency would allow us to advance any of our 
ongoing projects.  Krasner confirmed that Washington agencies 
had begun thinking about this problem, but had yet to come to 
a concerted position on it.  Agreeing with Levy, Errera said, 
using a chess analogy, that the Russians are skilled at 
"playing black," but do not have the array of opening gambits 
and imagination needed to "play white."   Laboulaye suggested 
that the Russians could usefully be encouraged to work on G-8 
nonproliferation initiatives during the presidency.   This 
would represent a natural next step in the G-8 handling of 
Russia on this subject.  We had, he recalled, talked about 
Russian proliferation at the Kananaskis Summit, but since the 
Evian Summit we have been talking with Russia about North 
Korean, Iranian and other proliferation threats.  Krasner 
agreed that this might be a fruitful area for work during the 
Russian presidency. 
 
¶5.  (C) In response to Krasner's question, Laboulaye 
acknowledged that there were "huge" differences among 
European Union members in their approaches to Russia. 
France, Germany, Italy and other established EU members were 
"open and accommodating" in dealing with Russia.  Former 
Warsaw Pact and Soviet members on the other hand were deeply 
suspicious of Russia.  Poland, having taken the EU lead over 
Ukraine as the Orange Revolution played out, has developed a 
more balanced voice on Russia in EU councils.  The 
Commission, too, can be very negative in its dealings with 
Russia, Laboulaye said. 
 
¶6.  (C) A slightly different array of French players lined up 
for the afternoon session on Arab reform.  Laboulaye and 
Lignieres departed, to be replaced by CAP Advisor Sophie 
Pommier and writer and commentator Olivier Roy.  Roy led off 
by contrasting European and U.S. approaches to promoting 
reform in the Arab world.  Europeans favor the respect of 
sovereignty of states, even if they may be ruled by repugnant 
regimes, and attempt to apply political and economic 
incentives to promote internal reform.  The U.S., as 
demonstrated by its intervention in Iraq, is prepared to 
pursue a policy of regime change if this is deemed necessary 
to bring about reform.  This approach was anathema in the 
Arab world and Europe before Iraq.  But Iraq has changed 
attitudes fundamentally, Roy stated.  There is now in the 
Middle East  "a call for democracy."  The idea of democracy 
has become popular among the people of the Middle East. 
 
¶7.  (C) Nevertheless, differences in the U.S. and European 
approaches remain, with Europeans still tending to see 
secular, authoritarian regimes in the region as bulwarks 
against fundamentalist Islam.  The problem with the approach, 
however, is that "secular, authoritarian regimes have 
generally been failures," Roy went on.  They do not reform 
politically or economically, they perform poorly in creating 
economic growth, and they fuel the growth of Islamic 
fundamentalism's appeal to the large numbers of dispossessed 
in society.  On the other hand, American-style intervention 
does not necessarily produce rapid democratization either. 
So both approaches have their weaknesses, Roy concluded.  His 
only constant was that democratic reform in the Arab world is 
a long-term process. 
 
¶8.  (C) Roy suggested that the West begin with a simple 
question:  "Who are the democrats, and what power for change 
to they wield?"  Entrepreneurs certainly have a stake in 
democratic and economic reform, but they are an "elusive" 
group in the Arab world.  (There are none, for example, in 
Iran; in Tunisia there are some, but they are not free 
agents, having always to "make deals" with the regime.)  This 
class does exist in Turkey and is one of Turkish democracy's 
strengths, but "it is weak in the Arab world."  Intellectuals 
are another constituency for democracy in the Arab world, but 
they are dependent in many instances on support from abroad, 
and this very support makes them suspect in the eyes of many 
of their fellow Arabs.  Liberal Muslims may also be a group 
favorable to democratic ideas, and there are many in the Arab 
world.  It might also be possible, as in Afghanistan, to work 
with traditional civil society groups displaying clan and 
tribal allegiances.  Whoever we decide are the democrats, 
there can be no democracy in the Arab world without political 
legitimacy and political legitimacy in the Arab world depends 
on nationalism and Islam.  Democracy cannot be rooted without 
reference to one, the other, or both.  In many instances, 
groups that hold this legitimacy are not now inclined to work 
with the West.  The FIS in Algeria, Hizballah in Lebanon, 
Hamas in the Palestinian territories and the Islamic 
Brotherhood in Egypt all enjoy political legitimacy with 
their constituencies and have to be dealt with in some way, 
Roy contended. 
 
