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Viewing cable 05BOGOTA4342, FY 2007 COUNTER NARCOTICS AND ANTICRIME ASSISTANCE
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05BOGOTA4342 | 2005-05-06 21:32 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Bogota |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 21 BOGOTA 004342
SIPDIS
FOR INL, ALSO FOR WHA
DEPT FOR ADM AID
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ABUD PREL MASS SNAR CO
SUBJECT: FY 2007 COUNTER NARCOTICS AND ANTICRIME ASSISTANCE
BUDGET - (REVISED COPY - SEE USAID SECTION - Promote Social
and Economic Progress)
¶1. Summary. Our counter-narcotics (CN) programs in Colombia
face a significant challenge in FY 2007: the expanded
authorities and the recognition that the battles against
narcotics and terrorism are related puts additional stress
on our resources. This cable explains in detail the
resources needed in FY-2007 to accomplish our CN mission and
to employ effectively the new authorities Congress has given
us. Our air assets and the Colombian special forces we are
training are increasingly called on to defend vital
infrastructure resources from terrorist attack, taking a
more offensive approach against narco-terrorist assets and
personnel, and rescuing victims of kidnappings and assaults
carried out by guerrilla groups. Our interdiction and
eradication programs have, nonetheless, been successful
recently. We should expect our aircraft to be struck by
hostile fire, necessitating increased expenditures on repair
and spare parts. All of these programs are the core of what
we must do to assist President Uribe to succeed in
eliminating narcotics trade in Colombia and stopping the
terrorists that threaten the democratic system of one of our
key Latin American allies, as well as the stability of the
entire Andean region. Colombia is the source of 80 percent
of the world's cocaine, an increasingly important supplier
of opium, and home to three foreign terrorist organizations.
We simply cannot afford not to support the GOC's counter-
narcotics programs.
¶2. The projects essential to continued success of our
Colombia policy include the aerial eradication program with
the Colombian National Police (CNP), the CNP Air Service
(ARAVI), the Colombian Army (COLAR) Helicopter Battalion and
Counter-Drug (CD) Brigade, enhancement of the COLAR special
operations capability (creation of commando battalions and
tactical reconnaissance assets), Colombian Navy (COLNAV)
maritime and riverine interdiction programs, and CNP
interdiction programs, including the Airmobile Companies
(Junglas) and road interdiction units. Of equal importance
in the medium term are our programs to support democracy,
alternative development, assist vulnerable groups, and
promote the rule of law and public security throughout
Colombia.
¶3. To carry out these programs, post proposes INL funding
of a minimum of $462.253 million for FY-2007. Counter-
narcotics programs require $180.665 million and $160.190
million is devoted to social, economic, and rule of law
programs. The detailed budget breakdown will be e-mailed to
INL/LP.
¶4. In addition, we recommend $121.398 million in Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) in FY2007 to support: training and
equipping of additional COLAR units; enhanced naval and
riverine operations; cargo airlift; and intelligence
aircraft provided to the GOC. End summary.
Support to the Colombian National Police (CNP) Anti-
narcotics Directorate (DIRAN) - $180.665 million
--------------------------------------------- ------
CNP Aviation (ARAVI) support -$80.075 million
Project summary
CNP Aviation (ARAVI) support - $80.075 million: DIRAN
aviation supports eradication and interdiction. Helicopters
serve as transport and eradication escorts; fixed-wing
aircraft move cargo and troops and also conduct intelligence
operations. Our focus for DIRAN aviation in FY2007 is
maintaining an aircraft availability rate of 75 percent
within a flying hour program agreed upon by NAS and the CNP.
As our eradication operations continue to be successful we
are forced to move to more remote areas where the coca crops
have migrated. We will be required to forward deploy more
aircraft for longer periods and further from permanent
bases. This will increase transport costs and other
expenses related to operating from temporary locations.
¶A. Project title. CNP aviation (ARAVI)
¶B. Project description. NAS assistance to ARAVI helps to:
advise and train ARAVI to manage its aviation program with
the ultimate goal of nationalization; provide quality
support to elements of the U.S. Mission in Colombia
requesting assistance from ARAVI; sustain NAS/ARAVI
advisers' ability to provide professional assistance to the
CNP; ensure ARAVI personnel maintain basic technical and
tactical skills; provide a safe environment in conducting
all missions. ARAVI maintains five aviation bases and, in
FY07, we expect to support 28 fixed-wing and 62 rotary-wing
aircraft. ARAVI participates in eradication and
interdiction operations and supports the war on terrorism
where this does not conflict with the primary counter-
narcotics mission.
¶C. Resources requested. In FY07 NAS/ARAVI requires $1.2
million for personnel; $3.85 million for both in-country and
CONUS training (we have identified training as a priority
for investment in view of a 2004 accident which destroyed a
$5.5 million DC-3 aircraft and hard landings by C-26
aircraft that have resulted in increased repair costs and
reduced aircraft availability); $56.325 million for
operations and maintenance (we have broken down approximate
costs for operations and maintenance by aircraft model;
costs are higher than in previous fiscal years because we
are supporting additional aircraft, we anticipate continued
price increases, and as aircraft age they invariably require
additional parts and maintenance; $13.1 million for fuel, an
approximate 30 percent increase over FY04 fuel expenditures.
We are requesting $1.5 million for ammunition and armament
(ARAVI provides gunships to the eradication program); $0.6
million for communications; $0.8 million for shipping; and
$2.7 million for construction, renovation and improvement
projects.
¶D. Resource justification. The resources requested are
required to support a fleet of 83 aircraft at an operational
availability rate of 75 percent. We are using current
(FY04) costs per aircraft model for operations and
maintenance and adjusting for anticipated inflation. As
aircraft age, they generally require additional maintenance
and spare parts-for example, there is structural stress and
damage to one-third of the Huey II fleet which requires
depot-level repair. We will continue to press DIRAN to
share more of the costs of ARAVI. We have seen progress,
with DIRAN assuming an increased share of the costs related
to the transfer of PNC personnel to the newly established
police posts in rural areas. ARAVI has also recently
purchased approximately $400,000 in fuel service equipment.
We are reviewing other areas, such as sharing construction
and aircraft fuel costs, as further ways to foster
nationalization and increase ARAVI's share of program costs.
When our OJT/Nationalization adviser is hired we will task
him/her with working with ARAVI to identify contractor
positions that ARAVI personnel can assume once fully
trained. This will reduce contractor overhead costs built
into operations costs.
¶E. Performance measures. The performance measures for
NAS/ARAVI are the operational readiness rates of the various
aircraft models, as indicated above, and the adherence to a
flight hour program and "banked hours" to ensure that
aircraft are available throughout the year for missions,
including support to eradication. As part of the latter,
NAS/ARAVI records interruptions in aerial eradication due to
the lack of required ARAVI aircraft and/or equipment. We
will also identify percentages of personnel working on the
program with the goal of increasing the percentage of ARAVI
personnel while simultaneously decreasing the percentage of
contractor personnel.
¶F. Sustainability. As outlined above, we believe the
resources requested will help ensure ARAVI's ability to
support counter-narcotics operations in Colombia. As noted,
we are currently studying an on-the-job training program to
increase the skills of ARAVI personnel and thereby reduce
our reliance upon contractor personnel. With additional
aircraft that are being procured in FY04, FY05 and beyond,
however, we anticipate the requirement for continued,
substantial contractor support, irrespective of the
possibility of additional ARAVI resources.
¶G. Evaluation plan. NAS/ARAVI meets with INL, contractor
and subcontractor personnel at least three times a year to
evaluate the NAS/ARAVI program and to identify specific
action items for continued improvement in our program. We
examine operational readiness rates and the flying hour
program (recently agreed to by NAS and ARAVI), adherence to
this program, and "banked hours" (as explained above) as
indicators of program efficiency and effectiveness. Upon
the creation and implementation of an OJT program we will
also examine how to increase the percentage of ARAVI
personnel relative to contractor personnel on the program.
From a safety standpoint, we will also examine the number of
total flight hours per aircraft model relative to the number
of accidents as an indication of the efficacy of our
maintenance and training components.
CNP Eradication - $82.520 million
Project Summary
CNP support for aerial eradication of illicit crops and
environmental monitoring - $82.520 million. These funds
will be used to: purchase herbicide to spray coca and poppy;
support contract costs; conduct environmental monitoring;
cover operational expenses associated with the detection and
aerial eradication of illicit crops, as well as the
verification of spray operations efficacy.
