This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002672 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2015 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS TU CY MT NATO EUN
SUBJECT: TURKEY MAY AGREE TO INFORMAL NATO-EU MINISTERIAL 
MEETINGS 
 
Classified By: Counselor for Political-Military Affairs Timothy A. Bett 
s for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C/NF) Summary: At NATO SYG de Hoop Scheffer's reported 
request, Turkey may soon agree to biannual NATO-EU informal 
meetings in order to move forward on NATO-EU cooperation. 
MFA officials told us May 6 that FonMin Gul has agreed in 
principle to this idea, but has not formally signed off as 
yet.  In keeping with the Turks' view of NAC decisions on 
Berlin Plus, such meetings could not discuss operational 
issues, but would be a forum for broad political discussion. 
Apparent Cypriot efforts to block Turkish participation in 
administrative arrangements for non-EU NATO allies to deal 
with the European Defense Agency might also block progress. 
Additionally, Ceylan admitted that the Turkish military has 
not participated in this policy decision; blowback from 
TGS--hardliners on the Cyprus issue--is possible.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (C/NF) On May 6, PolMilCouns and PolMilOff called on MFA 
Deputy Director General for Security Policy Fatih Ceylan 
(please protect) to discuss NATO-EU cooperation.  Ceylan 
reported that at the April 20 NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting 
in Vilnius, NATO SYG de Hoop Scheffer had proposed to FonMin 
Gul the idea of holding an informal NATO-EU meeting in order 
to move cooperation along.  According to Ceylan, Gul accepted 
the proposal "in principle" and said he would get back to the 
SYG.  Upon returning to Ankara, MFA staff prepared a memo for 
Gul that proposed agreeing to two informal NATO-EU meetings 
per year.  Ceylan said that Gul has had an especially busy 
travel schedule of late, and he understood the minister has 
not yet had the opportunity to study the memo. 
 
¶3. (C/NF) Ceylan said it was the bureaucracy's preference 
that the EU "invite" participants to the first meeting, but 
that was only a preference and a NATO-convened meeting could 
also be acceptable.  However, this question was included in 
the memo to FonMin Gul, and he warned that the minister might 
feel more strongly about an initial EU lead.  He saw 
questions about who does the inviting or hosting as secondary 
and could be worked out later. 
 
¶4. (C/NF) Ceylan emphasized the need for such meetings to be 
"informal;" when we asked what that meant, he said it would 
be like NATO's other informal meetings, such as the meeting 
in Vilnius.  Ceylan stressed that at such a meeting, no/no 
Berlin Plus (i.e, operational) issues could be addressed. 
Therefore no NATO classified operational information could be 
introduced.  The meeting would thus discuss general political 
matters only, not operations.  Ceylan offered examples for 
what this rubric might mean: The ministers could discuss 
political support for Afghanistan, but could not discuss 
ISAF; general discussion (and even agreement on) NATO 
providing logistics support in Darfur would be permitted, but 
no discussion of the number of aircraft, concept of 
operations, etc. 
 
¶5. (C/NF) Ceylan was also concerned that a new NATO-EU 
cooperation problem may get in the way of the informal 
ministerial concept moving forward.  He told us that he 
learned that at a recent RELEX meeting in Brussels, the ROC 
blocked administrative arrangements for allowing non-EU NATO 
members to participate in European Defense Agency business. 
While he worried that this might influence Gul, he hoped that 
the minister would still be persuaded of the need to move 
forward on NATO-EU cooperation. 
 
¶6. (C/NF) Comment: The Turks have been struggling with how to 
deal with the NATO-EU cooperation issue for many months, and 
they have been stuck on the Cyprus issue.  We believe that 
they are seeking a constructive way out of this problem, 
though they will insist that the way forward be on their 
terms.  Ceylan also admitted to us that he did not clear his 
proposal to Gul with TGS; the military is not only a major 
policy player here but also holds a hard line on Cyprus. 
Thus even if Gul approves MFA may get blowback from the 
military.  Ceylan was confident this would not be a problem, 
but it is clear to us this initiative is at a sensitive stage 
in Ankara.  End comment. 
EDELMAN