This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 001011 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2015 
TAGS: PREL PBTS PHUM OPDC WI MO AG
SUBJECT: POLISARIO "AMBASSADOR" DELIVERS ABDELAZIZ LETTER 
TO SECRETARY RICE, EXPLAINS POLISARIO POSITION ON MOROCCAN 
POWS AND POLISARIO DETAINEES, ALLUDES TO "DECISIVE SUMMER" 
FOR POLISARIO POSITION ON A PEACEFUL SOLUTION 
 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Marc Sievers, Reason 1.4 (b) (d) 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (C) DCM met with Polisario "Ambassador" to Algiers 
Mohammed Beissat May 19 at Beissat's request to accept a 
letter from Polisario Secretary General Abdelaziz to 
Secretary Rice (original faxed to NEA/MAG) and for a readout 
 
SIPDIS 
on Abdelaziz's May 10-13 visit to the U.S.  Abdelaziz's 
letter not surprisingly depicts Polisario as the party 
seeking a peaceful solution in the context of UNSC 
resolutions, and Morocco as the intransigent party.  It also 
requests a meeting between Abdelaziz and the Secretary 
"and/or other senior officials of the Department of State in 
order to express our views on the UN peace process in the 
Western Sahara."  Beissat told DCM that this summer would be 
critical for the Polisario's continued pursuit of a peaceful 
solution.  Polisario planned to send envoys to "every 
member-state of the UN" in order to gauge international 
support for a peaceful solution, by which he meant 
international willingness to apply pressure on Morocco to 
accept a referendum.  If the envoys did not find such 
willingness, Polisario "would need to consider other 
options," he warned.  DCM cautioned that Polisario would find 
itself completely isolated if it abandoned the UN framework. 
DCM also noted growing international insistence that 
Polisario release the remaining 408 Moroccan POWs.  Beissat 
responded that Abdelaziz represented the moderates in the 
Polisario, but without progress toward peace, he would not be 
able to control the radicals much longer.  On the POWs, 
Beissat said they were a "useful reminder" that the Western 
Sahara conflict continued.  Morocco, he claimed, had provided 
no accounting for the fate of 150 Polisario POWs and 600 
"disappeared" civilians that the Polisario insists were 
detained by Morocco in the late 1970s and '80s.  Until it did 
so, Polisario had no incentive to release the remaining 
Moroccans.  DCM insisted the POWs were a humanitarian issue 
and Polisario should release them without conditions. 
Beissat concluded that there needed to be international 
pressure on both sides, not just on the Polisario.  End 
summary. 
 
Abdelaziz Visit to U.S. 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Beissat began by describing Polisario Secretary 
General Mohammed Abdelaziz's May 10-13 visit to the U.S. as 
"excellent."  Abdelaziz had met with "many old friends" in 
Congress, including Senators Kennedy and Imhofe and 
Representative Pitts, and had then gone to Houston to meet 
James Baker.  Abdelaziz and Baker, he said, had discussed 
"all the issues" in a "very informative" meeting.  Beissat 
did not respond to a question about the content of the 
discussions with Baker other than to say that Baker remained 
a valued "source of advice."  Beissat said Abdelaziz had been 
"disappointed" that there had not been any response to a 
request for a meeting at the State Department.  Receiving 
Abdelaziz "at a senior level" would be a "good step." 
 
Appealing for U.S. Help 
----------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) DCM reviewed the state of U.S. relations with Morocco 
and Algeria, noting that the U.S. had a longstanding special 
relationship with Morocco which would not change, but also 
had an increasingly important partnership with Algeria. 
Beissat said Polisario regarded the U.S. relationship with 
Morocco "as an asset, not a threat," provided that the U.S. 
used the relationship to promote peace.  Beissat said that 
without progress toward peace, the leadership of the 
Polisario was under increasing pressure from hard-liners who 
wanted to push moderates such as Abdelaziz aside.  A 
senior-level U.S. meeting with Abdelaziz would help boost 
peace.  The hard-liners were arguing that Polisario had 
wasted fifteen years pursuing the UN framework and had 
betrayed the cause of Sahrawi self-determination.  Without 
progress toward peace, what arguments did the leadership have 
to refute these accusations?  The U.S. is the champion of 
freedom and democracy in the world.  Why would it not support 
the democratic option in the Western Sahara, i.e. a 
referendum? 
Envoys to Travel to All UN Members 
---------------------------------- 
¶4.  (C) Beissat said this summer would be crucial for the 
Polisario.  They planned to send envoys to all UN 
member-states to ask them all to push for a peaceful solution 
(i.e. for pressure on Morocco to accept a referendum).  If 
the envoys found international support, the Polisario 
leadership would be able to maintain its position.  If not, 
he warned, they would have to "consider other options."  DCM 
pushed back, noting that there was international consensus in 
support of the UN framework.  Polisario would be completely 
isolated if it tried to resume the use force.  Beissat said 
the Polisario had been disappointed by the latest UNSC 
resolution on the Western Sahara, which he said only referred 
to maintaining the ceasefire and freeing Moroccan POWs.  The 
resolution "smelled of the French," he claimed, and was 
one-sided in its raising Moroccan concerns without reference 
to the Polisario's. 
 
Moroccan POWs and Accounting for Polisario Missing 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5.  (C) DCM said the Polisario should release all the 
remaining 408 Moroccan POWs.  This was a strictly 
humanitarian issue, there was growing American sympathy for 
the Moroccan prisoners, and Polisario's insistence on holding 
them made Polisario (and Algeria) look bad.  Beissat 
responded that Polisario was willing to take the heat because 
holding on to the Moroccan POWs was the only way to remind 
the international community that there was still a conflict 
in the Western Sahara.  Both the UN Settlement Plan and the 
Baker Plan had called for the release of all prisoners and 
the return of refugees as soon as the date of a referendum 
was set.  Why did the international community not demand that 
Morocco account for missing Sahrawis, if not insist that it 
accept a referendum?  Beissat said that in the early days of 
the conflict in the late seventies and early eighties, 
Morocco had captured about 150 Polisario armed men and 
arrested about 600 Sahrawi civilians.  Even if Morocco no 
longer held any of them, it had never made any accounting for 
their fate.  Morocco had even ignored ICRC requests for 
information, and the ICRC had undermined its neutrality by 
accepting Morocco's silence.  At the very least, Morocco 
should provide death certificates and offer compensation to 
their families.  Polisario had already released thousands of 
Moroccans, but had received nothing in return.  DCM 
reiterated that releasing the remaining prisoners would be an 
important humanitarian gesture; continuing to hold them would 
only further damage the Polisario's reputation. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Beissat concluded the meeting by saying that 
Polisario knew it was the weaker party, but that did not mean 
it was defeated.  What was needed was international pressure 
on both sides in order to make progress.  Polisario would 
accept the outcome of a referendum, no matter what it was. 
But simply giving in to Morocco was out of the question. 
 
 
¶7.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
ERDMAN