This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 003963 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2015 
TAGS: PREL ECON CPAS IZ JO
SUBJECT: IRAQIS IN JORDAN: WELL-INTEGRATED, ECONOMICALLY 
IMPORTANT, POLITICALLY WARY 
 
Classified By: DAVID HALE, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I., REASONS: 1.4 (B &D) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) This cable provides an overview of the Iraqi 
community in Jordan based on information obtained from 
Jordanian and Iraqi government, UN, NGO, and Iraqi and 
Jordanian business and academic figures.  Approximately 
350,000 Iraqi nationals are presently living in Jordan, 
mostly in the greater Amman area.  The majority of these 
Iraqis are not new to Jordan, and at least half are 
non-Sunni.  Most have lower-middle class incomes or lower. 
There is potential for friction with Jordanians, but most 
locals welcome or at least tolerate the Iraqi community, not 
least because of the significant new investment and business 
stimulation their presence has brought.  While eager to 
develop commercial opportunities, most resident Iraqis are 
politically passive; in contrast, there is a significant 
amount of political activity carried out here by Iraqi 
visitors and transients.  End Summary. 
 
Iraqis in Jordan: Number and Make-up 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (SBU) While unofficial estimates of the number of Iraqis 
in Jordan vary from 50,000 to more than 500,000, most 
interlocutors agreed that the official Jordanian government 
estimate of 350,000 Iraqis resident in Jordan is fairly 
accurate.  This total does not reflect the large number of 
well-off Iraqis (more than 100,000, according to the Iraqi 
Embassy) who "shuttle" regularly between the two countries, 
frequently staying with relatives, some of whom they have 
placed in Jordan due to the continuing security problems in 
Iraq.  According to the Jordanian government, over half of 
the official number (about 200,000) of Iraqi nationals 
resident in Jordan arrived before the Gulf War of 1991.  In 
addition to political refugees of various kinds, this number 
includes a large number of undocumented laborers and factory 
workers who may arguably be classified as economic migrants. 
The Jordanian government claims that approximately 120,000 
Iraqis have taken up de facto residence here since 2001. 
While there are no official statistics, most interlocutors 
(including an Iraqi who has worked extensively with 
unemployed Iraqi laborers here) estimated that over 50 
percent of the Iraqis present in Jordan are Sh,ia. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Only about 12,000 Iraqis in Jordan have Jordanian 
residence or work permits, many of them doctors, teachers, 
and other professionals working in state-supported 
institutions.  This figure suggests that the majority of 
Iraqis present here are either not legal residents, own their 
own businesses, or are simply not working.  However, the 
situation is complicated by the lack of reliable statistics, 
many years of fluid border controls, and effective disregard 
by many Jordanian authorities and employers (as well as 
Iraqis) of legal regulations.  The Jordanian official 
responsible for population statistics placed the total number 
of Iraqi legal permanent residents in Jordan at approximately 
60,000. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) There are 20,000-30,000 wealthy and well-to-do 
Iraqis who maintain homes here, some occupied only 
intermittently.  Wealthy Iraqis maintain a high profile in 
Amman's swank Abdoun neighborhood and are the chief market 
for at least one local "high-society" newspaper.  A prominent 
banker told us that up to 100,000 Iraqis maintain bank 
accounts of $2,000 or more in Jordan (though many of these 
may be only part-time residents of Jordan); a well-connected 
Iraqi businessman and long-time Amman resident estimated the 
current number of Jordan-based Iraqi business managers and 
entrepreneurs at over 1,500. 
 
