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Viewing cable 05BOGOTA4342, FY 2007 COUNTER NARCOTICS AND ANTICRIME ASSISTANCE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BOGOTA4342 2005-05-06 21:32 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Bogota
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 21 BOGOTA 004342 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR INL, ALSO FOR WHA 
DEPT FOR ADM AID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ABUD PREL MASS SNAR CO
SUBJECT:  FY 2007 COUNTER NARCOTICS AND ANTICRIME ASSISTANCE 
BUDGET - (REVISED COPY - SEE USAID SECTION - Promote Social 
and Economic Progress) 
 
1.  Summary. Our counter-narcotics (CN) programs in Colombia 
face a significant challenge in FY 2007:  the expanded 
authorities and the recognition that the battles against 
narcotics and terrorism are related puts additional stress 
on our resources.  This cable explains in detail the 
resources needed in FY-2007 to accomplish our CN mission and 
to employ effectively the new authorities Congress has given 
us.  Our air assets and the Colombian special forces we are 
training are increasingly called on to defend vital 
infrastructure resources from terrorist attack, taking a 
more offensive approach against narco-terrorist assets and 
personnel, and rescuing victims of kidnappings and assaults 
carried out by guerrilla groups.  Our interdiction and 
eradication programs have, nonetheless, been successful 
recently.  We should expect our aircraft to be struck by 
hostile fire, necessitating increased expenditures on repair 
and spare parts.  All of these programs are the core of what 
we must do to assist President Uribe to succeed in 
eliminating narcotics trade in Colombia and stopping the 
terrorists that threaten the democratic system of one of our 
key Latin American allies, as well as the stability of the 
entire Andean region.  Colombia is the source of 80 percent 
of the world's cocaine, an increasingly important supplier 
of opium, and home to three foreign terrorist organizations. 
We simply cannot afford not to support the GOC's counter- 
narcotics programs. 
 
2.  The projects essential to continued success of our 
Colombia policy include the aerial eradication program with 
the Colombian National Police (CNP), the CNP Air Service 
(ARAVI), the Colombian Army (COLAR) Helicopter Battalion and 
Counter-Drug (CD) Brigade, enhancement of the COLAR special 
operations capability (creation of commando battalions and 
tactical reconnaissance assets), Colombian Navy (COLNAV) 
maritime and riverine interdiction programs, and CNP 
interdiction programs, including the Airmobile Companies 
(Junglas) and road interdiction units.  Of equal importance 
in the medium term are our programs to support democracy, 
alternative development, assist vulnerable groups, and 
promote the rule of law and public security throughout 
Colombia. 
 
3.  To carry out these programs, post proposes INL funding 
of a minimum of $462.253 million for FY-2007.  Counter- 
narcotics programs require $180.665 million and $160.190 
million is devoted to social, economic, and rule of law 
programs.  The detailed budget breakdown will be e-mailed to 
INL/LP. 
 
4.  In addition, we recommend $121.398 million in Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF) in FY2007 to support: training and 
equipping of additional COLAR units; enhanced naval and 
riverine operations; cargo airlift; and intelligence 
aircraft provided to the GOC.  End summary. 
 
Support to the Colombian National Police (CNP) Anti- 
narcotics Directorate (DIRAN) - $180.665 million 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
CNP Aviation (ARAVI) support -$80.075 million 
 
Project summary 
 
CNP Aviation (ARAVI) support - $80.075 million:  DIRAN 
aviation supports eradication and interdiction.  Helicopters 
serve as transport and eradication escorts; fixed-wing 
aircraft move cargo and troops and also conduct intelligence 
operations.  Our focus for DIRAN aviation in FY2007 is 
maintaining an aircraft availability rate of 75 percent 
within a flying hour program agreed upon by NAS and the CNP. 
As our eradication operations continue to be successful we 
are forced to move to more remote areas where the coca crops 
have migrated.  We will be required to forward deploy more 
aircraft for longer periods and further from permanent 
bases.  This will increase transport costs and other 
expenses related to operating from temporary locations. 
 
A.   Project title.  CNP aviation (ARAVI) 
 
B.   Project description.  NAS assistance to ARAVI helps to: 
advise and train ARAVI to manage its aviation program with 
the ultimate goal of nationalization; provide quality 
support to elements of the U.S. Mission in Colombia 
requesting assistance from ARAVI; sustain NAS/ARAVI 
advisers' ability to provide professional assistance to the 
CNP; ensure ARAVI personnel maintain basic technical and 
tactical skills; provide a safe environment in conducting 
all missions.  ARAVI maintains five aviation bases and, in 
FY07, we expect to support 28 fixed-wing and 62 rotary-wing 
aircraft.  ARAVI participates in eradication and 
interdiction operations and supports the war on terrorism 
where this does not conflict with the primary counter- 
narcotics mission. 
 
C.   Resources requested.  In FY07 NAS/ARAVI requires $1.2 
million for personnel; $3.85 million for both in-country and 
CONUS training (we have identified training as a priority 
for investment in view of a 2004 accident which destroyed a 
$5.5 million DC-3 aircraft and hard landings by C-26 
aircraft that have resulted in increased repair costs and 
reduced aircraft availability); $56.325 million for 
operations and maintenance (we have broken down approximate 
costs for operations and maintenance by aircraft model; 
costs are higher than in previous fiscal years because we 
are supporting additional aircraft, we anticipate continued 
price increases, and as aircraft age they invariably require 
additional parts and maintenance; $13.1 million for fuel, an 
approximate 30 percent increase over FY04 fuel expenditures. 
We are requesting $1.5 million for ammunition and armament 
(ARAVI provides gunships to the eradication program); $0.6 
million for communications; $0.8 million for shipping; and 
$2.7 million for construction, renovation and improvement 
projects. 
 
D.   Resource justification.  The resources requested are 
required to support a fleet of 83 aircraft at an operational 
availability rate of 75 percent.  We are using current 
(FY04) costs per aircraft model for operations and 
maintenance and adjusting for anticipated inflation.  As 
aircraft age, they generally require additional maintenance 
and spare parts-for example, there is structural stress and 
damage to one-third of the Huey II fleet which requires 
depot-level repair.  We will continue to press DIRAN to 
share more of the costs of ARAVI.  We have seen progress, 
with DIRAN assuming an increased share of the costs related 
to the transfer of PNC personnel to the newly established 
police posts in rural areas.  ARAVI has also recently 
purchased approximately $400,000 in fuel service equipment. 
We are reviewing other areas, such as sharing construction 
and aircraft fuel costs, as further ways to foster 
nationalization and increase ARAVI's share of program costs. 
When our OJT/Nationalization adviser is hired we will task 
him/her with working with ARAVI to identify contractor 
positions that ARAVI personnel can assume once fully 
trained.  This will reduce contractor overhead costs built 
into operations costs. 
 
E.   Performance measures.  The performance measures for 
NAS/ARAVI are the operational readiness rates of the various 
aircraft models, as indicated above, and the adherence to a 
flight hour program and "banked hours" to ensure that 
aircraft are available throughout the year for missions, 
including support to eradication.  As part of the latter, 
NAS/ARAVI records interruptions in aerial eradication due to 
the lack of required ARAVI aircraft and/or equipment.  We 
will also identify percentages of personnel working on the 
program with the goal of increasing the percentage of ARAVI 
personnel while simultaneously decreasing the percentage of 
contractor personnel. 
 
F.   Sustainability.  As outlined above, we believe the 
resources requested will help ensure ARAVI's ability to 
support counter-narcotics operations in Colombia.  As noted, 
we are currently studying an on-the-job training program to 
increase the skills of ARAVI personnel and thereby reduce 
our reliance upon contractor personnel.  With additional 
aircraft that are being procured in FY04, FY05 and beyond, 
however, we anticipate the requirement for continued, 
substantial contractor support, irrespective of the 
possibility of additional ARAVI resources. 
 
G.   Evaluation plan.  NAS/ARAVI meets with INL, contractor 
and subcontractor personnel at least three times a year to 
evaluate the NAS/ARAVI program and to identify specific 
action items for continued improvement in our program.  We 
examine operational readiness rates and the flying hour 
program (recently agreed to by NAS and ARAVI), adherence to 
this program, and "banked hours" (as explained above) as 
indicators of program efficiency and effectiveness.  Upon 
the creation and implementation of an OJT program we will 
also examine how to increase the percentage of ARAVI 
personnel relative to contractor personnel on the program. 
From a safety standpoint, we will also examine the number of 
total flight hours per aircraft model relative to the number 
of accidents as an indication of the efficacy of our 
maintenance and training components. 
 
 
CNP Eradication - $82.520 million 
 
Project Summary 
 
CNP support for aerial eradication of illicit crops and 
environmental monitoring - $82.520 million.  These funds 
will be used to: purchase herbicide to spray coca and poppy; 
support contract costs; conduct environmental monitoring; 
cover operational expenses associated with the detection and 
aerial eradication of illicit crops, as well as the 
verification of spray operations efficacy. 
 