¶A. Project title: CNP Aerial Eradication and
Environmental Management Programs
¶B. Project Description: In FY07 the aerial eradication
program will remain the primary focus of counter-narcotics
(CN) efforts in Colombia. Record successes were achieved
yet again in CY04 (136,551 hectares of coca and 3,061
hectares of opium poppy sprayed) and preliminary indications
are that CY05 results will be similar to last year. Though
we anticipate a reduction in total illicit crop cultivation,
this will be possible only if our rate of spray exceeds
narco-terrorists' replant rate. The challenge will be to
spray and re-spray in widely separated geographic areas.
This will require us to operate from more remote forward
operating locations for extended periods to reach
cultivations that are being relocated to non-traditional
growing areas. Traditional growing areas, such as the
department of Putumayo that once accounted for a large
percentage of coca cultivation, remain repressed with
nominal replant rates. The Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC)
recently released a report on coca and poppy cultivation in
the Andes that indicates no net decline in coca cultivation
in Colombia for CY04. There is some question as to the
accuracy of this report and those of previous years, but
post is reevaluating MPP objectives for 2007 and now assumes
the need to spray at current levels at least until there is
clear evidence of a significant reduction in net coca
cultivation. Our planning is now based on a target of
eradicating 130,000 hectares of coca in 2007.
The NAS coordinates activities between the GOC and NAS to
provide operational guidance, based on Colombian
environmental laws, to CNP spray bases throughout the
country. Activities are conducted in accordance with the
GOC's Environmental Management Plan, to include: spray base
operations, industrial safety programs, solid and liquid
waste management, environmental monitoring, public education
and social management, public health monitoring, and
contingency plan operations. We conduct inspections and
analyze samples of the soil, water, and from human
inhabitants in spray areas.
During 2004, the CNP established a satellite imagery
laboratory to conduct imagery analysis for illicit crop
detection, deforestation studies, pre- and post operations
characterizations of spray areas, and analysis of national
parks and indigenous reservations. Thus far in 2005,
agreements have been reached with the National Soil
Institute to establish a laboratory to analyze soil for
possible environmental damage from aerial eradication
operations. Another proposed project is the establishment
of a human health specimen laboratory to aid in monitoring
human health.
¶C. Resources requested: CN funds requested for the
project are: $82.520 million. Specific costs include:
U.S. and host nation personnel and administrative support:
$2.791 million; contract logistical, maintenance and
operations support: $53.404 million. This will support 10
OV-10, 9 AT-802, 6 T-65, 11 UH-1N, and 2 C-208 aircraft.
Chemical for spray: $15.484 million; fuel: $2.950 million;
transportation costs: $950.0 thousand; vehicle maintenance
and replacement: $250.0 thousand; petroleum-oil-lubricants,
refueling and chemical equipment: $75.0 thousand; hangar and
warehouse rental and logistics support: $2.218 million.
¶D. Resource justification: Targeted illicit crops will
remain difficult to reach, so the number of flight sorties
is expected to increase. More spray aircraft will be added
to the fleet through INL/A's Critical Flight Safety Program
(CFSP). Though the required INCLE funding has not been
appropriated, post must move forward with the request for
funding to cover operations and maintenance (O&M)
requirements for the planned additional airframes. Funds
requested will provide for operation and maintenance of
spray aircraft and helicopters, imagery gathering and
gyrocam aircraft, and heavy transport aircraft; operation
and maintenance of two additional AT-802s, two additional OV-
10s, and two additional T-65s. Fuel and herbicide will be
purchased and transported to support a spray campaign with
targets of 130,000 hectares of coca and 3,000 hectares of
poppy. With dispersed operations, ground vehicles will
become more critical and must be operated, maintained and
replaced at the main operating base and forward operating
locations. Requested funds will pay for the rental,
maintenance, and construction of maintenance and living
facilities at forward operating locations and the main
operating base in Bogota. We will continue to upgrade
communications and data processing equipment as older items
reach the end of their normal service life. Resources will
be used to contract spray pilots, helicopter crews,
maintenance, operations, logistics and safety personnel,
train host country pilots, contract host country national
and American Citizen Personal Services Contractors (PSCs),
technical staff to provide accounting, end-use monitoring,
oversight of the eradication program, and progress toward
identified program nationalization objectives. Additional
funding will be dedicated to new crop detection methods that
are being evaluated to increase eradication proficiency and
some O&M funding will be dedicated to enhanced imagery which
will provide us near real-time data, thereby increasing
overall efficiency. We are increasing verification
iterations and the new gyrocam programmed for FY05 will
allow us to verify crop detections, spray efficacy, and
replant rates more frequently and at less risk.
In 2003 NAS began supporting Colombia's implementation of
its Environmental Management Plan. Additional assets and
training will be required to enable the GOC to assume full
responsibility for supporting DIRAN operations and training,
including improving spray base environmental specific
infrastructure and replacing spray base equipment as needed.
This support will include equipment and infrastructure for
water treatment, chemical mixing, handling, storage, and
transport, calibration and maintenance of CNP chemical
equipment and personnel training. NAS will continue
cooperation with the National Institute of Health, National
Farm Bureau, and other GOC entities responsible for human
health and environmental monitoring.
¶E. Performance measures: We will continue on the spray
successes of previous years but must look beyond hectares
sprayed as a performance measure. Yearly crop estimates
provided by CNC do not permit adequate feedback on spray
efficacy. New cultivations appear to reach production well
before we are aware of them, so new detection methods must
be developed. More of the 2007 funding will be dedicated to
detection and verification.
Verifiable crop reduction, along with reduced potential crop
productivity, are true indicators of success. With newly
developed technologies we will be able to verify crop
reduction and spray efficacy on a quarterly basis. More
current information will enable us to return to previously
sprayed areas to combat replanting.
Following thorough investigation, most complaints of damage
to licit crops and human health have been shown to be
invalid or spurious. Our objective is to reduce the number
of valid complaints through careful planning and execution.
The development of an in-country capability to analyze soil,
water, and human tissue samples will enable us to resolve
complaints more quickly and equitably. We will dispose of
accumulated chemical or petroleum waste at the forward
operating locations. We will increase the number of public
forums used to present the message that eradication is not
the cause of deforestation or chemical damage to human
health.
¶F. Sustainability: Resources requested will support an
aggressive spray campaign to ensure performance measures are
met. We are entering a new stage of nationalization that
requires the Colombian National Police to take on more
responsibility, thus decreasing dependence on U.S.
contractor support. In June 2005, a joint working group
(JWG) composed of CNP ARAVI, CNP eradication, CNP
environmental, NAS contractor and NAS personnel will re-
convene to study areas where responsibility can be
transferred to the CNP. We recognize that the CNP cannot be
expected to take on full responsibility until cultivation is
reduced at least to a constant maintenance level that can be
sustained with resources that are realistically available to
the GOC. Our job is to enable the GOC to reach that
combination of increased capability and reduced cultivation
levels.
¶G. Evaluation: NAS Eradication measures progress on a
daily basis. Each FOL reports hectares sprayed, missions
flown, aircraft employed, status of aircraft, etc. NAS
contract oversight advisers meet with INL/A contract
management and CNP DIRAN leadership weekly to discuss and
evaluate progress throughout the areas of operations. We
plan to move spray verification from semi-annually to a
quarterly basis by employing a gyroscopic camera mounted on
a C-208 aircraft. This will provide immediate feedback on
spray efficacy, crop replant and pruning rates, and
additional detection data to supplement geo-spatial
information. On the environmental front we will continue
ground proofing of water and soil samples and evaluate and
consider complaints against erroneous spray. We will
continue to support medical treatment missions to spray
areas to provide health care and monitor possible spray
effects.
CNP Interdiction Project - $16.68 million
Project Summary
¶A. Project title. DIRAN Interdiction Project - $16.68
million
¶B. Project description. This project assists the CNP
DIRAN in its efforts to interdict the processing,
transportation, and export phases of Colombia's illegal drug
trade. Colombia is fighting a war against three
narcoterrorist armed groups that total approximately 40,000
combatants and support militia. The project provides
resources to DIRAN's three airmobile interdiction companies
(Jungla) and the DIRAN ground interdiction groups for
training, equipment, and logistics support. Intelligence
and investigations are an essential element for focused
interdiction operations. Funds will support DIRAN
intelligence and investigations groups, with special
emphasis on the intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft. The project will also focus
on integration of DIRAN's intelligence and communications
architecture with those of the CNP and the Colombian
military. Support is also provided to DIRAN's air- and
seaport group formed to interdict drugs transiting through
Colombia's commercial air and sea ports. Funds are used to
help secure and improve DIRAN's base infrastructure.
