This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 003769 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE/CT FOR MOLANDER AND RPARENT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2015 
TAGS: PTER PREL EFIN SNAR TBIO IN AF PK CE BG NP US INDO PAK
SUBJECT: MEA PROVIDES "NEXT STEPS" FOR US-INDIA CT JWG 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 3745 
     ¶B. NEW DELHI 3717 
     ¶C. NEW DELHI 3647 
     ¶D. NEW DELHI 3494 
     ¶E. NEW DELHI 2189 
     ¶F. STATE 28559 
     ¶G. NEW DELHI 878 
     ¶H. NEW DELHI 876 
     ¶I. 04 NEW DELHI 8028 
     ¶J. 04 NEW DELHI 5630 
     ¶K. 04 NEW DELHI 5486 
 
Classified By: Charge Robert O. Blake, Jr., for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an Action Request -- see Para 4. 
 
¶2.  (U) Summary: MEA Director (Americas) Renu Pall recently 
gave Poloff the GOI's understanding of the next steps agreed 
to at the August 31-September 1, 2004, Sixth Meeting of the 
India-US Counter-Terrorism Joint Working Group (CTJWG), with 
a request that this document be forwarded to Washington for 
response.  From our perspective in New Delhi, we have already 
made significant progress in many areas, limited progress in 
others, and no substantial progress in a few (see Paras 5-7). 
 When the next Coordinator for Counterterrorism takes office, 
we recommend that the Coordinator make the scheduling of the 
next US-India CTJWG a priority.  End Summary. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The lightly edited MEA text reads as follows. 
Begin text: 
 
Both India and the US agreed that terrorism was a challenge 
the international community needs to face collectively. 
 
Both sides agreed to further strengthen their intelligence 
sharing arrangements, with an emphasis on operational 
intelligence. 
 
The Indian side suggested that the US consider moving for the 
UN listing of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, which was already on the US 
list.  The USG agreed to consider it.  It was felt that the 
process of encompassing all jihadi groups must continue. 
 
India also agreed with the long-term US objective of 
de-jihadisation of the Pakistan-Afghanistan region.  Both 
India and the US felt that while al-Qaida may have diminished 
as an organizational structure, its reach had expanded as an 
ideological motivator.  The challenge of terrorism continued 
to mutate.  Countering the attraction that the al-Qaida 
ideology had come to hold was an area where India and the US 
could work together. 
 
The US assured that they continued to encourage Pakistan to 
address Indian concerns regarding cross border terrorism. 
Both India and the US agreed that the de-jihadisation of the 
Pak-Afghanistan region was a priority. 
 
India and the US agreed to continue coordinating their 
respective policies with regard to the situation in Nepal. 
 
On Sri Lanka, both delegations agreed on the need for 
continuing the ban on the LTTE.  It was felt that it would be 
helpful if other countries, particularly Canada, also 
proscribed the LTTE in order to make the ban more effective. 
 
India and the US agreed that their intelligence agencies 
would share information pertaining to Bangladesh becoming a 
major transit point for movement of terrorist individuals, 
arms and ammunition from Southeast Asia to South Asia and 
from Pakistan.  The US wished to continue the exchange of 
assessments with India on the situation in Bangladesh.  The 
US requested details of camps operating in Bangladesh and 
conveyed that there was a real commonality of interest with 
India on this subject.  It was agreed that it would be in 
mutual interest to be more precise on intelligence exchange. 
 
There was commonality of views on Afghanistan.  India shared 
the US objective to see Afghanistan emerge as a peaceful, 
stable democracy, not vulnerable to outside manipulation by 
jihadi forces.  It was estimated that the opium crop in 
Afghanistan had increased substantially over the prior one 
year.  This quantum jump would contribute to the heroin 
traffic sourced from Afghanistan.  The trend this year showed 
that the average of the last four years in narcotics 
trafficking across the India-Pak border into India had been 
crossed in the first six months alone.  There was agreement 
on the need for additional strategies to counter financing of 
terrorism through narco-trafficking. 
 
Detailed discussions were held on training and capacity 
building cooperation.  The US informed the Indian side that 
it would send an assessment team in October 2004 to further 
bilateral cooperation in the area of Anti-Terrorism 
Assistance courses and capacity building.  The Indian 
delegation's request that the calendar of training events be 
shared in advance by the US to the extent feasible met with 
understanding on the US side. 
 
The two delegations looked at the whole range of issues 
related to extradition and mutual legal assistance.  The GOI 
hoped to complete the process on the Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaty in the coming months.  Both sides agreed that there 
would be symbolic and substantive advantages were the MLAT 
brought into force.  There was agreement that specific cases 
of interest to either side should be expedited.  The US was 
grateful for assistance given to FBI on the IC-814 case. 
India conveyed that ways needed to be found for India to 
obtain more information on the IC-814 hijacking from Taliban 
elements in US custody.  India also flagged, in particular, 
the extradition case of Sameera Jumani, the wife of Abu Salem. 
 