A.   Project title:  CNP Aerial Eradication and 
Environmental Management Programs 
 
B.   Project Description:  In FY07 the aerial eradication 
program will remain the primary focus of counter-narcotics 
(CN) efforts in Colombia.  Record successes were achieved 
yet again in CY04 (136,551 hectares of coca and 3,061 
hectares of opium poppy sprayed) and preliminary indications 
are that CY05 results will be similar to last year.  Though 
we anticipate a reduction in total illicit crop cultivation, 
this will be possible only if our rate of spray exceeds 
narco-terrorists' replant rate.  The challenge will be to 
spray and re-spray in widely separated geographic areas. 
This will require us to operate from more remote forward 
operating locations for extended periods to reach 
cultivations that are being relocated to non-traditional 
growing areas.  Traditional growing areas, such as the 
department of Putumayo that once accounted for a large 
percentage of coca cultivation, remain repressed with 
nominal replant rates.  The Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC) 
recently released a report on coca and poppy cultivation in 
the Andes that indicates no net decline in coca cultivation 
in Colombia for CY04.  There is some question as to the 
accuracy of this report and those of previous years, but 
post is reevaluating MPP objectives for 2007 and now assumes 
the need to spray at current levels at least until there is 
clear evidence of a significant reduction in net coca 
cultivation.  Our planning is now based on a target of 
eradicating 130,000 hectares of coca in 2007. 
 
The NAS coordinates activities between the GOC and NAS to 
provide operational guidance, based on Colombian 
environmental laws, to CNP spray bases throughout the 
country.  Activities are conducted in accordance with the 
GOC's Environmental Management Plan, to include: spray base 
operations, industrial safety programs, solid and liquid 
waste management, environmental monitoring, public education 
and social management, public health monitoring, and 
contingency plan operations.  We conduct inspections and 
analyze samples of the soil, water, and from human 
inhabitants in spray areas. 
 
During 2004, the CNP established a satellite imagery 
laboratory to conduct imagery analysis for illicit crop 
detection, deforestation studies, pre- and post operations 
characterizations of spray areas, and analysis of national 
parks and indigenous reservations.  Thus far in 2005, 
agreements have been reached with the National Soil 
Institute to establish a laboratory to analyze soil for 
possible environmental damage from aerial eradication 
operations.  Another proposed project is the establishment 
of a human health specimen laboratory to aid in monitoring 
human health. 
 
C.   Resources requested:  CN funds requested for the 
project are:  $82.520 million.  Specific costs include: 
U.S. and host nation personnel and administrative support: 
$2.791 million; contract logistical, maintenance and 
operations support: $53.404 million.  This will support 10 
OV-10, 9 AT-802, 6 T-65, 11 UH-1N, and 2 C-208 aircraft. 
Chemical for spray: $15.484 million; fuel: $2.950 million; 
transportation costs: $950.0 thousand; vehicle maintenance 
and replacement: $250.0 thousand; petroleum-oil-lubricants, 
refueling and chemical equipment: $75.0 thousand; hangar and 
warehouse rental and logistics support: $2.218 million. 
 
D.   Resource justification:  Targeted illicit crops will 
remain difficult to reach, so the number of flight sorties 
is expected to increase.  More spray aircraft will be added 
to the fleet through INL/A's Critical Flight Safety Program 
(CFSP).  Though the required INCLE funding has not been 
appropriated, post must move forward with the request for 
funding to cover operations and maintenance (O&M) 
requirements for the planned additional airframes.  Funds 
requested will provide for operation and maintenance of 
spray aircraft and helicopters, imagery gathering and 
gyrocam aircraft, and heavy transport aircraft; operation 
and maintenance of two additional AT-802s, two additional OV- 
10s, and two additional T-65s.  Fuel and herbicide will be 
purchased and transported to support a spray campaign with 
targets of 130,000 hectares of coca and 3,000 hectares of 
poppy.  With dispersed operations, ground vehicles will 
become more critical and must be operated, maintained and 
replaced at the main operating base and forward operating 
locations.  Requested funds will pay for the rental, 
maintenance, and construction of maintenance and living 
facilities at forward operating locations and the main 
operating base in Bogota.  We will continue to upgrade 
communications and data processing equipment as older items 
reach the end of their normal service life.  Resources will 
be used to contract spray pilots, helicopter crews, 
maintenance, operations, logistics and safety personnel, 
train host country pilots, contract host country national 
and American Citizen Personal Services Contractors (PSCs), 
technical staff to provide accounting, end-use monitoring, 
oversight of the eradication program, and progress toward 
identified program nationalization objectives.  Additional 
funding will be dedicated to new crop detection methods that 
are being evaluated to increase eradication proficiency and 
some O&M funding will be dedicated to enhanced imagery which 
will provide us near real-time data, thereby increasing 
overall efficiency.  We are increasing verification 
iterations and the new gyrocam programmed for FY05 will 
allow us to verify crop detections, spray efficacy, and 
replant rates more frequently and at less risk. 
 
In 2003 NAS began supporting Colombia's implementation of 
its Environmental Management Plan.  Additional assets and 
training will be required to enable the GOC to assume full 
responsibility for supporting DIRAN operations and training, 
including improving spray base environmental specific 
infrastructure and replacing spray base equipment as needed. 
This support will include equipment and infrastructure for 
water treatment, chemical mixing, handling, storage, and 
transport, calibration and maintenance of CNP chemical 
equipment and personnel training.  NAS will continue 
cooperation with the National Institute of Health, National 
Farm Bureau, and other GOC entities responsible for human 
health and environmental monitoring. 
 
E.   Performance measures:  We will continue on the spray 
successes of previous years but must look beyond hectares 
sprayed as a performance measure.  Yearly crop estimates 
provided by CNC do not permit adequate feedback on spray 
efficacy.  New cultivations appear to reach production well 
before we are aware of them, so new detection methods must 
be developed.  More of the 2007 funding will be dedicated to 
detection and verification. 
 
Verifiable crop reduction, along with reduced potential crop 
productivity, are true indicators of success.  With newly 
developed technologies we will be able to verify crop 
reduction and spray efficacy on a quarterly basis.  More 
current information will enable us to return to previously 
sprayed areas to combat replanting. 
 
Following thorough investigation, most complaints of damage 
to licit crops and human health have been shown to be 
invalid or spurious.  Our objective is to reduce the number 
of valid complaints through careful planning and execution. 
The development of an in-country capability to analyze soil, 
water, and human tissue samples will enable us to resolve 
complaints more quickly and equitably.  We will dispose of 
accumulated chemical or petroleum waste at the forward 
operating locations.  We will increase the number of public 
forums used to present the message that eradication is not 
the cause of deforestation or chemical damage to human 
health. 
 
F.   Sustainability: Resources requested will support an 
aggressive spray campaign to ensure performance measures are 
met.  We are entering a new stage of nationalization that 
requires the Colombian National Police to take on more 
responsibility, thus decreasing dependence on U.S. 
contractor support.  In June 2005, a joint working group 
(JWG) composed of CNP ARAVI, CNP eradication, CNP 
environmental, NAS contractor and NAS personnel will re- 
convene to study areas where responsibility can be 
transferred to the CNP.  We recognize that the CNP cannot be 
expected to take on full responsibility until cultivation is 
reduced at least to a constant maintenance level that can be 
sustained with resources that are realistically available to 
the GOC.  Our job is to enable the GOC to reach that 
combination of increased capability and reduced cultivation 
levels. 
 
G.   Evaluation: NAS Eradication measures progress on a 
daily basis.  Each FOL reports hectares sprayed, missions 
flown, aircraft employed, status of aircraft, etc.  NAS 
contract oversight advisers meet with INL/A contract 
management and CNP DIRAN leadership weekly to discuss and 
evaluate progress throughout the areas of operations.  We 
plan to move spray verification from semi-annually to a 
quarterly basis by employing a gyroscopic camera mounted on 
a C-208 aircraft.  This will provide immediate feedback on 
spray efficacy, crop replant and pruning rates, and 
additional detection data to supplement geo-spatial 
information.  On the environmental front we will continue 
ground proofing of water and soil samples and evaluate and 
consider complaints against erroneous spray.  We will 
continue to support medical treatment missions to spray 
areas to provide health care and monitor possible spray 
effects. 
 
CNP Interdiction Project - $16.68 million 
 
Project Summary 
 
A.   Project title. DIRAN Interdiction Project - $16.68 
million 
 
B.   Project description.  This project assists the CNP 
DIRAN in its efforts to interdict the processing, 
transportation, and export phases of Colombia's illegal drug 
trade.  Colombia is fighting a war against three 
narcoterrorist armed groups that total approximately 40,000 
combatants and support militia.  The project provides 
resources to DIRAN's three airmobile interdiction companies 
(Jungla) and the DIRAN ground interdiction groups for 
training, equipment, and logistics support.  Intelligence 
and investigations are an essential element for focused 
interdiction operations.  Funds will support DIRAN 
intelligence and investigations groups, with special 
emphasis on the intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft.  The project will also focus 
on integration of DIRAN's intelligence and communications 
architecture with those of the CNP and the Colombian 
military.  Support is also provided to DIRAN's air- and 
seaport group formed to interdict drugs transiting through 
Colombia's commercial air and sea ports.  Funds are used to 
help secure and improve DIRAN's base infrastructure. 
Training in the United States, Colombia, and third countries 
is also funded, as is the new CNP training center near 
Espinal. 
 
