This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002974 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON FR CH
SUBJECT: PM RAFFARIN'S APRIL 21-24 TRIP TO CHINA 
 
REF: A. BEIJING 7133 
     ¶B. PARIS 1698 
     ¶C. BEIJING 7150 
     ¶D. BEIJING 4854 
     ¶E. BRUSSELS 1542 
 
Classified By: Charge Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Building on the high-profile exchange of 
French and Chinese presidential visits last year, Prime 
Minister Raffarin focused his late April visit mostly on 
economic issues and cultural affairs. His statement that 
China's March anti-secession law is "compatible" with the 
French position vis-a-vis Taiwan drew our interest, but few 
headlines.  The MFA tried to explain Raffarin's remarks by 
saying that the anti-secession law was consistent with the 
"one-China" policy that both the French and the United States 
espouse.  As for the military measures foreseen by the law, 
the MFA said that the "non-pacific measures" referred to in 
the law did not necessarily mean force, but could instead be 
construed as an embargo or a block on investment.  Both 
Raffarin and our MFA colleagues also repeated the French line 
in favor of lifting the EU's arms embargo, and in particular, 
by the end of June as decided by the December European 
Council. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) Poloff spoke with MFA China desk officer Arnaud Roux 
-- who was on the delegation -- on April 28 to discuss the 
Prime Minister's trip to China.  Roux noted that Raffarin 
visited Beijing, Shenyang, and Shanghai from April 21 through 
24, accompanied by Exterior Commerce Minister Francois Loos, 
Agriculture Minister Dominique Bussereau, Minister Delegate 
for Research Francois d'Aubert, MFA State Secretary Renaud 
Muselier, and Transport Ministry State Secretary Francois 
Goulard, along with some 30 business people -- reflecting the 
strong commercial focus of the visit. 
 
ANTI-SECESSION LAW 
 
¶3. (C)   It was, however, Raffarin's statement on China's 
anti-secession law that caught our attention. Apparently 
seeking to delink China's March passage of the law from EU 
plans to lift the embargo, Raffarin, at a press conference, 
described the law as "completely compatible" with the French 
position on Taiwan.  Queried on this point, Roux said that 
what Raffarin meant was that the anti-secession law was 
consistent with the one-China policy espoused by France ever 
since it had opened diplomatic relations with the PRC. 
"Raffarin only re-stated this position," Roux said.  When 
poloff pointed out the disturbing provision of the law that 
would allow the use of military force against Taiwan, Roux 
contested this, saying that the "non-pacific measures" 
mentioned in the law did not necessarily mean using force. 
China could employ, for example, an embargo against Taiwanese 
goods or investment as a means to pressure Taiwan -- the law 
did not necessarily mean the Chinese would use force.  Poloff 
responded that it appeared that the French had a different 
understanding of "non-pacific measures" than not only the 
U.S. but also than several of its European neighbors. 
 
¶4. (C) Roux also remarked that the French find the recent 
visit to Beijing by Taiwan KMT chairman Lien Chan to be a 
positive step, noting that Chinese willingness to talk "even 
with the opposition" showed its goodwill (this conversation 
took place before the issuance of the joint communique from 
the PRC and Taiwan's KMT). 
 
EU ARMS EMBARGO 
 
¶5.  (C)  Raffarin, during a press event with Chinese PM Wen 
Jiabao, called the embargo "anachronistic, wrongfully 
discriminatory, and in complete contradiction of the current 
state of the strategic partnership between Europe and China." 
 Raffarin repeated that "France continues to request the 
lifting of the embargo and does not see what could lead the 
European Council to change its position,"  referring to the 
December 2004 Council decision to lift the embargo by the end 
of June 2005. 
 
¶6. (C)  Roux repeated the French line that the lifting would 
be a "political step only" in recognition of Chinese 
progress.  He pressed poloff, noting even the U.S. had 
recognized this when the USG declined to present a resolution 
condemning Chinese human rights abuses at this year's HRC. 
Poloff responded that indeed the U.S. had seen small steps of 
improvement, which merited a modest measure such as 
refraining from bringing the human rights resolution, but 
that in no way had China made enough progress to merit 
lifting an embargo that would allow it to buy more arms. 
Roux responded with the repeated French line that the French 
have no intentions of selling arms to the Chinese. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Roux said that Chirac will continue to press for a 
decision on the arms embargo -- positive or negative -- by 
the end of the Luxembourg EU presidency.  When poloff asked 
whether Chirac would press for such a decision even if he 
believed he might not get the answer he wanted, Roux said yes. 
¶8.  (C) According to Roux, the two sides did not discuss the 
recent tension between China and Japan. 
 
COMMERCIAL DEALS 
 
¶9.  (U)  According to press accounts, China ordered 10 new 
Airbus planes (5 A319s for China Eastern and 5 A319/A320s for 
Shenzhen Airlines), worth 500 million to 600 million dollars, 
 and finalized the already announced contract for 5 Airbus 
A380s.  The French delegation also announced that they would 
like to see 1,000 more French SMEs working in China "des" 
¶2005. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶10.  (C)  The French continue to press for the lifting of the 
embargo (reftels B and C), even in the face of skepticism 
coming from their EU colleagues, in particular since China's 
March passage of the anti-secession law (refs D and E). 
While the French press conveyed Raffarin's statement on the 
compatibility of the law with the French position on Taiwan, 
it did not attract much attention.  Editorialists did not 
seize on the issue, choosing instead to comment on the 
commercial aspects of the trip. This illustrates the 
underlying theme we have seen in the French view of the 
French-Chinese relationship: strategic and commercial 
interests prevail.  As Raffarin demonstrated, the French 
continue to characterize U.S. security concerns in the region 
as overblown, allowing them to justify their pursuit of a 
lift.  They may calculate that being publicly outspoken in 
favor of lifting the embargo even if their EU partners are 
not persuade, will win them favor in Beijing.  Paris 
continues to cultivate that relationship in part because of 
the commercial opportunities it sees there, but also because 
Chirac believes that China is an essential element to the 
multipolar political arrangement that he envisions as optimal 
for French power projection.  END COMMENT. 
ROSENBLATT