This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ALMATY 001993 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CACEN (J. MUDGE), EUR/RPM, DRL/PHD (P. 
DAVIS) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2015 
TAGS: KZ PGOV PHUM POLITICAL
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: AMB. MINIKES' APRIL 27 MEETING WITH 
YEVGENIY ZHOVTIS 
 
Classified By: CDA Mark Asquino, reasons 1. 4 (B) and (D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Leading Kazakhstani human rights activist 
Yevgeniy Zhovtis told Amb. Minikes on April 27 that the 
deteriorating political and human rights situation in the 
country was the direct result of the government's paranoia 
about events in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.  He 
described an inner circle around President Nazarbayev divided 
between those who favored the use of repressive measures to 
squelch all opposition, and those who believe that dialogue 
and further democratization are necessary.   Zhovtis called 
on the OSCE to stand up for oppressed political figures and 
parties, and to work with the GOK to create a better 
legislative framework.  He also called on the West to push 
the GOK to engage in dialogue with the opposition and the 
public.  Zhovtis stated that Nazarbayev does not trust anyone 
enough to hand over power, and is in search of guarantees of 
protection for himself and his family after he leaves office. 
 The president is reportedly surrounded by hardliners who 
control the flow of information in order to capitalize on 
these fears.  Zhovtis observed that the CiO bid might be one 
factor in the discussion of Nazarbayev's future.  Amb. 
Minikes described the organizational challenges required of 
the CiO and the potential for Congressional scrutiny.  He 
noted that if there is not concrete discussion of 
Kazakhstan's bid soon, it will be "approved" by default next 
year.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Ambassador to the OSCE Stephan Minikes met with 
Yevgeniy Zhovtis, head of the Kazakhstan International Bureau 
on Human Rights (KIBHR), on April 27 in Almaty during a visit 
to discuss the GOK's OSCE CiO bid.  The Ambassador and POEC 
chief (notetaker) also participated. 
 
----------------------- 
Deteriorating Situation 
----------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Zhovtis, whose organization is one of 33 U.S. 
assistance partners currently under investigation by the GOK, 
indicated that his own situation and the general situation 
with respect for human rights were deteriorating.  The 
financial police had opened a tax investigation of KIBHR that 
worried him.  He saw the GOK's actions against NGOs, parties, 
and independent media as "paranoid behavior" prompted by 
events in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.  Zhovtis said 
that the Procuracy and the Committee on National Security 
(KNB) were clearly taking steps to try to avert a "velvet 
revolution," but there was no indication that such a 
revolution was possible.  The GOK's actions were instead 
radicalizing people who had been moderates. 
 
¶4. (C) Zhovtis emphasized that this was not a unified GOK 
policy.  There were some high-ranking officials who took a 
"softer" position and saw the long-term need to move toward 
democracy and dialogue.  He mentioned chairman of the 
Security Council Bulat Utemuratov, deputy head of the 
Presidential Administration Marat Tazhin, and presidential 
advisor Karim Masimov as belonging to this camp.  Deputy PA 
head Baurzhan Mukhamedzhanov is seen as a hard-liner; Zhovtis 
believes that the KNB and the Procuracy likely report 
directly to him, as PA head Adilbek Dzhaksybekov is "weak." 
Mukhamedzhanov and other hard-liners have convinced 
Nazarbayev that entering into dialogue with the opposition 
would be seen as a sign of weakness and/or fear by both 
supporters and the opposition.  The Ambassador observed that 
in reality, the GOK's efforts to crack down on the opposition 
were making it look weak.  (Note:  Unlike some of his 
colleagues in the human rights community, Zhovtis maintains 
close personal ties with well-connected businessmen and 
others who provide insight into the GOK.  End note.) 
 
¶5. (C) Asked what the OSCE should be doing to address the 
situation, Zhovtis suggested that it focus on two areas: 
moral and diplomatic support for opposition figures, groups, 
and parties that were bound to come under increasing GOK 
pressure, and assistance with the creation of a legislative 
framework that complies with international standards. 
Recalling the arrests of Ablyazov, Zhakiyanov, and Duvanov in 
2001-2002, Zhovtis predicted that the GOK might well take 
similar action against such figures as True Ak Zhol co-chairs 
Bulat Abilov and Altynbek Sarsenbaiuly.  Zhovtis added that 
there was a third need, perhaps more appropriately pursued 
bilaterally than through the OSCE:  to push the GOK to 
establish dialogue with the opposition and the people. 
Zhovtis emphasized that it was crucial to have dialogue now, 
with "people who are reasonable, not calling for violence." 
 
¶6. (C) Zhovtis noted that the opposition was also to blame 
 
 
for the lack of dialogue.  Many saw the National Commission 
on Democratization and Civil Society (NKVD) as a sham, 
intended only to prolong Nazarbayev's grip on power.  Others 
placed unreasonable pre-conditions on dialogue.  The 
Ambassador noted that the falsification of election results, 
which caused the exclusion of the opposition from the 
Mazhilis, had foreclosed one potentially useful forum for the 
exchange of ideas.  Zhovtis said the GOK has shown a desire 
for dialogue on some issues.  Representatives of the 
Constitutional Council and the Presidential Administration 
(deputy head Mukhamedzhanov) had asked him to organize a May 
3-4 conference on constitutional reform.  The GOK officials 
said that they would arrange for all key organizations, such 
as the Procuracy and the Supreme Court, to participate; they 
wanted Zhovtis to get For a Just Kazakhstan (FJK) leader 
Zharmakhan Tuyakbay and others from the opposition to take 
part.  Zhovtis reported that FJK had so far refused to commit 
on the grounds that pro-GOK experts would outnumber them; 
Zhovtis said he had argued to them that this was a good 
opportunity to get their message on constitutional reform to 
the public, as the national channels will cover the event. 
 
