This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DAR ES SALAAM 001001 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E 
 
E.O. 12958: 5/23/15 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM EAID SCUL TZ
SUBJECT:  Deteriorating Security Situation on Zanzibar 
 
 
Classified by Pol-Econ Chief Judy Buelow for reason 
1.4(b) 
 
REF: A) Dar es Salaam 972, B) Dar es Salaam 832, C) 
Dar es Salaam 801, D) Dar es Salaam 772 and previous 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Violence broke out in Zanzibar's 
Urban West Region during voter registration; weeks 
later, Stonetown and its environs are still on edge. 
A police operation to keep order during registration 
has ended, with a mixed verdict on its results. 
People who go out in the evenings still run the risk 
of random arrest or a police beating.  Civilian gangs, 
many associated with the ruling CCM party, also are 
said to be operating.  Individuals who come from Pemba 
Island, considered a hotbed of the opposition CUF, 
appear to be the target of most, but not all, of these 
attacks and arrests.  Stonetown's lively nightlife has 
become subdued, and many observers worry that the 
atmosphere of confrontation and intimidation could 
worsen as Zanzibar approaches a contentious election 
in October.  The bipartisan Muafaka Accord urged 
greater professionalism and political neutrality for 
the police force; the US mission has made a 
considerable investment in police training.  The next 
months will be a test of police capacity to play a 
positive role, rather than a negative one, in ensuring 
free, fair and peaceful elections.  End Summary. 
 
Confrontations and Violence in Urban West 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) Zanzibari interlocutors of all political 
persuasions expected there would be trouble during 
voter registration Urban West Region, and events 
proved them right.  During the registration period of 
April 2-26, Stonetown and its environs saw numerous 
violent incidents, most affecting CUF supporters 
although CCM adherents also were victimized.  These 
incidents, reported previously, included: an arson 
attack that damaged the home of a CCM agent; a mob 
attack on CUF candidate Hamad's home with damage to 
some vehicles in the neighborhood; an arson attack 
that destroyed a building materials factory, whose 
owner comes from Zanzibar's Pemba Island; arson 
attacks and home invasion against eight different 
homes in a Stonetown neighborhood that has a large 
population of people from Pemba Island; the murder of 
a CCM party agent, whose body was found in a shallow 
grave on his own farm, and an attack "by unknown 
persons" on citizens waiting at a registration center, 
which resulted in the hospitalization of six would-be 
registrants.  Different sources disagree on whether 
CCM or CUF supporters were the victims in this last 
attack.  Reportedly, groups of red-shirted thugs, 
nicknamed "the Janjaweed" are attacking and 
intimidating the Pembans.  Pemba is known as hotbed of 
support for the opposition CUF; the Janjaweed are 
associated with the ruling CCM. 
 
Police Launch "Operation Dondola" 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) In an effort to keep the peace in Urban West 
Region during voter registration, the regular Field 
Force Unit (FFU) of the Police launched "Operation 
Dondola."  Six police officers from the mainland 
directed Zanzibar's FFU contingent in the operation. 
Some of the police involved have benefited from INL 
and ILEA training in civil disorder management or in 
basic criminal investigation.  Speaking in a May 11 
meeting with RSO and poloff, Police Commissioner 
Tibasana characterized the operation as a standard 
police sweep, targeting areas of known criminal 
activity so as to reduce the potential for violence 
during the tense registration period.  Tibasana said 
that about 30 people were arrested under Operation 
Dondola, and that most had since been released. 
Charges included traffic and drug offenses, as well as 
offenses related to registration, or disorderly 
conduct near registration sites.  Operation Dondola, 
which received substantial publicity, ended along with 
voter registration on April 26.  Tibasana said the 
police had received no complaints from either party. 
He emphasized that he continually reminded the police 
on the street to act within law and to remain non- 
partisan.  In particular, he said he often reminded 
police and government leaders alike that the police 
cannot interfere with lawful political demonstrations. 
Tibasana is now planning for the elections and post 
election period, when a more visible police presence 
will likely be necessary. 
 
