This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 001727 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/E, PM. LONDON, PARIS, ROME 
FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS EAID SU ET NATO USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: NATO AND EU MEET TO DISCUSS SUPPORT TO DARFUR 
 
REF: ADDIS ABABA 01481 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  On 29 April 2005, NATO International Staff 
(IS) and International Military Staff (IMS) led by Assistant 
Secretary General Kobieracki, met with EU General Secretariat 
 
SIPDIS 
and EU Military Staff (EUMS) members led by Director General 
for ESDP, Pieter Feith in the EU's Kortenberg Building. 
Among the 20 plus in attendance were EUMS Director General 
Perruche, Anders Hendrikson from the European Commission and 
Canadian General Fenton (?) from the IMS.  Note:  USEU 
represented the only other bilateral partner of the AU at 
this meeting at the direct invitation of ESDP DG Feith. End 
summary 
 
¶2. (SBU) Pieter Feith opened the meeting with an overview 
saying "We are willing to inform you" on our planning so far 
within a wider context of what is going on in Darfur and 
offering the NATO side an in-depth fact sheet.  Feith focused 
on the results of the Joint Assessment Mission of 22 March 
noting this was an AU-led effort of bilateral partners 
working as an integrated team.  He highlighted the phased 
approach recommended in the report:  Phase I is to strengthen 
the current weakness in the AU structure in order to bring 
the current AMIS mission to full operational capacity (FOC); 
Phase II would expand the mission to approximately 7,600 
military and police; while envisioning a Phase III, if 
necessary, to expand the force to over 12,000.  Stating that 
his best sense is to carry out Phase I perhaps in parallel to 
building up to Phase II, Feith said we should increase the 
AU's effectiveness from the current 25% up to 80% before 
going on to Phase II. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Feith then began to catalogue the weakness and 
shortfalls of the current mission.  Command and control at 
all levels down to El Fasher and further to the sub-regional 
headquarters is the main problem.  In addition, intelligence 
information of any kind is lacking.  Citing the need for all 
participants to "sing off the same song sheet" Feith noted 
the need to enhance reporting mechanisms.  Summarizing his 
list of shortfalls, Feith again stressed his view that we, 
the international community, not jump to Phase II without 
increasing the AU's capacity.  Here he emphasized his belief 
that if NATO is asked for lift, NATO should keep in mind the 
overall approach, which is the need to finish Phase I. 
 
¶4. (SBU) On logistics support, Feith noted that all AU 
partners provided a wide range of assistance including 
communications and transportation, noting in particular the 
inclusion of PA&E, which he said was slow at the start 
resulting in a gap that was covered by some EU Member States. 
 Feith stated that if NATO wants to contribute logistics 
support it would be most welcome by the AU cautioning that 
such support should remain in consonance with ongoing efforts 
in order to go in the same direction. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Feith then turned to the African Peace Facility 
(APF) funding mechanism introducing the POC, Anders 
Hendrikson from the European Commission, and noting that such 
funding for the AU was characterized by conditionality.  Here 
in noted matter-of-factly that no funding under the APF would 
be available for NATO actions. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In closing his introductory remarks, Pieter Feith 
made the following points:  a. NATO and the EU should 
coordinate their public diplomacy (to which he added that the 
two organizations could relax on competitiveness in this 
area)  b. It is possible that an EU member state may propose 
an ESDP operation to formalize ongoing EU actions in an 
inclusive effort, which would include aerial surveillance and 
reconnaissance, but such a mission had not yet been proposed 
c. Solana will make the same points to Mbeki in South Africa 
during his visit (that day)  d. The EU will undertake a 
mission to Addis from 1-4 May for further discussions with 
the African Union and its bilateral partners. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Responding on behalf of the NATO side, ASG 
Kobieracki noted with humor Feith's comment about EU APF 
funding for NATO and then turning to the AU's Konar's letter 
to NATO, he said he wanted to be clear on where NATO is at 
the moment.  Identifying this effort as the first round of 
discussions Kobieracki said he was authorized to coordinate, 
to conduct staff-staff discussions, first with the African 
Union, and that the NATO effort would be complementary to 
ongoing efforts and would not duplicate the work of others 
stressing "we should work with you."  The first step is to 
understand what the EU has done, what the EU is doing, and 
what the EU will do in order to be complementary.  Accepting 
the need to coordinate public diplomacy, Kobieracki said NATO 
was at the exploratory stage and there had been no advance 
thinking on what NATO is considering.  He said his role is to 
clarify the situation so nations can decide in this context, 
he stressed, that NATO knows what it has and is aware of its 
limits. 
 