The US apprised India of its decision to make its data on 
lost and stolen passports available to Interpol.  This was 
inspired by the practice amongst European countries and was 
seen as a step to prevent countries from becoming safe 
havens.  It was suggested that India also consider doing so. 
 
The US requested access to Dahal, alleged to be involved in 
the murder of two US security guards in the US Embassy in 
Kathmandu.  The Indian side agreed to look into the matter. 
 
The US agreed to provide a detailed write-up on the Pacific 
Command proposal for a Counter-Terrorism Seminar to be held 
in India in February 2005 so as to explore ways to enhance 
inter-operability between the US and India on 
counter-terrorism related inter-agency coordination 
processes.  The steps to organizing such a CT seminar with 
India would involve: (i) details about GOI approach on the 
Seminar concept; (ii) definition of objectives by GOI and US; 
(iii) initial planning conference; (iv) preparation of list 
of participants i.e. officials in GOI with CT roles; (v) 
discussions on the timeframe and venue; (vi) mid-planning 
conference in December 2004 or two months prior to the CT 
seminar; (vii) final planning conference one month prior to 
CT Seminar i.e. January 2005. 
 
The US presentation on the PISCES border control system was 
noted.  India conveyed that it had already developed a 
software system, which was being installed in 17 airports in 
India.  This was along the lines of PISCES and it was hoped 
that it would be in place by November 2004.  The thinking on 
the Indian side, therefore, was to watch this indigenous 
system for some time and thereafter compare it with the 
American PISCES system and identify avenues for cooperation, 
which would have to meet the requirement of an inter-agency 
process on the Indian side.  The US requested early 
indication, either way, in terms of a yes or no. 
 
India provided a briefing on its efforts to bring in 
amendments to its Anti-Money Laundering Act and to its 
Financial Intelligence Unit.  The US said that it looked 
forward to working with the Indian FIU. 
 
Both countries also discussed implications of the hawala 
route, an issue at the G-20 meeting on October 18-19, 2004 
and the FATF meeting October 20-22, 2004.  There was 
agreement that hawala transfers were contributing to the 
financing of terrorism in South Asia.  Tracking of hawala was 
entirely intelligence-led.  Since legal transfers were easier 
to track, one approach would be to reduce the cost of money 
transfer transactions and thereby reduce the recourse to 
hawala.  The US delegation agreed to take the points made by 
India back to their colleagues in the US Department of State 
and the Treasury Department. 
 
US interest in cooperation in the field of bio-terrorism was 
noted.  The Indian side suggested that further discussions be 
held to look for an acceptable approach to cooperation in 
this field.  The US proposed to present a nonpaper in 
September 2004 for a table-top exercise as a starting point 
to look at procedural issues.  It was agreed that the Science 
Congress of January 2005 would be a starting point for 
discussions.  Sharing of best practices, technology exchange 
and capacity building were identified as broad areas for 
cooperation in this future-looking area. 
 
On the UN Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), US 
expressed support for Indian suggestions and nominations to 
the CTED to represent India's interest and expertise. It was 
agreed that India's nominations would be conveyed to the US 
as well. 
 
End text. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Action Request:  Post requests that SA and S/CT 
provide comments and suggestions on the above document that 
can be shared with MEA. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶5.  (C) This MEA paper is welcome as a checklist on progress 
to date and as a "to do" list, although coming so many months 
after the CTJWG, many of the items have moved forward in the 
interim.  We have made much progress in building our CT 
relationship with New Delhi.  The most common obstacle we 
face is the slow, cautious Indian bureaucracy.  From our 
perspective, we report the most significant progress in the 
following areas: 
 
-- Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT): We told the MEA that Washington 
led the effort that resulted in the May 2 addition of LeT to 
the UNSCR 1267 sanctions list (Ref E).  India's mainstream 
media presented the story in a very favorable light, and the 
MEA thanked us for our action and for keeping them in the 
loop as the motion wound its way through diplomatic 
obstacles.  Our subsequent discussions on LeT with NSA 
Narayanan and the MEA Joint Secretary (Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
Iran) have been more vigorous (Refs A and B), and we predict 
this will lead to greater information sharing on LeT. 
 
-- Nepal: The Indo-US united diplomatic front since King 
Gyanendra dismissed the Nepal parliament (Ref D and previous) 
demonstrates a level of cooperation and consultation more 
involved than simply "coordinating respective policies," and 
stems from a recognition of the common interests at stake. 
It is a template for Indo-US coordination in other policy 
areas. 
 
-- Narco-trafficking: INL funded from the 2003 LOA with the 
Ministry of Finance the first in a series of workshops on 
asset seizure/forfeiture under India's primary economic 
crimes and counter-narcotics laws, in which DEA, FBI and 
DHS/ICE participated as experts.  INL will host several more 
workshops throughout the country pursuant to this LOA 
mini-project.  Using INL funding, DEA will host a workshop 
with USG experts on asset seizure/forfeiture for Indian law 
enforcement agencies in August 2005. 
 