Training in the United States, Colombia, and third countries
is also funded, as is the new CNP training center near
Espinal.
¶C. Resources requested. $16.68 million
¶D. Resource justification. As the aerial eradication
project reduces cultivation levels, interdiction will become
even more important to dismantling Colombia's illegal
narcotics processing and trafficking. DIRAN's
organizational structure will have to focus additional
efforts on antinarcotics intelligence (both human and
technical intelligence capabilities) and investigations,
while maintaining and strengthening the rapid strike
capability of the Jungla companies. Support also must focus
on improving DIRAN's ground transportation capability, both
to take advantage of generally improved highway security and
to reduce requirements for air transportation.
¶E. Performance measurements. HCl cocaine/coca base and
heroin seized in Colombia and off-shore. Numbers of
narcotraffickers arrested and trafficking organizations
dismantled. HCl and heroin processing laboratories
destroyed. Numbers of DIRAN officers and men trained in job-
related skills, both in the United States and, increasingly,
in Colombia.
¶F. Sustainability. The letter of agreement for the DIRAN
support program stresses a phased "nationalization" plan in
which the GOC assumes increased responsibility for
sustainment. When the CNP national field training center is
completed, DIRAN will be able to conduct most of its field
training in Colombia.
¶G. Evaluation plan. Daily coordination with DIRAN, both
at the headquarters level and with frequent field visits to
plan and review operations.
CNP DIRAN Operational Support - $1.39 million.
Project Summary
CNP DIRAN Operational Support - $1.39 million. This money
will be apportioned among various CNP projects described
above and used to support CNP overhead cost that cannot be
identified with a particular program sub-category.
¶A. Project title. CNP DIRAN Operational Support - $1.39
million.
¶B. Project description. This project provides support to
counter-narcotics field operations and DIRAN base
operations. Among various CNP projects described above it
will fund operational expenses for rations, vehicle
maintenance, vehicle fuel, minor purchases, transportation,
lodging, meals and miscellaneous expenses of CNP overhead
costs.
¶C. Resources requested. $1.39 million ACI funding
¶D. Resources justification. Funds will be used to support
NAS-sponsored counter-narcotics field operations with
logistics, lodging, rations, and miscellaneous expenditures
and pay DIRAN base expenditures for maintenance, fuel for
NAS-procured vehicles, and other indirect costs. Taking
into account recent fuel and other price increases and the
18 percent appreciation of the local currency in 2004,
straight-line funding for this and other program accounts
actually represents a significant assumption of program
costs on the part of the CNP.
¶E. Performance measurements. Performance will be measured
by the availability of units under the supported projects to
perform operations as well as the success of the projects to
meet their performance measures.
¶F. Sustainability. As outlined above, we believe the
resources requested will help ensure another successful year
in operational support for counter-narcotics operations in
Colombia. We are currently studying ways to reduce the
response time to requests for service and goods for CNP
operations.
¶G. Evaluation plan. NAS administrative management
performs recurring reviews of delivered operational support
and evaluates action items for continued improvement in our
support. We will also examine ways to increase the
efficiency of operational support to the CNP with the same
or reduced level of funding.
Support to the Colombian Military -$ 121.4 million
--------------------------------------------- -----
Army Counter-drug Brigade - $3.5 million
Project Summary
The Narcotics Affairs Section provides support to Colombian
military forces, in particular the Army's Counter-drug
Brigade (CD Brigade) with logistics, training and equipment.
Support to the unit includes rations, fuel, force protection
material, ammunition, communications and weapons repair and
maintenance training, transportation, medical and counter-
mine equipment. The CD Brigade directly supports the CNP
Aerial Eradication Program in Colombia. The project goal is
the eventual capture or elimination of narcoterrorists
(FARC, ELN, AUC) associated with the production and
trafficking of illegal drugs. Other vetted Colombian
military units are provided minimal support for their manual
eradication of illicit crops and interdiction of drugs and
processing facilities.
¶A. Project title. Support to the Counter-drug (CD)
Brigade and Colombian Military - $3.5 million.
¶B. Project description. The CD Brigade's primary mission
is to provide ground security for CNP spray aircraft
operating throughout the country. It conducts operations
against high-value narco-terrorists targets in the areas to
be sprayed, including attacking known FARC, AUC, and ELN
concentrations. The CD Brigade conducts drug interdiction
operations, such as neutralizing narco-terrorist leadership
and destroying cocaine processing labs, storage facilities,
and precursor chemicals. The CD Brigade also targets coca
seedbeds. In 2004, CD Brigade operations contributed to a
significant reduction in ground fire impacts incurred by
spray program aircraft. In February, 2004, the CD Brigade
captured alias "Sonia," the FARC's southern bloc chief of
finances, who was subsequently extradited to the United
States on drug charges.
¶C. Resources requested. $3.5 million in ACI funding.
¶D. Resource justification. In 2002, the CD Brigade was
made a national asset, supporting aerial spray eradication
and conducting interdiction operations throughout the
country. Due to limited COLAF airlift capabilities, CD
Brigade elements are normally transported to spray areas by
chartered aircraft. Ground transportation in many instances
is also achieved via commercial sources. Funding will be
used to support advanced training by U.S. Army Special
Forces and maintenance of the CD Brigade, including
replacing military equipment, ammunition, rations, and fuel.
In addition, NAS will support other vetted COLMIL units that
support spray and interdiction operations in areas of
significant coca cultivation and production of cocaine.
This support will include Plan Colombia helicopter
transport, drug-sniffing dogs, fuel, mine detectors, and
force protection equipment. Maintenance of COLMIL
professionalization initiatives will be focused on
activities such as night air assault operations, mine
recognition and deactivation training, chemical handling and
destruction training to minimize the environmental impact of
destroying narcotics processing labs. These initiatives
will ensure that the CD Brigade has the optimal training for
conducting ground operations in support of aerial
eradication, conducting heli-borne assaults on high value
targets, and recognizing and respecting human rights.
NAS will also continue support for existing COLAR manual
eradication efforts in areas of high opium poppy
concentration that are difficult or dangerous for spray
aircraft to access. This support includes gasoline powered
brush cutters, GPS systems for marking poppy fields for
spray aircraft, photographic equipment to document
destruction, and fuel and protective equipment.
During FY04, basic logistical support of the CD Brigade
included $764,000 in air transport, $364,000 in rations and
$140,000 in fuel and ground transport. Those same expenses
in FY05 are estimated at $1,733,000 because of anticipated
exchange rate fluctuation and cost increases. These are the
minimum amounts necessary to sustain and transport the CD
Brigade to the area of spray operations.
¶E. Performance measurements. Decrease in the number of
hits against eradication aircraft; quantity of drugs seized
and destroyed in the processing and transit phases; number
of cocaine HCl processing facilities destroyed; number of
coca plant seedbeds and number of hectares of opium manually
eradicated.
¶F. Sustainability. Multi-year Plan Colombia funding will
be exhausted in FY05. The CD Brigade evolved from its
original concept as a static unit in the southern Putumayo
area to become a national asset deployed nationwide in
support of the aerial eradication program. This Colombia-
wide deployment was neither envisioned nor budgeted for
under the original Plan Colombia. The Colombian Army
(COLAR) does not have the funds to provide the logistical
support required by the CD Brigade to deploy in support of
aerial eradication. The CD Brigade will require USG support
until such time as it is determined that they are no longer
needed to support the aerial eradication mission or the GOC
budgets funds for their support.
¶G. Evaluation plan. The newly hired COLMIL program adviser
will be on site to evaluate the effectiveness of the CD
Brigade's use of USG-provided assistance. He will conduct
end use monitoring of USG-provided equipment, as well as
ensuring the proper maintenance and safeguarding of said
equipment. Indicators such as small arms hits against
eradication aircraft, number of HCl and base labs destroyed,
precursors and other chemicals captured or destroyed, and
number of enemy killed or captured will be used to evaluate
the effectiveness of the CD Brigade. Other COLMIL units
will be evaluated based on hectares of illicit crops
manually eradicated or interdiction of processed drugs.
Colombian Army (COLAR) Aviation Brigade - $112.803 million
Program Summary
The Colombian Army's Aviation Brigade provides the Colombian
Army and other public forces with the air mobility needed to
operate at extended ranges in isolated areas. Within the
Aviation Brigade, 79 Plan Colombia helicopters provide
dedicated support to counter-narcotics operations conducted
by the CD Brigade and host nation pilot and non-pilot
training for the helicopter battalion (BAHEL).
