This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002600 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2015 
TAGS: PREL TU KG UZ AJ GG
SUBJECT: DAS KENNEDY MAY 3 MEETING WITH TURKISH MFA DIRGEN 
AKINCI 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman, E.O. 12958, 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Continuing their strategic dialogue begun 
in February in Washington, EUR DAS Kennedy met May 3 with 
Turkish MFA DG for Central Asia and the Caucasus Akinci.  FM 
Gul travels to Kyrgyzstan May 5 and will encourage the Kyrgyz 
to avoid violence and prioritize their assistance requests. 
Turkey appears willing to work with the OSCE and to encourage 
the Kyrgyz to do so.  Akinci said Turkey seeks "stability" in 
Central Asia, but this should not be taken to mean it opposes 
democratization.  On Georgia, Kennedy encouraged the Turks to 
help promote reconciliation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Discussion on Armenia will be reported septel.  End Summary. 
 
 
Kyrgyzstan 
---------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Akinci told DAS Kennedy FM Gul will travel to 
Kyrgyzstan May 5 to meet with "everyone," including the most 
viable presidential candidates.  Gul's messages to all 
parties will be to avoid violence, focus on cooperation, 
prioritize requests for assistance (the head of TIKA, 
Turkey's AID-equivalent, will accompany Gul).  Akinci said 
Turkey is ready to help with Kyrgyz elections within the OSCE 
framework, including sending observers.  The Turks will also 
ask the Kyrgyz how they plan to compensate the losses of 
Turkish businesses looted in March (inter alia, he claimed a 
Turkish-owned hotel had been "confiscated").  Akinci promised 
to call Kennedy after Gul's visit.  He said the Kyrgyz had 
suggested that international funds could be available to pay 
such claims.  Kennedy said that we had sought to work closely 
with the Russians from the onset of the Kyrgyz crisis and to 
demonstrate that the OSCE could effectively represent 
Russia,s interests, such as OSCE,s focus on protection of 
national minorities. 
 
¶3.  (C) DAS Kennedy noted that TIKA and AID can usefully 
offer assistance to Kyrgyzstan.  She agreed the Kyrgyz needed 
to prioritize their requests, but suggested we should help 
them think through this.  She welcomed Turkey's willingness 
to work with the OSCE.  She urged that FM Gul reinforce the 
OSCE's importance with the Kyrgyz on his upcoming trip 
(including gaining timely Kyrgyz endorsement of the OSCE work 
plan), she encouraged the GOT to help convince the Russians 
to support the OSCE's mission, and she asked that the GOT 
consider contributing financially to the OSCE work plan. 
 
¶4.  (C) Akinci predicted Russia will not object to the work 
of NGOs, including the OSCE, in Kyrgyzstan because extreme 
nationalists threatened foreigners there, including Russians. 
 As they are wont to do, the Russians were simply objecting 
in order to lay down a marker, he asserted. 
 
Central Asia and Democratization 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Akinci said if events similar to those in Kyrgyzstan 
spread to other Central Asian countries, the unrest would not 
be as abrupt or violent as in Kyrgyzstan.  Any changes in 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan will come from the top, not the 
people, he asserted, and take the form of struggles "between 
clans." Akinci worried about where any sudden change in 
Uzbekistan would lead, claiming (without demonstrating any 
solid analytic basis) that, for several reasons, including 
"historically", Islam there is "not peaceful." 
 
 
¶6.  (C) "Revolts do not always yield "the desired results," 
Akinci tried to warn.  Turkey seeks "stability" everywhere, 
but this creates the mistaken impression Turkey does not want 
democracy.  Turkey does want democracy, Akinci asserted, but 
"reasonable people" can differ about the best way to reach 
it.  Kennedy noted democracy and stability are not 
antithetical ("correct, in the long term," Akinci replied), 
and we should all support reforms.  She hoped Turkey would 
encourage Central Asian governments to not oppose NGOs that 
are trying to bring reform.  Akinci gave no sign of 
willingness to do so. 
 
Nagorno-Karabakh 
---------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Akinci asked for an update on the Minsk Group. 
Trying to deprecate the process, Akinci noted the Armenians 
and Azeris had only had proximity talks in London.  Kennedy 
responded that the engagement had been serious and the two 
Presidents may meet at the COE Summit.  She urged Turkey to 
encourage President Aliyev to move forward on 
Nagorno-Karabakh. 
 
Georgia 
------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Akinci said Turkey's Ambassador to Georgia is 
awaiting a "green light" from the Georgian government and 
Abkhaz "officials" to visit Abkhazia.  Kennedy noted the 
recent Georgia/Abkhazia talks in Geneva had been successful 
in bringing Georgian and Abkhaz representatives together, but 
progress was limited.  Russia had taken negative steps 
recently, conducting military exercises in Abkhazia and 
holding a "convention" of separatist leaders.  Kennedy said 
she hoped Turkey would encourage the Russians to promote 
reconciliation in Georgia, not separatism, including in South 
Ossetia where the Georgians were offering substantial 
autonomy.  She encouraged the GOT to support the proposal for 
ferry service between Abkhazia and Trabzon, Turkey. 
 
¶9.  (C) In stiff-arming the suggestion that the GOT support 
the ferry service proposal, Akinci tried to lay out a 
situation in which, he claimed, Turkey's sizable 
Abkhaz-origin population considers Turkey too pro-Georgian, 
while the GoG considers Turkey too pro-Abkhaz.  Perhaps that 
means our policy is correct, he joked.  Turkey considers 
Georgian territorial integrity "sacred," he claimed, but all 
sides need to ask themselves pragmatically how to make life 
easier for their people.  He worried that the conflict will 
become "ossified" if the present impasse continues, and that 
President Saakashvili will be tempted to use force to try to 
solve it.  Kennedy said we would remind Putin of our 
insistence that Georgians eschew military force; in turn 
Russia must actively participate in the political process to 
resolve the conflicts. 
 
¶10.  (C) Kennedy said Russia should help the parties reach a 
solution.  Akinci defended as reasonable Russia's demand to 
keep its "privileges" in Abkhazia, including port access and 
land ownership.  Akinci added that recent Georgian behavior 
toward Ajara made Abkhazians doubt they could obtain true 
autonomy from the GoG. 
 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
------------------------------ 
 
¶11.  (C) Kennedy expressed USG disappointment that our 
application for BSEC observer status has not been accepted 
and asked Akinci why and whether Turkey had spoken in support 
as it had promised.  Akinci temporized and blamed the 
Russians.  Pressed, he urged that the U.S. be "patient" and 
claimed it was "not correct" that Turkey had not supported 
U.S. observer status. 
 
¶12.  (U) This cable was cleared by EUR/DAS Laura Kennedy. 
EDELMAN