This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 004141 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2015 
TAGS: PTER PREL SNAR PHUM CO OVIP
SUBJECT: CODEL BURTON MEETS WITH DEFENSE MINISTER AND NAVY 
OPERATIONS COMMANDER 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 
1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) CODEL Burton was briefed by Defense Minister Jorge 
Uribe and Naval Operations Commander Vice Admiral Guillermo 
Barrera on April 23.  Uribe said President Uribe's Democratic 
Security Strategy was designed to combat drug trafficking and 
terrorism and provided statistics on growing amounts of 
seized drugs, dropping murder rates, and other indicators of 
the strategy's success.  He emphasized that U.S. support was 
key to sustained progress.  Barrera discussed counterdrug 
strategies on the north and Pacific coasts and rivers.  In 
2004, the Navy seized almost USD 2 billion worth of drugs. 
He noted that the Navy was working to open more bases and 
develop better interdiction equipment.  End summary. 
 
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MOD: Focus on Drugs and Terrorism 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) On April 23, Minister of Defense (MOD) Uribe discussed 
the GOC's Democratic Security Strategy with CODEL Burton.  He 
said the two principle threats facing Colombia are drug 
trafficking and terrorism.  The Democratic Security Strategy 
aims to strengthen and guarantee the rule of law by (1) 
establishing state control of all national territory; (2) 
protecting the rural and urban population; (3) eliminating 
drug trafficking; (4) maintaining an offensive capacity 
against the illegal armed groups; and (5) guaranteeing 
transparency and accountability of state institutions.  By 
the end of his term, President Uribe wants to have severely 
damaged the drug trafficking industry, diminished state 
corruption, and established healthy employment levels.  The 
MOD emphasized that national security was required for social 
and economic development. 
 
¶3. (U) Minister Uribe offered some examples of progress: 
 
-- Aerial eradication of coca: between April 2004 and March 
2005, 152,839 hectares were sprayed.  During the same period 
the year before, 131,474 hectares were sprayed.  As of March, 
396,163 hectares had been sprayed since President Uribe took 
office.  Between January and March of this year, 58,173 
hectares were sprayed, a 39 percent increase from the same 
period in 2004. 
 
-- Aerial eradication of opium poppy: In 2004, 3,061 hectares 
were sprayed.  In 2003, 2,995 hectares, in 2002, 3,372, and 
in 2001, 2,268. 
 
-- Cocaine seized: Between April 2004 and March 2005, 145 
tons were seized.  During the same period the year before, 
136.5 tons were seized.  As of March, 332.1 tons had been 
seized since Uribe took office.  Between January and March of 
this year, 38 tons were seized, a decrease of eight percent 
from the same period in 2004. 
 
-- Precursor chemicals seized: Between April 2004 and March 
2005, 2,102 tons of solid chemicals and 1,237 gallons of 
liquids were seized.  During the same period the year before, 
2,825 tons and 1,965 gallons were seized.  As of March, 7,613 
tons and 4,642 gallons had been seized since Uribe took 
office. 
 
-- Drug production labs destroyed: Between April 2004 and 
March 2005, 1,841 labs were destroyed.  During the same time 
the year before, 1,740 labs were destroyed.  As of March, 
4,372 had been destroyed since Uribe took office.  Between 
January and March of this year, 555 had been destroyed, a 
decrease of 11 percent since 2004. 
 
-- Air Bridge Denial: Between January and March of 2005, two 
planes had been destroyed and four impounded.  The MOD 
emphasized that none of the planes had been shot down, but 
rather forced to land and destroyed on the ground.  In 2004, 
17 were destroyed and 21 impounded; in 2003, eight were 
destroyed and 23 impounded; in 2002, six were destroyed and 
five were impounded; in 2001, seven were destroyed and 11 
impounded; and in 2000, 23 were destroyed and 17 impounded. 
Uribe noted that the numbers demonstrated the importance of 
having re-started Air Bridge Denial in 2003. 
-- Murders: in 2002, there were over 29,000 murders in the 
country.  In 2004, there were approximately 20,000.  Between 
2002 and 2003 murders fell 18 percent and between 2003 and 
2004 14 percent.  Uribe noted that Medellin's murder rate, 
which used to be the highest in the country, had been cut in 
half. 
 