C.   Resources requested.  $16.68 million 
 
D.   Resource justification.  As the aerial eradication 
project reduces cultivation levels, interdiction will become 
even more important to dismantling Colombia's illegal 
narcotics processing and trafficking.  DIRAN's 
organizational structure will have to focus additional 
efforts on antinarcotics intelligence (both human and 
technical intelligence capabilities) and investigations, 
while maintaining and strengthening the rapid strike 
capability of the Jungla companies.  Support also must focus 
on improving DIRAN's ground transportation capability, both 
to take advantage of generally improved highway security and 
to reduce requirements for air transportation. 
 
E.   Performance measurements.  HCl cocaine/coca base and 
heroin seized in Colombia and off-shore.  Numbers of 
narcotraffickers arrested and trafficking organizations 
dismantled.  HCl and heroin processing laboratories 
destroyed.  Numbers of DIRAN officers and men trained in job- 
related skills, both in the United States and, increasingly, 
in Colombia. 
 
F.   Sustainability.  The letter of agreement for the DIRAN 
support program stresses a phased "nationalization" plan in 
which the GOC assumes increased responsibility for 
sustainment.  When the CNP national field training center is 
completed, DIRAN will be able to conduct most of its field 
training in Colombia. 
 
G.   Evaluation plan.  Daily coordination with DIRAN, both 
at the headquarters level and with frequent field visits to 
plan and review operations. 
 
 
CNP DIRAN Operational Support - $1.39 million. 
 
Project Summary 
 
CNP DIRAN Operational Support - $1.39 million.  This money 
will be apportioned among various CNP projects described 
above and used to support CNP overhead cost that cannot be 
identified with a particular program sub-category. 
 
A.   Project title.  CNP DIRAN Operational Support - $1.39 
million. 
 
B.   Project description.  This project provides support to 
counter-narcotics field operations and DIRAN base 
operations.  Among various CNP projects described above it 
will fund operational expenses for rations, vehicle 
maintenance, vehicle fuel, minor purchases, transportation, 
lodging, meals and miscellaneous expenses of CNP overhead 
costs. 
 
C.   Resources requested. $1.39 million ACI funding 
 
D.   Resources justification.  Funds will be used to support 
NAS-sponsored counter-narcotics field operations with 
logistics, lodging, rations, and miscellaneous expenditures 
and pay DIRAN base expenditures for maintenance, fuel for 
NAS-procured vehicles, and other indirect costs.  Taking 
into account recent fuel and other price increases and the 
18 percent appreciation of the local currency in 2004, 
straight-line funding for this and other program accounts 
actually represents a significant assumption of program 
costs on the part of the CNP. 
 
E.   Performance measurements. Performance will be measured 
by the availability of units under the supported projects to 
perform operations as well as the success of the projects to 
meet their performance measures. 
 
F.   Sustainability. As outlined above, we believe the 
resources requested will help ensure another successful year 
in operational support for counter-narcotics operations in 
Colombia.  We are currently studying ways to reduce the 
response time to requests for service and goods for CNP 
operations. 
 
G.   Evaluation plan.  NAS administrative management 
performs recurring reviews of delivered operational support 
and evaluates action items for continued improvement in our 
support.  We will also examine ways to increase the 
efficiency of operational support to the CNP with the same 
or reduced level of funding. 
 
Support to the Colombian Military -$ 121.4 million 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
Army Counter-drug Brigade - $3.5 million 
 
Project Summary 
 
The Narcotics Affairs Section provides support to Colombian 
military forces, in particular the Army's Counter-drug 
Brigade (CD Brigade) with logistics, training and equipment. 
Support to the unit includes rations, fuel, force protection 
material, ammunition, communications and weapons repair and 
maintenance training, transportation, medical and counter- 
 
mine equipment.  The CD Brigade directly supports the CNP 
Aerial Eradication Program in Colombia.  The project goal is 
the eventual capture or elimination of narcoterrorists 
(FARC, ELN, AUC) associated with the production and 
trafficking of illegal drugs.  Other vetted Colombian 
military units are provided minimal support for their manual 
eradication of illicit crops and interdiction of drugs and 
processing facilities. 
 
A.   Project title.  Support to the Counter-drug (CD) 
Brigade and Colombian Military  -  $3.5 million. 
 
B.   Project description.  The CD Brigade's primary mission 
is to provide ground security for CNP spray aircraft 
operating throughout the country.  It conducts operations 
against high-value narco-terrorists targets in the areas to 
be sprayed, including attacking known FARC, AUC, and ELN 
concentrations.  The CD Brigade conducts drug interdiction 
operations, such as neutralizing narco-terrorist leadership 
and destroying cocaine processing labs, storage facilities, 
and precursor chemicals.  The CD Brigade also targets coca 
seedbeds.  In 2004, CD Brigade operations contributed to a 
significant reduction in ground fire impacts incurred by 
spray program aircraft.  In February, 2004, the CD Brigade 
captured alias "Sonia," the FARC's southern bloc chief of 
finances, who was subsequently extradited to the United 
States on drug charges. 
 
C.  Resources requested.  $3.5 million in ACI funding. 
 
D.  Resource justification.  In 2002, the CD Brigade was 
made a national asset, supporting aerial spray eradication 
and conducting interdiction operations throughout the 
country.  Due to limited COLAF airlift capabilities, CD 
Brigade elements are normally transported to spray areas by 
chartered aircraft.  Ground transportation in many instances 
is also achieved via commercial sources.  Funding will be 
used to support advanced training by U.S. Army Special 
Forces and maintenance of the CD Brigade, including 
replacing military equipment, ammunition, rations, and fuel. 
In addition, NAS will support other vetted COLMIL units that 
support spray and interdiction operations in areas of 
significant coca cultivation and production of cocaine. 
This support will include Plan Colombia helicopter 
transport, drug-sniffing dogs, fuel, mine detectors, and 
force protection equipment.  Maintenance of COLMIL 
professionalization initiatives will be focused on 
activities such as night air assault operations, mine 
recognition and deactivation training, chemical handling and 
destruction training to minimize the environmental impact of 
destroying narcotics processing labs.  These initiatives 
will ensure that the CD Brigade has the optimal training for 
conducting ground operations in support of aerial 
eradication, conducting heli-borne assaults on high value 
targets, and recognizing and respecting human rights. 
 
NAS will also continue support for existing COLAR manual 
eradication efforts in areas of high opium poppy 
concentration that are difficult or dangerous for spray 
aircraft to access.  This support includes gasoline powered 
brush cutters, GPS systems for marking poppy fields for 
spray aircraft, photographic equipment to document 
destruction, and fuel and protective equipment. 
 
During FY04, basic logistical support of the CD Brigade 
included $764,000 in air transport, $364,000 in rations and 
$140,000 in fuel and ground transport.  Those same expenses 
in FY05 are estimated at $1,733,000 because of anticipated 
exchange rate fluctuation and cost increases.  These are the 
minimum amounts necessary to sustain and transport the CD 
Brigade to the area of spray operations. 
 
E.   Performance measurements.  Decrease in the number of 
hits against eradication aircraft; quantity of drugs seized 
and destroyed in the processing and transit phases; number 
of cocaine HCl processing facilities destroyed; number of 
coca plant seedbeds and number of hectares of opium manually 
eradicated. 
 
F.   Sustainability.  Multi-year Plan Colombia funding will 
be exhausted in FY05. The CD Brigade evolved from its 
original concept as a static unit in the southern Putumayo 
area to become a national asset deployed nationwide in 
support of the aerial eradication program.  This Colombia- 
wide deployment was neither envisioned nor budgeted for 
under the original Plan Colombia.  The Colombian Army 
(COLAR) does not have the funds to provide the logistical 
support required by the CD Brigade to deploy in support of 
aerial eradication.  The CD Brigade will require USG support 
until such time as it is determined that they are no longer 
needed to support the aerial eradication mission or the GOC 
budgets funds for their support. 
 
G.   Evaluation plan. The newly hired COLMIL program adviser 
will be on site to evaluate the effectiveness of the CD 
Brigade's use of USG-provided assistance.  He will conduct 
end use monitoring of USG-provided equipment, as well as 
ensuring the proper maintenance and safeguarding of said 
equipment.  Indicators such as small arms hits against 
eradication aircraft, number of HCl and base labs destroyed, 
precursors and other chemicals captured or destroyed, and 
number of enemy killed or captured will be used to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the CD Brigade.  Other COLMIL units 
will be evaluated based on hectares of illicit crops 
manually eradicated or interdiction of processed drugs. 
 
Colombian Army (COLAR) Aviation Brigade - $112.803 million 
 
Program Summary 
 
The Colombian Army's Aviation Brigade provides the Colombian 
Army and other public forces with the air mobility needed to 
operate at extended ranges in isolated areas.  Within the 
Aviation Brigade, 79 Plan Colombia helicopters provide 
dedicated support to counter-narcotics operations conducted 
by the CD Brigade and host nation pilot and non-pilot 
training for the helicopter battalion (BAHEL). 
 
