This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001049 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2015 
TAGS: MARR MASS PREL PGOV AG MO WI SOFA
SUBJECT: SENHADJI POSITIVELY ASSESSES INAUGURAL JOINT 
MILITARY DIALOGUE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman; reasons 1.4 (B)(D) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Over May 24 lunch with Ambassador, MOD Secretary 
General Senhadji expressed great satisfaction with his 
Washington visit and the inaugural session of the Joint 
Military Dialogue.  He also indicated Algeria would approve a 
SOFA for the June Flintlock exercises; reaffirmed Algerian 
interest in concluding a long-term SOFA agreement; and said 
Armed Forces Chief Gait-Salah's visit to Russia was routine 
and would not produce anything "dramatic" (i.e., a MIG deal), 
a point explicitly confirmed by Presidential Chief of Staff 
Belkheir in a subsequent conversation.  On the lack of a 
response on a Blue Lantern request, Senhadji indicated he had 
not known the contract in question (concerning a purchase 
from a South African firm) contained a Blue Lantern provision 
and asked for the documentation, leaving the impression they 
would respond if their contractual obligation was documented. 
 On C-130H gunships, Senhadji reaffirmed Algeria's preference 
for the purchase of new gunships, as opposed to converting 
existing C-130s.  On terrorism statistics, he acknowledged a 
considerable discrepancy between the numbers presented at the 
JMD and public statements by GOA officials.  He explained 
that President Bouteflika always referred to the number of 
"terrorist victims" rather than the number of "dead" -- a 
much broader concept since virtually all Algerian families 
were touched by terrorism one way or another.  Regarding the 
Western Sahara issue,  Senhadji saw an autonomy outcome as 
the only real solution and regretted that Morocco had 
rejected the Baker Plan, since it had provided a way to reach 
that goal while honoring the self-determination principle. 
(End Summary) 
 
SENHADJI PLEASED WITH JMD, HIGH-LEVEL RECEPTION 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassador and DATT lunched with MOD Secretary General 
MG Senhadji May 23 at his invitation to review the results of 
the Joint Military Dialogue.  Ambassador congratulated 
Senhadji on his Washington visit, noting it seemed to have 
achieved everything we set out to achieve -- the creation of 
a mechanism for regular, high-level consultations to guide 
and facilitate our expanding military cooperation, a better 
understanding of the Algerian military's commitment to 
modernization and professionalization, and a strong 
reaffirmation of our commitment to expanded counterterrorism 
cooperation.  Senhadji said he was extremely pleased with the 
visit and with his many meetings and appreciative that 
Secretary Rumsfeld had received him so warmly. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ALGERIA WILL APPROVE EXERCISE SOFA 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador said that he had presented a demarche to 
Foreign Minister Bedjaoui May 21 regarding a SOFA to cover 
Exercise Flintlock 2005.  The Minister had said the Ministry 
would consider the proposed exchange of notes on an exercise 
SOFA "positively."  Ambassador thanked Senhadji for having 
spoken to Bedjaoui about the SOFA issue following his return 
from the JMD discussions.  Senhadji reiterated his strong 
support for a long-term SOFA and said the Algerian government 
would certainly sign an agreement covering the Flintlock 
exercise, since preparations for the exercise were so far 
along, the exercise was less than two weeks away, and it was 
important for developing our cooperation. 
 
ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF VISIT TO MOSCOW 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Ambassador asked about Armed Forces Chief Gait-Salah's 
May 22-26 visit to Moscow.  Asked if the visit would produce 
anything dramatic or of interest, Senhadji said the visit was 
a routine exchange, in response to an invitation from the 
Russian Ministry of Defense.  That said, Algeria still did a 
lot of business with the Russians because so much of their 
equipment was ex-Soviet and they needed spare parts.  The 
current visit involved day-to-day business between the two 
militaries, he said, leaving the strong impression that no 
deal on MIGs was imminent, as has been rumored in the local 
press.  In a separate May 24 conversation, Presidential Chief 
of Staff Belkheir also confirmed to Ambassador that the visit 
was routine.  He explicitly stated the visit would not/not 
produce a deal on MIGs, noting that Gait-Salah was not 
empowered to make any such decision. 
 
BLUE LANTERN END-USE MONITORING 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5. Ambassador recalled that last February he had raised with 
Senhadji our concerns about the lack of an Algerian response 
to a Blue Lantern request, explaining that the failure to 
respond could complicate future sales.  DATT noted that he 
had also sent a letter to the Directorate of Exterior 
Relations and Cooperation (DREC) over a month ago and had not 
received a response.  The two Blue Lantern cases in question 
involved the sale of American-made equipment to the Algerians 
through a South African firm.  Senhadji initially responded 
that the issue was between the U.S. and the South African 
firm and that Algeria had already given end-use assurances to 
the South African firm.  It should not have to provide two 
such assurances, he said.  DATT helpfully clarified that when 
the Algerians signed the contract, they agreed to the Blue 
Lantern provisions and thus had an obligation to respond to 
our request.  Upon learning this, Senhadji asked DATT to 
provide copies of the appropriate documentation to his 
executive assistant (who was present at the lunch).  DATT 
will provide documents as soon as possible. 
 