¶A. Project title. Colombian Army (COLAR) Aviation Brigade
- $112.803 million
¶B. Project description. The current inventory of 79
rotary-wing (r/w) aircraft is projected to remain at this
level through 2007. The successes of the CD Brigade and
aerial eradication programs in CY02 through CY04 and through
the first quarter of 2005 are attributable to the direct
support provided by COLAR Aviation. USG expanded
authorities have significantly increased the operational
tempo; additionally the dispersal of cultivation and
narcoterrorism nationwide has led to more remote and
extended operations. The Infrastructure Security Support
(ISS) program in Arauca Department requires additional
resources to support a permanent presence at the heliport in
Saravena. This capability is critical to the protection of
vital economic infrastructure.
¶C. Resources requested. $112.803 million in ACI funding.
Specific costs are: U.S. and host nation personnel and
administrative support and training $3.028 million; forward
operating and base operations and maintenance (O&M) support
and construction $4.390 million; aviation contract support
and maintenance for 15 UH-60, 27 UH-1N, 32 Huey II, 5 KMAX
aircraft - $85.259 million; vehicle maintenance and
replacement $226.0 thousand; petroleum, oil, lubricants and
refueling equipment $9.750 million; information technology
upgrades $350.0 thousand; project operations support, to
include ammunition and armaments, $6.293 million;
transportation costs $1.800 million.
¶D. Resource justification. Increased contract and
logistical support expenses are due to the conversion from a
cost-plus contract to fixed-price contract. Aging aircraft
continue to drive increased maintenance requirements and
necessitate continuation of the INL/A Critical Flight Safety
Program to ensure continued safe operation of the aircraft.
Continued dispersal of operations nationwide requires
additional infrastructure and support for mobile operations
over extended periods. Additionally, as the capabilities of
the Aviation Brigade continue to increase, so will the
demand to operate further and further from its main base in
Tolemaida. There will be a corresponding increase in
aircraft flight hours and fuel usage across the fleet.
Ground vehicles will be acquired, operated, maintained and
replaced as necessary at operating locations across the
country. Requested funds will pay for rental, maintenance
and construction to improve Colombian Army Aviation
institutions; the main bases in Tolemaida and Melgar and
forward operating locations in Caqueta, Nario, Guaviare,
Meta, and Arauca departments, as well as new bases as the
requirements arise. In CY07 we will have met our
nationalization goal with the UH-60 program and moved into a
minimized contractor/USG oversight role. Thereafter, pilot
and non-pilot resources will be shifted to the Huey II and
UH-1N programs. Training will continue to focus on
maintaining high levels of pilot proficiency standards and
maintenance procedures in accordance with INL/A policies and
directives utilizing minimum contractor oversight.
Communications and data processing equipment upgrades and
expansion are needed to meet increasing operational tempo
and distances requirements. Funding will be used to
contract host country national and U.S. PSC technical staff
to provide accounting, end use monitoring, and oversight of
the Plan Colombia Helicopter Program.
¶E. Performance measures. By FY07, the COLAR should have
an effective Aviation Brigade capable of carrying out the
full range of aviation activities supporting not only CN,
but also counter-terrorist operations. Qualitative
indicators of performance will be successes in eradication
and interdiction programs with decreasing dependence on U.S.
assistance.
¶F. Sustainability. As outlined above, the resources
requested will ensure another successful year in COLAR
aviation support for counter-narcotics operations in
Colombia. We anticipate that the UH-60 program will be in
the sustainment phase consisting of minimal contractor
oversight and a continued commitment by the COLAR to provide
required staffing to sustain an 80 percent operational
readiness rate. Additionally, the UH-1N program will be
close to the sustainment phase and the Huey II program more
than 50 percent completed.
¶G. Evaluation plan. The contract in CY07 will be a
performance-based contract with specific performance
measures and a reporting and monitoring process. The NAS
conducts annual program reviews with INL/A and conducts
annual joint working group conferences with all partner
agencies involved in the nationalization plan. These
partners include the Department of Defense, U.S. Southern
Command, Security and Assistance Agency and the Training and
Assistance Team, the U.S. Military Group, INL/A, and the
Colombian Army.
Air Interdiction and Surveillance (ABD) - $5.495 million
¶A. Project title: Air Interdiction and Surveillance -
$5.495 million.
¶B. Project description. The Air Interdiction and
Surveillance (Air Bridge Denial - ABD) program is a
presidential-directed and authorized program to intercept
and interdict aircraft suspected of trafficking in illicit
drugs and other contraband. It employs five tracker
aircraft maintained by the United Sates Government and
operated by the Colombian Air Force to intercept drug
carrying aircraft.
¶C. Resources requested. $5.495 million in ACI funding.
¶D. Resource justification. The Air Interdiction and
Surveillance program supports in-country USG/INL contractor
and in-country costs to cover the operations costs of five
Colombian Air Force (COLAF) C-560 tracker aircraft used for
interception of suspected drug trafficking aircraft, to
include the required logistics support to upgrade and
maintain the locations where USG contractor personnel are
based. Costs of replacement and refresher training of COLAF
pilots are also included in in-country estimates. Another
$25 million is being requested by INL to cover the program's
U.S. contractor costs.
¶E. Performance measurements. Increase in the percentage of
suspect tracks intercepted and forced to land for
inspection; increase in law enforcement end games;
reduction in the number of unidentified, assumed suspect
aircraft; overall reduction in the use of aircraft to carry
drugs and drug-related money, arms, and personnel.
¶F. Sustainability. As outlined above, we believe the
resources requested will help ensure another successful year
in support of counter-narcotics air interdiction and
surveillance in Colombia. We are phasing in nationalization
of the program's training to decrease reliance upon U.S.
contractors for training.
¶G. Evaluation plan. Project is evaluated at monthly in-
progress reviews, a semiannual review, and an annual
certification. During the monthly reviews, NAS personnel
meet with GOC, DOS, DOD, and Homeland Security personnel to
review the program's progress and identify specific action
items to improve the program. During the semiannual
reviews, DOS senior leadership reviews the program's
achievements for the period and makes recommendations as
necessary. During the yearly certification, an interagency
team travels to Colombia, reviews the different aspects of
the program, and makes recommendations to the Secretary of
State with respect to continuation of the program.
Navy maritime interdiction - $1.6 million
Project Summary
¶A. Project title. Navy Maritime Interdiction - $1.6
million
¶B. Project description. GREAS (Grupo de Reconocimiento y
Asalto [reconnaissance and assault group]) is a special
Colombian Navy Unit developed to conduct clandestine coastal
interdiction operations against narcotraffickers and
narcoterrorists that are shipping cocaine HCl from
Colombia's seacoasts, primarily in "go fast boats." GREAS
is a trilateral project (Colombia, UK, and USG) in which the
Colombian Navy provides highly motivated personnel, as well
as operational and logistical support; the UK provides
specialized training, logistical support and liaison; and
the USG provides funding for specialized equipment and
logistical support. This is an existing project in the
eradication/interdiction-funding category. Much of the
success of the GREAS project is due to lack of pubic
awareness of the group's capabilities and methods of
operation.
¶C. Resources requested. $1.6 million in ACI funding.
¶D. Resource justification. Additional resources are
required to expand the reach of this successful program.
¶E. Performance measurements. Metric tons of cocaine HCl
seized in maritime or coastal interdiction units; numbers of
narcoterrrorists arrested/killed; and major trafficking
organizations disrupted or dismantled.
¶F. Sustainability. The Colombian Navy is committed to
providing sufficient numbers of highly trained and motivated
personnel to the GREAS project. The Colombian Navy also
provides significant operational support with aircraft,
ships, etc. After the GREAS infrastructure (headquarters,
barracks, boat ramps, etc) and equipment is provided, the
Colombian Navy will be able to sustain the unit.
¶G. Evaluation plan. NAS provides a project officer (part-
time) who manages the project in close coordination with the
DEA and a full-time UK liaison officer. The GREAS unit is
evaluated based on its operational tactics, techniques and
procedures and operational results (HCl and go fast boats
seized, narcotraffickers arrested, etc.)
Promote the rule of law - $28.033 million
-----------------------------------------
Ministry of Defense & Institutional Reform - $0
Project summary
¶A. Project title. Ministry of defense & Institutional
Reform project - $0.0
¶B. Project description. The Ministry of National Defense
(MOD) Institutional Reform project is designed to expand
reforms within the MOD related to institution building, to
include the development of a national security strategic
planning system, strengthening the civilian management and
direction of the ministry so that the MOD will be able to
develop a more comprehensive narcotics and terrorism control
program. The project also aims to enhance the Colombian
people's understanding and support of national security.