¶4. (C) Two representatives of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), who met with Charge 
the following day, corroborated the number of arrests 
under Operation Dondola.  They said the ICRC had had 
access to the detainees.  The ICRC representatives 
also noted that police, in what is unfortunately still 
common practice, had beaten and mistreated some of the 
detainees.  However, the ICRC did not find evidence of 
a deliberate policy of abuse of detainees under 
Operation Dondola. 
 
¶5. (C) A fundamentalist Muslim NGO, known as "Uamsho" 
or "Islamic Revival" presented a more disturbing view 
of the Operation Dondola arrests.  (Uamsho's leaders 
almost certainly support CUF, although they publicly 
deny an association with any political party.)  Uamsho 
invited poloff to Zanzibar to discuss the experiences 
of three men who had been arrested.  In a lengthy May 
17 meeting in the Uamsho offices, poloff met with each 
man in turn.  Two said they had attempted to register 
at the Kinononi registration center, but that the 
local sheha said that they were ineligible because 
they came from Pemba Island.  Later that same night, 
police came to their homes to arrest them on 
disorderly conduct charges.  One man reported that 
when he was en route to the station, the police beat 
him so badly that he required hospitalization.  The 
other said that when he was released several days 
later, an "intelligence official" demanded a 150,000 
shilling bribe.  The two reported that six other 
Pemban men who had tried unsuccessfully to register at 
the Kinononi center during the day, had also been also 
arrested that night.  They said that all eight have 
since been released, but that the local sheha was 
threatening to arrest them again.  A third man told 
poloff that he had been arrested and charged with 
weapons offenses, early one morning when he had been 
out jogging.  Four others were arrested, apparently at 
random, and charged in the same case.  One of these, 
who originated from Unguja Island, was quickly 
released, but charges are still pending against the 
other four, who are all from Pemba.  No weapons, 
pictures of weapons, or evidence of a weapons cache 
were presented in court. 
 
Tensions Persist after Close of Registration 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) In the weeks since voter registration ended, 
Urban West Region remains tense and confrontations 
have persisted.  The ICRC representatives said that 
Pemban neighborhoods in particular were "under 
pressure."  Many men in these neighborhoods are not 
sleeping in their homes at night, for fear of attack. 
The ICRC blamed the "janjaweed" gangs for the home 
invasions and beatings. In a May 16 discussion, the 
CUF party's International Affairs Director, Ismail 
Jussa Ladhu, also said that the youth gangs were 
beating people randomly in the streets and that some 
women have been raped. 
 
¶7. (C) Although Operation Dondola has ended, the 
heightened police activity continues.  Several 
interlocutors report increased patrols, especially in 
Pemban neighborhoods, random sweeps of people gathered 
in the streets, and even the closure of popular 
nightclubs.  Jussa reported that he was in the CUF's 
party headquarters on the night of May 14, when police 
surrounded the building and threatened to open fire on 
people who did not leave immediately.  Jussa said that 
he telephoned an official at police headquarters, who 
then ordered the police around the building to leave. 
However, Jussa said that the police vehicle struck the 
corner of a building as it was backing away through 
the narrow, twisting streets around the CUF 
headquarters.  The following day, CUF leaders were 
called into police station to respond to accusations 
that CUF supporters had stoned the vehicle, causing 
the damage.  Jussa and others reported that during the 
previous week, police units in full riot gear had 
closed down several dance halls, sometimes hours 
before their official closing time.  None of these 
nightspots is linked to any particular political 
party.  During high season, which will start in June, 
some are frequented by foreign tourists. 
 
¶8. (U) Several interlocutors reported that the police 
continue to sweep the streets in the evening hours, 
arresting people and sometimes beating them, more or 
less at random.  Typically, those arrested are charged 
with loitering.  Loitering is in fact a popular 
pastime on Zanzibar, and usually it is not treated as 
illegal.  After evening prayers, a Zanzibari will 
often go to a favorite street corner or ally to meet 
with friends and exchange the day's news.  Longtime 
residents of Stonetown know the location of "CUF 
corner" and dozens of other popular gathering spots 
associated with one group or another.  While many 
observers believe that the crackdown 
disproportionately affects CUF supporters and Pembans, 
almost anybody risks getting caught up in a sweep. 
Several newspapers reported that Zanzibar's Deputy 
Attorney General was beaten during a police sweep. 
Many interlocutors noted that Zanzibaris were now 
staying home at night, and that the streets were 
unusually empty after evening prayers. 
 
