This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


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C O N F I D E N T I A L  HANOI 001179 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/BCLTV AND EAP/K 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PARM PHUM KN KS VM DPRK
SUBJECT: VIETNAM-DPRK TIES:  OPPORTUNITIES FOR AND 
CONSTRAINTS ON POSITIVE ROLE FOR HANOI 
 
REF: A. 03 HANOI 2650 
     ¶B. 04 HANOI 2175 
     ¶C. HANOI 204 
     ¶D. HANOI 136 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., John Boardman per 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
 
¶1. (C) The Vietnam-DPRK bilateral relationship, although 
strained by last year's "mass defection" of North Korean 
asylum-seekers from Ho Chi Minh City to Seoul, is slowly 
returning to normal.  Vietnam recognizes that its 
"traditional ties" with the North, combined with its 
proximity to China and economic reform experience, put it in 
the unique, and often difficult, position, of having to deal 
with North-South and DPRK-related issues.  It appears that 
Vietnam is willing to use its position to make a positive, 
although very limited, contribution to efforts to both 
resolve the North Korean nuclear problem and encourage the 
DPRK to open up -- and the ROK is quietly encouraging Vietnam 
to do so.  However, Hanoi's ties with Pyongyang also 
constrain its range of action, particularly in the case of 
DPRK asylum-seekers entering Vietnam.  Although Vietnam's 
political ties with the DPRK are dwarfed by its economic 
relationship with the ROK, Vietnam will not turn its back on 
its old friend, and there may be future opportunities for 
Hanoi to take advantage of its "in" with Pyongyang.  As the 
United States and Vietnam discuss regional and global matters 
of mutual concern, it may be worthwhile to encourage the 
Vietnamese to look beyond their immediate neighborhood and 
add DPRK-related matters to the list of issues in which we 
share an interest in addressing and resolving.  End Summary 
and Comment. 
 
"Traditional Friendship" Slowly on the Mend 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Pyongyang was among the first to establish 
diplomatic relations with Hanoi, and the "close and 
traditional ties" that North Korean and Vietnam came to enjoy 
were bolstered by the DPRK's assistance during the Vietnam 
War.  Although the relationship suffered in the 1970s and 
1980s because of Pyongyang's support for Pol Pot and its 
criticism of Vietnam for invading Cambodia, bilateral 
relations regained their footing in the 1980s.  That said, 
while political ties are the mainstay of the Vietnam-DPRK 
relationship, in truth, Vietnam's growing trade and 
investment relations with South Korea offer more real value 
to Vietnam:  the ROK was ranked seventh in two-way trade in 
2003 and second (after the United States) in terms of 
investment in Vietnam in 2004; on the other hand, there does 
not appear to be any trade with the DPRK at all (Ref A). 
Furthermore, Vietnam and the ROK now regularly trade 
high-level visitors, while senior Vietnam-DPRK exchanges are 
increasingly moribund.  However, political and ideological 
fraternity, close ties between the Communist Party of Vietnam 
and the Korean Workers Party and Vietnam's loyalty to an old 
ally ensure that Vietnam continues to honor North Korea with 
the title "traditional friend." 
 
¶3. (SBU) The two countries' ties took a hit last July with 
the transport of 468 DPRK asylum-seekers from Ho Chi Minh 
City to Seoul (Ref B).  In addition to lodging a number of 
official protests with Hanoi, Pyongyang recalled Ambassador 
Pak Ung Sop and publicly accused Vietnam of participating in 
a "mass kidnapping conspiracy."  In subsequent months, 
several low- and mid-level bilateral exchanges were also 
cancelled. 
 
¶4. (C) Relations now appear to be returning to normal. 
According to ROK Embassy DCM Bae Jae-hyun and MFA Korea Desk 
Director Tran Van Hieu, North Korean Ambassador Pak returned 
to Hanoi on March 27 (reportedly in time to prepare for and 
host the April 15 Kim Il-sung birthday event.)  Bilateral 
exchanges are now back on track as well:  Northeast Asia 
Institute (NAI) Director Ngo Xuan Binh told us that, in a 
recent conversation with North Korean Embassy officials, the 
two sides agreed that a delegation led by Binh could travel 
to Pyongyang for a visit hosted by the DPRK's Institute for 
International Relations. 
 
Vietnam's Ties with the DPRK a Help and a Hindrance 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
 
¶5. (C) Vietnamese officials and academics acknowledge that 
Vietnam's long-standing ties with the DPRK, together with its 
economic reform experience and shared border with China, put 
it in a unique, and sometimes difficult, position to play 
some kind of role in a number of North-South and DPRK-related 
issues, namely:  DPRK asylum-seekers, the North Korean 
nuclear problem and efforts to encourage Pyongyang to open 
up.  They express a desire for Vietnam to take advantage of 
its situation to do something positive in dealing with these 
matters -- and note that the ROK is increasingly encouraging 
Vietnam to do so.  But they also quickly point out that, 
while friendly relations with the DPRK give Vietnam an "in" 
that others do not have, these same relations have 
constrained its range of options, particularly in the case of 
asylum-seekers.  Nevertheless, when circumstances allow, 
Vietnam seems to be attempting to play a limited, indirect 
and positive -- if not proactive -- role. 
 