¶8. (SBU) For the NATO IMS, Canadian General Fenton(?) asked 
the EU about AU command and control "at all levels" noting 
that harmony with the EU and support of the AU is the NATO 
goal.  Saying that C2 is a red-line barrier in NATO, he asked 
the EU side to go into more detail about the operation's C2 
problems and to evaluate quantifiably the quality of the 
present effort.  Responding for the EUMS, Lt Gen Perruche 
said that although advisors and planners had been sent by all 
partners to build the chain-of-command, it hasn't been 
successful as the AU is very careful to keep the leadership 
positions at all levels.  General Perruche added that even 
providing all the necessary assets at the strategic, 
operational and tactical levels didn't help as the African 
culture doesn't match the western system.  In the African 
system, according to General Perruche, the credibility of the 
local leadership is the key.  General Perruche clearly 
pointed out that fixing the C2 system first is the highest 
priority and that this priority was communicated clearly to 
the AU by its bilateral partners. 
 
¶9. (SBU) On a positive note, Perruche said that where they 
are deployed, they are having a positive affect "globally we 
can say so - it works, but there is no collective impact, 
only local."  Perruche continued saying "We have good ideas, 
but the AU must accept them first and even if the AU leaders 
agree there is no guarantee that others will implement the 
decisions."  One UK member of the EUMS with experience on the 
ground specified the shortfalls saying that there are no 
terms of reference and no standard operating procedures in 
the command and control system, no delineation of tasks among 
the participants and no strategic and operational direction 
of the mission.  While agreeing that there are some bright 
officers involved, he said that clearly there are also some 
incompetents.  An additional frustration is that deputies do 
not give direction in the absence of their principals. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Peter Stamps of the European Commission, who was 
formerly the EU Council Secretariat liaison in Addis while on 
active service with the British Army, added that the AU lacks 
the numbers of personnel needed to execute the mission.  On 
top of that, there are those in the region who "count the 
number of white faces going in and out" as a negative metric. 
 In defense of the AU, Stamps added that intense political 
pressure had forced the AU to execute the mission before it 
was properly planned.  The EUMS J-3, Brigadier General Brauss 
concurred but noted that "the plan is a piece of paper, they 
have to want to implement it." 
¶11. (SBU) Matthew Reece for the Council Secretariat agreed 
with all the EU speakers and added his view that it's about 
capacity and ownership, the latter requiring a lot of the 
AU's attention while there is a need to expand the mission 
with limited capacity.  He added that his is why there is a 
push to move operational planning to Khartoum while leaving 
strategic direction in Addis while endeavoring to improve 
both simultaneously.  Finally, he added that in the AU there 
is a reluctance to delegate, which creates bottlenecks within 
an already limited capacity for action.  Here Pieter Feith 
interjected that NATO might be useful in supporting the split 
of strategic and operational planning between Addis and 
Khartoum because of the great distance involved. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Turning to the civilian aspects, Pieter Feith 
called on Casper Klynge of the Directorate for Civilian 
Aspects of ESDP to comment on the police component.  Klynge 
described an even greater shortfall in police than in 
military.  Currently, the requirement is for 815 officers of 
which only 230 are in-country.  The urgent police needs are 
force generation, communications equipment, vehicles and 
guidance.  In Phase II, the police requirement goes up to 
1560 as there will be a greater need post-stabilization for 
policing as IDPs return.  He is doubtful they will ever do it 
as force generation, logistics and communications will still 
be lacking. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Anders Hendrikson of the Commission spoke next.  He 
stressed that the EU has two strategic objectives.  First, 
the EU identified the AU as a strategic partner in Africa. 
Most of the work so far in this relationship has been in the 
field of defense and security (AMIS I and AMIS II).  The 
second objective is reigning in the chaos of Darfur.  There 
is tension between these two objectives, according to 
Hendrikson; between the need to build AU capacity over time 
and the need to do some urgently in Darfur.  He noted that 
this tension almost split the AU as it was forced to take a 
big risk in launching AMIS.  Because the AU will do other 
operations and Africa over the coming years, we need the AU 
there.  Because of the importance of our common strategic 
interest in the success of the AU, his advice to NATO was, 
therefore, to focus on the March AU-led Joint Assessment 
Report, to be sensitive to the tension described above, and 
to keep the quality concerns in mind.  Finally, Hendrikson 
pointed out a valid concern of the AU:  lack of coordination 
in the international community.  Here he expressed his 
appreciation for the NATO effort while asking everyone to be 
cognizant of the AU's concern. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Next, the NATO side asked if the EU had been 
welcomed by the AU.  Pieter Feith responded that the AU 
officially accepted the UN Security Council resolutions but 
that the reality may be different in the field where there 
are instances of non-cooperation. 
 