The project is conducted in coordination with the Center for
Civil Military Relations (CCMR) of the U.S. Navy's Post-
Graduate School. This is an on-going project under the rule
of law budget category.
The project assists the MOD in five critical areas of MOD
responsibility:
Strategic planning
Program planning
Intelligence and telecommunications integration
Systems and equipment acquisition
Budget, financial control and auditing
¶C. Resources requested. $0.0
¶D. Resource justification. No FY07 funds are required to
continue the first two elements of the project; the third
element will be completed in 2005. The MOD has completed
its first phase of reform and requires no additional
assistance in establishing the processes and procedures in
the five critical areas noted above. The USG will provide
occasional technical assistance/consultation, but this can
be accomplished using already available resources.
¶E. Performance measurements
Completion of MOD directives, planning procedures, etc.
¶F. Sustainability
¶G. Evaluation plan. Overall goal: expand reforms within
the MOD related to institution building, to include the 1)
development of a national security strategy, 2)
strengthening the civilian management and direction of the
ministry, so that the MOD will be able to develop a more
comprehensive narcotics control program, and 3) enhancing
the Colombian people's understanding and support of national
security.
Illegal Armed Groups/Reinsertion into society - $.5 million
Project summary
This project supports the MOD's demobilization program that
motivates narco-terrorists to desert/demobilize; collects
intelligence/information and disseminates to operational
intelligence channels of the military and police; and
processes/validates them prior to entering the GOC
Reinsertion Into Civil Society Program.
¶A. Project title. "Programa Atencin Humanitaria al
Desmovilizado" (Humanitarian Treatment to the Demobilized.)
- $0.5 million
¶B. Project description. This project supports the MOD
demobilization program, chartered by the President under the
national security strategy, that motivates members of
illegal armed groups to desert. Once in the program, the
MOD certifies them as legitimate voluntary deserters of the
FARC, ELN, or AUC. A GOC interagency board then approves
their entry into the GOC reinsertion into civil society
program. During the board deliberations, the institutions
and agencies participating determine if the individual
enters the reintegration phase or imprisons them for crimes
of lesser humanity, gross human right abuses, or narcotics
trafficking crimes. The project adviser provides expert
advice in information operations (psychological operations)
and program development designed to encourage desertions
from the narco-terrorist organizations through mass media
communication strategies. The support also entails
specialized training and equipment to support the GOC
demobilized processing system, which includes in-depth
interviews with each demobilized for intelligence purposes.
Information from the program has prevented numerous
terrorist attacks.
¶A. Resources requested: $0.50 million in ACI funding.
¶B. Resource justification. The program continues to
reduce the rank in file of the narco-terrorist
organizations. The intelligence gained through the program
contributes to 70 percent of military and counter-narcotics
operations across the country. The program's credibility
has increased throughout the country so that narco-
terrorists no longer fear surrender to the public force (79
percent surrender to public force). With the opening of
five additional demobilized reception centers (peace
centers/homes) throughout Colombia, U.S. support will focus
on networking the entire program as well as ensuring
standardization of the interview process and sharing of
operational intelligence. Intelligence is shared with DEA,
ORA, DAO, Milgp, and other U.S. Embassy agencies, as
appropriate.
¶C. Performance measurements. Number of individuals
demobilized resulting in overall reductions in the size of
the illegal narco-terrorist groups. Number of weapons,
explosives and other narco-terrorist resources turned in.
Number of terrorist attacks prevented because of
intelligence provided by demobilized. Number of public
force operations supported.
¶D. Sustainability. The GOC provides approximately USD 8
million to support this project. United States Government
support is closely coordinated with the GOC to ensure that
we fill the essential gaps in GOC funding.
¶E. Evaluation plan. Daily coordination between the NAS
adviser and GOC officials; frequent field visits to various
police and military units receiving the demobilized; weekly
statistical information analysis on deserters; capturing of
narco-terrorist logistical support mechanisms (weapons,
explosives, cocaine labs, processed cocaine, prosecutions of
leadership of the terrorists, etc.); evaluation of the
information campaign's effectiveness through polling and
interviews.
DOJ - Justice Sector Reform Projects - $6.0 million
Project Summary. The GOC, with USG assistance, is
undergoing a dramatic transition to an accusatory criminal
justice system. This is critical to Colombia's
effectiveness in combating criminal organizations and to
sustain its democracy. The Embassy, through the Department
of Justice, has provided essential training and technical
assistance for this transition. Continued USG support is
critical to ensuring an effective transition and
implementation. In addition, DOJ is providing essential
training and technical assistance to critical investigation
units: Human Rights, Anti-Kidnapping, Anti-Terrorism, Asset
Forfeiture and Money laundering, and Anti-Corruption
programs.
¶A. Project title. DOJ Justice Sector Reform Projects -
$6.0 million
¶B. Project description. These programs are administered by
the U.S. Department of Justice and involve support for the
transition to an accusatory system, implementation of an
effective criminal justice system and specialized
investigative units: Human Rights, Anti-Terrorism, Anti-
Kidnapping, Anti-Narcotics, Anti-Corruption, Asset
Forfeiture and Money Laundering.
¶C. Resources requested. $6.0 million in ACI funding
¶D. Resource justification. The GOC is implementing a new
criminal justice system. This dramatic and historical
transition to an accusatory system will improve Colombia's
ability to investigate and prosecute criminal organizations
involved in narcotics trafficking, terrorism, kidnapping and
other serious crimes plaguing Colombia. An effective
criminal justice system is key to Colombia's stability and
ability to combat criminal and terrorist organizations. DOJ
has provided critical assistance to the GOC in this
transition, providing essential training and technical
assistance to Colombian judges, prosecutors and police
investigators. This assistance includes technical training,
organizational support, security (witness protection, court
security and judicial protection), forensic support,
institutional development, information and case tracking.
This transition involves a gradual implementation throughout
the country, beginning in 2005 and continuing through 2008.
In addition, the GOC has specialized investigative units to
investigate and prosecute major criminal organizations and
crimes in Colombia. These include a national human rights
unit and 15 regional units tasked with investigating crimes
against human rights perpetrated by guerrilla groups,
militias, and, to a lesser extent, government officials.
These investigations involve mass gravesites, bombings,
extortion, and murder. Other units include a national Anti-
Kidnapping unit and 37 regional units; Asset Forfeiture and
Money Laundering; Anti-Narcotics; Anti-Corruption; and Anti-
Terrorism. This assistance will provide the needed
augmentation of equipment, training, and operational funds
necessary to develop more effective complex case
investigation and prosecution.
Performance measurements: effective implementation of an
accusatory system with improved investigations, prosecutions
and resolution of cases; increase in the number of
prosecutions and convictions in complex cases involving
human rights violations; anti-corruption, money laundering,
anti-kidnapping, and anti-terrorism.
¶F. Sustainability. Part of the DOJ assistance is the
development of permanent Colombian training capability; GOC
investigative and prosecution capability, including complex
cases; effective criminal case adjudication by Colombian
courts; and administration of effective rule of law.
¶G. Evaluation plan. DOJ will conduct routine periodic
reviews at least annually in the form of end-use monitoring
visits, meetings with host government officials, and reports
to DOJ and INL/NAS on program status with appropriate GOC
and USG updates.
Prison security- $0.5 million
Project summary. Support penitentiary system (INPEC)
reforms begun in FY00. Institutionalize proper selection,
training, and equipping of prison guards; upgrade/construct
secure prisons/wings; and establish proper policies and
regulations to control inmates, including extraditables.
¶A. Project title. Anti-corruption/Prison Reform - $0.5
million.
¶B. Project description. Improve, expand, equip and train
all anti-corruption entities which involve judicial police,
intelligence and disciplinary control units to conform with
code reform nationwide.
¶C. Resource requested: $500,000 in ACI funding.
¶D. Resource justification. This will assist in decreasing
corruption among prison staff, will provide staff with the
training and equipment to investigate and prosecute crimes
committed within the prison system and which will assist in
crimes investigated by outside law enforcement agencies. In
addition, the program will assist the GOC in prison design,
construction and management.
¶E. Performance measurements. Progress will be measured by
quarterly reports submitted by prison officials and follow-
up audits conducted by personnel within the BOP office, to
include advisory personnel from the United States.
¶F. Sustainability. Sustainability will depend on INPEC's
administrative staff, which will also receive training in
this area to ensure investigations, follow-ups, etc.
