This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAR ES SALAAM 000972 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  5/15/15 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM TZ
SUBJECT:  SALIM SALIM SOUNDS OFF ON ELECTIONS, POLITICAL 
MACHINATIONS, PROSPECTS FOR VIOLENCE IN ZANZIBAR 
 
REF:  DAR ES SALAAM 0908 and previous 
 
Classified by Charge d'Affaires Michael S. Owen for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  In a wide-ranging two-hour lunch 
meeting, former OAU Secretary General Salim Salim told us 
he had failed to capture the CCM presidential nomination 
because of strong opposition from the Zanzibari faction of 
the CCM.  Salim, who is a Zanzibari of Arab heritage, 
accused some party members of "reverse racism" because they 
had considered him "insufficiently African" to become 
President.  Salim acknowledged that Foreign Minister Jakaya 
Kikwete had run a strong campaign to capture the 
nomination, but charged that "lots of money" had changed 
hands and lots of promises had been made, many of which are 
unlikely to be kept.  Salim blasted Zanzibari President 
Karume as a "lightweight," and said in a free vote he would 
not even have captured the party's nomination.  Mohammed 
Bilal, who had also been vying for the Zanzibari 
presidential nomination, had been "heavily pressured" to 
withdraw, Salim said, but this could backfire in the 
general election by further weakening Karume's support 
among CCM party faithful.  If a free and fair election were 
held today, he said, CUF would almost certainly win the 
Zanzibari presidency.  Die-hards in the CCM are fighting to 
ensure that does not happen, Salim said, and violence 
during and after the elections in Zanzibar is almost 
certain unless Karume can exercise strong leadership in the 
weeks ahead.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (U)  Charge joined the Belgian Ambassador and UK and 
Canadian High Commissioners for a March 12 lunch meeting 
with former OAU Secretary General and recently defeated 
presidential aspirant Salim Salim.  Salim, who is also a 
former Foreign Minister, had been considered a strong 
candidate but ultimately finished second to current Foreign 
Minister Jakaya Kikwete in the ruling CCM party's 
presidential nominating convention (ref). 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Party Heavyweights Maneuver Behind the Scenes 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Salim provided a detailed accounting of the 
machinations undertaken during the CCM's nominating party 
convention, leading to Kikwete's nomination.  Although much 
debate and the final vote were public, he said, the real 
decisions were made in closed-door meetings chaired by 
President and party chairman Mkapa.  Candidates were not 
allowed in some of these meetings, Salim said, so even 
though the public events gave the impression of open-ness 
and transparency, there was in fact considerable opacity to 
many of the decisions. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Salim was particularly incensed over one such 
closed-door meeting in which his own candidacy was debated 
by the party's Central Committee.  Salim was not allowed 
into the meeting, but had heard details of the proceedings 
from one of his supporters.  Salim said his candidacy had 
been attacked by the Zanzibari contingent of the CCM, who 
complained that Salim was "an Arab," and "insufficiently 
African" to become president.  He claimed that one delegate 
said that "Salim's skin is not black enough" ever to become 
president of Tanzania.  Salim expressed considerable 
bitterness over this episode, particularly the fact that 
Mkapa let it continue and did not try to intervene or rebut 
these arguments. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Salim also told us that in the weeks leading up to 
the party convention, the CCM leadership had repeatedly 
said that strong anti-corruption credentials would be a 
requirement to obtain the party's nomination.  During the 
initial Central Committee meeting however, Mkapa had 
downplayed corruption as a factor, saying at one point that 
"nobody's completely clean."  When party Vice-chairman John 
Malacela was unexpectedly eliminated in the first round by 
the Central Committee, Mkapa could have sent a strong 
message by using Malacela's dubious record on corruption as 
a justification for his elimination; instead, Mkapa simply 
said that Malacela was "too old" and "not electable." 
According to Salim, this was a clear signal that corruption 
would not be a determining factor in selection of the 
nominee, and took the wind out of the sails of the CCM's 
anti-corruption contingent. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Kikwete:  Lots of Money, Lots of Promises 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  Salim acknowledged that Kikwete had run an 
energetic and skillful campaign, and deserved to win the 
nomination.  Kikwete had done a particularly good job of 
traveling throughout the countryside and enlisting the 
support of youth groups.  On the other hand, Salim said, a 
lot of money had changed hands and a lot of promises had 
been made by Kikwete in the process, and many such promises 
would be next to impossible to keep.  Once Kikwete takes 
office and begins making appointments, he said, there will 
be "a mad scramble" with many disappointed supporters left 
with nothing.  Salim also said - with a certain degree of 
admiration - that Kikwete had "done a good job" of paying 
off the press to ensure nothing but a steady stream of 
favorable press reporting. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Karume's Nomination Heightens Tensions Within CCM 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶7.  (C)  Turning to Zanzibar, Salim admitted that the 
process for re-nominating current Zanzibari President 
Karume once again was "not very democratic."  Karume faced 
a very tough challenge from Mohammed Bilal, a protege of 
former Zanzibari president Salmin Amour; in a free and fair 
vote in the CCM Central Committee or on the floor of the 
party convention, Bilal would almost certainly have 
trounced Karume, according to Salim.  Mkapa and Kikwete had 
both placed "extremely heavy pressure" on Bilal, and in the 
end he had crumbled and dropped out of the race, handing 
the nomination to Karume.  This could ultimately backfire, 
Salim said, because many Bilal supporters were now 
embittered and would find it difficult to support Karume. 
Although they would be unlikely to support the opposition 
party CUF, they could well stay at home on election day, 
thus weakening Karume's vote count. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Salim was particularly critical of Karume, terming 
him a "political lightweight" who had achieved his position 
only because of his historic name.  Salim explained a key 
Kikwete/Karume nexus:  Kikwete had supported Karume's 
nomination over former president Amour in 2000, which was 
the critical boost Karume needed to catapult into the 
Zanzibar presidency.  Karume thus was obliged to support 
Kikwete's candidacy over fellow Zanzibari Salim.  According 
to Salim, Karume's popularity in Zanzibar had steadily 
waned since 2005, and if a free and fair election were held 
today, Karume would almost certainly lose to CUF candidate 
Sharif Seif Hamad. 
 