A.   Project title. Colombian Army (COLAR) Aviation Brigade 
- $112.803 million 
 
B.   Project description.   The current inventory of 79 
rotary-wing (r/w) aircraft is projected to remain at this 
level through 2007.  The successes of the CD Brigade and 
aerial eradication programs in CY02 through CY04 and through 
the first quarter of 2005 are attributable to the direct 
support provided by COLAR Aviation.   USG expanded 
authorities have significantly increased the operational 
tempo; additionally the dispersal of cultivation and 
narcoterrorism nationwide has led to more remote and 
extended operations.  The Infrastructure Security Support 
(ISS) program in Arauca Department requires additional 
resources to support a permanent presence at the heliport in 
Saravena.  This capability is critical to the protection of 
vital economic infrastructure. 
 
C.   Resources requested. $112.803 million in ACI funding. 
Specific costs are: U.S. and host nation personnel and 
administrative support and training $3.028 million; forward 
operating and base operations and maintenance (O&M) support 
and construction $4.390 million; aviation contract support 
and maintenance for 15 UH-60, 27 UH-1N, 32 Huey II, 5 KMAX 
aircraft - $85.259 million; vehicle maintenance and 
replacement $226.0 thousand; petroleum, oil, lubricants and 
refueling equipment $9.750 million; information technology 
upgrades $350.0 thousand; project operations support, to 
include ammunition and armaments, $6.293 million; 
transportation costs $1.800 million. 
 
D.   Resource justification.  Increased contract and 
logistical support expenses are due to the conversion from a 
cost-plus contract to fixed-price contract.  Aging aircraft 
continue to drive increased maintenance requirements and 
necessitate continuation of the INL/A Critical Flight Safety 
Program to ensure continued safe operation of the aircraft. 
Continued dispersal of operations nationwide requires 
additional infrastructure and support for mobile operations 
over extended periods.  Additionally, as the capabilities of 
the Aviation Brigade continue to increase, so will the 
demand to operate further and further from its main base in 
Tolemaida.  There will be a corresponding increase in 
aircraft flight hours and fuel usage across the fleet. 
Ground vehicles will be acquired, operated, maintained and 
replaced as necessary at operating locations across the 
country.  Requested funds will pay for rental, maintenance 
and construction to improve Colombian Army Aviation 
institutions; the main bases in Tolemaida and Melgar and 
forward operating locations in Caqueta, Nario, Guaviare, 
Meta, and Arauca departments, as well as new bases as the 
requirements arise.  In CY07 we will have met our 
nationalization goal with the UH-60 program and moved into a 
minimized contractor/USG oversight role.  Thereafter, pilot 
and non-pilot resources will be shifted to the Huey II and 
UH-1N programs.  Training will continue to focus on 
maintaining high levels of pilot proficiency standards and 
maintenance procedures in accordance with INL/A policies and 
directives utilizing minimum contractor oversight. 
Communications and data processing equipment upgrades and 
expansion are needed to meet increasing operational tempo 
and distances requirements.  Funding will be used to 
contract host country national and U.S. PSC technical staff 
to provide accounting, end use monitoring, and oversight of 
the Plan Colombia Helicopter Program. 
 
E.   Performance measures.  By FY07, the COLAR should have 
an effective Aviation Brigade capable of carrying out the 
full range of aviation activities supporting not only CN, 
but also counter-terrorist operations.  Qualitative 
indicators of performance will be successes in eradication 
and interdiction programs with decreasing dependence on U.S. 
assistance. 
 
F.   Sustainability.  As outlined above, the resources 
requested will ensure another successful year in COLAR 
aviation support for counter-narcotics operations in 
Colombia.  We anticipate that the UH-60 program will be in 
the sustainment phase consisting of minimal contractor 
oversight and a continued commitment by the COLAR to provide 
required staffing to sustain an 80 percent operational 
readiness rate.  Additionally, the UH-1N program will be 
close to the sustainment phase and the Huey II program more 
than 50 percent completed. 
 
G.   Evaluation plan.  The contract in CY07 will be a 
performance-based contract with specific performance 
measures and a reporting and monitoring process.  The NAS 
conducts annual program reviews with INL/A and conducts 
annual joint working group conferences with all partner 
agencies involved in the nationalization plan.  These 
partners include the Department of Defense, U.S. Southern 
Command, Security and Assistance Agency and the Training and 
Assistance Team, the U.S. Military Group, INL/A, and the 
Colombian Army. 
 
Air Interdiction and Surveillance (ABD) - $5.495 million 
 
A.  Project title: Air Interdiction and Surveillance - 
$5.495 million. 
 
B.  Project description.  The Air Interdiction and 
Surveillance (Air Bridge Denial - ABD) program is a 
presidential-directed and authorized program to intercept 
and interdict aircraft suspected of trafficking in illicit 
drugs and other contraband.  It employs five tracker 
aircraft maintained by the United Sates Government and 
operated by the Colombian Air Force to intercept drug 
carrying aircraft. 
 
C.  Resources requested.  $5.495 million in ACI funding. 
 
D.  Resource justification.  The Air Interdiction and 
Surveillance program supports in-country USG/INL contractor 
and in-country costs to cover the operations costs of five 
Colombian Air Force (COLAF) C-560 tracker aircraft used for 
interception of suspected drug trafficking aircraft, to 
include the required logistics support to upgrade and 
maintain the locations where USG contractor personnel are 
based.  Costs of replacement and refresher training of COLAF 
pilots are also included in in-country estimates.  Another 
$25 million is being requested by INL to cover the program's 
U.S. contractor costs. 
 
E.  Performance measurements.  Increase in the percentage of 
suspect tracks intercepted and forced to land for 
inspection; increase in law enforcement end games; 
reduction in the number of unidentified, assumed suspect 
aircraft; overall reduction in the use of aircraft to carry 
drugs and drug-related money, arms, and personnel. 
 
F.  Sustainability.  As outlined above, we believe the 
resources requested will help ensure another successful year 
in support of counter-narcotics air interdiction and 
surveillance in Colombia.  We are phasing in nationalization 
of the program's training to decrease reliance upon U.S. 
contractors for training. 
 
G.   Evaluation plan.  Project is evaluated at monthly in- 
progress reviews, a semiannual review, and an annual 
certification.  During the monthly reviews, NAS personnel 
meet with GOC, DOS, DOD, and Homeland Security personnel to 
review the program's progress and identify specific action 
items to improve the program.  During the semiannual 
reviews, DOS senior leadership reviews the program's 
achievements for the period and makes recommendations as 
necessary.  During the yearly certification, an interagency 
team travels to Colombia, reviews the different aspects of 
the program, and makes recommendations to the Secretary of 
State with respect to continuation of the program. 
 
Navy maritime interdiction - $1.6 million 
 
Project Summary 
 
A.   Project title.  Navy Maritime Interdiction - $1.6 
million 
 
B.   Project description.  GREAS (Grupo de Reconocimiento y 
Asalto [reconnaissance and assault group]) is a special 
Colombian Navy Unit developed to conduct clandestine coastal 
interdiction operations against narcotraffickers and 
narcoterrorists that are shipping cocaine HCl from 
Colombia's seacoasts, primarily in "go fast boats."  GREAS 
is a trilateral project (Colombia, UK, and USG) in which the 
Colombian Navy provides highly motivated personnel, as well 
as operational and logistical support; the UK provides 
specialized training, logistical support and liaison; and 
the USG provides funding for specialized equipment and 
logistical support.  This is an existing project in the 
eradication/interdiction-funding category.  Much of the 
success of the GREAS project is due to lack of pubic 
awareness of the group's capabilities and methods of 
operation. 
 
C.   Resources requested.  $1.6 million in ACI funding. 
 
D.   Resource justification.  Additional resources are 
required to expand the reach of this successful program. 
 
E.   Performance measurements.  Metric tons of cocaine HCl 
seized in maritime or coastal interdiction units; numbers of 
narcoterrrorists arrested/killed; and major trafficking 
organizations disrupted or dismantled. 
 
F.   Sustainability. The Colombian Navy is committed to 
providing sufficient numbers of highly trained and motivated 
personnel to the GREAS project.  The Colombian Navy also 
provides significant operational support with aircraft, 
ships, etc.  After the GREAS infrastructure (headquarters, 
barracks, boat ramps, etc) and equipment is provided, the 
Colombian Navy will be able to sustain the unit. 
 
G.   Evaluation plan.  NAS provides a project officer (part- 
time) who manages the project in close coordination with the 
DEA and a full-time UK liaison officer.  The GREAS unit is 
evaluated based on its operational tactics, techniques and 
procedures and operational results (HCl and go fast boats 
seized, narcotraffickers arrested, etc.) 
 
Promote the rule of law - $28.033 million 
----------------------------------------- 
 
Ministry of Defense & Institutional Reform - $0 
 
Project summary 
 
A.   Project title.  Ministry of defense & Institutional 
Reform project - $0.0 
 
B.   Project description.  The Ministry of National Defense 
(MOD) Institutional Reform project is designed to expand 
reforms within the MOD related to institution building, to 
include the development of a national security strategic 
planning system, strengthening the civilian management and 
direction of the ministry so that the MOD will be able to 
develop a more comprehensive narcotics and terrorism control 
program.  The project also aims to enhance the Colombian 
people's understanding and support of national security. 
The project is conducted in coordination with the Center for 
Civil Military Relations (CCMR) of the U.S. Navy's Post- 
Graduate School.  This is an on-going project under the rule 
of law budget category. 
 
