This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CANBERRA 000882 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP AND EAP/ANP 
MANILA PASS KOROR, KOLONIA AND MAJURO 
WELLINGTON PASS APIA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2015 
TAGS: PREL MNUC AS KN CH KS JA ID ARF
SUBJECT: EAP A/S HILL'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
SECRETARY L'ESTRANGE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
Classified By: Charge Bill Stanton. Reasons 1.4 b/d. 
 
Summary 
------- 
¶1. (S) EAP Assistant Secretary Christopher R. Hill told 
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) 
Secretary Michael L'Estrange on May 17 that there was a 
 
SIPDIS 
growing sense of urgency in Washington about the DPRK's 
nuclear program.  L'Estrange agreed that the current state of 
"limbo" could not continue for much longer and that the 6PT 
process may have run its course.  L'Estrange said that 
Australia viewed the elevation of the U.S.-Japan-Australia 
Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) as a very positive 
development.  The GOA wanted to ensure that the TSD remained 
an informal, non-bureaucratic forum where the ministers could 
engage in real dialogue.  Australia also wanted to be certain 
that the TSD did not impinge in any way on AUSMIN. 
L'Estrange said Australia's view of China was one of 
"optimism, without any illusions."  At the same time, the GOA 
wanted to reassure Japan that Australia was not blindly 
falling into China's thrall, and thought PM Koizumi's more 
strategic foreign policy might offer a chance to "reinvent" 
Australia-Japan relations.  L'Estrange said Australia 
believed new Indonesian President Yudhoyono presented an 
opportunity, was pursuing a comprehensive engagement with 
Jakarta, and hoped for a similar strengthening of 
U.S.-Indonesian ties.  End summary. 
 
DPRK 
---- 
¶2. (S) In a May 17 meeting in Canberra, EAP A/S Hill briefed 
DFAT Secretary L'Estrange (Deputy Secretary-equivalent) on 
the latest developments on North Korea.  He observed that the 
DPRK had in all likelihood used the year-long 6PT impasse to 
further advance its nuclear weapons program.  L'Estrange 
replied the GOA believed the 6PT might have run their course; 
unfortunately, there appeared to be no consensus on an 
alternate path.  Beijing wanted to be perceived as doing 
something in order to "keep Washington off its back" and to 
keep the matter out of the UNSC -- but not enough to risk 
destabilizing the DPRK. 
 
¶3. (S) Asked about North-South relations, A/S Hill noted that 
the two Koreas were holding vice-ministerial level 
discussions that day in response to a sudden May 14 request 
from the DPRK.  Fertilizer would be at the top of the agenda 
for the North.  In general, Pyongyang's approach toward the 
ROK was to try to manipulate emotions in the South to drive a 
wedge between Seoul and Washington.  The Japanese Government, 
meanwhile, was taking a hard line, in part because the 
Japanese public was so engaged on the DPRK issue. 
 
Trilateral Security Dialogue 
---------------------------- 
¶4. (C) A/S Hill and L'Estrange agreed that the elevation of 
the U.S.-Japan-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) 
to the ministerial level was highly positive.  In Australia's 
view, L'Estrange said, the logical choice for the first 
meeting of the three ministers would be on the margins of the 
UNGA in September.  The ARF Ministerial in July was another 
possibility, although the "optics" of the three countries 
meeting separately at an ARF event could be awkward. 
 
¶5. (C) L'Estrange told A/S Hill that Australia had two major 
concerns related to the TSD.  First, on format, Australia 
wanted to be sure that the frank and informal structure that 
had made the dialogues at the deputy-secretary level so 
valuable would continue.  The GOA had found the purposefully 
less structured discussions extremely useful and hoped to 
resist the natural tendency toward formality when any meeting 
was held at the ministerial level.  Australia was wary about 
proposals to make the TSD "operational" or 
"intelligence-oriented," because the required interagency 
coordination could create exactly the kind of bureaucratic 
apparatus and process the GOA was hoping to avoid. 
 
¶6. (C) Australia's other major concern, L'Estrange said, was 
to make sure the TSD did not impinge on the annual 
Australia-U.S. Ministerial (AUSMIN), which the GOA considered 
to be the centerpiece of its bilateral meetings with the U.S. 
 The most likely AUSMIN dates for this year appeared to be 
either immediately before or after APEC in November, which 
was why Australia believed the UNGA was probably the best 
date for the first TSD ministerial -- to put some separation 
between the two events. 
 