C-130s GUNSHIPS  -- NEW OR MODIFIED? 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) Ambassador and DATT noted that during the Joint 
Military Dialogue the previous week, the subcommittee on 
security assistance addressed the issue of C-130 gunships, 
which the Algerians have expressed an interest in acquiring. 
According to unofficial minutes prepared by a EUCOM 
representative, the Algerians stated that they wanted to 
convert one or two of their current C-130s rather than 
purchase a new gunship.  Senhadji expressed surprise at 
hearing this, saying Algeria wanted to purchase new gunships. 
 DATT subsequently spoke with our Security Assistance Officer 
who had participated in the subcommittee session.  The latter 
clarified that the Algerian members of the subcommittee did 
state that such a conversion was a viable alternative, given 
that there were no more C-130H models available for purchase 
and that on their return to Algeria they would examine the 
conversion option.  Their original position, however, was 
that Algeria wanted to purchase additional aircraft.  DATT 
will ensure that the position of the Algerian military is 
clarified with EUCOM and DSCA. 
 
TERRORISM CASUALTY STATISTICS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Ambassador said he had been struck by the Algerians' 
JMD briefing on the numbers killed in terrorism incidents and 
the number of remaining armed terrorists.  The total numbers 
killed, in particular, were far lower than the 
100,000-150,000 figures mentioned in various statements by 
senior Algerian officials.  Senhadji insisted that the 
figures presented (10,700 civilians, 6,000 military, and 
16,400 terrorists killed; 14,963 civilians, 10,000 military 
wounded, 34,800 terrorists arrested, 7,000 terrorists 
surrendered) were the real figures.  The other figures used 
by political officials had been "political figures." 
Explaining part of the discrepancy, he said that in citing 
figures, President Bouteflika always referred to the number 
of "victims," not the number of "dead."  Obviously, the 
"victims" category was a much broader concept that literally 
would include all Algerians, since virtually every family in 
the country was touched by terrorism, one way or another. 
 
¶8. (C) In this context, Senhadji recalled his recent 
conversation with Deputy NSC Adviser Abrams, who had asked if 
terrorism could ever take hold again in Algeria.  He had 
unhesitatingly replied that it could not.  The people, he 
explained, had been fooled once, but they were not stupid and 
now understood that terrorism had been directed against them. 
 He recounted how in the early 1990s, the people accepted the 
Islamic terrorists' line that burning schools, police 
stations, post offices, and the like was warranted because 
they had been told it was the religiously correct thing to 
do.  But they changed their views about the terrorists when 
the actions of these groups began to touch them personally, 
with the raping of their wives and daughters.  This, along 
with the arming of local militia and patriotic groups, had 
been the real turning point in the war against terrorism 
inside Algeria.  The decision to arm local groups, he 
recalled, had been very difficult but, once taken, it quickly 
became apparent it was the right thing to do because it 
reinforced the public's willingness to confront the 
terrorists. 
 
WESTERN SAHARA 
-------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Senhadji stressed that the stability of Morocco and 
the stability of the throne were important to regional 
stability and to Algeria's national interests.  He clearly 
pointed to autonomy as the solution to the Western Sahara 
issue, noting with regret Morocco's rejection of the Baker 
Plan, whose provisions for a 5-year period of autonomy could 
have been managed so as to produce the outcome Morocco needed 
(i.e., sovereignty over the Western Sahara).  He also 
regretted that the Western Sahara had been such a divisive 
issue for Morocco and Algeria because on almost all other 
counts -- ethnicity, language, culture, religion -- both 
shared much in common.  He volunteered that the Western 
Sahara issue was one on which all Moroccans felt strongly. 
By contrast, Algerians did not focus on the Western Sahara 
very much or nearly so strongly.  Nonetheless, Algeria's 
position supporting self-determination had remained constant 
over the years in supporting the Sahrawi right of 
self-determination.  Algeria could not deny to the Sahrawis 
what Algeria had claimed for itself in the struggle against 
the French. 
 
¶10. (C) Ambassador said his personal analysis was that since 
integration was unacceptable to the Sahrawis and independence 
was unacceptable to the Moroccans, that left the autonomy 
option as the only viable outcome where there was some common 
ground.  Accordingly, this is what everyone should be working 
to achieve while honoring the principle of 
self-determination.  The U.S. position was that the principle 
of self-determination needed to be respected and that working 
for improved Moroccan-Algerian relations was the best way to 
proceed, since it would help create a regional climate more 
conducive to settlement of the Western Sahara issue. 
Ambassador added that he did not see how an independent state 
outcome would serve Algerian national interests, since such a 
state inevitably would be weak, have porous borders, invite 
outside influence, and provide a haven for terrorists like 
the Sahel.  Senhadji, having just commented that the 
principal strategic threats to Algeria come from the south, 
did not respond directly but clearly took the point. 
ERDMAN