-- ATA Training: The DS assessment team that visited in 
October 2004 reported favorably on the robust program we have 
with India.  The Indian participants who are sent for ATA 
training are well chosen and represent a good geographic mix. 
 They are also adapting their training for local conditions 
and replicating it well in state and national police training 
programs, giving the program its intended multiplier effect. 
However, the GOI request to be able to lock in training 
months in advance conflicts with what we understand is the 
program's requirement to remain nimble and able to respond to 
shifting priorities. 
 
-- Bio-Terrorism: Our HHS Attache is planning joint Indo-US 
workshops for later in 2005 with the National Institutes of 
Communicable Diseases (Delhi) and the National Institute of 
Virology (Pune) on inter-related topics of bio-safety and 
biosecurity.  The goal of these workshops is to share 
information on safe handling of bio-material, safety of 
personnel, and security of laboratories that house pathogens. 
 The concept proposal for these workshops has been shared 
with the Indian agencies.  We are also exploring other 
avenues to engage appropriate GOI and other Indian 
stakeholders on bio-security, and will report progress septel. 
 
¶6.  (S) On other agenda items, our progress has been more 
limited: 
 
-- LTTE: Canadian PolCouns has told Poloff that his 
government is re-examining possible changes in Canada's 
position toward LTTE.  We will continue to engage the 
Canadians on this, but have seen no evidence of a change in 
policy. 
 
-- Bangladesh: Although we see greater willingness to share 
information (for instance, during A/S Rocca's April 18 visit 
to New Delhi), the MEA has not responded to Embassy's 
repeated requests for more detailed exchanges -- beyond that 
which is the public domain (Refs G and H) -- to verify and/or 
bolster their assertions regarding cross-border terrorism 
originating in Bangladesh.  Exchanges in ORCA channels also 
continue.  The disconnect between MEA's repeated verbal 
agreement to cooperate and provide additional information, 
and their delay in responding to our questions (Ref F), needs 
to be closed further. 
 
-- MLAT: The Indian Cabinet on November 3 ratified the Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaty, which had been on the CTJWG agenda 
since 2002.  The GOI adopted amendments to reciprocate the 
reservations which the US Senate inserted when it ratified 
the MLAT (Ref I).  We are close to concluding MLAT, but we 
are still discussing the modalities of how to incorporate 
both countries' understandings into the final exchange of 
instruments.  At this point the issues all involve procedure; 
no substantive disagreements remain. 
 
-- IC-814: Please see Ref C for current status and action 
request on this long-pending issue. 
 
-- PACOM CT Seminar: Planning for the PACOM CT seminar 
continues, with the ball now in India's court to nominate 
workable dates for the final planning conference and the 
event itself.  The PACOM team, Mission staff and MEA 
counterparts made significant progress in accomplishing the 
organizational steps enumerated above during a successful 
initial planning conference in December 2004.  The seminar 
objectives, approach, and general participants have been 
identified, with only the event dates and details left to be 
finalized. 
 
-- FIU: Mission LE community is ready to offer training to 
India's FIU once it is staffed and functioning.  This cannot 
happen, however, until the Prevention of Money Laundering Act 
has been notified in the Official Gazette, which FIU chief 
Sunil Bhargava told us should happen "by mid-June."  Having 
an FIU up and running would be a condition for India's 
admission to the Financial Action Task Force. 
 
¶7. (C)  On some agenda items, we report no substantial 
progress since the August-September 2004 CTJWG: 
 
-- Extraditions: The Department of Justice has requested that 
the GOI provide a supplemental affidavit to support its 
extradition request for Sameera Jumani, the wife of Abu 
Salem.  To date, the GOI has provided no supplemental 
information. 
 
-- Sharing Passport Information: CONS and ICE recently 
discussed lost/stolen passports with MHA Joint Secretary 
Mishra, who reported that the MHA was still considering 
making the information available to INTERPOL, and asked for 
advice on how they could get our information. 
 
-- Dahal: Legatt reports no progress in FBI access to Dahal 
despite repeated requests through CBI. 
 
-- PISCES: MHA told CONS and ICE that they would first 
evaluate how well the modernized Indian system performs 
before making any decision on PISCES.  MHA has also asked us 
for a USG point of contact to discuss integrating elements of 
PISCES into their own system, but they probably will not be 
interested in acquiring the entire PISCES program. 
 
-- Hawala: There has been no action to date on cooperation 
with the GOI on regarding hawala.  New Delhi continues to 
"agree to disagree" with us on this issue, arguing that 
criminalizing hawala transactions is more effective than 
regulating (and tracking) them. 
 
¶8.  (U) Minimize considered. 
BLAKE