The project assists the MOD in five critical areas of MOD 
responsibility: 
 
      Strategic planning 
      Program planning 
      Intelligence and telecommunications integration 
      Systems and equipment acquisition 
      Budget, financial control and auditing 
 
C.   Resources requested.  $0.0 
 
D.   Resource justification. No FY07 funds are required to 
continue the first two elements of the project; the third 
element will be completed in 2005.  The MOD has completed 
its first phase of reform and requires no additional 
assistance in establishing the processes and procedures in 
the five critical areas noted above.  The USG will provide 
occasional technical assistance/consultation, but this can 
be accomplished using already available resources. 
 
E.   Performance measurements 
 
Completion of MOD directives, planning procedures, etc. 
 
F.   Sustainability 
 
G.   Evaluation plan.  Overall goal: expand reforms within 
the MOD related to institution building, to include the 1) 
development of a national security strategy, 2) 
strengthening the civilian management and direction of the 
ministry, so that the MOD will be able to develop a more 
comprehensive narcotics control program, and 3) enhancing 
the Colombian people's understanding and support of national 
security. 
 
 
Illegal Armed Groups/Reinsertion into society - $.5 million 
 
Project summary 
 
This project supports the MOD's demobilization program that 
motivates narco-terrorists to desert/demobilize; collects 
intelligence/information and disseminates to operational 
intelligence channels of the military and police; and 
processes/validates them prior to entering the GOC 
Reinsertion Into Civil Society Program. 
 
A.   Project title.  "Programa Atencin Humanitaria al 
Desmovilizado" (Humanitarian Treatment to the Demobilized.) 
- $0.5 million 
 
B.   Project description.  This project supports the MOD 
demobilization program, chartered by the President under the 
national security strategy, that motivates members of 
illegal armed groups to desert.  Once in the program, the 
MOD certifies them as legitimate voluntary deserters of the 
FARC, ELN, or AUC.  A GOC interagency board then approves 
their entry into the GOC reinsertion into civil society 
program.  During the board deliberations, the institutions 
and agencies participating determine if the individual 
enters the reintegration phase or imprisons them for crimes 
of lesser humanity, gross human right abuses, or narcotics 
trafficking crimes.  The project adviser provides expert 
advice in information operations (psychological operations) 
and program development designed to encourage desertions 
from the narco-terrorist organizations through mass media 
communication strategies.  The support also entails 
specialized training and equipment to support the GOC 
demobilized processing system, which includes in-depth 
interviews with each demobilized for intelligence purposes. 
Information from the program has prevented numerous 
terrorist attacks. 
 
A.   Resources requested: $0.50 million in ACI funding. 
 
B.   Resource justification.  The program continues to 
reduce the rank in file of the narco-terrorist 
organizations.  The intelligence gained through the program 
contributes to 70 percent of military and counter-narcotics 
operations across the country.  The program's credibility 
has increased throughout the country so that narco- 
terrorists no longer fear surrender to the public force (79 
percent surrender to public force).  With the opening of 
five additional demobilized reception centers (peace 
centers/homes) throughout Colombia, U.S. support will focus 
on networking the entire program as well as ensuring 
standardization of the interview process and sharing of 
operational intelligence.  Intelligence is shared with DEA, 
ORA, DAO, Milgp, and other U.S. Embassy agencies, as 
appropriate. 
 
C.   Performance measurements.  Number of individuals 
demobilized resulting in overall reductions in the size of 
the illegal narco-terrorist groups.  Number of weapons, 
explosives and other narco-terrorist resources turned in. 
Number of terrorist attacks prevented because of 
intelligence provided by demobilized.  Number of public 
force operations supported. 
 
D.   Sustainability.  The GOC provides approximately USD 8 
million to support this project.  United States Government 
support is closely coordinated with the GOC to ensure that 
we fill the essential gaps in GOC funding. 
 
E.   Evaluation plan.  Daily coordination between the NAS 
adviser and GOC officials; frequent field visits to various 
police and military units receiving the demobilized; weekly 
statistical information analysis on deserters; capturing of 
narco-terrorist logistical support mechanisms (weapons, 
explosives, cocaine labs, processed cocaine, prosecutions of 
leadership of the terrorists, etc.); evaluation of the 
information campaign's effectiveness through polling and 
interviews. 
 
DOJ - Justice Sector Reform Projects - $6.0 million 
 
Project Summary.  The GOC, with USG assistance, is 
undergoing a dramatic transition to an accusatory criminal 
justice system.  This is critical to Colombia's 
effectiveness in combating criminal organizations and to 
sustain its democracy.  The Embassy, through the Department 
of Justice, has provided essential training and technical 
assistance for this transition.  Continued USG support is 
critical to ensuring an effective transition and 
implementation.  In addition, DOJ is providing essential 
training and technical assistance to critical investigation 
units: Human Rights, Anti-Kidnapping, Anti-Terrorism, Asset 
Forfeiture and Money laundering, and Anti-Corruption 
programs. 
 
A.  Project title.  DOJ Justice Sector Reform Projects - 
$6.0 million 
 
B. Project description.  These programs are administered by 
the U.S. Department of Justice and involve support for the 
transition to an accusatory system, implementation of an 
effective criminal justice system and specialized 
investigative units: Human Rights, Anti-Terrorism, Anti- 
Kidnapping, Anti-Narcotics, Anti-Corruption, Asset 
Forfeiture and Money Laundering. 
 
C.  Resources requested.  $6.0 million in ACI funding 
 
D. Resource justification.  The GOC is implementing a new 
criminal justice system.  This dramatic and historical 
transition to an accusatory system will improve Colombia's 
ability to investigate and prosecute criminal organizations 
involved in narcotics trafficking, terrorism, kidnapping and 
other serious crimes plaguing Colombia.  An effective 
criminal justice system is key to Colombia's stability and 
ability to combat criminal and terrorist organizations.  DOJ 
has provided critical assistance to the GOC in this 
transition, providing essential training and technical 
assistance to Colombian judges, prosecutors and police 
investigators.  This assistance includes technical training, 
organizational support, security (witness protection, court 
security and judicial protection), forensic support, 
institutional development, information and case tracking. 
This transition involves a gradual implementation throughout 
the country, beginning in 2005 and continuing through 2008. 
 
In addition, the GOC has specialized investigative units to 
investigate and prosecute major criminal organizations and 
crimes in Colombia.  These include a national human rights 
unit and 15 regional units tasked with investigating crimes 
against human rights perpetrated by guerrilla groups, 
militias, and, to a lesser extent, government officials. 
These investigations involve mass gravesites, bombings, 
extortion, and murder.  Other units include a national Anti- 
Kidnapping unit and 37 regional units; Asset Forfeiture and 
Money Laundering; Anti-Narcotics; Anti-Corruption; and Anti- 
Terrorism.  This assistance will provide the needed 
augmentation of equipment, training, and operational funds 
necessary to develop more effective complex case 
investigation and prosecution. 
 
Performance measurements: effective implementation of an 
accusatory system with improved investigations, prosecutions 
and resolution of cases; increase in the number of 
prosecutions and convictions in complex cases involving 
human rights violations; anti-corruption, money laundering, 
anti-kidnapping, and anti-terrorism. 
 
F.  Sustainability.  Part of the DOJ assistance is the 
development of permanent Colombian training capability; GOC 
investigative and prosecution capability, including complex 
cases; effective criminal case adjudication by Colombian 
courts; and administration of effective rule of law. 
 
G.  Evaluation plan.  DOJ will conduct routine periodic 
reviews at least annually in the form of end-use monitoring 
visits, meetings with host government officials, and reports 
to DOJ and INL/NAS on program status with appropriate GOC 
and USG updates. 
 
 
Prison security- $0.5 million 
 
Project summary.  Support penitentiary system (INPEC) 
reforms begun in FY00.  Institutionalize proper selection, 
training, and equipping of prison guards; upgrade/construct 
secure prisons/wings; and establish proper policies and 
regulations to control inmates, including extraditables. 
 
A.  Project title.  Anti-corruption/Prison Reform - $0.5 
million. 
 
B.  Project description. Improve, expand, equip and train 
all anti-corruption entities which involve judicial police, 
intelligence and disciplinary control units to conform with 
code reform nationwide. 
 
C.  Resource requested: $500,000 in ACI funding. 
 
D.  Resource justification.  This will assist in decreasing 
corruption among prison staff, will provide staff with the 
training and equipment to investigate and prosecute crimes 
 
 
committed within the prison system and which will assist in 
crimes investigated by outside law enforcement agencies.  In 
addition, the program will assist the GOC in prison design, 
construction and management. 
 
E.  Performance measurements.  Progress will be measured by 
quarterly reports submitted by prison officials and follow- 
up audits conducted by personnel within the BOP office, to 
include advisory personnel from the United States. 
 
F.  Sustainability. Sustainability will depend on INPEC's 
administrative staff, which will also receive training in 
this area to ensure investigations, follow-ups, etc. 
 
G.  Evaluation plan. Evaluation will be monitored by 
indicators requested on a monthly and quarterly basis and 
with follow-up audits by the BOP. 
 
