This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DHAKA 002087 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR SA A/S ROCCA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM EAID KISL BG
SUBJECT: BANGLADESH SCENESETTER FOR A/S ROCCA 
 
REF: A. 04 DHAKA 03768 
 
     ¶B. DHAKA 01150 
     ¶C. DHAKA 01802 
     ¶D. DHAKA 01851 
     ¶E. DHAKA 01924 
     ¶F. DHAKA 01799 
     ¶G. DHAKA 01742 
     ¶H. DHAKA 02061 
     ¶I. DHAKA 01807 
     ¶J. DHAKA 01922 
 
Classified By: P/E Counselor D.C. McCullough, reasons para 1.4 b, d. 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary.  We should acknowledge the surprising run of 
positive BDG actions since February, but push for more, 
especially against political and extremist violence.  It is 
important to reiterate our concerns about terrorism, 
extremist Islam, minority rights, and a transparent and 
credible electoral process.  BNP confidence about its 
political prospects is growing.  End Summary. 
 
Growing BNP Confidence Because... 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Politically, the opposition remains divided and 
rudderless.  The Awami League (AL) cannot find an issue to 
generate momentum, and leaders privately acknowledges that 
general strikes are ineffective and unpopular.  Its new tack 
-- demanding electoral and caretaker reforms the BDG will 
never accept -- is wonky, a possible prelude to a boycott, 
and questioned even by some AL supporters who believe 
elections are the one political activity Bangladesh does 
well.  The AL has the dubious view that BNP fears an election 
boycott.  AL feelers to IOJ (so much for principled 
opposition to religion in politics) and Ershad's Jatiya party 
went nowhere, as did former president B. Chowdhury's new 
party.  The BNP-Jamaat Islami alliance is devoid of mutual 
respect by grounded solidly in electoral expedience.  The 
BNP's aversion to political risk minimizes its vulnerability 
to self-inflicted controversy.  Last summer's introduction of 
the Rapid Action Battalion, and the subsequent birth of the 
"crossfire" phenomenon, has been the BDG's most popular of 
its few major initiatives in office. 
 
¶3. (C) Economically, despite the obvious problems ranging 
from poverty to infrastructure, a generally positive 
macro-economic climate allows the BDG, and a pretty isolated 
PMO, to believe that the economy is progressing nicely. 
Foreign investment is up, inflation is manageable, and annual 
growth is a respectable five percent.  There's been no 
perceptible pain from the end of textile quotas, though many 
expect it within the year as small, inefficient factories 
start to close.  For Dhaka elites, life is getting better 
with new shopping centers, housing projects, and hospitals of 
a standard unseen in Bangladesh (ref A).  The replacement in 
April of the retiring reformer who led the central bank with 
a civil servant without private sector experience reinforces 
BDG disinterest in new, potentially costly or disruptive 
reforms (ref B). 
 
¶4. (C) Internationally, the BDG believes the geographical 
breadth of its political and commercial ties shields it from 
diplomatic pressure (ref C).  Western political "meddling" 
annoys it but can shame the BDG into action if the outcome, 
like jailing human traffickers, does not jeopardize a core 
PMO interest.  The optics and utility of a good relationship 
with the U.S. are important to the BDG, in part because it 
wants USG goodwill during times of trouble with India.  The 
abortive Singapore conference suggested to the BDG that key 
Western and Asian countries will not challenge it on 
political matters. 
 
Positive Developments Since Kibria's Murder 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) In the aftermath of the shocking January 27 murder of 
AL leader Shah Kibria, there has been a surprising run of 
positive BDG actions: 
 
A) The banning on February 23 of two extremist Islamist 
groups and the arrest of about a dozen militants charged with 
non-lethal bomb attacks on cultural events and two social 
development NGOs (ref D).  Since then, there has been a 
notable lull in extremist and high-profile political 
violence.  DGFI's investigation of these groups began in 
mid-2004, but the timing of the crackdown was triggered by 
BDG embarrassment over the Bangladesh World Bank conference 
in Washington and the alarming "Bangla Bhai" article in the 
New York Times. 
 
B) The arrest and charging of nine BNP persons for the murder 
of Shah Kibria.  After a very slow start, Bangladesh police 
provided good cooperation during A/LEGATT's consultations on 
the case (ref E).  We have concerns about the integrity of 
the confessions extracted under apparent duress from all the 
suspects except the ringleader, but many observers believe 
the suspects are in fact involved in the murder. 
C) The sentencing to death of 22 mostly BNP-linked persons 
for the May 2004 murder of AL MP Ahsanullah Master (ref F). 
 
D) Cabinet approval of all but one of the remaining UN 
counter-terrorism conventions; prompt parliamentary 
ratification is promised (ref G). 
 
E) BDG drafting of legal changes to facilitate the 
investigation and prosecution of anti-terrorism cases (ref H). 
F) A 62 percent drop in police "crossfire" deaths from 
January to March (ref I), though lately there are signs of a 
revival. 
 
G) Virtual agreement on a Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreement. 
 
H) Continued high prosecution and conviction rates for human 
traffickers. 
 
I) The BDG ultimately decided against appointing the 
controversial and politically provocative Home Secretary, 
Omar Farooq, as Chief Election Commissioner, sending the 
pro-Jamaat retired civil servant instead to run the 
Bangladesh Telecommunications Regulatory Commission.  The 
appointment of the CEC in May and the presentation of the BDG 
budget in June effectively kick off an 18-month campaign for 
the next general election. 
 