------------------------ 
Crisis looms in Zanzibar 
------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (C)  Salim expressed grave concern over the prospects 
for electoral violence on Zanzibar.  Die-hards in the 
Zanzibari CCM recognize Karume's weakness, and will pull 
out all the stops to assure his victory, he said. 
Similarly, the CUF rank and file believes they were robbed 
of victory in 1995 and 2000, and are vowing never to let 
this happen again.  Both sides will "do everything 
possible" to win, and each will erupt if it feels it has 
been cheated at the polls.  Salim said that the Zanzibari 
wings of both parties have "too many hot-heads" who are 
only concerned about victory, and are not looking at the 
possible consequences of another questionable election. 
 
¶10.  (C)  The next three months will be critical, said 
Salim, and will above all require strong leadership and 
statesmanship from Karume.  If Karume can reach out to 
Bilal supporters and bring them back into the fold, this 
will strengthen his position and make it more likely he can 
negotiate some sort of power-sharing arrangement with CUF. 
Conversely, failure to reach out to Bilal will make it even 
more likely Karume's supporters will resort to 
intimidation, violence, and fraud to win the election, thus 
making post-election chaos almost inevitable.  Salim 
reiterated the crucial importance of leadership from 
Karume, but his skepticism on this front was all too clear. 
 
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Comment 
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¶11.  (C)  Comment:  Although Salim's remarks were no doubt 
influenced to some extent by his disappointment at not 
capturing the presidential nomination, they ring generally 
true.  In particular, the approaching train wreck in 
Zanzibar is of growing general concern, and Salim's 
analysis tracks very closely with ours.  We also share his 
skepticism over President Karume's ability - or inclination 
- to exert strong leadership and avoid a crisis.  We have 
discussed these concerns with several like-minded 
diplomatic missions here and are planning a series of 
meetings with both Karume and Kikwete to ensure they fully 
understand the consequences of another fraudulent election 
in Zanzibar, and to encourage them to take action now to 
calm tensions and avert a crisis.  End Comment. 
 
OWEN