Drug awareness, Demand Reduction, and Culture of Lawfulness 
-- $715,000 
 
Project Summary.  Colombia faces two issues that threaten 
the long term USG interest of a stable government and 
society based on the rule of law.  While the national 
government has had great success in establishing presence 
and authority throughout Colombia in recent years, there is 
a traditional lack of confidence in governmental 
institutions and a lack of faith in the rule of law.  The 
second threat is the level of drug abuse among Colombians, 
especially young people.  The Demand Reduction, Drug 
Awareness, and Culture of Lawfulness program addresses these 
issues.  The Culture of Lawfulness portion provides 
thousands of children instruction and opportunities to 
discuss what it means to be a citizen in a democratic, law 
based, society.  It provides similar instruction to members 
of the Colombian National Police (CNP).  Our Drug 
Awareness/Demand Reduction efforts provide equipment, 
training, and support to numerous NGOs to support proven and 
effective programs or to initiate new ones to teach 
Colombians the dangers of drug use. 
 
A.   Project Title: Demand Reduction/Drug Awareness and 
Culture of Lawfulness - $715,000. 
 
B.   Project Description.  Supports NGOs that support civil 
society and drug prevention programs in Colombia.  Designs 
and publishes material and education campaigns furthering 
these goals.  Sponsors conferences, travel, and visits. 
Funds grants to NGOs to conduct comprehensive Culture of 
Lawfulness training targeting parents, teachers, and local 
leaders.  This is a comprehensive program, administered by 
the National Strategy Information Center (NSIC) that works 
in coordination with the Presidential Anti-Corruption Office 
and local education secretariats throughout Colombia.  NSIC 
is also developing a curriculum of instruction to present 
Culture of Lawfulness training to members of the Colombian 
National Police.  Program funds support Colombian national 
and local government's projects in drug prevention and 
Culture of Lawfulness aimed at the regular populace as well 
as the police. 
 
C.   Resources Requested - $715,000 in ACI funding. 
 
D.   Resource Justification.  To provide grants to support 
education projects for the police, children, parents, 
teachers, and local leaders in Culture of Lawfulness 
activities. 
 
Commodities: Design and publication of materials for 
prevention and Culture of Lawfulness training.  Audiovisual 
equipment, computers, and other equipment used for outreach, 
training, and program support.  Drug prevention and Culture 
of Lawfulness strategies and techniques are constantly 
evolving therefore sponsoring conferences, seminars, and 
trainings as well as travel expenses to such events are 
necessary. 
 
E.   Performance Measurement.  The number of students 
provided instruction in Culture of Lawfulness and drug 
prevention. Number of trainers trained and how many people 
they can instruct.  The number of participating schools and 
programs and their geographic coverage of Colombia. 
Internal and/or independent evaluations of programs and 
activities to measure changes in attitude and behavior 
towards lawfulness and drug use. 
 
F.   Sustainability. In most cases, assistance takes the 
form of one time assistance such as equipment purchases that 
will enable an organization to sustain its programs with no 
further USG commitment.  In the case of grants, a 
requirement of the grants is that they be designed to be 
sustainable by Colombian sources. 
 
G. Evaluation.  Evaluation will depend on the type of 
assistance provided and the type of program supported.  For 
one-time training, seminars, or conferences, exit interviews 
and evaluations of its usefulness will be conducted.  For 
grants, a comprehensive evaluation of change in awareness 
and attitudes of those participating in the program's 
activities is conducted by the grantee. 
 
CNP Reestablishment of Public Security in Conflicted Zones - 
$18.603 million. 
 
Project summary.  Colombia is fighting a war against three 
narco-terrorist armed groups that total approximately 40,000 
combatants and support militia.  Thousands of innocent 
civilians, as well as hundreds of police and military are 
killed annually.  The FARC, the largest narco-terrorist 
group, earns a minimum of US$1 billion per year from the 
illegal narcotics trade.  The GOC cannot provide the social 
and economic benefits of democracy for all Colombians 
without restoring and strengthening the rule of law and 
government presence throughout the country.  The first step 
in restoring government presence is providing public 
security, the role of the CNP, supported by the Colombian 
military.  This multi-year program assists the CNP in 
reestablishing public security in the rural, conflictive 
zones by organizing, training, and equipping approximately 
20,000 police and constructing/reconstructing hardened 
police stations.  Terrorist attacks and crime rates have 
dropped significantly since this program was started. 
 
A.   Project title: CNP Reestablish Public Security in 
Conflicted Zones - $18.603 million. 
 
B.   Project description.  The highest priority strategic 
objective of Colombia's national security strategy (la 
Politica de Defensa y Seguridad Democratica - Democratic 
Security and Defense Policy) is to "gradually restore the 
presence of public forces in all the municipalities" of 
Colombia (the public force is composed of the CNP and 
Colombian military.)  In August, 2002, some 157 of 
Colombia's 1,158 municipalities (equivalent to U.S. 
counties) had no police presence.  In most of these 
municipalities, small police detachments were forced to 
abandon their posts due to repeated terrorist attacks. 
Hundreds of other municipalities, and thousands of 
kilometers of Colombia, do not have sufficient numbers of 
police to provide adequate public security.  Failure to 
maintain public forces throughout Colombia creates 
"ungoverned spaces."  The GOC cannot provide the social and 
economic benefits of democracy for all Colombians without 
restoring and strengthening the rule of law and government 
presence throughout the country.  The first step in 
restoring government presence is providing public security-- 
the role of the CNP--supported by the Colombian military. 
 
This project supports the CNP in fulfilling the top three 
elements required by Colombia's national security strategy: 
 
Organize, train and equip at least 157 police units (minimum 
of 46-men each) assigned in the municipalities with no 
police presence.  This element was completed in February 
2004; NAS is now assisting the CNP in stationing police in 
the "second-tier" towns. 
 
Organize, train, and equip sixty-two 150-man mobile 
Carabineros, or rural police squadrons.  These units will be 
capable of establishing public security in the high threat 
areas in Colombia's vast rural zones.  All 62 squadrons will 
be trained by 2006; the focus thereafter will be on 
providing replacement personnel and equipment. 
 
Construct, or reconstruct, scores of fortified police 
stations in the larger municipalities.  Based on 
availability of funds, approximately 80 stations will be 
hardened.  Some 20 stations will have been constructed or 
hardened by 2006 and this project element is now a major 
focus of the USG effort. 
 
C.   Resources requested. $18.603 million in ACI funding. 
 
D.   Resource justification.  We are seeking to eliminate 
ungoverned spaces.  By 2006, the CNP is projected to have 
reached its goal of fielding 62 Carabineros mobile 
squadrons, a total of 9,300 policemen.  With an average 20 
percent personnel replacement rate (for deaths, 
reassignments, etc.), the CNP must organize, train and equip 
more than 1,800 Carabineros per year.  Additional funds will 
be needed to complete basic infrastructure development and 
construction at the CNP national field training center, near 
Espinal, as well as provide continued support to that 
training center which is essential to sustainability of the 
program.  That center houses both the Carabineros training 
course and other antinarcotics police training courses, 
including the Jungla course and landmine recognition 
training.  Funds will also be used to construct/renovate CNP 
stations in rural Colombia and provide limited training and 
essential equipment to the municipality police. 
 
The results of this project have been significant.  Rural 
Colombia is much more secure than as recently as 2002.  The 
movement and supply corridors of the FARC and other illegal 
armed groups have been cut; entire terrorist units have been 
dismantled.  Internally displaced families are returning to 
their towns and farms. 
 
 
E.   Performance measurements.  Numbers of Carabineros 
trained, equipped and deployed.  Reduction in overall crime 
rates, terrorist attacks, homicides, kidnapping, etc. 
Return of internally displaced persons to their home towns; 
improvements to the rural economy.  Improved security for 
rural economic and social development projects. 
 
F.   Sustainability.  The USG-GOC letter of agreement 
specifically assigned sustainment costs for USG-provided 
equipment to the CNP.  When the CNP national field training 
center is completed, the Carabineros and municipality units 
will be able to conduct most of their field training there. 
The GOC provides approximately $100 million annually to 
support this project. 
 
G.   Evaluation plan.  The NAS Carabineros project advisor, 
supported by the DIRAN Ground Interdiction Team, makes 
frequent field visits. 
 
Promote Social and Economic Progress - $ 143.257 million 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
The programs under this heading are carried out by USAID. 
USAID's overarching goal will be to achieve a sustainable 
reduction in the production of illicit drugs and the 
promotion of peace in Colombia.  This will be achieved 
through three inter-related programs that aim to enhance 
democratic governance, expand economic and social 
alternatives to illicit crop production, and provide medium 
and long-term support to internally displaced persons and 
other vulnerable groups. 
 
A.  Project title.  Support for democracy - $19 million. 
 
B.  Project description.  USAID's democracy program provides 
technical assistance and training to modernize the criminal 
justice system; protect and promote human rights; improve 
transparency and efficiency in the use of public resources 
(this includes work to strengthen political parties, 
legislative strengthening activities, and policy support); 
and to mitigate conflict.  Activities will promote a strong 
democratic government presence to counter the negative 
effects that illicit activities have on transparency, 
accountability and the ability of local officials to 
practice good governance. 
 
