This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


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FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1652
INFO AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
DARFUR COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
USLO TRIPOLI 
USMISSION GENEVA

UNCLAS  NDJAMENA 000834 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, H, INR, INR/GGI, 
PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS 
FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL, 
ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF KAWC CD SU
SUBJECT: REFUGEES IN EASTERN CHAD: A LOOK AHEAD (PART I) 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 814 
 
¶1.  Summary: Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration 
officers Margaret McKelvey (Director of the Africa Office) 
and Hazel Reitz (Chad Program Officer and UNHCR liaison 
officer) visited Chad from May 4 to 18 to conduct a periodic 
review of progress of protection and assistance efforts for 
Darfur refugees and to review PRM-supported programs of 
international and non-governmental organizations.  PRM TDYers 
visited Djabal, Goz Amer, Oure Cassoni, Gaga, and Farchana 
refugee camps.  This is the second of three cables on the 
visit.  PRM officers found that there is no concerted effort 
yet to adopt a common planning horizon among the humanitarian 
players, the refugees, and the Chadians and recommends that 
they adopt a common 2006-2007 planning horizon in order to 
make economically rational programming choices.  All partners 
should be involved in a decision on a planning horizon. 
UNHCR has contingency plans for up to 100,000 new arrivals, 
but only about 10,000 surplus spots in camps identified at 
present.  UNHCR reports that Government of Sudan "soldiers" 
are deployed all along the borders prevented any significant 
new influxes of refugees into Chad.  New arrivals will likely 
be in bad shape.  Planning efforts continue to be complicated 
by the lack of qualified international and Chadian personnel. 
 End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
PLANNING HORIZON: C'EST PREVU" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.   There is no concerted effort to adopt a common planning 
horizon among the humanitarian players, the refugees, and the 
Chadians.  "C'est prevu" is a phrase heard commonly in 
eastern Chad to indicate that something missing in the 
overall humanitarian effort is planned specifically to be 
done or foreseen for some future point.   As recommended by 
visiting FFPO Stan Stalla, it would be useful to adopt at 
least a 2006-2007 planning horizon in order to make 
economically rational programming choices.  It is politically 
very difficult for the Chadian Government and humanitarian 
organizations to openly admit that Sudanese refugees may be 
here for some time.  There is no viable peace agreement on 
Darfur in sight and many of the refugees have been shut out 
of return to their places of origin as the result of deals 
made among local authorities in Darfur.  The Chadian National 
Agency for Refugees (CNAR) agreed that the international 
community and humanitarian organizations should plan on at 
least three more years of having Darfur refugees in Chad. 
UNHCR officials said at least two more years. 
 
¶3.  A planning horizon to 2007 would affect cost/benefit 
choices on the promotion of tree planting, a move from water 
tankering to gravity-fed water systems where possible, 
assigning implementing partners to various locations and 
sectors, and the degree to which to equip and train Chadian 
gendarmes.  Semi-permanent classrooms are under construction 
in the ten "permanent" camps (i.e., not Oure Cassoni or Am 
Nabak).  UNICEF is still waiting for shipments of text books 
from Sudan in order to ensure that students can maximally fit 
back into the Sudanese system; in the meantime, students do 
not have enough books and some teachers are looking for a 
curriculum that is more appropriate to Darfur's political 
aspirations. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
CONTINGENCY PLANNING 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  UNHCR has in train contingency plans for up to 100,000 
new arrivals, but there are only about 10,000 surplus spots 
in camps identified at present.  Humanitarian workers 
reported that Government of Sudan "soldiers" deployed all 
along the borders are preventing any significant new influxes 
of refugees into Chad.  Meanwhile, refugees (and fighters), 
humanitarian staff, and the African Union Mission in Sudan do 
cross the border and report that the situation in Darfur is 
insecure for the average civilian.  Some refugee family 
members cross back to Sudan Liberation 
Movement/Army-controlled areas to find pasturage for their 
animals. 
 