¶9.  (C) Krasner agreed that we would have to confront this 
difficulty.  He noted that the U.S. emphasis has been on 
promoting elections.  First elections in many of the 
countries in the region may not be perfect.  Some may give 
power to Islamist parties and groups.  Our objective should 
be to ensure that first elections in some of these countries 
are not last elections.  Under the right conditions, elected 
governments will be held accountable by the electorate, 
leading to democratic change and good governance.  Roy 
pointed to the difficulty of ensuring that first elections do 
not become last elections, ushering in a democratically 
elected dictatorship that will never relinquish power. 
Similarly, there is a question as to whether change would 
result, even if relatively fair elections could be arranged a 
second time in some of these countries.  This is because 
people tend to retreat into   tribal and ethnic identities in 
periods of uncertainty, because of fears of reprisal should 
traditional rivals ascend to power. 
 
¶10.  (C) Agreeing, Pommier said that it is the lack of 
political maturity in much of the Arab world that makes 
democratic change rare.  Of all Arab groups, Roy suggested, 
the Palestinians are perhaps the most politically mature. 
They have the experience of relatively free elections in 1996 
-- and the experience of rule by an aging, charismatic, but 
despotic and ineffectual leader that they do not want to 
repeat.  Agreeing, Levy noted that the Palestinians are among 
the most educated peoples in the Arab world.  Taking the 
argument one step further, Roy said that if the Palestinians 
are able to build a successful, democratic state, they will 
demonstrate to others in the Arab world that nationalism and 
democracy can go together.   That could be a useful example 
in promoting democracy elsewhere. 
 
¶11.  (C) With the final group of discussions, dedicated to 
"Promoting Democracy, the Rule of Law and Human Rights" and 
"Transatlantic and Multinational Cooperation," Levy 
introduced Jean-Maurice Ripert, the French MFA Director for 
the U.N. and International Organizations and, later, Eric 
Chevallier, the former Special Adviser to Bernard Kouchner, 
former Special Representative of the Secretary General 
(SRSG) to Kosovo.  After Krasner outlined the Secretary of 
State's emphasis on post-conflict reconstruction and the need 
to have well configured mechanisms to identify and react 
quickly to potential crises around the world, Ripert 
elaborated on the challenges of reconstruction.  He said that 
the French have termed reconstruction a "complex situation," 
that is, it is not simply coming to the aid of a nation after 
a natural disaster where assistance can be given with little 
threat or ambiguity.  Rather, it is an environment where 
there are often multiple actors, movement across borders and 
imperfect information that combine to create a situation 
where outside action can be costly and confusing.  Ripert 
said that the U.S. and France agree that current mechanisms 
are insufficient to deal with these new challenges.  All 
sides understand there needs to be international coordination 
yet no one nation will submit to the authority of another 
nation when it comes time for this coordination to take 
place.  Furthermore, he added, while internal coordination is 
imperative, external coordination is just as important.  One 
central problem of coordination, Ripert said, is that often 
times the coordinating bodies do not share the same vision -- 
they talk in shared terms while not understanding the other's 
definition of these terms -- this, coupled with the fact that 
different countries and organizations have different 
processes, contributes to the confusion.  Ripert said that an 
example of this confusion is manifest in the term 
"Development of the Rule of Law."  He said that people use 
this term as if the goal was universally understood, yet 
there is little consensus as to what developing a rule of law 
entails.  Ripert said that 'Human Rights' and 'Democracy' are 
two other terms that are often mistakenly viewed as 
interchangeable.  He asserted that the U.S. generally 
promotes democracy while France promotes human rights. 
 
¶12.  (C) Ripert said that the U.S. focus on democracy over 
human rights is worrisome to the French.  He said that the 
meeting of the Community of Democracies would take place in 
Santiago as the U.S. and Kofi Annan would "advocate an end to 
the UN Commission on Human Rights."  Ripert said that it is 
good to question the effectiveness of the Commission, but 
that the reform measures proposed are not the right 
solutions.  For example, he said, creating a two-thirds rule 
for electing members would allow a country like Libya to get 
on the Commission before the U.S.  He said the Commission on 
Human Rights, as the international human rights advocate, 
needs to have everyone on board, "the good guys and the bad 
guys."  Otherwise, he said, there is a danger that no 
organization focused on human rights will exist within the 
UN.  Furthermore, he warned that allowing human rights 
violators to exist on the periphery of an organization serves 
to discourage democratic activists in those countries. 
Ripert said that activists such as Iran's Shirin Ebadi 
consistently demand that France not give up on their plight, 
and giving up on the Human Rights Commission would send these 
leaders the wrong message.  Krasner answered that the Human 
Rights Commission has not been effective and that even if the 
Human Rights Commission were to go away, the norms upon which 
human rights are based will not.  So, he asked, is it better 
under the circumstances to have a hypocritical organization? 
Krasner then suggested that the French CAP consider thinking 
of solutions that challenge traditional norms.  He asked them 
to question the Westphalian assumption that gives rights to 
states based on the fact that they are sovereign nations and 
consider what might happen if states were held to human 
rights or democratic standards in order to determine their 
admission into bodies such as the UN Security Council.  The 
challenge, he said, is to identify what will motivate the 
state to undergo change.   For example, Krasner said, 
pressure from Mercosur was enough to compel Paraguay to 
institute reform.  He said that finding, creating, and/or 
strengthening other institutions so that they might hold this 
same persuasive edge may be key to changing the behavior of 
states. 
 