-- Kidnappings: Between April 2004 and March 2005, there were 
675 kidnappings.  During the same period the year before, 
there were 1,310.  As of March, there had been 3,137 
kidnappings since Uribe took office, a drop of 36 percent 
compared to the Pastrana administration.  Between January and 
March of this year, there were 87 kidnappings, a drop of 56 
percent compared to the same period in 2004. 
 
-- Terrorist attacks (including on oil pipelines and other 
infrastructure): Between April 2004 and March 2005, there 
were 683 attacks.  During the same period the year before, 
there were 1,310 attacks.  As of March, there had been 3,137 
attacks since Uribe took office, a decrease of 36 percent 
compared to the Pastrana administration.  Between January and 
March of this year, there were 148 attacks, a decrease of 34 
percent compared to the same period in 2004. 
 
-- Attacks on towns: in 2000, there were 85 and in 2004, 
there was only one.  Uribe noted that there had already been 
one in 2005 (the FARC attacked the indigenous town of 
Toribio, Cauca Department in late April). 
 
-- Combat between the military and illegal armed groups: In 
2000, there were 811 combat actions and in 2004, there were 
2,193.  The Ambassador emphasized that the increasing number 
of clashes did not mean that the illegal armed groups were 
growing in strength, but rather that the military was more 
aggressive. 
 
-- Attacks on the pipeline: As of March, there had been 55 
attacks on the pipeline in 2005.  There 93 in 2004, 179 in 
2003, 64 in 2002, and 260 in 2001. 
 
-- Attacks on energy towers: As of March, there had been 25 
attacks in 2005.  There were 121 in 2004, 329 in 2003, and 
254 in 2001. 
 
-- Individual demobilizations: As of March 2005, 641 
individuals had deserted an illegal armed group and entered 
the GOC's reinsertion program.  There were 2,972 in 2004, 
2,538 in 2003, and 1,412 in 2002.  Approximately half of 
these deserters come from the FARC. 
 
¶4. (C) In response to a question from the CODEL, MOD Uribe 
acknowledged that Colombia was concerned about President 
Chavez' growing arms arsenal and close ties to Fidel Castro. 
He said the threat was exacerbated by the growing instability 
in the Andean region, such as in Bolivia and Ecuador. 
 
¶5. (U) Uribe credited U.S. assistance and President Uribe's 
vision and leadership for the GOC's security successes.  He 
noted that in the past year and a half, over 100,000 of the 
370,000 members of the military and police had been trained 
in human rights.  He reported that the Defense Ministry is 
streamlining the military's logistics system to avoid waste 
and inefficiency.  In closing, he said the GOC had to stay on 
course to achieve lasting results and continued U.S. 
assistance was crucial. 
 
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Navy: Combating Drugs on Three Fronts 
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¶6. (C) Vice Admiral Guillermo Barrera, the Naval Operations 
Commander, briefed the CODEL on the Navy's counterdrug 
actions.  He reported that the Navy's three areas of 
operation -- the north and Pacific coasts and country's 
rivers -- totaled 1.14 million square kilometers. 
Approximately 480 tons of drugs are shipped from the Pacific 
coast and 135 tons from the north coast each year.  Resources 
are scarce.  For example, the Pacific coast Naval units have 
one third of the equipment that the north coast units have, 
and the riverine area has only one fixed wing aircraft. 
Barrera assured the CODEL that the Navy works closely with 
other services to offset equipment shortages.  When a ship, 
helicopter, and surveillance aircraft are all available for 
an operation, the Navy has a 70 percent success rate in 
locating and stopping an illicit drug shipment. 
 
¶7. (C) In 2004, the Navy seized 77,000 kilograms of drugs, or 
almost USD 2 billion worth of drugs.  In 1997, the Navy had 
only two bases.  Today, there are five in Santa Marta, 
Cartagena, Turbo, Buenaventura, and Bahia Malaga.  Four more 
will soon be open in Rioacha, San Andres Island, 
Barranquilla, and Tumaco thanks, in part, to U.S. assistance. 
 The Navy is also working to develop more effective 
interdiction equipment. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment: Although GOC statistics follow the trend line 
of U.S. numbers, they often are derived from different 
sources (like the UN) and therefore do not match ours.  End 
comment. 
WOOD