¶5.  For now, additional refugee flows will be accommodated at 
 
Gaga, the newest refugee camp.  Gaga is extremely well-laid 
out and follows the long-ignored camp planning principle of 
placing tents in circular arrangements for reasons of 
community interaction and security.  In a circular lay-out, 
one has line of sight to all neighbors from one's tent and 
with sufficiently wide "roads" in between blocs to act as 
firebreaks.  The transfer of new arrivals from the Breidjing 
camp (i.e., those previously unregistered) to Gaga that Reitz 
and McKelvey witnessed was a model of efficiency and 
compassionate treatment of the refugees.  They were trucked 
the 60 kilometers to the new site.  Africare, the new camp 
manager, had arrived on site only April 20 and the transfers 
began May 1.  Tents up were up and trees that were not to be 
cut marked with red paint.  Oxfam was putting in sturdy 
latrines (plastic sheeting but with metal frames and cement 
slabs) to serve in the short term for refugees at the 
standard ratio of 20 refugees per latrine.  Gaga shows what 
can be done when there is sufficient time to start a new camp. 
 
¶6.  The nutritional state of recent new arrivals/Chadians in 
the wadi near Oure Cassoni and along the Sudan/Chad border 
indicates severe food insecurity among the local Chadian 
population and those arriving from Darfur.  As high as 15% 
severe acute malnutrition per an ACF (Action Contre la Faim) 
survey of all under fives participating in the UNHCR 
registration there (Reitz and McKelvey observed) -- see 
septel -- indicates severe food insecurity among the local 
Chadian population and those coming from Darfur. 
 
¶7.  Recommendations:  Despite general agreement that there 
may be no significant inflows in the near future, UNHCR 
should continue to seek to be prepared.  Contingency planning 
should take into account the likelihood that any new arrivals 
would be in desperate shape.  Contingency planning should 
also take into account internally-displaced Chadians (see 
below) and involve all partners. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8.  The capacity of non-governmental (NGO) implementing 
partners (IPs) and the present dearth of qualified Chadian 
national staff in the refugee assistance effort remain 
critical concerns that need to be addressed.  The success of 
the humanitarian effort in Chad will be highly dependent upon 
placing humanitarian staff who are experienced, competent, 
and willing to stay for at least a year (i.e., who have all 
three characteristics).   While UNHCR has largely "turned the 
corner" on getting the right staff in place and has an expert 
senior management team in N'Djamena and Abeche, the NGO IPs 
largely have not.  Intersos, International Rescue Committee 
(IRC), COOPI (an Italian health organization) and IMC 
(International Medical Corps), for example, have experienced 
near total turnover of field staff in the past two months. 
Christian Children's Fund (CCF), which is the only NGO with a 
specific child protection expertise in the refugee operation, 
has a near-perfect operational plan on paper and funding via 
UNICEF, but still has only two staff in country.  The number 
of first-time-in-Africa/first-time-managing-a-pr ogram staff 
is striking.  UNICEF, WFP, and WHO all lag behind UNHCR in 
getting longer-term staff in place, but WFP and UNICEF are 
now in good shape. 
 
¶9.  Success will also depend on there being sufficient 
numbers of NGO IPs to tackle the range of tasks/sectors.  IRC 
and Intersos in particular are overstretched by the range of 
their responsibilities in the Oure Cassoni and Djabal/Goz 
Amer camps.  They will likely need to be relieved of some 
responsibilities by bringing in other NGO IPs as previously 
recommended by PRM with respect to IRC.  Action Contre la 
Faim will replace IRC in therapeutic feeding no later than 
early July if all goes as planned.  Though IRC has not yet 
been informed, UNHCR (not to be shared with IRC) is thinking 
about replacing it in the health sector with AHA (African 
Humanitarian Action). 
 