¶G. Evaluation plan. Evaluation will be monitored by
indicators requested on a monthly and quarterly basis and
with follow-up audits by the BOP.
Drug awareness, Demand Reduction, and Culture of Lawfulness
-- $715,000
Project Summary. Colombia faces two issues that threaten
the long term USG interest of a stable government and
society based on the rule of law. While the national
government has had great success in establishing presence
and authority throughout Colombia in recent years, there is
a traditional lack of confidence in governmental
institutions and a lack of faith in the rule of law. The
second threat is the level of drug abuse among Colombians,
especially young people. The Demand Reduction, Drug
Awareness, and Culture of Lawfulness program addresses these
issues. The Culture of Lawfulness portion provides
thousands of children instruction and opportunities to
discuss what it means to be a citizen in a democratic, law
based, society. It provides similar instruction to members
of the Colombian National Police (CNP). Our Drug
Awareness/Demand Reduction efforts provide equipment,
training, and support to numerous NGOs to support proven and
effective programs or to initiate new ones to teach
Colombians the dangers of drug use.
¶A. Project Title: Demand Reduction/Drug Awareness and
Culture of Lawfulness - $715,000.
¶B. Project Description. Supports NGOs that support civil
society and drug prevention programs in Colombia. Designs
and publishes material and education campaigns furthering
these goals. Sponsors conferences, travel, and visits.
Funds grants to NGOs to conduct comprehensive Culture of
Lawfulness training targeting parents, teachers, and local
leaders. This is a comprehensive program, administered by
the National Strategy Information Center (NSIC) that works
in coordination with the Presidential Anti-Corruption Office
and local education secretariats throughout Colombia. NSIC
is also developing a curriculum of instruction to present
Culture of Lawfulness training to members of the Colombian
National Police. Program funds support Colombian national
and local government's projects in drug prevention and
Culture of Lawfulness aimed at the regular populace as well
as the police.
¶C. Resources Requested - $715,000 in ACI funding.
¶D. Resource Justification. To provide grants to support
education projects for the police, children, parents,
teachers, and local leaders in Culture of Lawfulness
activities.
Commodities: Design and publication of materials for
prevention and Culture of Lawfulness training. Audiovisual
equipment, computers, and other equipment used for outreach,
training, and program support. Drug prevention and Culture
of Lawfulness strategies and techniques are constantly
evolving therefore sponsoring conferences, seminars, and
trainings as well as travel expenses to such events are
necessary.
¶E. Performance Measurement. The number of students
provided instruction in Culture of Lawfulness and drug
prevention. Number of trainers trained and how many people
they can instruct. The number of participating schools and
programs and their geographic coverage of Colombia.
Internal and/or independent evaluations of programs and
activities to measure changes in attitude and behavior
towards lawfulness and drug use.
¶F. Sustainability. In most cases, assistance takes the
form of one time assistance such as equipment purchases that
will enable an organization to sustain its programs with no
further USG commitment. In the case of grants, a
requirement of the grants is that they be designed to be
sustainable by Colombian sources.
¶G. Evaluation. Evaluation will depend on the type of
assistance provided and the type of program supported. For
one-time training, seminars, or conferences, exit interviews
and evaluations of its usefulness will be conducted. For
grants, a comprehensive evaluation of change in awareness
and attitudes of those participating in the program's
activities is conducted by the grantee.
CNP Reestablishment of Public Security in Conflicted Zones -
$18.603 million.
Project summary. Colombia is fighting a war against three
narco-terrorist armed groups that total approximately 40,000
combatants and support militia. Thousands of innocent
civilians, as well as hundreds of police and military are
killed annually. The FARC, the largest narco-terrorist
group, earns a minimum of US$1 billion per year from the
illegal narcotics trade. The GOC cannot provide the social
and economic benefits of democracy for all Colombians
without restoring and strengthening the rule of law and
government presence throughout the country. The first step
in restoring government presence is providing public
security, the role of the CNP, supported by the Colombian
military. This multi-year program assists the CNP in
reestablishing public security in the rural, conflictive
zones by organizing, training, and equipping approximately
20,000 police and constructing/reconstructing hardened
police stations. Terrorist attacks and crime rates have
dropped significantly since this program was started.
¶A. Project title: CNP Reestablish Public Security in
Conflicted Zones - $18.603 million.
¶B. Project description. The highest priority strategic
objective of Colombia's national security strategy (la
Politica de Defensa y Seguridad Democratica - Democratic
Security and Defense Policy) is to "gradually restore the
presence of public forces in all the municipalities" of
Colombia (the public force is composed of the CNP and
Colombian military.) In August, 2002, some 157 of
Colombia's 1,158 municipalities (equivalent to U.S.
counties) had no police presence. In most of these
municipalities, small police detachments were forced to
abandon their posts due to repeated terrorist attacks.
Hundreds of other municipalities, and thousands of
kilometers of Colombia, do not have sufficient numbers of
police to provide adequate public security. Failure to
maintain public forces throughout Colombia creates
"ungoverned spaces." The GOC cannot provide the social and
economic benefits of democracy for all Colombians without
restoring and strengthening the rule of law and government
presence throughout the country. The first step in
restoring government presence is providing public security--
the role of the CNP--supported by the Colombian military.
This project supports the CNP in fulfilling the top three
elements required by Colombia's national security strategy:
Organize, train and equip at least 157 police units (minimum
of 46-men each) assigned in the municipalities with no
police presence. This element was completed in February
2004; NAS is now assisting the CNP in stationing police in
the "second-tier" towns.
Organize, train, and equip sixty-two 150-man mobile
Carabineros, or rural police squadrons. These units will be
capable of establishing public security in the high threat
areas in Colombia's vast rural zones. All 62 squadrons will
be trained by 2006; the focus thereafter will be on
providing replacement personnel and equipment.
Construct, or reconstruct, scores of fortified police
stations in the larger municipalities. Based on
availability of funds, approximately 80 stations will be
hardened. Some 20 stations will have been constructed or
hardened by 2006 and this project element is now a major
focus of the USG effort.
¶C. Resources requested. $18.603 million in ACI funding.
¶D. Resource justification. We are seeking to eliminate
ungoverned spaces. By 2006, the CNP is projected to have
reached its goal of fielding 62 Carabineros mobile
squadrons, a total of 9,300 policemen. With an average 20
percent personnel replacement rate (for deaths,
reassignments, etc.), the CNP must organize, train and equip
more than 1,800 Carabineros per year. Additional funds will
be needed to complete basic infrastructure development and
construction at the CNP national field training center, near
Espinal, as well as provide continued support to that
training center which is essential to sustainability of the
program. That center houses both the Carabineros training
course and other antinarcotics police training courses,
including the Jungla course and landmine recognition
training. Funds will also be used to construct/renovate CNP
stations in rural Colombia and provide limited training and
essential equipment to the municipality police.
The results of this project have been significant. Rural
Colombia is much more secure than as recently as 2002. The
movement and supply corridors of the FARC and other illegal
armed groups have been cut; entire terrorist units have been
dismantled. Internally displaced families are returning to
their towns and farms.
¶E. Performance measurements. Numbers of Carabineros
trained, equipped and deployed. Reduction in overall crime
rates, terrorist attacks, homicides, kidnapping, etc.
Return of internally displaced persons to their home towns;
improvements to the rural economy. Improved security for
rural economic and social development projects.
¶F. Sustainability. The USG-GOC letter of agreement
specifically assigned sustainment costs for USG-provided
equipment to the CNP. When the CNP national field training
center is completed, the Carabineros and municipality units
will be able to conduct most of their field training there.
The GOC provides approximately $100 million annually to
support this project.
¶G. Evaluation plan. The NAS Carabineros project advisor,
supported by the DIRAN Ground Interdiction Team, makes
frequent field visits.
Promote Social and Economic Progress - $ 143.257 million
--------------------------------------------- ------------
The programs under this heading are carried out by USAID.
USAID's overarching goal will be to achieve a sustainable
reduction in the production of illicit drugs and the
promotion of peace in Colombia. This will be achieved
through three inter-related programs that aim to enhance
democratic governance, expand economic and social
alternatives to illicit crop production, and provide medium
and long-term support to internally displaced persons and
other vulnerable groups.
¶A. Project title. Support for democracy - $19 million.
¶B. Project description. USAID's democracy program provides
technical assistance and training to modernize the criminal
justice system; protect and promote human rights; improve
transparency and efficiency in the use of public resources
(this includes work to strengthen political parties,
legislative strengthening activities, and policy support);
and to mitigate conflict. Activities will promote a strong
democratic government presence to counter the negative
effects that illicit activities have on transparency,
accountability and the ability of local officials to
practice good governance.