C.  Resources requested.  $19 million in ACI funding. 
 
D.  Resource justification.  The democracy programs and 
objectives represent essential components in the overall USG 
effort to help eliminate the threats of illegal drugs and 
narcoterrorists.  These programs enhance democratic 
governance at the national and local levels (in targeted 
growth corridors) to extend the presence of an accountable, 
legitimate and just state, particularly to address the needs 
of traditionally underserved regions and populations.  This 
will be accomplished through the continuation and 
consolidation of five comprehensive and inter-related 
programs that, combined, will address the most critical 
challenges to strengthening the rule of law in Colombia. 
The justice program will work to broaden access to legal 
services for millions of Colombians while also helping to 
implement the national level reforms necessary to make the 
Colombian judiciary more transparent, democratic, and 
effective.  The human rights program will continue to 
prevent egregious human rights violations through various 
prevention and protection mechanisms such as the early 
warning system and will promote respect and awareness of 
human rights, particularly among vulnerable populations. 
The transparency and accountability program will reduce 
corruption by working to improve the efficiency and 
transparency in the use of public resources and by helping 
to strengthen internal controls.  Finally, the peace 
initiative program will help mitigate conflict in the 
country by strengthening the capacity of the office of the 
High Commissioner for Peace (HCP) to promote the peaceful 
resolution of Colombia's decades-old internal conflict. 
 
E.  Performance measurements:  As USAID/Colombia begins 
implementing its revised strategy for the period 2006-2008, 
new indicators that track progress on information will be 
developed and targets on current indicators may be revised 
as of 2006.  Current performance indicators include 1) 
number of recipients benefited by USAID-funded Ministry of 
Interior protection program for trade unionists, human 
rights workers, witnesses in human rights cases and other 
groups; 2) number of GOC agencies with standardized internal 
control procedures; and 3) number of casas de justicia 
established. 
 
F.  Sustainability:  The revised strategy consists of a 
strategic set of interrelated and mutually reinforcing 
programs and activities that will help remedy, on a 
sustainable basis, many of the root causes of Colombia's 
ills that gave rise to the dual threat of illegal narcotics 
and terrorism.  Strengthening the Colombian state, 
reinvigorating the economy, and building social capital will 
considerably enhance overall prospects for achieving greater 
stability in the country and region.  In order to promote 
sustainability of these initiatives, USAID will 
significantly expand and broaden economic alternatives, 
largely through trade capacity building given the still 
untapped opportunities provided under the Andean Trade 
Preferences and Drug Enforcement Act (ATPDEA) and the 
expanded growth opportunities which would be provided by 
prospective bilateral and hemispheric free trade agreements. 
The program and strategy will also seek increased private 
sector investment in targeted growth corridors for the 
purpose of generating jobs, especially for youth.  National 
level policy dialogue will serve as the foundation for these 
interventions in recognition of its importance to improving 
Colombia's global competitiveness, especially with regard to 
market development, transparency, fiscal stability, trade 
and investment policy, institutional reforms, and judicial 
and commercial law reform. 
 
G.  Evaluation plan:  USAID's democracy programs are 
evaluated on a continuous basis.  Quarterly reports are 
issued and all programs are thoroughly reviewed under 
USAID's annual report process and portfolio reviews, which 
are conducted each year.  Through this process actual 
results are compared against performance indicator targets. 
In addition, program results are reported in the embassy's 
Mission Performance Plan (MPP). 
 
Alternative development - $83.3 million; includes $4.3 
million in operating expenses 
 
It should be noted that USAID's request for the alternative 
development program has been adjusted downward to $83.3 
million due to overall federal budget constraints.  However, 
the activities described below assume an overall budget of 
$88.5 million.  This amount represents USAID's original 
request.  With this reduction, activities under this 
critical and high-profile priority program will subsequently 
be scaled back. 
 
A.  Project title.  Alternative Development - $83.3 million; 
includes $4.3m in operating expenses 
 
B.  Project description.  USAID's alternative development 
(AD) program provides income and employment opportunities to 
rural residents and small farmers who have eradicated and 
agree not to grow illicit crops and supports small and 
medium private enterprises that generate licit income and 
employment opportunities.  Assistance is also provided for 
social and productive infrastructure as a means for 
improving access to markets and services.  The strengthening 
of licit economic opportunities will contribute to permanent 
abandonment of illicit crop production.  The AD program will 
strengthen national and local institutions that carry out 
alternative development planning and trade capacity 
building.  The AD program will also support the 
strengthening of democratic and local governance and 
decentralization efforts.  Technical assistance will also be 
provided to improve the management and conservation of 
natural resources in buffer zones around national parks and 
to support indigenous communities by improving their 
livelihoods through the implementation of sustainable 
productive activities. 
 
C.  Resources requested.  $83.3 million in ACI funding. 
 
D.  Resource justification.  These programs and objectives 
represent essential components in the overall USG effort to 
help eliminate the threats of illegal drugs and 
narcoterrorists.  Through the alternative development 
programs, USAID works with the private sector to achieve a 
sustainable expansion of economic opportunities in a manner 
that provides viable alternatives to illicit crop 
production; works with municipal governments to help make 
local institutions more responsive and effective in 
responding to the needs of citizens; improves access to and 
the efficient operation of land markets; and facilitates 
sustainable, broad-based income and employment growth in 
strategically targeted areas of the country.  This will be 
accomplished through market-driven, private sector-led 
alternative development in regions/sub-regions of the 
country under the influence of illicit agriculture that can 
effectively support economically viable and sustainable 
agricultural and other alternatives to illicit crop 
cultivation. 
 
E.  Performance measurements.  As USAID/Colombia begins 
implementing its revised strategy for the period 2006-2008, 
new indicators that track progress on information, such as 
jobs created, will be developed and targets on current 
indicators may be revised as of 2006.  Current performance 
indicators include 1) number of licit crops in hectares 
established through alternative development programs in coca 
and poppy growing regions; 2) number of families benefited 
by alternative development programs; and 3) number of 
infrastructure projects completed in municipalities and 
departments through AD and local governance programs. 
 
F.  Sustainability.  The revised strategy consists of a 
strategic set of interrelated and mutually reinforcing 
programs and activities that will help remedy, on a 
sustainable basis, many of the root causes of Colombia's 
ills that gave rise to the dual threat of illegal narcotics 
and terrorism.  Strengthening the Colombian state, 
reinvigorating the economy, and building social capital will 
considerably enhance overall prospects for achieving greater 
stability in the country and region.  To promote 
sustainability of these initiatives, USAID will 
significantly expand and broaden economic alternatives, 
largely through trade capacity building given the still 
untapped opportunities provided under the Andean Trade 
Preferences and Drug Enforcement Act (ATPDEA) and the 
expanded growth opportunities which would be provided by 
prospective bilateral and hemispheric free trade agreements. 
The program and strategy will also seek increased private 
sector investment in targeted growth corridors for the 
purpose of generating jobs, especially for youth.  National 
level policy dialogue will serve as the foundation for these 
interventions in recognition of its importance to improving 
Colombia's global competitiveness, especially with regard to 
market development, transparency, fiscal stability, trade 
and investment policy, institutional reforms, and judicial 
and commercial law reform. 
 
G.  Evaluation plan.  USAID's Alternative Development 
programs are evaluated on a continuous basis.  Quarterly 
reports are issued and all programs are thoroughly reviewed 
under USAID's annual report process and portfolio reviews, 
which are conducted each year.  Through this process actual 
results are compared against performance indicator targets. 
In addition, program results are reported in the embassy's 
Mission Performance Plan (MPP). 
 
Support to Vulnerable Groups and Internally Displaced 
Persons  -- $26.5 million; includes $4 million transferred 
to USAID from Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM). 
 
A.  Project title.  Support to Vulnerable Groups and IDPs - 
$26.5 million. 
 
B.  Project description.  USAID's internally displaced 
persons (IDP) humanitarian assistance program provides 
economic and social assistance to vulnerable groups, 
including child ex-combatants, youth at risk of recruitment 
by illegal armed groups, host communities, and persons 
displaced by civil strife and violence.  USAID-funded 
activities will focus on short, medium and longer-term 
solutions leading to the sustainable re-integration of IDPs 
and former child combatants into mainstream Colombian 
society through programs at the national and local levels. 
Pending a USG policy decision, adult ex-combatants may also 
be assisted.  The IDP program helps to improve community 
infrastructure and provide economic alternatives to deter 
people from participating in illegal narcotics activities. 
Note: This request incorporates an additional $4 million 
that would be transferred from PRM to USAID to implement the 
short-term IDP programs previously managed by PRM. 
Combining PRM's short-term activities with USAID's mid- and 
long-term programs will facilitate smooth transitions for 
beneficiaries within the IDP chain of assistance and 
streamline overall program management. 
 
