This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000743 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SECRETARY OF STATE RICE FROM AF A/S NEWMAN AND 
AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE PROSPER 
 
DEPT FOR S/ES NICK BURNS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU NI LI
SUBJECT: OBASANJO AND CHARLES TAYLOR 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.4 b. 
and d. 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary: In our May 13 meeting, President Obasanjo 
reiterated his familiar arguments against turning Taylor 
over to the Special Court in Sierra Leone.  He showed no 
sense of urgency and made it clear that he did not want to 
engage.  However, he agreed on the importance of continued 
dialogue.  He designated the Nigerian National Security 
Advisor Aliyu Mohammed, Nigeria's Solicitor General 
Professor Ignatius Ayua, and Acting MFA Permanent Secretary 
Amb. O.A. Ashiru as the Nigeria team to discuss with us how 
to go forward.  We recommend that the Department 
immediately invite the three to come to Washington to 
continue the discussion.  With respect to a possible UN 
Security Council Resolution extending UNMIL authority to 
arrest Taylor should he appear in Liberia, Obasanjo said 
that further discussions should be with the Nigerian 
Permanent Representative in New York.  See paragraph 6 for 
our comments and recommendations.  Obasanjo also promised 
to do what he could to press Konare on going to NATO 
concerning Darfur.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (S) With the American Ambassador in Abuja, we met with 
Obasanjo the morning of May 13 at the Presidency.  On his 
side were his Chief of Staff, the MFA Director General, and 
various other Presidency staff.  Amiable throughout, 
Obasanjo opened by expressing surprise that we had come to 
Abuja so soon after he had been in Washington.  We replied 
that building on Obasanjo's meetings in Washington, the 
President and the Secretary had sent us to Abuja to follow 
up on Charles Taylor.  We began with a brief discussion 
about Konare's possible appearance at NATO in the coming 
week concerning Darfur.  Obasanjo promised to do what he 
could to ensure that Konare lived up to his agreement to 
go. 
 
¶3.  (S) When the conversation turned to Charles Taylor, we 
recalled Obasanjo's meetings in Washington where he agreed 
to appoint interlocutors with whom we could explore the way 
forward.  We asked for the names of those interlocutors and 
also for his thinking about the concepts that could govern 
future conversations.  Obasanjo repeated his usual themes: 
it had been in response to the international community, 
especially ECOWAS and the United States, that he had agreed 
to accept Charles Taylor.  He noted that Taylor had been 
escorted to Nigeria by Mbeki and Chissano.  He said that 
his agreement to accept Taylor had never been time limited. 
He also said that West Africa in general, and Nigeria in 
particular, are being badly treated by the rest of the 
international community over Taylor; absent Nigeria's 
hosting of Taylor, the bloodshed in Liberia would have 
continued.  He said that were he to turn over Charles 
Taylor to the Special Court in Sierra Leone, his own 
credibility would be undermined with respect his West 
African diplomacy and Nigeria's peacekeeping efforts, both 
of which are interests shared with the U.S.  He cited as a 
specific example the meeting he is hosting in the coming 
week of all of the Togolese factions, where he needs to be 
seen as a man of his word. 
 
¶4.  (S) Two things could change the situation, Obasanjo 
continued.  Should Charles Taylor be guilty of crimes while 
he has been in Nigeria, the former head of state would have 
to go; and if a democratically elected Liberia government 
should ask him to turn over Charles Taylor, he would 
respond positively.  Obasanjo was dismissive of the 
intelligence he had seen about Taylor's alleged crimes 
while in Nigeria: "its wishy-washy."  Obasanjo made it 
clear that should we determine it was in the best interests 
to keep Taylor out of Liberia, even after democratic 
elections, Taylor could stay in Nigeria indefinitely. 
 
¶5.  (S) When we pressed for the names of his team with whom 
we could discuss ways of moving forward, Obasanjo said we 
need a small team on both sides.  Apparently on the spot, 
he designated the National Security Advisor, Aliyu 
Mohammed, as chair, to be joined by the Solicitor General 
and the Acting MFA Permanent Secretary with ambassadorial 
rank.  "That way," Obasanjo continued, "legal experts can 
talk to legal experts, diplomats can talk to diplomats, and 
security people can talk to security people.  And soon it 
will be October" (the latter a reference to the date of the 
upcoming Liberia elections).  He offered to send his team 
to Washington for the next round of discussions.  Any 
agreement between the two teams, Obasanjo continued, would 
require consultations, perhaps approval from ECOWAS and the 
AU. 
 
¶6.  (S) We raised the possibility of a Security Council 
resolution expanding UNMIL's authority to arrest Taylor 
should he appear in Liberia.  Obasanjo dismissed such a 
resolution as misplaced humor:  it would practically 
guarantee that Taylor remains in Nigeria.  We asked with 
whom we could discuss a draft text.  His response:  the 
Nigerian Permanent Representative in New York. 
 
¶7.  (S) Comments and recommendations:  Obasanjo will 
clearly delay as long as possible any movement on Charles 
Taylor, though he does not want to offend the President and 
the Secretary of State.  He resents a possible Security 
Council resolution, and clearly will not dialogue with us 
about a text.  Obasanjo betrayed no willingness to 
contemplate turning Taylor over the Special Court in Sierra 
Leone.  For him, the options are to keep Taylor in Nigeria 
or send him elsewhere at the request of democratically 
elected government in Monrovia.  For us, at this time, 
there are three options: 
 
A) Push Obasanjo on Charles Taylor, and if Obasanjo does 
not move we agree to move forward with out his consent on a 
UNSC resolution. 
 
B) Respect Obasanjo's position, but allow the Danish effort 
to move forward with their staff negotiating in new your 
with the Nigerians. 
 
C) Acquiesce. 
 
¶8.  (S) In deciding which option to select, we must keep in 
mind the potential impact on a wide range of areas where we 
cooperate with Nigeria.  Absent strong pressure that could 
affect those other interests, Obasanjo will do little or 
nothing now.  With the exception of Aliyu Mohammed, his 
"team" is not close to the center of power in Abuja, nor is 
the Nigeria Permanent Representative in New York. 
Nevertheless, we should continue to negotiate in good 
faith.  We recommend an early letter of invitation from the 
Department to Aliyu Mohammed, as chairman of the Nigerian 
team, to bring the team to Washington for continued talks. 
With respect to a possible Danish-sponsored UN Security 
Council resolution, we should avoid negotiating on 
Nigeria's behalf.  Instead, we should urge sponsors of any 
such resolution to approach the Nigerian Permanent 
Representative in New York or the Presidency in Abuja. 
CAMPBELL