¶10.  Africare has just started as camp manager of the new 
Gaga Camp and will cover food distribution, environmental 
concerns, and logistics as well as the initial construction 
of camp infrastructure.  MSF is beginning to talk, as it 
often does at this stage of a refugee situation, of pulling 
 
out of Chad now that the "emergency is over".  Hopefully it 
can be persuaded to remain longer; its health care facilities 
in Farchana are excellent in terms of organization, 
relatively comprehensive coverage (though not all elements of 
EPI are in place for example), and cleanliness.  Among the 
"usual suspects" missing from the Chad scene is Save the 
Children, which would be an excellent addition in terms of 
child protection. 
 
¶11.  Further complicating the issue of IP quality and 
capacity is the fact that all of the international 
organizations and some bilateral donors are looking for IPs 
at the same time.  UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP are looking for IPs 
to undertake programs for affected Chadians as well as for 
refugees.  Similarly, USAID/OFDA is looking for IPs for 
projects for affected Chadians while ECHO is looking for IPs 
to receive refugee funding.  Even WHO is looking for partners 
in data collection.  Food for work projects in the Goz Beida 
area, for example, are not up and running owing to a lack of 
IPs, not/not to any lack of food. 
 
¶12.  All of the external humanitarian players lament the lack 
of sufficient numbers of qualified Chadian nationals to fill 
key roles in the relief structures.  Moreover, many of the 
Chadians employed come from "the South" rather than from the 
refugee zone, which adds a further element of tension in 
terms of intra-Chadian conflict.  Incorporating Chadians is 
not only important in terms of compensatory action for Chad's 
welcome of the refugees but also will become increasingly 
necessary as the expatriate presence inevitably declines over 
time.  Preparing for such a transition must begin now, with 
efforts to build Chadian capacity that would also have 
longer-term benefits to Chad, once the refugees have gone 
home.  The PRM-supported work that Catholic Relief Services 
(CRS) is doing with the Chadian NGO SECADEV and that the 
International Federation of Red Cross/Crescent Societies 
(IFRC) is doing with the Chadian Red Cross are small steps. 
(Comment:  It is difficult to avoid the boom/bust cycle of 
humanitarian work that comes with a new influx of refugees 
when it comes to local organizations that need to staff up 
quickly and focus their major energies on the new problem but 
that find themselves with little financial or management 
support for humanitarian work on behalf of the national 
population once refugees leave.  Both CRS and the IFRC are 
aware of this pitfall.  End Comment.) 
 
¶13.  In the area of nutritional monitoring, Reitz and 
McKelvey discussed with UNHCR and UNICEF the possibility of 
developing an inter-agency capacity to review the nutritional 
situation across all camps on a standard and periodic (e.g., 
quarterly) basis to also allow for incorporating Chadians in 
on-the-job training.  Nutritionists and nurses from the 
Chadian medical training facilities in Abeche and N'Djamena 
could be included in an effort that would also include 
technical assistance from the U.S. The Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) and some school of public health 
(e.g., Columbia University which has specialized to a degree 
in refugee health and in training U.S.-based students 
therein).  If successful, this could channel Chadian health 
personnel into the refugee assistance effort as well as 
increase the overall Chadian professional capacity for the 
longer term. 
 
¶14.  Recommendations:  The NGO consortia InterAction in 
Washington and ICVA in Geneva should be challenged to help 
develop a pool of qualified (French-speaking) personnel 
available for placement in Chad rather than just having NGOs 
rely upon personnel ads in the usual places.  PRM should 
discuss with International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
whether its "migration for development"-type programs might 
be able to produce some additional health care personnel from 
"southern" francophone countries that may not normally feed 
staff into NGOs without raiding of medical personnel from 
other nations' health care systems. PRM should review with 
CDC the possibility of sustained technical assistance for 
nutritional surveillance. 
 
¶15.  Khartoum and Tripoli Minimize Considered. 
WALL 
 
 
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