This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 OTTAWA 001384 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CA ECON ETRD MX PGOV PREL EWWT SMIG SNAR SOCI
SUBJECT: CANADA: MISSION PERSPECTIVE ON SPP SECURITY GOALS 
 
REF: A. MEXICO 02776 B. OTTAWA 01364 
 
¶1.  SUMMARY: Mission Canada appreciates the opportunity to 
comment on the interagency effort under way to identify a 
coherent and forward looking security road map for North 
America.  We must continue to search for security weaknesses 
and identify areas where our three countries can strengthen 
our effort.  As indicated in Ref B, the most logical way 
forward will be to consolidate and harmonize a plethora of 
existing programs, from multiple-use NEXUS cards to 
functional and user-friendly watch lists.  We also believe 
that SPP should recognize and play off initiatives and 
activities that are already successfully underway.  For 
example, we applaud the idea in the law enforcement goal of 
focusing on legal differences that undermine the otherwise 
excellent law enforcement cooperation between the US. and 
Canada. All Mission elements have discussed the various 
security Goal Papers as they have been developed in 
Washington over the past two weeks and offer our comments 
below.  We welcome feedback and discussion on the various 
pieces of this mosaic that we have identified and invite 
suggestions from any quarter on how we in Mission Canada can 
help further the North American Partnership. Comments on the 
prosperity side of SPP are being transmitted septel. END 
SUMMARY 
 
---------------------------------- 
GOAL 1: Traveler Security Strategy 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  All of us want to facilitate legitimate trade and travel 
to the maximum extent possible while still keeping those who 
would do us harm from entering the US.  As a result, visa 
policy harmonization has been a top priority of both Canada 
Immigration and the State Department's Visa Office.  In 
addition, Post has accorded every effort to convince Canada 
to bring into line their visa waiver program with ours. 
 
¶3.  We should all do more to improve the visa screening 
process for potential at-risk travelers.  Though now down to 
two weeks processing time, compared to an average of 75 days 
a year ago, more rapid identification and verification of 
high-risk individuals through better connectivity is a must 
if we are to truly "facilitate" legitimate travel and trade 
in today's instant and time sensitive world. 
 
¶4.  One idea worth serious consideration is a continent-wide 
NEXUS program that defines and identifies individuals who 
pose little or no security or law enforcement risk.  The 
current NEXUS program could be improved by simplifying the 
application process through introducing on-line NEXUS 
applications.  Also worth exploring is the notion of a single 
NEXUS card that would be valid for air, sea and land 
crossings.  Some cost recovery could be included in the 
application process (i.e., for a retina recognition 
capability). 
 
------------------------------- 
Goal 2: Cargo Security Strategy 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  Improving/updating PiP, Canada's version of C-TPAT, 
should be an objective.  PiP, pre-dates 9/11 and thus far 
fails to guarantee the security of a manufacturer's/shipper's 
chain of supply.  Canada could benefit from the lessons 
learned in formulating and implementing C-TPAT in the US. 
Both the US and Canada would further benefit if PiP and 
C-TPAT could be coordinated so that companies would have to 
meet one set of standards for both. 
 
------------------------- 
Goal 3: Reducing Travel Time 
------------------------- 
 
¶6.  The effort to increase participation in FAST should focus 
on those locations currently suffering traffic congestion or 
likely to in the near future.  All construction planned at 
border crossings should include in design the fundamental 
advantages of FAST and NEXUS dedicated lanes and inspection 
booths.  Additionally, both the US and Canada should continue 
to involve other government regulatory agencies from both 
countries in programs such as FAST and C-TPAT to utilize risk 
management and expedited reporting methods in order to 
improve border crossing facilitation. 
 
------------------------------ 
Goal 4: Aviation Security Strategy 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7.  Security for US CBP officials at preclearance sites 
remains problematic.  It would be better if CATSA security 
screeners were to be placed in front of our CBP pre-clearance 
personnel at all airports.  At six of seven pre-clearance 
sites, DHS/CBP inspectors interview US bound passengers 
before they are screened by security.  This poses a threat to 
the security and welfare of our airport CBP staff as they are 
exposed to unscreened passengers and baggage. 
 
