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Viewing cable 05BANGKOK3073, THAI GIVE APPROVAL TO PRM DAS RYAN FOR BURMA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BANGKOK3073 2005-05-09 09:31 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bangkok
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 003073 
 
SIPDIS 
 
GENEVA FOR RMA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2015 
TAGS: PREF PREL TH BM BURMA
SUBJECT: THAI GIVE APPROVAL TO PRM DAS RYAN FOR BURMA 
BORDER CAMP REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Alexander Arvizu.  Reason 1.4 (B,D). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  During an April 18-23 visit by PRM Bureau 
DAS Kelly Ryan, the Thai government gave its approval for a 
multi-year program to resettle Burmese refugees residing in 
camps along the Thai-Burma border to the United States.  DAS 
Ryan told Thai officials that the United States wanted to 
begin this program in the Tham Hin camp, was prepared to 
offer resettlement to all eligible registered refugees in 
camp, and would be able to begin processing before the end of 
2005.  Thai National Security Council head General Winai 
expressed some concern that such a program could pull more 
Burmese into Thailand and asked the United States to pursue 
the program as discreetly as possible.  DAS Ryan agreed that 
it was important to try and deter a pull factor and said that 
the USG viewed Tham Hin as a pilot and would make decisions 
about how best to proceed in resettling refugees from the 
other camps after further analysis.  The Thai also told Ryan 
that the long-delayed Provincial Admissions Boards for 
screening Burmese refugees would begin operations in May. 
General Winai indicated that the Thai government was looking 
favorably at establishing the site currently being used to 
process Hmong for U.S. resettlement as a more permanent 
facility for Burmese resettlement processing.  DAS Ryan 
lauded the Thai decision to permit expanded vocational and 
educational training for Burma border camp refugees and urged 
the Thai to permit income generation as well.  DAS Ryan also 
urged the Thai to permit UNHCR access to Chinese dissident Lu 
Decheng.  End summary. 
 
2. (U) Population, Refugees, and Migration Bureau Deputy 
Assistant Secretary Kelly Ryan visited Thailand from April 
18-23 to discuss refugee matters.  Dorothea Lay, CIS Office 
of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, 
accompanied her.  Ryan met with Thai government and 
multilateral organization officials and NGO representatives. 
She also participated in a well-received two-day conference 
with Southeast Asian refugee NGOs designed to provide 
information about the U.S. refugee resettlement program so 
NGOs will be able, if they choose, to refer refugee cases for 
U.S. resettlement. 
 
General Winai Gives OK to Burma Border Camp Resettlement 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
3. (SBU) DAS Ryan began her April 20 meeting with Thai 
National Security Council Secretary General Winai Phattiyakul 
by reviewing progress made over the past year on the Hmong 
and urban Burmese resettlement programs.  She said that the 
United States was now prepared to begin a multi-year 
resettlement program for eligible refugees in the refugee 
camps along the Thai-Burma border.  The United States 
proposed to begin in Tham Hin camp.  It was prepared to offer 
resettlement to all qualified refugees at that site who were 
registered by UNHCR in December 2004 as well as those who had 
entered Tham Hin after 1999 when the previous registration 
was done but whom UNHCR was not able to register last 
December.  Ryan said that if the Thai government agreed, the 
United States was prepared to make the necessary preparations 
to begin processing before the end of 2005. 
 
4. (SBU) DAS Ryan noted that the United States was not 
certain how many Tham Hin refugees would choose the 
resettlement option.  But she noted that she had heard the 
refugees there express frustration with crowding in the camp 
and with the lack of immediate prospects for return to Burma. 
 In response to Winai,s question about U.S. interest in 
other camps, DAS Ryan stated that the USG looked at Tham Hin 
as a pilot.  It recognized the Thai concern about a possible 
pull factor and wanted to proceed carefully.  Tham Hin would 
provide a start and allow the USG to put the systems in place 
for large-scale processing.  The USG proposed to evaluate the 
experience gained in Tham Hin as it moved forward to other 
camps.  The United States planned to be engaged in 
resettlement in Thailand for the long haul. 
 
5. (SBU) Winai indicated that the Thai government approved a 
U.S. resettlement program for the Burma border camps.  He 
thanked Ryan for the USG efforts over the past year on the 
Hmong and urban Burmese programs, but did note that the Thai 
government was concerned about a pull factor.  The Hmong 
program had drawn 5,000 Hmong from Laos into Thailand.  Winai 
said he also wanted the U.S. to be discreet about a Tham Hin 
resettlement program to forestall any disorder in the border 
camps.  DAS Ryan expressed confidence that the two sides 
would be able to deal with the pull factor.  The USG had 
proceeded as discreetly as possible with the urban Burmese 
program and would do the same with Tham Hin.  She also said 
that it would be helpful for the two sides to have an 
exchange of letters to confirm the agreement on border camp 
resettlement. 
 