China 
----- 
¶7. (C) L'Estrange described the Australian Government's view 
of China as "optimism, without any illusions."  The GOA had 
both economic and political reasons for pursuing good 
relations with Beijing, but it also understood that a 
benevolent China in the future was not predetermined.  A/S 
Hill replied that the U.S. too had an investment in seeing 
that China evolved in a way that was not antithetical to our 
interests.  The 6PT might have failed so far in the "main 
event" of dismantling the DPRK's nuclear program, but one 
positive result had been closer diplomatic collaboration 
between the U.S. and the PRC.  We planned to keep up the pace 
of engagement this year through an ambitious calendar of 
summits: President Bush and Chinese President Hu Jintao would 
likely meet three times before the end of the year. 
 
Japan 
----- 
¶8. (C) Australia, according to L'Estrange, was trying to 
"reinvent" its relationship with Japan, which historically 
had been principally a trading partner.  While Japan remained 
Australia's most important economic partner, the new, more 
strategic foreign policy approach adopted by the Koizumi 
Government may have opened a door for increased political 
cooperation.  This was the message that PM Howard had taken 
to Tokyo on his recent visit, L'Estrange said.  Australia 
also wanted to reassure the Japanese that the GOA was not 
"standing in the middle of the road blinded by China's 
headlights."  This was one reason that Australia was 
exploring a free trade agreement with Japan even as it 
entered FTA negotiations with China. 
 
Indonesia 
--------- 
¶9. (C) L'Estrange said the GOA, starting with PM Howard, 
considered new Indonesian President Yudhoyono (SBY) to be an 
impressive and serious interlocutor.  Australia was using the 
A$1 billion (US$770 million) it had pledged in post-tsunami 
assistance to deepen relationships between the two countries' 
officials and private sectors.  Good governance would be a 
prime focus of the aid.  Referring to the 
Australian-Indonesian Ministerial Forum that had brought six 
Indonesian cabinet ministers and staff to Australia in March, 
L'Estrange commented that the personal relationships between 
the two governments' officials, especially at the sub-cabinet 
level, were making possible real communication without the 
"layers of formality" that used to exist.  The GOA regarded 
Foreign Minister Wirajuda especially highly.  L'Estrange said 
Australia hoped the U.S. would also see SBY as an opportunity 
and increase its engagement with Indonesia. 
 
¶10. (C) A/S Hill replied that the U.S. was still in the early 
phase of forging a deeper relationship with Indonesia, but 
that our efforts were going well so far.  IMET restrictions 
had been lifted.  Both Deputy Secretary Zoellick and PACOM 
Commander Admiral Fallon had visited Jakarta in recent weeks. 
 While obstacles to better relations -- such as the Timika 
case -- still posed challenges, the U.S. recognized that 
there was a window of opportunity, especially because of the 
improvement in America's image in Indonesia post-tsunami, A/S 
Hill told L'Estrange. 
 
East Asian Summit 
----------------- 
¶11. (C) L'Estrange indicated that Australia was prepared to 
meet ASEAN's demand that it sign the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC) in exchange for an invitation to the East 
Asian Summit (EAS) later this year.  A final decision to sign 
would probably come in the next month to six weeks. 
Australia had been studying how the South Koreans and 
Japanese -- two other U.S. allies -- had acceded to the 
treaty.  The GOA would take a similar approach, making 
certain that signing the TAC did not in any way conflict with 
its ANZUS obligations. 
 
¶12. (C) A/S Hill said the U.S. position on the EAS for the 
moment was to wait and watch how the new grouping developed; 
it was possible that the forum would not amount to much. 
L'Estrange agreed that the future of the EAS was far from 
certain -- "PM Howard himself takes a rather jaundiced view 
of meaningless summitry" -- but the GOA had concluded that it 
was better to be safe and be at the table from the start just 
in case the forum did develop into something significant. 
Furthermore, participation by countries such as Japan, India, 
and Australia would help prevent Chinese domination of the 
EAS.  And Australia could help advance Washington's views at 
the grouping on issues of interest to Washington. 
 
Participants 
------------ 
¶13. (U) DFAT Secretary L'Estrange was accompanied by First 
Assistant Secretary for the Americas and Europe Jeremy 
Newman.  A/S Hill was accompanied by Charge, Polcouns 
(notetaker), and EAP Special Assistant Koehler. 
 
¶14. (U) A/S Hill's delegation has cleared this message. 
 
Stanton