This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS  ALMATY 001721 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR EUR/CACEN (JMUDGE), EUR/RPM, DRL/PHD (PDAVIS) 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM KZ POLITICAL
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: AMB. MINIKES' MEETING WITH OPPOSITION 
PARTIES 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: In an April 25 roundtable in Almaty, Amb. 
Minikes heard the views of opposition politicians on 
Kazakhstan's bid to become the chair of the OSCE in 2009 and 
the current state of play with regard to respect for human 
rights and democratic principles in Kazakhstan. 
Participants did not think that Kazakhstan deserved to be 
selected as CiO; some argued that the decision should not be 
made until after presidential elections in December 2005, as 
the opposition would bring the country into compliance with 
OSCE standards.  All thought that the GOK was pursuing the 
OSCE chairmanship as a way to advance its own interests 
rather than from a desire to improve its respect for OSCE 
principles.  They told Amb. Minikes that the GOK's record on 
human rights and democracy issues was worsening.  One 
opposition representative asked for the OSCE's help in 
establishing dialogue with President Nazarbayev.  Summing up 
the conversation, For a Just Kazakhstan presidential 
candidate Zharmakhan Tuyakbay called on the U.S. and the EU 
to act to encourage the GOK to conduct fair presidential 
elections.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (U) During a visit to Kazakhstan to discuss the GOK's 
bid for the 2009 OSCE chairmanship, Ambassador Stephan 
Minikes held a roundtable discussion on April 25 with 
Zharmakhan Tuyakbay, For a Just Kazakhstan's presidential 
candidate;  Bulat Abilov and Oraz Zhandosov, co-chairs of 
True Ak Zhol; Alikhan Baimenov, chairman of Ak Zhol; Asylbek 
Kozhakhmetov, head of Alga DCK ("Ahead, Democratic Choice of 
Kazakhstan"); Petr Svoik of recently-dissolved Democratic 
Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK); and Serikbolsyn Abdildin, head 
of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan (CPK).  All 
participants except Baimenov are members of the For a Just 
Kazakhstan (FJK) electoral bloc and support Tuyakbay's 
candidacy.  The Ambassador and POEC chief (notetaker) also 
participated. 
 
--------------------- 
Kazakhstan's OSCE Bid 
--------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) In response to Amb. Minikes question of why the GOK 
was seeking the chairmanship of the OSCE, Tuyakbay indicated 
that the main motivation was to escape criticism.  He 
claimed that for the past four or five years, the 
Kazakhstani government had been waging a propaganda campaign 
within European institutions to give the impression of 
progress on democracy.  The GOK sees what Tuyakbay called 
"constant criticism" from the OSCE and the U.S. as a 
potential threat to its economic and political status.  It 
thinks that if it becomes CiO, it can deflect such 
criticism.  Amb. Minikes noted that the CiO is held to an 
even higher standard that other members and could therefore 
expect to face greater, not less, scrutiny. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Tuyakbay asserted that the GOK's propaganda 
campaign had already produced results; despite the worsening 
human rights situation, "OSCE criticism has declined."  He 
described ODIHR's assessment of the 2004 parliamentary 
elections as relatively mild.  Acknowledging the strong U.S. 
PC intervention on April 14 regarding amendments to the 
Kazakhstani election law, Tuyakbay claimed that President 
Nazarbayev signed the legislation the following day as a 
signal that input from the international community was 
unwelcome. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Amb. Minikes explained that the U.S. believes that 
it would be beneficial for Kazakhstan to succeed in its bid 
for the CiO, but not under conditions that would make a 
mockery of OSCE criteria.  He also noted that as the OSCE 
does not have a strong secretariat, the country holding the 
chairmanship plays a crucial role in the organization's 
success or failure.  To be an effective chairman, a country 
must have a large, well-trained corps of diplomats; it must 
be willing to spend _12 to _15 million; and the Foreign 
Minister must be prepared to devote over half his time to 
OSCE issues.  Amb. Minikes also pointed out that 
Kazakhstan's CiO candidacy could come under uncomfortable 
scrutiny during possible Helsinki Commission hearings on the 
Hill. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Zhandosov noted that Nazarbayev son-in-law Rakhat 
Aliyev, Kazakhstan's ambassador to the OSCE, was the primary 
advocate of the CiO bid.  Although Nazarbayev and Aliyev are 
not personally close, they are political allies.  Baimenov 
 
 
claimed that the CiO bid is a GOK tactic to gain time, by 
arguing to the West that they will take steps to reach OSCE 
standards after the presidential elections; in reality, he 
claimed, the GOK had no desire to confirm to OSCE standards. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Abilov added that he fully supported Kazakhstan's 
bid for the CiO, because he was certain that Tuyakbay would 
win in upcoming presidential elections and implement the 
reforms needed to make Kazakhstan a worthy chairman.  He 
added that if the presidential elections, which he expected 
to take place in December 2005 rather than December 2006, 
were as flawed as the 2004 parliamentary elections, the 
opposition would have to "restrain people from going to the 
streets."  Zhandosov and Baimenov echoed Abilov's assertion 
that the elections would take place in 2005.  Zhandosov 
urged that the CiO issue not be decided until after those 
elections; if Tuyakbay wins, "this will be a different 
country.  If Nazarbayev resorts to falsification, the result 
will be mass protests and violence." 
 
¶8. (SBU) Abdildin said that although he would like to see 
Kazakhstan succeed in both its CiO bid and its quest to join 
the UNSC in 2010, the state did not yet meet "the demands of 
the people or OSCE standards" and was therefore not yet 
worthy of either goal.  Svoik attributed the GOK's question 
for the OSCE chairmanship to a desire to fool the OSCE and 
the Kazakhstani people into believing the country was 
actually democratic.  He called on the U.S. to push the GOK 
for serious political reforms this year. 
 
