This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001278 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY (TEXT) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2015 
TAGS: PREL ETRD PGOV XR XF
SUBJECT: ARAB-SOUTH AMERICA SUMMIT - A NEGATIVE BALANCE FOR 
THE GOB 
 
REF: BRASILIA 1252 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES PHILLIP T. CHICOLA, REASONS 1.4 
(b & d 
) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  The Arab-South America Summit ended May 
¶11.  Unfortunately, for the GOB the reverberations may take 
longer to subside.  The overwhelming consensus among 
Brazilian opinion-makers is that the event, and its 
ill-conceived declaration, will not enhance Brazil's image 
and call into question the ability of the GOB to achieve its 
developing world leadership aspirations.  Observers concur 
that Arab participants departed the Brazilian capital in a 
joyous mood, as opposed to the sullen one among many South 
American representatives, and both left in their wake many 
ordinary Brazilians who were puzzled and irritated by the 
event.  From the Latins' viewpoint, there were few bright 
spots.  The new Iraqi government, however, emerges as a clear 
winner.  At his first international foray, President Talabani 
was accepted as a legitimate head of state by all 
participants, made a positive impression, and perhaps more 
importantly, was vocally defended by other Arab participants 
(led by Algeria) when criticized by Chavez.  Nevertheless, 
Talabani was heavily overshadowed by the distractions created 
by Argentine President Kirchner's early departure, Chavez 
antics, and a politically provocative declaration that, in 
the eyes of many Brazilians, "imported" into Brazil the 
problems of terrorism and the problematic Middle East peace 
process, while providing few visible benefits to Brazil or 
the region.  The divisions created by the event, in the view 
of Brazil's Jewish community, could damage centuries of warm 
relations between Brazil's ethnic Arab and Jewish 
populations.  End Summary 
 
PANNED IN THE REVIEWS 
--------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U)  Brazil's press overwhelmingly blamed the GOB for the 
Summit's dubious outcome.  Lead editorials in Brazil's 
principal dailies expressed dismay that, while Arab 
representatives probably departed Brasilia in a jubilant 
mood, getting what they wanted in the declarations criticisms 
of the U.S. and Israel, the South Americans, who mostly 
wanted to talk trade issues, got little in return for their 
political concessions on the declaration.  Noting that the 
summit is a milestone in President Lula da Silva's oft-stated 
ambition to create a "new political and commercial 
geography," a 12 May "O Estado de S. Paulo" editorial 
lambasted the GOB for the futility of its anachronistic 
"third-world" project.  Meanwhile, the "bad blood" between 
Argentina and Brazil actually worsened in front of everyone's 
eyes, with Kirchner's early departure widely seen as a slap 
in the face to Lula.  One political pundit in "O Globo", 
commenting on an outcome which in retrospect seemed 
inevitable, opined that "Brazil has succeeded with the Summit 
in displeasing the Greeks, the Trojans, and (even the) the 
Argentines."  "O Globo" further mused that the summit results 
pointed up incompetence at Itamaraty, asking how any document 
which included in its preparation Syria and Hugo Chavez, 
among others, could not create major diplomatic controversy. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Numerous commentators pointed out that the Summit 
could have a "boomerang effect" on Brazil's foreign policy 
and global leadership ambitions.  Lula came under 
particularly heavy fire from both the media and important 
Brazilian congressional leaders for his apparent reluctance 
to even use the word "democracy" in either the Summit itself 
(Lula mentioned democracy once in his closing speech) or 
press for its inclusion in the final declaration (where it 
appears once, in reference to the workings of the UN).   Also 
controversial was Lula's closing comment that seemingly 
attributed the existence of terrorism to the "maldistribution 
of wealth."  The irony was not lost --"O Estado" pointed out 
that while the declaration deplores poverty and the chasm 
between rich and poor countries, not a few of its signatories 
are potentates with immense personal fortunes who, with 
little regard for women or human rights, rule over 
improverished societies. 
 
