This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003745 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2015 
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS ENRG IN PK AF TX INDO PAK
SUBJECT: MEA UPBEAT ON INDO-PAK, CLEARER ON SIACHEN 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 3717 
     ¶B. NEW DELHI 3213 
     ¶C. NEW DELHI 2189 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: In a May 18 meeting with Polcouns and 
Poloff, MEA Joint Secretary (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran) 
Dilip Sinha gave us the clearest GOI position on Siachen we 
have had in some time, stressing that settlement will require 
a signed map showing current troop positions in order to 
close a deal with Islamabad on demilitarizing the Glacier. 
He confirmed other reports that the PM would like to see a 
deal on this long festering issue.  On the Baglihar dam, New 
Delhi will respect the neutral expert's decision, although 
New Delhi insists Islamabad was premature in invoking the 
Indus Waters Treaty dispute resolution process.  Planning for 
the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline may move forward, with 
Petroleum Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar meeting Pakistani and 
Iranian counterparts over the next several weeks.  MEA sees 
terrorist attacks in Kashmir as an expected seasonal uptick 
as the infiltration passes start to clear.  Alluding to NSA 
Narayanan's concern (expressed to the Charge May 17) about 
the need to insulate the peace process from an upsurge in 
terrorism, Polcouns pressed for more US-India information 
sharing on Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LET).  Sinha agreed in 
principle to renew former J/S AK Singh's practice of 
arranging Indian intelligence briefings on cross-border 
terrorism.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) In response to PolCouns' remark about Indian media 
and NSA Narayanan's upbeat perspective on the trajectory of 
Indo-Pak relations (Ref A), Sinha replied that he was keeping 
his fingers crossed, and hailed the continued success of the 
LoC cease-fire (now in its nineteenth month).  He underlined 
the importance of keeping the dialogue open, and of the need 
"to avoid panic if it takes more than one or two rounds to 
resolve some of these issues."  He said that only two sets of 
Composite Dialogue talks are currently scheduled, with the 
rest of the agenda yet to be determined: 
 
-- May 25-26 (Islamabad): Defense Secretaries discuss 
demilitarizing Siachen Glacier; and 
 
-- May 27-28 (Islamabad): The two Surveyors-General meet to 
discuss the delineation of the border at Sir Creek. 
 
MEA Firm: Signed Map Before Demilitarizing Siachen 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶3.  (C) On Polcouns' question of whether a Siachen deal was 
"ripe fruit to be picked" during the upcoming May 25-26 
meeting between Defense Secretaries, as recently 
characterized by strategists C Raja Mohan and AG Noorani, 
Sinha explained why the MEA wants a signed map showing 
current troop positions before pulling forces back from the 
Glacier.  Despite tacit agreement on demilitarization and 
where the troops would re-deploy, New Delhi needed Islamabad 
to publicly accept the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) 
because there was no trust regarding Siachen "post-Kargil." 
If Islamabad did not publicly and explicitly accept the AGPL 
with a delineated map signed by the two Defense Secretaries, 
he said, it could dispute the demarcation at a later date.  A 
signed map would be harder to refute and would give the GOI 
political cover for a diplomatic or military response should 
Pakistani troops later occupy the territory on the Saltoro 
ridge line that Indian troops now hold.  Sinha cautioned that 
"1989 and 1992 are in the past," referring to two prior 
occasions when a deal on Siachen appeared imminent. 
Likewise, on Sir Creek he indicated that a deal was 
achievable, but only if Islamabad agrees to clear demarcation. 
 
Respecting Baglihar Process 
--------------------------- 
¶4.  (C) Sinha reiterated that India would abide by whatever 
decision emerged from the neutral expert appointed under the 
Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) dispute resolution process (Ref B), 
although he maintained that Islamabad was premature to 
initiate it and he believed that the GOI would be vindicated. 
  Sinha agreed with PolCouns' assertion that India and 
Pakistan would be likely to exercise more caution on the 
water issue in J&K in the future, with Indian hydroelectric 
engineers more careful about their designs, and Islamabad 
less likely to refer disputes to arbitration, depending on 
the outcome.  Echoing what we have heard from the Pakistani 
Charge, Sinha was confident that Baglihar was now on the 
right track and could be managed through technical talks. 
 
Ministerial Pipeline Talks Coming Up 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) Pointing out that Petroleum Minister Mani Shankar 
Aiyar would visit Pakistan around May 25 and Iran in early 
June (dates not finalized), Sinha said that India's main 
interest in Iran is energy.  The Iran-Pakistan-India gas 
pipeline was an important CBM that was also critical for 
India's energy needs.  Sinha ticked off "numerous" problems 
the project faces aside from ILSA -- finance, security, 
"Pakistan's intransigence" -- but the three governments would 
work to overcome them because the project was important for 
all three economies and would promote regional cooperation 
and prosperity.  Polcouns briefed on ILSA's provisions, but 
Sinha appeared only broadly aware of the law and accepted our 
offer of a detailed paper on ILSA. 
 
¶6.  (C) Sinha conveyed GOI openness to pursuing other energy 
options, including the proposed 
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline.  He cautioned, 
however, that he knew of no independent assessment of how 
much gas Turkmenistan has, or how much was already obligated 
to Russia, which makes this venture less compelling for India 
than the pipeline originating in Iran.  Acknowledging that 
actual construction could take as long as ten years on either 
of these projects, Sinha underscored the importance India 
attaches to lining up resources to meet its current and 
future energy requirements. 
 
Too Soon to Assess Pak Support for Terrorism 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) After receiving PolCouns' condolences for recent 
terrorist attacks against civilian targets in J&K, including 
the May 12 grenade attack at the Tyndale-Briscoe school in 
Srinagar, Sinha observed that the seasonal uptick in violence 
in the Valley had begun.  Stressing that the GOI had seen no 
movement by the GOP to uproot terrorist infrastructure (Ref C 
and previous), despite the US-led UN designation of 
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba as an Al-Qaida affiliate, Sinha declared 
that New Delhi wanted an end to Islamabad's "double game" of 
fighting Al-Qaida in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan 
while supporting Kashmir-oriented terrorism.  "We want to see 
the same level of commitment in (Pakistan's) east as you see 
in the west," he stated. 
 
¶8.  (C) Alluding to NSA Narayanan's concern (Ref A), 
expressed to the Charge on May 17 about the need to insulate 
the peace process from an upsurge in terrorism, Polcouns 
pressed for more US-India information sharing on 
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT).  Sinha agreed in principle to renew 
his predecessor J/S AK Singh's practice of arranging 
intelligence-based briefings on cross-border terrorism 
trends.  Polcouns underlined Washington's abiding interest in 
LeT, including for its activities in Iraq and the United 
States. 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Sinha's statement that a signed map of the AGPL is a 
political requirement for New Delhi is the most definitive 
language we have heard on what it needs to make a deal on 
Siachen.  His upbeat opinion of the Composite Dialogue 
process and his caution against impatience are usual for the 
MEA, which prefers to dampen speculation of "low-hanging 
fruit," even when the political level is looking for ways to 
move forward. 
 
¶10.  (C) We are encouraged that MEA may be willing to explore 
more detailed information sharing.  This may be due, in part, 
to our leadership in adding LeT to the UNSC 1267 Sanctions 
List (Ref C), and to the growing appreciation of the problem 
that LeT poses for both countries.  We will report any 
briefings in detail septel. 
BLAKE