----------------------------- 
Kazakhstan's OSCE Commitments 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Amb. Minikes asked participants how they assessed 
the GOK's record on adhering to its OSCE commitments. 
Kozhakhmetov painted a bleak picture, noting that DCK 
founder Galymzhan Zhakiyanov remains in custody; the 
Parliament is taking steps to limit freedom of speech, 
assembly, and political association; the GOK is attempting 
to close several newspapers, including Respublika, Soz, and 
Zash Alash; and the GOK had requested the arrest of 
Respublika editor Irina Petroshova in Moscow.  He echoed 
Tuyakbay's comment that Nazarbayev's signature of the 
election law amendments one day after the PC intervention 
was a signal, and added that Nazarbayev had similarly signed 
the extremism law two days after international organizations 
criticized it.  Kozhakhmetov criticized the OSCE for failing 
to speak out on the liquidation of DCK. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Zhandosov echoed Kozhakhmetov's assessment, noting 
that since the fall the GOK had increased the pressure on 
the opposition, independent media, and NGOs.  He predicted 
that the trend will intensify, as Nazarbayev realizes that 
he cannot win reelection without disabling the opposition 
and resorting to falsification.  Zhandosov criticized the 
OSCE Center in Almaty for failing to speak out on the 
election law amendments.  He stressed that the OSCE should 
use the July Parliamentary Assembly in Washington as an 
opportunity to give a "correct assessment" of the situation 
in Kazakhstan and push the GOK in the "right direction." 
Kozhakhmetov noted that all the Kazakhstani delegates will 
be from pro-presidential parties and will therefore give a 
distorted view of the situation. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Zhandosov added that For a Just Kazakhstan had 
attempted unsuccessfully to establish a dialogue with the 
GOK; in a March 29 announcement, they had proposed a series 
of steps to prevent a repeat of events in Kyrgyzstan: 
adoption of a new election law that meets OSCE standards; 
the appointment of new members of the Central Election 
Commission and all subordinate local commissions; the 
release of Galymzhan Zhakiyanov and all others charged for 
political reasons; an end to repression of the mass media; 
and review of the results of the fall Mazhilis elections. 
Zhandosov noted that President Nazarbayev had not responded, 
and asked if the OSCE could play a role in facilitating 
dialogue. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Baimenov claimed that Nazarbayev and his 
associates are betting on the fact that in their bilateral 
relations with Kazakhstan, OSCE members place greater 
emphasis on energy and counterterrorism cooperation than on 
human rights issues.  Amb. Minikes replied that while at 
 
 
times strategic interests prevail, President Bush had spoken 
out clearly in his inauguration speech when he said that our 
"national interests and our beliefs are now one."  Baimenov 
said that he plans to visit Brussels in May or June to 
highlight the real situation in Kazakhstan and to ask EU 
members which OSCE they want to see in 2009:  one controlled 
by Kazakhstan, Russia, and the other signers of the Astana 
declaration, or one in which the human dimension is as 
important as security issues.  He stressed that the GOK must 
take steps to reform before the next presidential election; 
nothing would be done afterward.  Baimenov told Amb. Minikes 
that he had proposed to ODIHR director Strohal during the 
latter's January visit that the OSCE develop a quarterly 
roadmap for Kazakhstan on human dimension issues.  Amb. 
Minikes noted that the OSCE had never worked with a member 
state in that way before, but that this was a possible 
attractive approach to helping Kazakhstan convince 
participating States of its commitment to putting OSCE 
principles into practice. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Abdildin reminded Amb. Minikes that Kazakhstan had 
never conducted an election or a referendum that met OSCE 
standards.  He criticized the OSCE's assessment of the 2004 
Mazhilis elections as being too mild.  Abdildin predicted 
that the upcoming presidential elections would result in 
additional serious violations.  He called on the U.S. to 
tell Nazarbayev, who had celebrated his 15th year in office 
the previous day and was seeking a fifth term, that he has 
been in power long enough. 
 
---------------------------- 
View of Events in Kyrgyzstan 
---------------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) Abilov asserted that events in Ukraine, Georgia, 
and Kyrgyzstan all reflected the desire of people to live in 
a normal, prosperous country with free elections.  The 
violence in Kyrgyzstan was instigated by Akayev's people and 
the mafia in order to provoke instability.  Abilov drew a 
parallel between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, noting that in 
both countries "the state policy is corruption." Baimenov 
observed that acting Kyrgyz president Bakiyev had been 
forced to establish relations with Nazarbayev out of 
economic necessity. 
 
--------------- 
The Bottom Line 
--------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) Speaking for the group, Tuyakbay said that the 
opposition in Kazakhstan asks the U.S. and the EU for only 
one thing: their best efforts to convince the GOK of the 
need to conduct fair presidential elections.  The opposition 
is confident of their popularity and their ability to run 
the country effectively.  They need the help of the West 
only to ensure that presidential elections are fair. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Comment:  As always, some of the opposition's 
claims were exaggerated.  We doubt, for example, that 
President Nazarbayev rushed to sign the election law 
amendments in response to the U.S. statement in the OSCE PC. 
Given Nazarbayev's high popularity ratings it is also 
unlikely that the opposition will win upcoming presidential 
elections, as Abilov predicted.  We also think Zhandosov's 
criticism of the OSCE Center regarding the election law 
amendments was unfair, given the volume of controversial 
legislation currently under consideration; the Center was in 
fact in the process of organizing a public discussion of the 
election law amendments when they were signed so quickly by 
President Nazarbayev. End comment. 
 
¶17. (U) Dushanbe minimize considered. 
 
ORDWAY 
 
 
NNNN