------------------------------- 
Goal 5:  Maritime Security Strategy 
------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  Keeping criminals and terrorists from reaching our shores 
from the high seas is just as important as keeping them from 
transiting our land borders.  We need a fully integrated 
US-Canada Maritime surveillance system to detect problematic 
vessels and we need an interdiction capability before suspect 
vessels enter US and Canadian ports and seaways.   We are 
fortunate in that we have willing partners on the Canadian 
service side (Canadian Navy, RCMP, and Coast Guard). For 
instance, the Canadian Navy authorities at the Trinity 
facility in Halifax are making extensive renovations and are 
expanding the new Maritime Security Operations Center (MSOC). 
 This Center will eventually link more closely with US 
interagency intelligence analysis centers. Similarly, US 
Coast Guard and the RCMP are hoping the US and Canada will 
soon sign a Shiprider Protocol which would allow both 
services to better carry out their interdiction and arrest 
responsibilities in our shared waterways.  Nonetheless, there 
are old "sovereignty-related" perceptions that need to be 
broken down so that these programs can eventually run more 
seamlessly.  One such "confidence building measure" would be 
a program for jointly training maritime search procedures to 
US and Canadian officials. Topics such as Confined Space 
Training, vessel boarding and searching/rummaging and 
underwater remote video inspection could be beneficial and 
make consistent our respective efforts. 
 
¶9.  One of the most consistent messages we hear from our 
industry contacts is that on the Canadian side of the border, 
infrastructure is the major bottleneck.  One way to address 
this issue may be to develop more fully alternative modes of 
transport such as the use of short-sea shipping.  Post 
recommends the establishment of an interagency working group 
tasked with identifying obstacles to investment and activity 
in this section.  Canada and Mexico would do a similar 
internal assessment -- the analysis of which would feed into 
a trilateral short-sea shipping working group. 
 
-------------------------------- 
GOAL 6: LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY 
---------------------------- 
 
¶10.  On land, Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) 
have proven essential in the fight against criminals and 
terrorists who attempt to cross our land frontier undetected. 
Nonetheless, we are concerned about obvious security gaps 
along the Canadian-US contiguous border. To ensure that US 
and Canadian law enforcement officials can do their jobs, we 
believe that air assets should be standard at all IBET 
locations.  We also think the road ahead necessitates our 
implementation of joint, versus the current parallel, 
operational deployment of IBET participants in pursuit of 
criminals and terrorists. For this to be practicable, 
however, there are memoranda of understanding, protocols and 
agreements that need to be finalized and implemented. For 
instance, the absence of a carriage of arms reciprocal 
agreement between the US and Canada has been a stumbling bloc 
to more effective Integrated Border Enforcement Team 
deployments.  The US passed Title 19 legislation in February 
2003, and has developed implementation guidelines now being 
put in place.  Canada has stated that it would be amenable to 
offer US law enforcement officers Title 19-like authorities 
and exemptions, and this should be pursued. 
 
¶11. Also of concern is the illegal transshipment of 
controlled goods through Canada to proscribed nations. US 
exporters are exempt from obtaining Department of State and 
Commerce export licenses for some controlled military and 
dual use products destined for Canada.  However, some 
Canadian companies have circumvented Canada's regulations 
prohibiting the export of US origin items to sanctioned 
nations by falsifying the country of origin on applications 
for Canadian Government export permits.  To date, the US has 
encouraged Canadian authorities to enact new legislation 
commensurate with current US prohibitions on the illegal 
transshipment of controlled goods to sanctioned nations.  We 
have initiated partnership with Canadian authorities in an 
outreach effort to better educate private companies on issues 
associated with the illegal diversion of controlled goods.  A 
Washington push to move forward on strengthened regulations 
and penalties would help convince the Canadians of our 
intent. 
 
¶12. Migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons is an 
emotional hot button for many Canadians. Though Canada just 
made it into our Tier 1 status after being classified Tier 2 
for lack of government action against human traffickers, 
there remains much that Ottawa can do to counter what we see 
as a growing phenomenon in and through Canada.  What we know 
for sure is that there are no verifiable numbers to measure 
the magnitude of the problem, and despite the RCMP's 
establishment of counter-human trafficking task groups, to 
date there has been only one arrest of a man accused of 
trafficking.  There have been no successful prosecutions of 
human traffickers in Canada. 
 
¶13. In response to Washington's efforts to highlight the 
issue, the Cross Border Crime Forum tasked US and Canadian 
members to prepare a Joint Threat Assessment on Human 
Trafficking and by all reports the final document, complete 
with recommendations, should be ready by the end of the year. 
 This is an important first step, but to be effective both 
Canadian and US authorities will need to evaluate and where 
acceptable, follow through on the Assessment's 
recommendations. 
 
---------------------------- 
GOAL 7: Intelligence Sharing 
---------------------------- 
 
¶14.  All USG agencies involved in cross border activities 
have at least some information gathering or reporting 
function.  However, the Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI) has responsibility and oversight of all intelligence 
coordination and activities conducted overseas. The structure 
and mechanisms called for in the new US intelligence 
legislation still need to be worked out, and it is imperative 
the USG avoid confusion that would result from a duplication 
of effort. 
 