The Flip Side 
------------- 
 
¶6. (C) There has also been a series of backwards steps and 
reminders of persisting core problems: 
 
A) Despite assurances, the BDG has failed to capture the 
politically problematic "Bangla Bhai" or Abdhur Rahman, his 
group's military commander.  Officials suggest they fled to 
India.  Critics blame lack of political will and note RAB's 
success in tracking down hundreds of major criminals in all 
parts of Bangladesh. 
 
B) The BDG refuses to pursue "masterminds" (presumably senior 
BNP officials) in the Kibria and other AL attacks.  Its 
obstruction of the August 21 attack on Hasina fuels 
speculation the BDG directs or protects the perpetrators. 
 
C) The BDG, via police passivity and in some cases 
complicity, backtracked on protecting Ahmadiyas (ref J). 
 
D) The BNP and the AL refuse to give each other an inch, with 
the AL calling the BNP "killers" and "traitors" to the 
principles of Independence, and the BNP asserting the AL is 
anti-Bangladesh and treasonably pro-India. 
 
E) The Anti-Corruption Commission continues to flounder under 
bad leadership and BDG interference, with no hint it can 
evolve into a credible body.  Instead, based on anecdotal 
evidence, corruption at the top may be getting worse in the 
run-up to the next election. 
 
The Bilateral Balance 
--------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Many of the positive BDG actions noted above were 
unexpected, but continued progress in key areas like 
extremist violence will be constrained by the BDG's 
unwillingness to acknowledge the extent of the problem or to 
attack it frontally.  Oddly enough, PMO officials have 
already told us that the USG should be appreciative of the 
banning of the two Islamist groups and the BDG's "solving" of 
the Master and Kibria murders.  The appreciation they have in 
mind is a PM Zia-POTUS meeting in New York or Washington. 
 
¶8. (C) The BDG continues to be responsive to USG 
interventions, most recently by engineering bail for detained 
journalist Shoaib Chowdhury.  However, we note with some 
concern that PM Zia, even in her capacity as defense 
minister, was "unavailable" to meet with Admiral Fallon.  Two 
weeks later, she was similarly "unavailable" to inaugurate on 
Bangladesh TV USAID's new Bengali production of "Seasame 
Street," despite being offered anytime over a two-week span. 
It is unclear if her unavailability was a diplomatic snub. 
 
Suggested Points 
---------------- 
¶9. (C) For BDG: 
-- Condolences on the Savar factory collapse.  Happy that 
USAID-trained personnel and (training) equipment could lead 
the relief efforts.  Admiral Fallon had hoped to discuss with 
PM other ways the U.S. military could build disaster response 
capabilities in Bangladesh. 
 
-- Appreciate your cooperation with the FBI in the Kibria 
case, the conviction of Ahsanallah Master's killers, the 
arrest and charging of the Kibria suspects, and the 
banning/investigation of the two extremist groups. 
 
-- Look forward to the transparent and credible prosecution 
of the Kibria and other suspects. 
 
-- Also appreciate DGFI's briefings on its investigation of 
Bangla Bhai and colleagues.  Capturing Bangla Bhai would send 
a strong rebuttal to the points in the January New York Times 
article. 
 
-- Appreciate the relative lull in political violence since 
late February, which underscores the importance of solving 
such crimes and the application of vigorous law enforcement 
to avert a perceived climate of impunity for violence. 
 
-- Concerned by the renewed attacks on Ahmadiyas and police 
facilitation of extremist demonstrators and the erection of 
provocative signboards at Ahmadiya mosques.  We appreciate 
that after attacks against Ahmadiyas in late 2003, PM/you 
stated the BDG would not declare them non-Muslims.  We also 
note that the ban on Ahmadiya publications is still under 
judicial review and mostly not enforced.  What can you do to 
show your support for the rights of all Bangladeshis? 
 
-- Appreciate the cabinet's approval of eight UN CT 
conventions, but the last one, on terrorism financing, is 
key.  When do you expect Parliament to ratify the UN 
conventions? 
 
-- Know that Ambassador Thomas has raised Leahy amendment 
concerns with you.  This is serious.  We noted the sharp drop 
in "crossfires" in February and March, but are concerned that 
since late April they appear to be on the rise. 
 
-- Like you, we want free and fair elections.  We know it is 
Bangladesh's right to organize its elections and make 
official appointments.  Our focus is on how the entire 
political process operates, from political party actions to 
campaigning and voting.  We believe the focus should be on 
the process, not individuals, and that democratic rights 
should be exercised and defended, not surrendered. 
 
-- Disappointed by the Anti-Corruption Commission's very slow 
start. 
 
¶10. (C) For Sheikh Hasina: 
 
-- Saddened that you've lost full hearing in one year and 
partially in the other, hope continued medical treatment will 
help. 
 
-- (Notional) Congratulations on your candidate's May 9 
re-election as mayor of Chittagong.  I know he's been very 
critical of the U.S. in the past, but I welcome his win as a 
vindication of Bangladeshi democracy. 
 
-- I know you're contemplating proposed changes to the 
electoral and caretaker systems, particularly regarding the 
way key leaders during that period are appointed.  We believe 
this issue is the sole domain of the Bangladeshi people. 
 
-- We understand the importance of the next elections.  We 
will watch closely how the entire political process operates 
in Bangladesh.  We believe the focus should be on the 
process, not individuals, and that democratic rights should 
be exercised and defended, not surrendered. 
 
-- In that context, I don't understand why the AL is 
boycotting the by-election created by Kibria's murder. 
 
-- In December 2003, you made a statement of support for 
Ahmadiyas.  Now that they are under renewed attack, are you 
considering making another statement? 
CHAMMAS