 
 
EYE ON THE MIDDLE EAST 
---------------------- 
 
¶4.  (U)  Iraqi President Talabani, as it turned out one of 
the few Arab stars attending the Summit, provided good copy 
to Brazil's press in defense of the U.S. presence in Iraq. 
Describing the outcome of the Summit in positive words, 
Talabani noted that the Summit supported Iraqi sovereignty 
and independence, the recent elections, democracy, the new 
government formed by the National Assembly, and condemned 
terrorism.  "The presence of foreign forces does not signify 
occupation," Talabani was quoted in "O Estado de S.Paulo". 
But, he added, "We hope for the day when we will have 
completed the reform of our army and police and could then 
ask the Americans to depart."  Referring to the lack in the 
final Summit declaration of specific language targeting 
countries that harbor or support terrorists, President 
Talabani told Brazil's largest circulation daily, "Folha de 
¶S. Paulo", that Iraq preferred "to resolve this problem with 
its neighbors in private conversations."  What was 
accomplished in Brasilia, Talabani pointed out, was an appeal 
to the Arab media which indirectly supports terrorism, and, 
he added, that he "had received promises from Jordanian and 
Syrian leadership that they would stop this propaganda." 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Referring to the "contretemps" with Hugo Chavez 
earlier in the Summit (reftel), Talabani said that he later 
spoke with Chavez and explained the difference between 
"occupation and the presence of foreign forces."  According 
to the Iraqi President, Chavez said he understood. "Embracing 
and kissing me," Talabani added, "he (Chavez) said he 
supported our struggle." (Comment: Typical Chavez, inconsistent, 
emotional and insincere. End comment.) 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  In his interviews, Palestinian National Authority 
President Mahmoud Abbas also sought to present a softened 
image to the Brazilian press, but he was far less convincing 
than Talabani in demonstrating moderation. Referring to 
language in the final Summit Declaration that expresses the 
right of "resistance to foreign occupation," implicitly 
interpreted as condoning Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Abbas 
stated that neither group was terrorist.  He expected that 
"all Palestinian factions will adopt peaceful means" in their 
struggle.  He and other Palestinian spokespersons celebrated 
the final Declaration.  "We are satisfied with the 
Summit...Everything in the Declaration is well said and 
reflects our thoughts."  Abbas also praised President Lula 
for his "very positive, constructive role." 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Understandably, Jewish groups in Brazil were less 
charitable about the Summit.  The Confederacao Israelita do 
Brasil, speaking for Jewish organizations throughout Brazil, 
issued a manifesto immediately following the Summit attacking 
the role of the Brazilian Government for "importing a war 
that was not ours."  Under the title of "Terror, No" the 
paper stated that Brazil had been "disrespected," especially 
since the stated purpose of the Summit had been the 
advancement of economic and cultural ties -- issues all but 
overlooked in the flurry of political rhetoric.  The 
Declaration, the Confederacao noted, appeared to accept a 
difference between "good terrorism and bad terrorism," yet 
never made reference to such topics as democracy or the 
rights of women.  Describing GOB motivations for an event 
focused solely on building commercial relations as 
"disingenuous," Confederation President Berel Aizenstein 
opined that the true intention was to obtain votes for a 
Brazilian seat on the UN Security Council. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Comment:  In a conversation with Charge and PolCouns 
on the margins of a reception on the evening of 11 May, a 
subdued Marcel Biato, deputy foreign affairs advisor to Lula, 
criticized "press exaggerations" about summit controversies 
and defended the "symbolic value" of the event for the GOB's 
continuing strategy of outreach to non-traditional partners, 
in pursuit of building political and commercial alliances and 
its credibility as a global leader and UNSC candidate (Note: 
Septel will analyze this stragegy at the halfway mark in 
Lula'a mandate. End note.)  In this regard, Biato said the 
GOB was prepared to absorb some criticism for an event it 
 
 
still deemed useful.  However, Biato then offered a curiously 
contradictory and self-deprecating defense of the event -- 
i.e., that the Brazil summit would have no broad or long-term 
international consequence, hence critics of its outcomes 
should stand down and not worry. 
 
¶9.  (C) Comment continued.  Biato's confused defensiveness is 
illustrative -- the GOB will have difficulty convincingly 
portraying the summit in positive terms, politically or 
commercially, and its image for competence and leadership 
emerged tarnished.  GOB officials cannot hide the summit's 
avoidable costs and the gains -- concretely, only an 
agreement to negotiate a commercial accord between Mercosul 
and the Gulf Cooperation Council -- do not seem to come close 
to compensating for the negative balance.  In addition, it is 
far from clear that the summit, in any tangible way, helps 
Brazil in its quest for a permament UNSC seat.  In fact, an 
Egyptian diplomat told Charge on the night of the summit's 
closing that it would make much more (we presume a UNSC seat 
for Egypt) before the Arabs would agree to support Brazil's 
bid for the Security Council. 
 
Chicola