¶13.  (C) Pierre Levy then introduced Eric Chevallier who 
described several key lessons from the past decade on 
post-conflict situations that should inform the international 
community going forward.  The first, he said, was that in 
conflict resolution there has always been a huge gap between 
expectations and what can actually be achieved.  High 
expectations at the outset cause people to measure the 
success of action based not upon what it has achieved, but on 
what it was expected to achieve, therefore a disproportionate 
number of actions are deemed failures while very few are 
deemed successes.  This, in turn, makes intervention a harder 
sell to the domestic constituency.   The second lesson, 
Chevallier said, is that external legality is never enough. 
For the West, an election is the culmination of the 
democratic process; it follows that the West, in introducing 
elections to an undemocratic society, often concludes that, 
because elections have occurred, the society is democratic. 
Chevallier said that he believes elections are absolutely 
necessary, but that simply stenciling them onto a society is 
not enough.  Therefore, we must examine and replicate the 
process that brings a society to elections- it is through 
this process that a society begins to feel empowered and 
therefore capable of choosing its own leaders and making its 
own decisions.  The third lesson is that in conflict and 
post-conflict situations short-term goals often contradict 
long-term goals. 
 
¶14.  (C) Chevalier said that often times in post-conflict 
situations the international community holds the population 
to an impossible human standard.  It is unreasonable, he 
said, to expect a man who has recently learned that his wife 
was killed by the other side to "forgive and forget." 
Furthermore, people on the ground need to have a realistic 
concept of what their future will be like, the promise of an 
ideal future in the long-term is useless when a person sees 
only a bleak short-term existence with no means of ever 
arriving at that distant goal.  Objectives must be concrete, 
Chevallier said, they must be translated into realities that 
people can reasonably expect on the ground.   All parties 
agreed that the proximity of the EU and hope of potential EU 
membership provided countries of the former Yugoslavia a 
realistic horizon that allowed them to change more rapidly 
than they would've had the potential for EU membership not 
existed.  Krasner said that identifying and/or creating 
bodies that serve, as a motivational tool for states is 
imperative adding that it would be great if Africa had an 
effective mechanism for promoting change. 
 
¶15.  (C) On elections, Chevallier said that there are 
generally two schools of thought: the first is focused on the 
importance of the process and the second on the importance of 
the outcome.   In the first school of thought, elections, 
even imperfect, are seen as one step in a process of 
refinement of the democratic process.  Afghanistan and Iraq 
are both examples of this.  However, proponents of the second 
school of thought, he said, argue that it is better to wait 
and have elections when the timing is right.  He cited Bosnia 
as an example of this.  Ripert added that this question of 
process vs. outcome is one that the French are currently 
debating as regards elections in Lebanon.  When asked which 
model he favored, Krasner responded that in the past he would 
have said that if elections are held too early that the 
results would fall on sectarian lines, but that his answer 
now would be different.  He said that elections that are 
focused on process rather than outcome can be successful but 
that more robust election monitoring is needed to ensure that 
the democratic process is adhered to and improves over time. 
Chevallier added that monitoring needs to be in place before, 
during and after elections but asked what organization would 
be responsible for conducting it, noting that the OSCE 
already does election monitoring.   Krasner answered that the 
OSCE could possibly do it, that coalitions of the willing 
would not be the right type to conduct monitoring, and that 
the UN may not be capable either.  Strengthening the AU to 
serve this function, he added, could be an attractive option. 
 
 
¶16.  (C) Ripert agreed that a more robust election monitoring 
apparatus would be useful and suggested that the U.S. and 
France work to define criteria.  He explained that he was 
recently involved in UN discussions where they worked to 
define criteria for the use of force and that it occurred to 
him that it would be valuable to define criteria for other 
actions as well such as successful political transition.  All 
sides agreed that this would be a good idea and that it would 
be beneficial to include the British in these discussions as 
well. 
 
¶17.  (U)  S/P Deputy Barry Lowenkron has cleared on this 
cable. 
WOLFF