6. (SBU) DAS Ryan then asked Winai about the long-proposed 
Thai Provincial Admissions Boards (PABs) that would screen 
Burmese asylum seekers.  She expressed the hope that the PABs 
would begin operating soon.  Ryan also inquired whether the 
Thai government would consider establishment of a separate 
site for resettlement processing for Burmese approved by the 
PABs.  She noted that she had heard there was some Thai 
government discussion about using the site currently being 
used for Hmong processing at Tham Krabok temple in Saraburi 
Province for this purpose. 
 
7. (SBU) Winai responded that the Thai government had 
discussed the Tham Krabok processing site with UNHCR.  The 
Thai Ministry of Interior agreed with the idea.  He noted, 
however, there was more work to do on the Thai side, 
including gaining concurrence from the private foundation 
that owned the land.  As for the PABs, the Thai government 
was making progress.  The goal was to have them active in 
four provinces by the end of May.  UNHCR will participate on 
the PABs.  (Note:  Since the USG anticipates that some of the 
refugee cases approved by the PABs will be referred to the 
USG for resettlement, this decision would be welcome and 
potentially cost saving as the USG had already funded 
improvements to the infrastructure at the site for the Hmong 
screening.) 
 
8. (SBU) DAS Ryan praised the Thai government,s recent 
decision to permit expanded educational and vocational 
training opportunities for Burma border camp refugees.  This 
was a good idea that made sense in terms of durable 
solutions.  Refugees with added skills would be better able 
to contribute whether they were resettled or repatriated to 
Burma.  Winai responded that the Thai had started with 
vocational training and advanced education.  The process had 
gone slowly so far, but would hopefully speed up. 
 
 
Thai MFA Explains Position on Chinese Refugee 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) On April 19, DAS Ryan met with Thai Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Director General Kittiphong Na-Ranong.  She 
began the meeting by asking Kittiphong about the status of 
the PABs.  DAS Ryan also noted U.S. concern about Burmese 
refugees living in urban areas who had recently been moved to 
border camps.  Turning to resettlement of Burma border camp 
refugees, DAS Ryan described the U.S. proposal to begin a 
multi-year resettlement program beginning in Tham Hin camp 
later this year.  She expressed the hope that those who have 
arrived since 1999, the year when the last registration 
occurred, could be added to the lists of camp refugees that 
UNHCR is currently compiling. 
 
10. (SBU) Kittiphong responded that the Ministry of Interior 
was saying that the PABs would begin working in May.  He 
stated that the MFA for its part had tried to push MOI to get 
the PABs up and running.  On the urban Burmese refugee move 
to the border camps, Kittiphong noted that &Thailand has 
been quite flexible" in the past on this issue.  He noted 
that the Thai government often took a hard public line, but 
was &flexible8 in practice.  Kittiphong said there were two 
schools of thought in the RTG about resettlement of border 
camp refugees: the first was looking toward resettlement for 
the refugees; the other, mostly the military and other 
security agencies, were concerned about the "pull factor" 
resettlement might promote.  He stated that he was very 
sympathetic to National Security Council Secretary chief 
General Winai, who had to balance these opposing views. 
 
11. (C) DAS Ryan then raised the issue of the Chinese 
dissident Lu Decheng, emphasizing that the United States 
opposed any plans to deport him to the PRC or other countries 
and that the UNHCR should be allowed to do a formal refugee 
status determination interview.  She noted that the USG had 
not encouraged a public campaign for Lu in hopes that this 
would make it easier for the RTG to permit UNHCR access. 
 
12. (C) Kittiphong replied that the RTG appreciated the U.S. 
position.  He reiterated the RTG concern about the pattern of 
PRC and other nationals acting in a "systematic way" to use 
Thailand as a transit route for refugee resettlement.  He 
also made reference to a recent DPRK refugee case and stated 
the RTG worry of setting a precedent for these types of 
cases.  He particularly mentioned initial media coverage of 
Lu Decheng's case in late 2004 that "made it very difficult" 
to process Lu,s case quietly.  Thailand could not be seen as 
doing whatever the United States wanted.  Kittiphong also 
said that RTG authorities had checked out Lu's story and 
concluded that he had nothing to fear if he returned to the 
PRC.  DAS Ryan countered that based on her first-hand 
experience, the PRC had manipulated evidence in the past in 
presenting information to the United States and to other 
foreign government officials in attempts to counter refugees' 
claims of persecution. 
 
13. (C) Kittiphong then cited the personal involvement of 
former Foreign Minister Surakiart Sathirathai in the case of 
Chinese dissident Yuan Bin, who was detained for a short time 
in a Thai prison in 2004 before being granted UNHCR access 
and expedited resettlement to the U.S.  Kittiphong said that 
Surakiart's personal involvement in Yuan Bin's case left the 
RTG feeling that they were being used by dissident groups and 
their networks to get people out of the PRC to the US or 
elsewhere. 
 