¶9. (C) Discussions with a wide range of interlocutors 
are yielding a mixed view of the security situation in 
Zanzibar's Urban West Region.  While government 
officials, such as Zanzibar Water Minister Mansoor 
Himid, are inclined to say that all has been calm 
since voter registration ended, almost everybody else 
paints a disturbing picture of police crackdowns on 
public gatherings, assaults by partisan thugs, and 
heightened tension.  The situation bears watching. 
Early June marks the beginning of high season, when 
foreign tourists return to Stonetown, raising the 
possibility that foreigners could be caught up in 
political confrontations.  The heightened political 
tensions do not bode well for a peaceful election 
campaign. 
 
The Role of the Police is Pivotal 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) The verdict is also mixed on the role of the 
police in either quelling or provoking political 
confrontations.  The police have always been a crucial 
factor in Zanzibar's brief history of troubled 
elections.  During the contentious 2000 campaign, the 
police were accused of pro-CCM bias and blamed for 
using excessive force to quell opposition protests. 
The Muafaka Accord subsequently negotiated between the 
CCM and the CUF, called for better police training and 
suggested guidelines to ensure an effective, non- 
intimidating police presence during elections. 
Developments since then suggest an improved police 
capacity to keep order, even when political tensions 
are running high.  The police received very good 
reports for their efforts in the 2003 by-elections and 
in voter registration on Pemba late in 2004.  As the 
high-stakes 2005 elections approach, however, it is 
far from certain that the police will continue to 
build on these hard-won lessons.  Agustin Ramadhani, 
the Deputy Chairman of the Zanzibar Electoral 
Commission (ZEC), thought that the police were the 
single most important factor determining if the 
elections would be peaceful.  Ramadhani admitted that 
sometimes the police were biased.  He said the ZEC 
planned a major a civic education campaign, focusing 
especially on the police. 
 
¶11. (C) The role of Zanzibar's police is also of 
particular interest to the US mission, which has made 
a considerable investment in police training programs 
on Zanzibar and the mainland.  Tanzanian police have 
attended courses offered through ILEA in Gaborone or 
in the Roswell Academy, which emphasize basic 
investigative techniques.  The US mission built and 
equipped a forensic laboratory on the mainland.  It is 
our expectation that this training will enable the 
police to investigate crimes and build evidence-based 
cases against the perpetrators, thereby reducing 
pressure for the police to make random arrests or to 
use beatings to obtain confessions.  Some police have 
also attended civil disorder management training, 
learning techniques to quell violent disturbances by 
using minimal, proportionate force.  One goal of this 
training is to prevent a repetition of Zanzibar's 
post-election violence in 2000, when anti-riot police 
moved too quickly to the use of live ammunition, with 
tragic results.  Zanzibar's police, and their 
training, could soon be put to the most difficult of 
tests:  CUF's Jussa said that, should the 2005 
elections once again be "stolen," CUF would take to 
the streets in massive, peaceful displays of "people 
power, like in Ukraine." 
 
¶12. (C) Comment:  Tension is growing on Zanzibar, 
jeopardizing prospects that the electoral contest will 
be either fair or peaceful.  While the capacity of 
Zanzibar's police is slowly improving, the force is 
still a long way from being fully competent and 
professional.  There is still a risk that the police 
will once again be visibly part of the problem, in the 
event of the elections are fraudulent or violent.  The 
greater risk is that Zanzibar's embattled political 
leaders will pressure the police to forget their 
training, and to become a partisan tool for a 
government determined to retain power by any means. 
Ultimately, the police work for the Zanzibar 
Revolutionary Government; this government has always 
been CCM and is set on remaining so.  In our 
discussions with Zanzibar's governmental leaders, we 
will urge that police be allowed to do their jobs:  to 
guarantee respect for law and order and an environment 
of security that is fundamental to a free and fair 
political campaign.  End comment. 
 
¶13. (u) Please see Embassy Dar es Salaam's SPRNet site 
for a complete update and background on the Tanzanian 
elections. 
 
STILLMAN