C.  Resources requested.  $26.5 million in ACI funding. 
 
D.  Resource justification.  These programs and objectives 
represent essential components in the overall USG effort to 
help eliminate the threats of illegal drugs and 
narcoterrorists.  The IDP programs will continue to focus on 
humanitarian assistance for persons displaced by the 
conflict, including former child-combatants.  USAID support 
will continue to focus on healthcare, shelter, income 
generation activities, education, and psychosocial 
assistance.  Logistical and planning assistance, including 
the development of a reliable monitoring and evaluation 
system to track progress for the reintegration of adult ex- 
combatants into civil society in support of the GOC's 
demobilization and reinsertion program, will continue to be 
provided. 
 
E.  Performance measurements.  As USAID/Colombia begins 
implementing its revised strategy for the period 2006-2008, 
new indicators that track progress on information will be 
developed and targets on current indicators may be revised 
as of 2006.  Current performance indicators include 1) 
number of IDPs assisted; and 2) number of former child 
combatants assisted. 
 
F.  Sustainability.  The revised strategy consists of a 
strategic set of interrelated and mutually reinforcing 
programs and activities that will help remedy, on a 
sustainable basis, many of the root causes of Colombia's 
ills that gave rise to the dual threat of illegal narcotics 
and terrorism.  Strengthening the Colombian state, 
reinvigorating the economy, and building social capital will 
considerably enhance overall prospects for achieving greater 
stability in the country and region.  Under its revised 
strategy, USAID/Colombia will significantly expand and 
broaden economic alternatives, largely through trade 
capacity building given the still untapped opportunities 
provided under the ATPDEA and the expanded growth 
opportunities which would be provided by prospective 
bilateral and hemispheric free trade agreements.  The 
program and strategy will also seek increased private sector 
investment in targeted growth corridors for the purpose of 
generating jobs, especially for youth.  National level 
policy dialogue will serve as the foundation for these 
interventions in recognition of its importance to improving 
Colombia's global competitiveness, especially with regard to 
market development, transparency, fiscal stability, trade 
and investment policy, institutional reforms, and judicial 
and commercial law reform. 
 
G.  Evaluation plan.  USAID's vulnerable groups and IDP 
programs are evaluated on a continuous basis.  Quarterly 
reports are issued and all programs are thoroughly reviewed 
under USAID's annual report process and portfolio reviews, 
which are conducted each year.  Through this process actual 
results are compared against performance indicator targets. 
In addition, program results are reported in the embassy's 
Mission Performance Plan (MPP). 
 
A.  Project title.  Reincorporation to Civilian Life - $14.5 
million. 
 
B.  Project description.  With approved funding, USAID's 
reincorporation support program will be able to expand 
assistance to the GOC efforts to demobilize, disarm and 
reincorporate back into civilian life thousands of illegal 
armed group (IAG) members. Each of these IAGs has been 
designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under 
the U.S. Patriot Act. The GOC reincorporation program 
provides incentives such as job training and psycho-social 
assistance for ex-combatants in exchange for verifiable 
renunciation of membership in Colombian FTOs such as the 
AUC(Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia/United Self-Defense 
Forces of Colombia). The GOC has pledged over $85 million 
resources for DR during 2004-2007, but additional resources, 
along with USAID know-how that come with them, are needed to 
assure the success of the program. Note: The specifics of 
 
this program have not yet been fully designed, although 
USAID has been supporting institutional/structural aspects 
of the GOC's reincorporation efforts. The program funding 
requested here involves direct material support to former 
FTO members. This assistance is crucial to the success of 
the reincorporation effort, but will only proceed if the USG 
reaches a favorable policy decision in consultation with 
Congress. 
 
C.  Resources requested.  $14.5 million in ACI funding. 
 
D.  Resource justification.  Colombia is now at a crucial 
crossroads in its efforts to greatly diminish the negative 
affects of narco-terrorism and establish itself as a 
peaceful nation whose citizens may benefit from lasting 
sustainable social and economic development.  Recent events 
and progress in the AUC demobilization and reincorporation 
process represent a unique and remarkable opportunity for 
both the GOC and the USG.  With USG support, the GOC has the 
chance to create a lasting peace in Colombia and stability 
within the region through the dismantling of a FTO that has 
been responsible for thousands of deaths and a sizable 
proportion of the illicit drugs being exported to the U.S. 
from Colombia.  The Colombians want us to be a partner in 
this endeavor.  In Cartagena, President Bush gave President 
Uribe his commitment to continue supporting GOC 
efforts. Success in this endeavor will also tangibly 
contribute to the Global War on Terrorism, arguably the 
USG's overriding foreign policy priority. 
 
In 2003, the Colombian High Commissioner for Peace (HCP) and 
the AUC signed an accord that called for complete 
demobilization of the AUC by December 31, 2005.  To date, 
4,820 individuals have been collectively demobilized and are 
participating in the 18-24 month long reincorporation 
process. 
 
Congress provided Expanded Authorities that recognize in 
Colombia that narcotrafficking and terrorism are 
intertwined. The AUC has been deeply involved in both. In 
one such demobilization, of then-AUC Commander Salvatore 
Mancuso's Catatumbo Bloc, producing coca fields were 
returned to State control, facilitating eradication. The HCP 
is currently finalizing negotiations with the central 
command of the AUC for the demobilization of an additional 
15,000 terrorists by the end of 2005. The impact of this on 
USG counter-narcotic and anti-terrorism objectives in 
Colombia could be very significant. 
 
The benefits from supporting a successful AUC 
reincorporation process greatly out-weigh the risk or 
consequences of a faulty or failed one. If the demobilized 
return to a life of crime, violence and terrorism, then the 
sharp drop in murders, massacres, and kidnapping during the 
Uribe administration will stall, if not reverse. A reversal 
in such security trends would seriously undermine President 
Uribe and his Democratic Security Policy.  In turn, such a 
failure would damage Uribe's ability to continue to pursue 
his aggressive fight against drugs and terror in Colombia. 
Our strongest ally in Latin America would have suffered a 
serious setback, directly affecting the prospects for 
continued success in meeting critical USG foreign policy 
interests in an increasingly unstable region. 
 
If successful, the DR process with the AUC will also serve 
as a confidence builder for future peace negotiations with 
all IAGs and contribute to a further reduction in the human 
rights violations and in the internal displacement of 
populations resulting from the ongoing Colombian armed 
conflict as well as drug production and trafficking.  While 
there are currently no official peace negotiations between 
the GOC and the FARC guerrilla group, there are talks 
underway between the HCP and another IAG, the ELN, and 
Colombian officials are planning for the demobilization of 
an additional 3,000 FTO combatants within the coming year. 
 
E.  Performance measurements:  Current USAID support to the 
reincorporation process includes an "Accompaniment, 
Monitoring and Evaluation" system (SAME) which assesses the 
degree of reinsertion into civilian life of each individual 
in the program. This system will be used to measure program 
performance. 
 
F.  Sustainability:  The sustainability of the proposed 
program will be measured by recidivism rates. SAME tracks 
this on an individual basis. When an individual is 
experiencing difficulty in the reincorporation process, 
special attention will be given to correct the problem and 
ensure sustainability of the investment in an individual's 
return to civilian life. If on the other hand, an individual 
returns to the ranks of a FTO, SAME will signal the need to 
immediately halt any USG assistance to that person. 
 
G.  Evaluation plan:  All of USAID's programs are evaluated 
on a periodic basis.  In this case the SAME mechanism will 
be used. On-going USAID support to the reincorporation 
process in the City of Medellin has recently been evaluated. 
 
A.   Project title.  Program development and support - $7.4 
million. 
 
B.   Project description.  Provides administrative 
management and logistical support for NAS counter-narcotics 
and law enforcement projects.  Funds provide salaries, 
benefits and allowances of permanently assigned U.S. and 
foreign national employees, TDY assistance, general 
administrative and indirect operating expenses that cannot 
be identified with a specific project.  The NAS has 
experienced significant growth with the creation of Plan 
Colombia and the follow-on Andean Counter-drug Initiative. 
Logistical and administrative support requirements have 
increased consistent with program growth and expansion 
around the country.  The management unit operates as a de 
facto ICASS service provider to support other agencies' law 
enforcement program activity. 
 
C.   Resources requested. $7.4 million ACI funding 
 
D.   Resources justification. An aged fleet and high vehicle 
maintenance costs support the need for additional vehicles 
and a full complement of new computers to enhance 
productivity of support staff.  Increased travel is required 
to support rapidly changing requirements for procurement and 
logistical support to eradication and interdiction 
activities.  Increased ICASS service costs result from 
workload counts associated with "provider services" to law 
enforcement agencies.  FSN salary increase and 5% "unique 
conditions of work" allowance contribute significantly to 
increased costs. 
 
E.   Performance measurements. The measure of performance is 
the efficient administrative, financial and logistical 
support provided to NAS field operations; more effective and 
streamlined administrative procedures; maintenance of 
appropriate funding levels and implementing effective 
internal control procedures. 
 
F.   Sustainability.  A review and analysis of 
administrative operating procedures to standardize 
administrative and logistical support processes; staff 
development and training for a stable administrative 
management staff; receipt of timely appropriate funding 
levels needed to maintain buying power in a dynamic global 
economic market. 
 
G.   Evaluation plan: Creation of documented standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) for logistical and 
administrative support procedures; improved understanding 
and execution of job duties by staff; recognized improved 
customer service by program staff; receipt of appropriate 
funding levels. 
 
WOOD