¶C. Resources requested. $19 million in ACI funding.
¶D. Resource justification. The democracy programs and
objectives represent essential components in the overall USG
effort to help eliminate the threats of illegal drugs and
narcoterrorists. These programs enhance democratic
governance at the national and local levels (in targeted
growth corridors) to extend the presence of an accountable,
legitimate and just state, particularly to address the needs
of traditionally underserved regions and populations. This
will be accomplished through the continuation and
consolidation of five comprehensive and inter-related
programs that, combined, will address the most critical
challenges to strengthening the rule of law in Colombia.
The justice program will work to broaden access to legal
services for millions of Colombians while also helping to
implement the national level reforms necessary to make the
Colombian judiciary more transparent, democratic, and
effective. The human rights program will continue to
prevent egregious human rights violations through various
prevention and protection mechanisms such as the early
warning system and will promote respect and awareness of
human rights, particularly among vulnerable populations.
The transparency and accountability program will reduce
corruption by working to improve the efficiency and
transparency in the use of public resources and by helping
to strengthen internal controls. Finally, the peace
initiative program will help mitigate conflict in the
country by strengthening the capacity of the office of the
High Commissioner for Peace (HCP) to promote the peaceful
resolution of Colombia's decades-old internal conflict.
¶E. Performance measurements: As USAID/Colombia begins
implementing its revised strategy for the period 2006-2008,
new indicators that track progress on information will be
developed and targets on current indicators may be revised
as of 2006. Current performance indicators include 1)
number of recipients benefited by USAID-funded Ministry of
Interior protection program for trade unionists, human
rights workers, witnesses in human rights cases and other
groups; 2) number of GOC agencies with standardized internal
control procedures; and 3) number of casas de justicia
established.
¶F. Sustainability: The revised strategy consists of a
strategic set of interrelated and mutually reinforcing
programs and activities that will help remedy, on a
sustainable basis, many of the root causes of Colombia's
ills that gave rise to the dual threat of illegal narcotics
and terrorism. Strengthening the Colombian state,
reinvigorating the economy, and building social capital will
considerably enhance overall prospects for achieving greater
stability in the country and region. In order to promote
sustainability of these initiatives, USAID will
significantly expand and broaden economic alternatives,
largely through trade capacity building given the still
untapped opportunities provided under the Andean Trade
Preferences and Drug Enforcement Act (ATPDEA) and the
expanded growth opportunities which would be provided by
prospective bilateral and hemispheric free trade agreements.
The program and strategy will also seek increased private
sector investment in targeted growth corridors for the
purpose of generating jobs, especially for youth. National
level policy dialogue will serve as the foundation for these
interventions in recognition of its importance to improving
Colombia's global competitiveness, especially with regard to
market development, transparency, fiscal stability, trade
and investment policy, institutional reforms, and judicial
and commercial law reform.
¶G. Evaluation plan: USAID's democracy programs are
evaluated on a continuous basis. Quarterly reports are
issued and all programs are thoroughly reviewed under
USAID's annual report process and portfolio reviews, which
are conducted each year. Through this process actual
results are compared against performance indicator targets.
In addition, program results are reported in the embassy's
Mission Performance Plan (MPP).
Alternative development - $83.3 million; includes $4.3
million in operating expenses
It should be noted that USAID's request for the alternative
development program has been adjusted downward to $83.3
million due to overall federal budget constraints. However,
the activities described below assume an overall budget of
$88.5 million. This amount represents USAID's original
request. With this reduction, activities under this
critical and high-profile priority program will subsequently
be scaled back.
¶A. Project title. Alternative Development - $83.3 million;
includes $4.3m in operating expenses
¶B. Project description. USAID's alternative development
(AD) program provides income and employment opportunities to
rural residents and small farmers who have eradicated and
agree not to grow illicit crops and supports small and
medium private enterprises that generate licit income and
employment opportunities. Assistance is also provided for
social and productive infrastructure as a means for
improving access to markets and services. The strengthening
of licit economic opportunities will contribute to permanent
abandonment of illicit crop production. The AD program will
strengthen national and local institutions that carry out
alternative development planning and trade capacity
building. The AD program will also support the
strengthening of democratic and local governance and
decentralization efforts. Technical assistance will also be
provided to improve the management and conservation of
natural resources in buffer zones around national parks and
to support indigenous communities by improving their
livelihoods through the implementation of sustainable
productive activities.
¶C. Resources requested. $83.3 million in ACI funding.
¶D. Resource justification. These programs and objectives
represent essential components in the overall USG effort to
help eliminate the threats of illegal drugs and
narcoterrorists. Through the alternative development
programs, USAID works with the private sector to achieve a
sustainable expansion of economic opportunities in a manner
that provides viable alternatives to illicit crop
production; works with municipal governments to help make
local institutions more responsive and effective in
responding to the needs of citizens; improves access to and
the efficient operation of land markets; and facilitates
sustainable, broad-based income and employment growth in
strategically targeted areas of the country. This will be
accomplished through market-driven, private sector-led
alternative development in regions/sub-regions of the
country under the influence of illicit agriculture that can
effectively support economically viable and sustainable
agricultural and other alternatives to illicit crop
cultivation.
¶E. Performance measurements. As USAID/Colombia begins
implementing its revised strategy for the period 2006-2008,
new indicators that track progress on information, such as
jobs created, will be developed and targets on current
indicators may be revised as of 2006. Current performance
indicators include 1) number of licit crops in hectares
established through alternative development programs in coca
and poppy growing regions; 2) number of families benefited
by alternative development programs; and 3) number of
infrastructure projects completed in municipalities and
departments through AD and local governance programs.
¶F. Sustainability. The revised strategy consists of a
strategic set of interrelated and mutually reinforcing
programs and activities that will help remedy, on a
sustainable basis, many of the root causes of Colombia's
ills that gave rise to the dual threat of illegal narcotics
and terrorism. Strengthening the Colombian state,
reinvigorating the economy, and building social capital will
considerably enhance overall prospects for achieving greater
stability in the country and region. To promote
sustainability of these initiatives, USAID will
significantly expand and broaden economic alternatives,
largely through trade capacity building given the still
untapped opportunities provided under the Andean Trade
Preferences and Drug Enforcement Act (ATPDEA) and the
expanded growth opportunities which would be provided by
prospective bilateral and hemispheric free trade agreements.
The program and strategy will also seek increased private
sector investment in targeted growth corridors for the
purpose of generating jobs, especially for youth. National
level policy dialogue will serve as the foundation for these
interventions in recognition of its importance to improving
Colombia's global competitiveness, especially with regard to
market development, transparency, fiscal stability, trade
and investment policy, institutional reforms, and judicial
and commercial law reform.
¶G. Evaluation plan. USAID's Alternative Development
programs are evaluated on a continuous basis. Quarterly
reports are issued and all programs are thoroughly reviewed
under USAID's annual report process and portfolio reviews,
which are conducted each year. Through this process actual
results are compared against performance indicator targets.
In addition, program results are reported in the embassy's
Mission Performance Plan (MPP).
Support to Vulnerable Groups and Internally Displaced
Persons -- $26.5 million; includes $4 million transferred
to USAID from Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM).
¶A. Project title. Support to Vulnerable Groups and IDPs -
$26.5 million.
¶B. Project description. USAID's internally displaced
persons (IDP) humanitarian assistance program provides
economic and social assistance to vulnerable groups,
including child ex-combatants, youth at risk of recruitment
by illegal armed groups, host communities, and persons
displaced by civil strife and violence. USAID-funded
activities will focus on short, medium and longer-term
solutions leading to the sustainable re-integration of IDPs
and former child combatants into mainstream Colombian
society through programs at the national and local levels.
Pending a USG policy decision, adult ex-combatants may also
be assisted. The IDP program helps to improve community
infrastructure and provide economic alternatives to deter
people from participating in illegal narcotics activities.
Note: This request incorporates an additional $4 million
that would be transferred from PRM to USAID to implement the
short-term IDP programs previously managed by PRM.
Combining PRM's short-term activities with USAID's mid- and
long-term programs will facilitate smooth transitions for
beneficiaries within the IDP chain of assistance and
streamline overall program management.
¶C. Resources requested. $26.5 million in ACI funding.