Economic Activities 
------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) According to a recent German-funded study, up to 
65% of Iraqi residents in Jordan are financially needy and 
place a strain on Jordan's already limited housing, energy, 
and water resources.  The study found that many of these 
Iraqis are working illegally for low wages, while others are 
simply unemployed.  Although many of the latter claim they 
wish to return to Iraq, they are unable to pay Jordanian 
fines (about two dollars for each "illegal" day in Jordan) 
for staying without authorization, and claim to fear 
imprisonment in Jordan should they attempt to re-cross the 
border (Note: We have seen no evidence that any Iraqis have 
been imprisoned for this.  End Note).  The study also noted 
that the majority of Iraqi migrs, including those who are 
unemployed, are well-skilled and willing to work for lower 
wages than many of their Jordanian counterparts.  This has 
posed a problem for local Jordanians who are not as highly 
trained but vying for the same technical positions, 
particularly in fields such as teaching and medicine.  This 
problem first became apparent in the late 1990,s when there 
were some vociferous protests from unemployed Jordanian PHD's 
over Iraqi university professors teaching in Jordan. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Despite occasional frictions arising from such 
pressures, most Jordanians appear to welcome the rising 
presence of Iraqis here as an economic and commercial boon. 
Iraqis have a reputation among Jordanian merchants as great 
customers who pay in cash and rarely haggle.  Meanwhile, 
Iraqi investors continue to pump money into Jordan's economy, 
particularly in private businesses and real estate.  In 2004 
Iraqi investment in Jordan totaled nearly $400 million, while 
Iraqis made over 55% of Jordanian real estate purchases. 
Additional Iraqi money is being put into Jordanian companies 
through partnerships, subsidiaries/branches of companies 
owned in Iraq, and new business initiatives.  The number of 
small to medium sized companies in Jordan has also grown due 
to Iraqi investment and (possibly temporary) relocation of 
Iraqi business activity from Iraq to Jordan.  A recent 
Jordanian study estimates that at least $2 billion in Iraqi 
funds has migrated to Jordan since 2001. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) In an effort to further encourage this inflow, the 
GOJ has begun offering a special "Investor Passport" for a 
large fee to wealthy Iraqis as part of a package that will 
entitle them to equal treatment with domestic investors as 
well as the right to residence.  At King Abdullah,s urging, 
a select group of about 15 wealthy Iraqi residents (including 
reputed billionaires Talal al-Gaaoud and Mohammed al-Bunnia) 
has formed a committee to develop large-scale joint ventures 
designed to benefit the economies of both countries and 
deepen commercial integration. 
 
Political Activities 
-------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) While eager to talk about Iraq, most Iraqi migrs 
remain confused about the evolving political situation there 
and are very hesitant to get involved with politics.  There 
are few signs of significant Iraqi political organization or 
other activity here; rallies rarely take place either for or 
against the coalition or the Iraqi government. 
Out-of-country voter turnout for the January, 2005 Iraq 
elections in Jordan was 20,000, only about a fifth of total 
potential voters.  Most of those who did vote supported the 
so-called "Sistani list," and were presumably Sh,ia.  Most 
Iraqis here have never been politically engaged in either 
Iraq or Jordan and quietism is their default position.  One 
very wealthy Iraqi businessman pointed to political risk 
aversion as a virtue that had helped his company and family 
thrive.  At the same time, many Iraqis here expressed great 
pride in the wake of the elections (whether they voted or 
not), and readily articulate the hope that a better Iraq is 
emerging. 
 
¶9.  (C) A handful of Sunni tribal leaders and 
Western-educated business figures living in Amman are the 
exception to their compatriot's political passivity.  Some 
maintain an idealistic or nationalistic preoccupation with 
politics in Iraq.  Some may even harbor personal political 
ambitions, or seek political support for their business 
activities.  Our observation is that this group has steadily 
drifted away from rejection and denial of developments in 
Iraq towards acceptance that the page has turned.  They are 
largely pursuing these ambitions through discussion and 
political engagement with visiting Iraqis and Iraqis in Iraq. 
 Examples include Talal and Jalal al-Gaaod from Anbar and 
wealthy Iraqi Shi'ite businessman Ali Khawwam, whose family 
is a reputed funding source for SCIRI and Dawa, and who 
frequently "hosts" visiting senior Iraqi officals at the 
Amman Four Seasons hotel. 
 