¶15. (SBU) In responding to an IMS question on the EU's view 
about the short-term and long-term requirements for NATO 
assistance, Feith suggested reading the documents currently 
in use by the bilateral partners, copies of which the EU 
passed to NATO at the meeting.  Feith followed-up saying that 
it is a fast-moving situation as this week the AU PSC 
approved expansion of the mission to Phase II.  Here he noted 
that the EU expects a letter from the AU officially informing 
them of this decision.  In this context, Feith again stressed 
the need to "follow the party line" meaning that both 
organizations should work to remedy the existing shortfalls, 
which are listed in the documents, as it makes no sense, said 
Feith, to pump more troops in (a effort he attributed to 
Pronk's staff at UN) while acknowledging that "media wise" 
more troops makes sense.  Summarizing this point, Feith said 
that more troops "will not improve the overall effectiveness 
as troops without support adds to the negative image of the 
international community." 
 
¶16. (SBU) Turning to the expansion of the mission, General 
Perruche said he still didn't know where the AU will get the 
troops as they need to both augment current levels and to 
rotate employed forces.  Rhetorically he continued:  Where 
will they come from?  What will be the quality of the troops? 
 What will they do?  Where will they get logistics support? 
How long will it take? To this he added "The EU logistics 
plan was never followed."  Supporting his boss, an officer of 
the EUMS added "They (the AU) provide a man, a uniform and 
boots only."  Perruche then summarized the challenge "It's 
education and culture." 
 
¶17. (SBU) The NATO side then asked, "Where would NATO fit in 
in a complementary way?"  Responding for the EU side, BG 
Brauss the J-3 said "It's hard to say, but if two NATO 
participants join the mission next week (1-4 May) you'll get 
an idea.  The answer will be subject to your assessment in 
coordination with the EU." 
 
¶18. (SBU) Next, an officer of the IMS asked about expansion 
of the mission saying that if the AU PSC has already decided 
to expand the mission, isn't that a fait accompli?  Christian 
Manahl of the Council Secretariat replied that in the AU 
"politics does not equal reality."  He stressed that it will 
take much longer than the AU thinks giving all of us time to 
address the current shortfalls.  His advice, consistent with 
all those present from the EU side, was "don't rush to Phase 
II."  Feith added that this is high politics in the AU: 
"Konar should get the same message at the EU and NATO." 
Perhaps, Feith suggested, NATO could take a tougher approach 
by saying "we'll help with lift when we see improvement in 
Phase I."  Supporting this view, the EUMS said that if we all 
stick to the same line on establishing the logistic support 
first then expansion, we can work with the AU together. 
 
¶19. (SBU) For NATO, ASG Kobieracki said that NATO is looking 
for information on ongoing bilateral support to the AU as 
NATO will be considering all options.  The EU side offered to 
provide their matrix on this point.  Next, Kobieracki asked, 
in the spirit of complementarity and transparency if it would 
be possible for two NATO observers to join the UN, EU, US, CA 
trip to Addis 1-4 May?  Pieter Feith responded that he was 
"authorized to say 'most welcome'."  He did suggest, however, 
that NATO register directly with the AU and that the EU would 
provide the contact details for this.  Feith then offered an 
admittedly more political message saying he assumed NATO 
would be broadly in line with the EU approach as this is a 
first opportunity to really work in harmony.  He quickly 
added that he assumed the AU would naturally want to talk 
about expansion to Phase II with NATO.  In closing this 
issue, Feith commented that "you'll get all the cooperation 
of friends."  In response, Kobieracki reiterated that NATO 
has as of yet no common policy as it is still in the 
exploratory stage and that the NATO representatives in Addis 
will do nothing to undermine the specific EU line and will 
publicly support the EU general line. 
 
¶20. (U) There being no other questions, the meeting adjourned 
after one hour and five minutes. 
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED 
 
McKinley 
.