¶15.  The law enforcement subgroup of the Cross Border Crime 
Forum has been working steadfastly for years to streamline 
other mechanisms to enhance the effectiveness of intelligence 
information sharing between US and Canadian Government law 
enforcement and justice authorities.  Of note, the series of 
Joint Threat Assessments on Organized Crime, Drug 
Trafficking, Identity Theft and Firearms Trafficking have 
been significant instruments through which previously not, or 
poorly shared information has been documented by both 
nations' law enforcement and justice authorities.  As noted 
above, a Joint Trafficking in Persons Threat Assessment is 
being prepared and should be published by the end of the 
year.  Additionally, we understand that a new Threat 
Assessment on Counterfeit Goods is being considered.  It 
already has high level Canadian endorsement.  These documents 
form an urgently needed foundation for comprehensive strategy 
development by US and Canadian law enforcement authorities 
and could be expanded to include a wider range of agency 
stakeholders from both sides of the border. The eventual 
usefulness however, will measured by the willingness of both 
nation's authorities to endorse and pursue the Assessments' 
agreed upon recommendations. 
 
¶16.  Nonetheless, currency smuggling is an issue that Mission 
components feel still needs immediate attention.  US and 
Canadian law requires negotiable instruments at or over 
10,000 dollars (both Canadian and US) be declared at ports of 
entry, both inbound and outbound.  Canada Border Security 
Agency (CBSA) is charged with the border enforcement of the 
reporting requirement in Canada on behalf of the Financial 
Transactions Reports Analysis Center of Canada (FINTRAC), 
which reviews  incoming reports for potential action by law 
enforcement.  Currently, FINTRAC is attempting to implement a 
72-hour information turnaround which does little to enable US 
or Canadian authorities at the border points of entry to 
investigate or arrest suspects involved in money smuggling at 
the actual time of entry/departure.  Though, Canada is 
expected to enact legislative changes by January 2006 that 
would allow for a more direct sharing of seizure data and 
intelligence between US and Canadian authorities along the 
contiguous US-Canada border.  Unless the transfer of data is 
immediate, criminals and possibly terrorists will continue to 
transport negotiable financial instruments between the US and 
Canada with relative impunity. 
 
¶17.  More broadly, there is a need for more useful 
information sharing between US and Canadian law enforcement 
officials in situations where no formal joint or cross border 
investigations are in place or where standing provisions for 
Mutual Legal Assistance do not apply.  Impediments to 
investigations, arrests and prosecutions resulting from 
Canada's more stringent Privacy Act requirements plague US 
law enforcement and Justice officials.  Bringing Canada's 
"reason to believe" standard more in line with our "reason to 
suspect" standard should be done.  It will require high level 
attention. 
 
------------------- 
Goal 8: BioProtection 
------------------- 
 
¶18.  Post believes that all the objectives under the 
BioProtection Strategy are presently being addressed 
utilizing various fora established in existing treaties, 
memoranda of understandings, trade agreement, and through 
declarations by international standard setting bodies.  Key 
to meeting the timeframes being set in the SPP is a strong 
buy-in by pertinent federal/state-provincial and local 
agencies. 
 
------------------------------------- 
GOAL 9: Protection Prevention and Response 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶19.  Though more can be done, Canadian and US authorities 
already cooperate on emergency management, both formally and 
informally.  For instance, both TOPOFF II and TOPOFF III 
provided valuable insight into how prepared Canada and the US 
are to respond effectively to a mass causality event.  To 
further hone skills and expose deficiencies, we hope Canada 
will continue to participate with the US and others, and 
indeed expand their gaming to include wider provincial and 
local jurisdictions.  Obviously, the ultimate goal will be to 
correct deficiencies and make stronger and better our 
collective ability to respond.  We say this, noting that 
there are many state/provincial and local jurisdictions that 
have in place a wide-range of cross border local emergency 
response assistance agreements. 
 
¶20.  We also believe that the US's Center for Disease Control 
and Health Canada have been and continue to be close and 
active partners, a relationship between experts that should 
assist US and Canadian efforts to identify, isolate and 
eventually eliminate threats posed by infectious diseases. 
One possible area that may help both the US and Canada more 
quickly and effectively respond to a mass casualty event or 
possible pandemic would be to investigate whether or not a 
harmonization of medical professional licensing requirements 
could be done.  Post recognizes the such an effort would have 
significant repercussions on medical standards and practices 
in both the US and Canada, but if an event occurs that 
necessitates a "good Samaritan" response, affected residents 
on both sides of the border could be helped more quickly if 
both governments allow the pre-positioning of 
license/certification data in each other's jurisdictions. 
 
Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa 
 
DICKSON