14. (SBU) DAS Ryan proposed to Kittiphong that the RTG 
consider the idea of establishing a transit center to handle 
processing of Burmese refugees approved by the PABs.  She 
also lauded the RTG,s decision to permit expanded 
educational and vocational training opportunities for camp 
refugees.  Kittiphong replied that the idea of a transit 
center to assist in the completion of processing was a good 
idea but deferred to the Ministry of Interior (MOI) for the 
final decision.  On the issue of providing more systematic 
vocational training in the camps, Kittiphong nodded 
sympathetically to this idea and stated that MFA had 
suggested it during the Cambodian refugee crisis in the 
1980s.  It had taken &20 years to get this idea approved." 
 
Ministry of Interior Says PABs Will Begin in May 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
15. (SBU) DAS Ryan explained the U.S. plans for Burma border 
camp resettlement in her April 20 meeting with Thai Ministry 
of Interior Inspector General Tirawattr Kullavanijaya.  She 
said the United States would continue with resettlement 
processing for the urban Burmese who had been moved to the 
border camps.  She expressed the hope that the Thai 
government would show generosity toward the urban Burmese who 
had not reported to the refugee camps and urged that none be 
deported.  She asked about the status of the PABs and the 
possibility of a dedicated processing site for those approved 
by the PABs.  DAS Ryan also praised the Thai government 
decision to permit expanded vocational and educational 
training for refugees. 
16. (SBU) Tirawattr responded that the PABs should begin work 
in May and that using the Tham Krabok site was possible.  He 
noted that the Thai Ministry of Education was looking at 
getting more involved with refugee education.  The Thai 
government was concerned with the international perception 
that camp refugees were being &warehoused8 or not well 
treated.  Tirawattr expressed frustration with the lack of 
political progress in Burma and the continuing inflow of 
Burmese, noting that while 2,000 urban Burmese had been 
resettled, the number coming into Thailand continued to rise. 
 
 
UNHCR Reviews Montagnard Situation 
---------------------------------- 
 
17. (SBU) In an April 19 meeting, UNHCR Regional 
Representative Hasim Utkan reviewed the Montagnard situation 
in Cambodia with DAS Ryan.  He repeated UNHCR,s rationale 
for signing the MOU on this subject with the Vietnamese and 
Cambodian governments.  He said that there were now 129 
Montagnards who had received UNHCR refugee status but did not 
want resettlement to a third country.  UNHCR was reviewing, 
in some cases for the third time, those for whom it had 
previously rejected refugee status.  Utkan stated that in his 
view the approval threshold for the Montagnards was generally 
quite low. 
 
18. (SBU) UNHCR, Utkan said, now had no plans to return 
involuntarily any of the Montagnards.  It believed it had a 
breathing space for further implementation of the MOU prior 
to a high-level meeting in late May with the Vietnamese and 
Cambodians.  But time would eventually run out.  He 
emphasized that UNHCR found itself in a difficult position 
when the Montagnard refugees were rejecting the only durable 
solution ) resettlement ) that it could offer.  DAS Ryan 
stated that the USG did not want any unmonitored return, 
voluntary or involuntary, of the Montagnards.  It was also 
concerned about Montagnards who would cross into Cambodia in 
the future and were not covered by the MOU.  DAS Ryan said 
the USG would consider whether some of the Montagnard cases 
currently refused by UNHCR might warrant USG review and asked 
UNHCR to provide some illustrative cases. 
 
Meetings with NGO Representatives 
--------------------------------- 
 
19. (SBU) The head of the Thailand-Burma Border Consortium, 
Jack Dunford, told DAS Ryan that he was concerned about a 
drop in European Union (EU) funding, of about 3 million 
Euros, starting in 2006.  He said he suspected, though it was 
not saying so, that the EU would shift the funds to 
assistance projects inside Burma.  He added that the recent 
Human Rights Watch report on the Thai-ordered move of urban 
Burmese refugees to the border camps confused the two issues 
of refugee resettlement to third countries with the situation 
faced by Burmese human rights and democracy NGOs in Thailand. 
 He said that most of the refugees who were moved to the 
camps were interested in resettlement and the camp transfer 
meant only a delay in that process.  He added that the camp 
transfer had not affected the &serious8 human rights and 
democracy groups.  The members of these groups typically had 
Thai identification cards, work permits, or were protected by 
various Thai government organizations. 
 
20. (U) American Refugee Committee and International Rescue 
Committee representatives told DAS Ryan that they were 
optimistic about the apparent opening provided by the RTG,s 
support for increased education and vocational training 
opportunities for Burma border camp refugees.  Computer 
skills and Internet access would be important areas to 
support.  They expressed the hope that all of this would in 
turn lead to income generation possibilities for the 
refugees.  Both representatives also stated concern about the 
slow start-up of the PABs and the possibility that the Thai 
government might take action against the urban Burmese 
refugees who had not reported to the border camps. 
 
21. (U) DAS Ryan has cleared this message. 
BOYCE