This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 004541 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2015 
TAGS: PTER KJUS PHUM PREL SNAR CO AUC
SUBJECT: PEACE COMMISSIONER DISCUSSES AUC DEMOBILIZATION 
PROCESS 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) On May 10, Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo 
discussed with the Ambassador his plans to adopt a divide and 
conquer strategy to demobilize the rest of the AUC.  He 
explained that the GOC would push for two key points in the 
Justice and Peace law being considered in Congress: (1) that 
paramilitarism be an act of sedition and (2) that persons who 
were drug traffickers before joining the AUC would not be 
prohibited from benefiting, although the crimes they 
committed before joining would be.  He expressed concern that 
some of the changes the bill's sponsors and the Minster of 
Interior and Justice had made without his knowledge had 
softened the draft law.  End summary. 
 
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Divide and Conquer 
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¶2. (C) Peace Commissioner Restrepo told the Ambassador that 
the AUC leadership was disorganized and did not have a 
unified negotiating strategy.  In order to take advantage of 
this, Restrepo had begun holding meetings with individual 
commanders outside of the concentration zone to isolate those 
who were against the peace process.  In early May, he met 
with Central Bolivar Bloc (BCB) military commander "Javier 
Montanez," who is heavily involved in the drug trade and has 
been skeptical of peace talks.  During the one-on-one 
meeting, Montanez said he would demobilize his 5,000 men if 
given sufficient legal guarantees.  In the coming week, 
Restrepo planned to hold a meeting with senior AUC commander 
Vicente Castano, who controls several thousand men.  Restrepo 
explained that once a commander demobilized with his troops, 
he would be too vulnerable to reject the peace process and 
return to the conflict.  AUC commander Salvatore Mancuso was 
a case in point.  AUC spokesman Ernesto Baez had asked 
Mancuso to threaten to return to the conflict if the Justice 
and Peace law passed.  Mancuso refused and instead said 
publicly he would not return to the battlefield and asked the 
GOC to increase his security. 
 
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Justice and Peace Law 
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¶3. (C) Restrepo explained that he would insist that two 
principle changes be made to the Justice and Peace law. 
First, article 64 making paramilitarism an act of sedition 
needed to be reinserted.  Restrepo explained that the GOC 
needed this article for procedural reasons so that the 
paramilitaries could be pardoned for having belonged to an 
illegal armed group (IAG).  He assured the Ambassador the GOC 
would not permit human rights violations, drug trafficking, 
or other serious crimes to be considered pardonable, 
political crimes.  Ambassador replied that, in our reading, 
inclusion of article 64 did not present a problem. 
 
¶4. (C) Second, Restrepo explained that the clause Senator 
German Vargas Lleras had inserted into article ten to prevent 
persons who were drug traffickers before joining the illegal 
armed group from benefiting from the law needed to be 
removed.  Otherwise, at least half of the AUC commanders 
would not be eligible and would have no reason to demobilize. 
 He said the text needed to be changed to specify that crimes 
committed before membership in the group would not be 
covered.  Restrepo admitted that the GOC would be criticized 
for removing the clause, but that he had persuaded President 
Uribe it was necessary.  Ambassador emphasized the importance 
that there be no benefits for activities before membership in 
an IAG. 
 
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Concern About Pretelt's Changes 
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¶5. (C) Restrepo expressed concern about changes the sponsors 
of the bill and Minister of Interior and Justice Sabas 
Pretelt had made to the latest draft they presented to 
Congress, without notifying Restrepo.  The sponsors (who 
include Uribista Senators Mario Uribe, Claudia Blum, and Luis 
Gomez Gallo) proposed making the eligibility requirements for 
individual and collective demobilization the same, removing 
the requirement that individual deserters provide 
intelligence on their illegal armed group.  Restrepo asserted 
that individual deserters needed to provide information, but 
that collective demobilized did not.  Second, Restrepo said 
he did not understand why the sponsors had shortened the 
investigation time frames (in the sponsors' draft, a 
prosecutor is required to report the results of the 
benefiary's open statement to the Prosecutor General's Office 
within 12 hours and the Prosecutor General's Office is 
required to investigate the beneficiary in 30 days). 
Restrepo said an investigation period of at least 90 days 
seemed more reasonable.  Ambassador strongly agreed. 
Restrepo also disagreed with how the sponsors had taken away 
the Reparations and Reconciliation Committee's responsibility 
to oversee the reparations process. 
 
¶6. (C) Restrepo thought a proposal to allow the President to 
extend the time frame for which crimes could be covered would 
be a disincentive for illegal armed groups to demobilize. 
The draft passed in committee stated that the bill would only 
cover crimes committed before the law had gone into effect. 
A congresswoman had proposed that the President be given 
permission to extend this time limit to facilitate a peace 
process with guerrilla groups.  Restrepo agreed that, in 
theory, the idea was good, but warned that doing so would 
discourage illegal armed groups from ceasing their illicit 
activities immediately if they knew they could still benefit 
from the law later on. 
 
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Subsequent Information 
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¶7. (C) In response to the Ambassador's concern that the draft 
law allows persons to receive an alternative sentence for 
crimes they did not initially admit if they subsequently 
accept guilt, Restrepo explained the reasoning was to require 
each beneficiary to collaborate with authorities in an 
on-going manner.  Many paramilitaries could not necessarily 
be expected to remember all of their crimes.  He told the 
Ambassador that he would look into the possibility of adding 
more explicit language that, if a beneficiary could not prove 
he did not intentionally conceal an un-confessed crime, then 
he would not be eligible for an alternative sentence. 
Restrepo emphasized, however, that the language could not be 
overly ambiguous because a subsequent administration could 
use the law to block large numbers of paramilitaries from 
benefiting. 
 
¶8. (C) Restrepo agreed that the law needed to find an 
adequate balance between peace and justice.  He warned, 
however, that making the law overly harsh would unify the AUC 
leadership against the law and the peace process, and allow 
the most militant commanders to dominate.  He said the GOC 
had to re-take control of the Congressional debate because it 
would responsible for implementing the final version. 
WOOD