Ba'athist Presence - Low and Mainly Quiescent 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (C) The number of ex-Ba,athis (including family 
members) living in Jordan is estimated by most interlocutors 
at about 20,000.  Many of these have lived in Jordan for many 
years and were not directly associated with military or 
political activities in Iraq.  Although many remain critics 
of the U.S.-led coalition, most keep a low profile and appear 
to be as politically passive as other Iraqis here.  Few 
figure in migr gossip, despite the fact that the 
&anti-Ba,athist8 Iraqi community here is much larger. 
Saddam's three daughters Rana, Hala, and Ragad Hussein have 
political asylum here (as did some of Saddam,s opponents in 
the past), but keep a low profile at Palace instruction and 
are heavily monitored by the security services, as is the 
pro-Saddam Islamist figure Abdul Latif Humayam.  Prominent 
Ba'athist figures such as Mohammed Izzat al-Duri and Yunis 
al-Ahmad live in Syria and do not come to Jordan, but may 
occasionally send representatives here. 
 
A Hub for Visiting Activists 
------------------------ 
 
¶11.  (C) In contrast to the political inactivity of most 
Iraqi residents of Jordan, Iraqi visitors and transients 
carry on substantial Iraqi political activity here, using 
Jordan as a low-profile business, banking, fund-raising, and 
meeting center.  Most but not all of these politically active 
visitors are Sunni Arabs.  The following is a representative 
breakdown of regular visitors pursuing Iraqi politics while 
in Jordan (all Sunni Arabs except the last entry): 
 
Tribal Leaders - Sheik Majid Ali al-Suliman (Dulaimy); Sheik 
Omer al-Suliman (Dulaimy); Sheikh Dari Ma'shan al-Faisal 
al-Jarba (Shammar-Mosul); Sheikh Fahim Afoun al-Mafarji 
(Yousifiyeh - Ba'athist ties); Sheikh Ghazi Hanash al-Taei 
(Mosul - generally sends his son). 
 
Islamists - Osamah Tikriti; Thamir al-Sultan; Muthara Harith 
al Dhari; Fakhri al-Qaisi (Salafi); Sheikh Ahmed al-Kubaisi 
(Dubai resident); Taglieb al-Alosi (from Fallujah - now 
working in Dubai with Sheikh Ahmed); Qasiem al-Jumaili. 
Al-Qaisi and al-Jumaili were and may still be insurgency 
sympathizers. Al-Dhari and al-Sultan support the Muslim 
Scholars group. 
 
"Nationalist" - Sheikh Wathab al-Dulaimy; Mowafik al-Hadithi; 
Ra'ad al-Hamdani; Dr. Husein al-Jumaili.  Hamdani is an 
ex-Lt. General - both he and Jumaili are seen as moderates. 
 
Neo-Ba'athist (Ba'athists against Saddam)- Mudher Khorbit; 
Samir Shaikli; Issam al-Rawi; Abdul Razzak al-Khorbit.  The 
two Khorbits live in Syria but occasionally visit Jordan. 
 
Democratic/Secular - Ra'ad al-Mukhlis; Hatem al-Mukhlis; 
Jabar al Kubaisi. 
 
"Flexible/Opportunists" - Sa'ad Bazaz; Dr. Mejbel Sheik Isa. 
Bazaz is Iraq's media tycoon. 
Shi'ites - Iyad Allawi and his brother (private visits); 
Khabeim al-Ghazi; Mowaffak al-Rubaie; Sheikh Fatih Kashif al 
Gitta (Sistani advisor); Abdul Amir al-Zahid Saleh (Jaffari 
advisor); Ala'a Traej (SCIRI figure). 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. The Iraqi population living in Jordan is well-established 
and has been here longer than many assume.  While the 
&shuttle8 population moving between Iraq and Jordan is 
large, we have not seen evidence of a mass exodus of Iraqis 
heading here.  Nonetheless Iraqis in Jordan are having a 
major economic impact, the implications of which are largely 
positive for Jordan and could be for Iraq as well if guided 
into the right channels. 
 
¶12.  Baghdad minimize considered. 
HALE