¶D. Resource justification. These programs and objectives
represent essential components in the overall USG effort to
help eliminate the threats of illegal drugs and
narcoterrorists. The IDP programs will continue to focus on
humanitarian assistance for persons displaced by the
conflict, including former child-combatants. USAID support
will continue to focus on healthcare, shelter, income
generation activities, education, and psychosocial
assistance. Logistical and planning assistance, including
the development of a reliable monitoring and evaluation
system to track progress for the reintegration of adult ex-
combatants into civil society in support of the GOC's
demobilization and reinsertion program, will continue to be
provided.
¶E. Performance measurements. As USAID/Colombia begins
implementing its revised strategy for the period 2006-2008,
new indicators that track progress on information will be
developed and targets on current indicators may be revised
as of 2006. Current performance indicators include 1)
number of IDPs assisted; and 2) number of former child
combatants assisted.
¶F. Sustainability. The revised strategy consists of a
strategic set of interrelated and mutually reinforcing
programs and activities that will help remedy, on a
sustainable basis, many of the root causes of Colombia's
ills that gave rise to the dual threat of illegal narcotics
and terrorism. Strengthening the Colombian state,
reinvigorating the economy, and building social capital will
considerably enhance overall prospects for achieving greater
stability in the country and region. Under its revised
strategy, USAID/Colombia will significantly expand and
broaden economic alternatives, largely through trade
capacity building given the still untapped opportunities
provided under the ATPDEA and the expanded growth
opportunities which would be provided by prospective
bilateral and hemispheric free trade agreements. The
program and strategy will also seek increased private sector
investment in targeted growth corridors for the purpose of
generating jobs, especially for youth. National level
policy dialogue will serve as the foundation for these
interventions in recognition of its importance to improving
Colombia's global competitiveness, especially with regard to
market development, transparency, fiscal stability, trade
and investment policy, institutional reforms, and judicial
and commercial law reform.
¶G. Evaluation plan. USAID's vulnerable groups and IDP
programs are evaluated on a continuous basis. Quarterly
reports are issued and all programs are thoroughly reviewed
under USAID's annual report process and portfolio reviews,
which are conducted each year. Through this process actual
results are compared against performance indicator targets.
In addition, program results are reported in the embassy's
Mission Performance Plan (MPP).
¶A. Project title. Reincorporation to Civilian Life - $14.5
million.
¶B. Project description. With approved funding, USAID's
reincorporation support program will be able to expand
assistance to the GOC efforts to demobilize, disarm and
reincorporate back into civilian life thousands of illegal
armed group (IAG) members. Each of these IAGs has been
designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under
the U.S. Patriot Act. The GOC reincorporation program
provides incentives such as job training and psycho-social
assistance for ex-combatants in exchange for verifiable
renunciation of membership in Colombian FTOs such as the
AUC(Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia/United Self-Defense
Forces of Colombia). The GOC has pledged over $85 million
resources for DR during 2004-2007, but additional resources,
along with USAID know-how that come with them, are needed to
assure the success of the program. Note: The specifics of
this program have not yet been fully designed, although
USAID has been supporting institutional/structural aspects
of the GOC's reincorporation efforts. The program funding
requested here involves direct material support to former
FTO members. This assistance is crucial to the success of
the reincorporation effort, but will only proceed if the USG
reaches a favorable policy decision in consultation with
Congress.
¶C. Resources requested. $14.5 million in ACI funding.
¶D. Resource justification. Colombia is now at a crucial
crossroads in its efforts to greatly diminish the negative
affects of narco-terrorism and establish itself as a
peaceful nation whose citizens may benefit from lasting
sustainable social and economic development. Recent events
and progress in the AUC demobilization and reincorporation
process represent a unique and remarkable opportunity for
both the GOC and the USG. With USG support, the GOC has the
chance to create a lasting peace in Colombia and stability
within the region through the dismantling of a FTO that has
been responsible for thousands of deaths and a sizable
proportion of the illicit drugs being exported to the U.S.
from Colombia. The Colombians want us to be a partner in
this endeavor. In Cartagena, President Bush gave President
Uribe his commitment to continue supporting GOC
efforts. Success in this endeavor will also tangibly
contribute to the Global War on Terrorism, arguably the
USG's overriding foreign policy priority.
In 2003, the Colombian High Commissioner for Peace (HCP) and
the AUC signed an accord that called for complete
demobilization of the AUC by December 31, 2005. To date,
4,820 individuals have been collectively demobilized and are
participating in the 18-24 month long reincorporation
process.
Congress provided Expanded Authorities that recognize in
Colombia that narcotrafficking and terrorism are
intertwined. The AUC has been deeply involved in both. In
one such demobilization, of then-AUC Commander Salvatore
Mancuso's Catatumbo Bloc, producing coca fields were
returned to State control, facilitating eradication. The HCP
is currently finalizing negotiations with the central
command of the AUC for the demobilization of an additional
15,000 terrorists by the end of 2005. The impact of this on
USG counter-narcotic and anti-terrorism objectives in
Colombia could be very significant.
The benefits from supporting a successful AUC
reincorporation process greatly out-weigh the risk or
consequences of a faulty or failed one. If the demobilized
return to a life of crime, violence and terrorism, then the
sharp drop in murders, massacres, and kidnapping during the
Uribe administration will stall, if not reverse. A reversal
in such security trends would seriously undermine President
Uribe and his Democratic Security Policy. In turn, such a
failure would damage Uribe's ability to continue to pursue
his aggressive fight against drugs and terror in Colombia.
Our strongest ally in Latin America would have suffered a
serious setback, directly affecting the prospects for
continued success in meeting critical USG foreign policy
interests in an increasingly unstable region.
If successful, the DR process with the AUC will also serve
as a confidence builder for future peace negotiations with
all IAGs and contribute to a further reduction in the human
rights violations and in the internal displacement of
populations resulting from the ongoing Colombian armed
conflict as well as drug production and trafficking. While
there are currently no official peace negotiations between
the GOC and the FARC guerrilla group, there are talks
underway between the HCP and another IAG, the ELN, and
Colombian officials are planning for the demobilization of
an additional 3,000 FTO combatants within the coming year.
¶E. Performance measurements: Current USAID support to the
reincorporation process includes an "Accompaniment,
Monitoring and Evaluation" system (SAME) which assesses the
degree of reinsertion into civilian life of each individual
in the program. This system will be used to measure program
performance.
¶F. Sustainability: The sustainability of the proposed
program will be measured by recidivism rates. SAME tracks
this on an individual basis. When an individual is
experiencing difficulty in the reincorporation process,
special attention will be given to correct the problem and
ensure sustainability of the investment in an individual's
return to civilian life. If on the other hand, an individual
returns to the ranks of a FTO, SAME will signal the need to
immediately halt any USG assistance to that person.
¶G. Evaluation plan: All of USAID's programs are evaluated
on a periodic basis. In this case the SAME mechanism will
be used. On-going USAID support to the reincorporation
process in the City of Medellin has recently been evaluated.
¶A. Project title. Program development and support - $7.4
million.
¶B. Project description. Provides administrative
management and logistical support for NAS counter-narcotics
and law enforcement projects. Funds provide salaries,
benefits and allowances of permanently assigned U.S. and
foreign national employees, TDY assistance, general
administrative and indirect operating expenses that cannot
be identified with a specific project. The NAS has
experienced significant growth with the creation of Plan
Colombia and the follow-on Andean Counter-drug Initiative.
Logistical and administrative support requirements have
increased consistent with program growth and expansion
around the country. The management unit operates as a de
facto ICASS service provider to support other agencies' law
enforcement program activity.
¶C. Resources requested. $7.4 million ACI funding
¶D. Resources justification. An aged fleet and high vehicle
maintenance costs support the need for additional vehicles
and a full complement of new computers to enhance
productivity of support staff. Increased travel is required
to support rapidly changing requirements for procurement and
logistical support to eradication and interdiction
activities. Increased ICASS service costs result from
workload counts associated with "provider services" to law
enforcement agencies. FSN salary increase and 5% "unique
conditions of work" allowance contribute significantly to
increased costs.
¶E. Performance measurements. The measure of performance is
the efficient administrative, financial and logistical
support provided to NAS field operations; more effective and
streamlined administrative procedures; maintenance of
appropriate funding levels and implementing effective
internal control procedures.
¶F. Sustainability. A review and analysis of
administrative operating procedures to standardize
administrative and logistical support processes; staff
development and training for a stable administrative
management staff; receipt of timely appropriate funding
levels needed to maintain buying power in a dynamic global
economic market.
¶G. Evaluation plan: Creation of documented standard
operating procedures (SOPs) for logistical and
administrative support procedures; improved understanding
and execution of job duties by staff; recognized improved
customer service by program staff; receipt of appropriate
funding levels.
WOOD