--------------------- 
Nazarbayev's Approach 
--------------------- 
 
¶7. (C)  Zhovtis described Nazarbayev as a life-long Communist 
Party apparatchik who knows how to create and control an 
organization in such as way as to prevent any dissent or 
opposition. Nazarbayev does not like to be challenged or be 
surrounded by people with political weight.  Former Prime 
Minister Kazhegeldin, now exiled to London, is the best 
example of this.  The longer Nazarbayev stays in power, 
Zhovtis added, the less trusting and less confident in his 
personal safety he becomes.  Events in Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, 
and Georgia had only accelerated this process.  Zhovtis 
emphasized that Nazarbayev trusts no one, not even his own 
family.  In many ways, he has a harder time controlling his 
family than others in the inner circle.  Son-in-law Rakhat 
Aliyev is a prime example; the decision to exile him to 
Vienna, rather than to take more drastic action against him, 
was seen by many as a sign of Nazarbayev's weakness. 
 
¶8. (C) The Nazarbayev family, according to Zhovtis, has done 
"everything the Akayevs did in Kyrgyzstan, but on a much 
bigger scale."  Seeing how authorities in Georgia and Ukraine 
are going after the assets of former leaders had made 
Nazarbayev extremely conscious of the need to obtain strong 
guarantees for himself and his family. Zhovtis observed that 
as the inevitable loss of power gets nearer, Nazarbayev is 
guided more and more by this fear.  The Ambassador noted that 
there is no one in Kazakhstan today to whom Nazarbayev would 
be willing to turn over power.  Zhovtis added that Nazarbayev 
would never cut a deal with the opposition to step down 
unless he had a firm guarantee from the west. 
 
¶9. (C)  Nazarbayev has less control than before, according to 
Zhovtis.  His inner circle controls and interprets the flow 
of information reaching the president.  Utemuratov used to be 
one of his closest advisors, but now the representatives of 
the security forces have the upper hand.  Zhovtis has the 
impression that this group of fewer than ten people is using 
the specter of instability to scare Nazarbayev into taking 
repressive actions.  Zhovtis added that while Nazarbayev used 
to govern in a very authoritative manner, calling his cabinet 
together and issuing firm directives, his GOK contacts have 
told him that more recently Nazarbayev has taken the approach 
of asking for, rather than demanding, support. 
 
¶10. (C) That said, Zhovtis predicted that Nazarbayev would 
win reelection in a completely free and fair presidential 
election, thanks to his extremely strong support in rural 
areas and among the Russian-speaking population.  He would 
not win with the wide margin he has in the past, but he would 
undoubtedly win.  Zhovtis stressed that the question was 
ultimately hypothetical since Nazarbayev had no desire to 
create a political system where all parties could compete. 
 
-------------------- 
Kazakhstan's CiO Bid 
-------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Commenting on Kazakhstan's desire to chair the OSCE 
in 2009, Zhovtis said he believed someone else must have 
suggested it to President Nazarbayev.  He had eventually been 
persuaded to support the idea out of a desire to be part of 
the Western "club" and to play a bigger role on the world 
stage.  Because he can't count on support from the West, 
however, Nazarbayev must also maintain close relations with 
 
 
Putin; that was why he agreed to sign the Moscow and Astana 
declarations on the OSCE. 
 
¶12. (C) Zhovtis was unable to predict how Nazarbayev would 
react if Kazakhstan did not obtain the 2009 chairmanship.  He 
explained that since Nazarbayev sees every issue through the 
prism of succession and the need for personal guarantees, it 
is necessary to weigh his fear of the future against his 
desire to be a member of the Western "club."  He observed 
that the CiO might be one factor in the negotiations about 
Nazarbayev's future. The Ambassador commented that if that 
were the case, it might be useful for Kazakhstan to postpone 
the bid so that the decision would come at a time when 
Nazarbayev was actually willing to discuss transition.  It is 
clear that he intends to run for reelection once again, 
whether it is in December 2005 or December 2006; on the 
current timeline, the OSCE decision would occur before 
Nazarbayev was willing to discuss his future. 
 
¶13. (C) Amb. Minikes explained to Zhovtis that while the 
formal decision on the 2009 CiO would be taken at the 
December 2006 ministerial, in reality the decision-making 
process needs to happen now.  If there is no discussion of 
Kazakhstan's bid at a point when it is still possible to find 
another candidate and allow for a graceful postponement of 
the candidacy, then the candidacy will be approved by 
default.  Some in the OSCE had expressed reluctance to 
embarrass the GOK by opposing the bid.  Amb. Minikes noted 
that beyond the question of the suitability of any country to 
chair the OSCE, there is also the question of organizational 
capacity.  The CiO must have a qualified team of at least 20 
people in Vienna, with a similar sized team backing them up 
in the capital.  The Foreign Minister must be willing to 
spend at least half of his or her time on the road doing OSCE 
business. CiO activities can cost $8 to $12 million for the 
year.  The Helsinki Commission often calls hearings to 
discuss CiO candidacies, which can result in uncomfortable 
scrutiny. 
 
¶14. (C) Zhovtis noted that he is in frequent contact with EU 
embassies in Almaty on this and other issues; while the 
British appear to have a clear position of not supporting the 
bid, the rest are maneuvering.  He commented that the 
European Parliament has recently become more outspoken in its 
criticism of the Kazakhstani government, which could have an 
impact on CiO deliberations. 
ASQUINO 
 
 
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