Asylum-Seekers:  Avoid Straining Ties with the DPRK 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶6. (C) Although surprised and annoyed by North Korea's 
reaction to last year's "mass defection" (Ref C), Vietnam 
nonetheless appears to be working to prevent a repeat of the 
accumulation of DPRK asylum-seekers that ultimately led to 
strained relations with the North.  A nine-year South Korean 
resident of Ho Chi Minh City told us that it is now 
"difficult" for North Koreans to make it to Vietnam from 
China and that South Korean residents here are fearful of 
drawing the attention of the police.  South Korean Embassy 
Political First Secretary Lee Kang-kuk said that his Embassy 
believes there are "very few, if any" DPRK asylum-seekers now 
in Vietnam.  (Note:  It is unclear if this is because of a 
reduced inflow of asylum-seekers or an increased, and quiet, 
outflow, or both.  End Note.)  NAI's Director Binh noted 
that, while Vietnam recognizes the "humanitarian nature" of 
this issue, its policy is not to allow Vietnam to become a 
"refugee camp" (a desire he observed may be shared by the 
ROK.) 
 
¶7. (C) Furthermore, even when Vietnam has also shown 
flexibility in dealing with North Korean asylum-seekers -- 
most recently in the case of the six North Koreans who 
entered the Swedish and French Embassy compounds last 
December (Ref D and previous) -- the Vietnamese authorities 
assiduously sought to avoid causing offense to the DPRK. 
According to Swedish DCM Helena Sangeland, although the 
Vietnamese were "very cooperative" in dealing with the 
situation, they nonetheless insisted on discretion and that 
the French and Swedes provide the North Koreans with travel 
documents.  They also underlined that, in the event of future 
episodes, the North Koreans would have to be turned over to 
the GVN -- for eventual return to the country from which they 
crossed into Vietnam. 
 
Nuclear Issue:  Attempting to Send Indirect Message 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶8. (C) In the case of the North Korean nuclear issue, Vietnam 
is attempting to play a positive, if limited and indirect, 
role.  During the April visit to Hanoi of ROK Prime Minister 
Lee Hae-chan, Vietnam State President Tran Duc Luong's 
position of "strong support" for the ROKG's "Peace and 
Prosperity Policy" was included in the two countries' joint 
statement.  According to the ROK Embassy's Lee Kang-kuk, this 
was the "first time ever" the GVN went on record in support 
of South Korea's efforts to address the North Korean nuclear 
issue.  MFA Korean Desk Director Hieu was less effusive, 
noting that, although this was the first direct reference to 
President No Moo-hyun's policy, this is not a "new position" 
for Hanoi:  "Vietnam's long-standing position has been to 
support a peaceful and non-nuclear Korean Peninsula.  We are 
very concerned about the situation, and our position on North 
Korea's nuclear program is clear," he stressed. 
 
¶9. (C) However, as much as Vietnam would like to make a 
positive contribution -- both to respond to the growing 
encouragement of the ROK and others and broaden Vietnam's 
diplomatic horizons -- "there are limits to what we can do to 
address this problem," Hieu continued.  Because of Vietnam's 
relationship with the DPRK and its policy of non-interference 
in another country's internal affairs, "we are not in a 
position to do much.  We must deal with this issue 
indirectly."  Similarly, according to NAI's Binh, "we cannot 
 
 
criticize the North directly, but what we can do is ensure 
that our message gets out in the press or on State-run 
television.  When there are reports on TV or in Nhan Dan 
('People's Daily', the Communist Party's newspaper) about 
Vietnam's support for a peaceful and non-nuclear Korean 
Peninsula, that is how we are delivering our views" to the 
North. 
 
Vietnam as a Model:  Yes, but... 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Both the MFA's Hieu and NAI's Binh observed that 
Vietnam "could be a model for North Korea in the areas of 
economic reform and opening up to the world."  Vietnam's 
economic transition and "Doi Moi" (renovation) experience 
offer a more practical model than China, which is too large 
and decentralized (also Ref A).  Similarly, MFA Asia 
Department Director General Nguyen Ba Cu told us that 
Vietnam's relationship with the United States could provide 
North Korea with a model of "two former enemies changing and 
improving their ties."  In the area of economic reform, over 
the past several years several delegations of DPRK academics 
have visited Vietnam for two- to three-week "familiarization 
and training visits" organized by a Swedish university; the 
most recent visit was less than a month ago.  In addition, 
according to the ROK Embassy DCM, South Korea recently 
quietly offered -- and Vietnam accepted -- financial 
assistance to launch a program bring DPRK officials to 
Vietnam for similar visits, and the ROK Embassy has 
approached the Swedes to learn about their ongoing program. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Although our contacts acknowledge that Vietnam's 
reform experience and relationship with the DPRK put it in a 
unique position to reach out to and influence North Korea, 
they are nonetheless cautious about what, if any, effect 
Hanoi can have on Pyongyang.  "The South Koreans wants us to 
encourage North Korea to open up.  Unfortunately, our 
influence is more limited than they think," the MFA's Hieu 
said.  He reiterated that, "Vietnam cannot interfere in North 
Korean internal issues."  The NAI's Binh expressed a similar 
view, noting that, although Vietnam believed its experience 
could help North Korea, its influence is limited and that, 
for now, "lower-level official and academic exchanges will 
have to be enough."  Recalling a conversation he had with the 
North Korean Ambassador, Binh said, "Ambassador Pak accused 
us of changing too much and selling out." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) The gap between Vietnam's economic relationship with 
the ROK and its political ties with the DPRK will likely 
continue to widen.  Regardless, based on its historical ties 
with and loyalty to its old ally, it is doubtful that Hanoi 
will turn its back on the DPRK.  Vietnam is seeking to 
broaden its own foreign policy horizons, and with the 
encouragement of the ROK, there may continue to be 
opportunities for it to use its relationship with the DPRK to 
make positive contributions to ongoing issues of interest. 
Any efforts in this regard will be limited, however, by 
Vietnam's lack of real leverage.  As the United States and 
Vietnam discuss regional and global issues of mutual concern, 
it may be worth urging the Vietnamese to look beyond their 
immediate neighborhood and underline to them our shared 
interest in using whatever influence we can muster to address 
and resolve DPRK-related issues of concern.  End Comment. 
Boardman 
 
 
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