This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000615 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SNEC (AMB MANN) AND EUR/CACEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL PARM AM AJ
SUBJECT: OSCE SPECIAL REP ON N-K POW ISSUE, CEASE-FIRE 
VIOLATIONS 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Evans for reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) OSCE Special Rep Andrzej Kasprzyk told the Ambassador 
on April 7 that although OSCE CiO Rupel had secured agreement 
during his March 31 visit from "N-K" authorities for three 
Azerbaijani POWs to be returned, this action was complicated 
by the April 1 capture of an Armenian soldier by Azerbaijan. 
Kasprzyk readily admitted that his group's efforts to monitor 
the Line of Contact were limited.  He said that Azerbaijani 
forces' efforts to improve tactical positions had brought the 
lines very close together, leading to an increase in 
cease-fire violations.  Kasprzyk also described efforts by 
the co-chairs and his office to arrange meetings of 
Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders on the margins of upcoming 
multilateral events.  End Summary. 
 
Prisoners of War 
---------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Kasprzyk said that CiO Rupel had talked to N-K 
"President" Ghukasyan, and that the latter had said "consider 
it done" (the release of the three Azeris being held by N-K 
authorities).  The next day, an Armenian had strayed over the 
border (not the line of contact) and been captured by the 
Azeris, so the N-K authorities (working closely with the 
Armenians, of course) put a hold on the return of the three, 
figuring that the Armenian POW would face a long wait without 
their maintaining a bargaining chip.  On Wednesday, (April 6) 
Kasprzyk got involved by placing a call to Azeri Defense 
Minister, but the latter did not take his call; rather, an 
officer at the MoD wrote down the Armenian offer, which was 
that both sides should release their prisoners (three Azeris, 
one Armenian) simultaneously on the Armenian-Azeri border 
near the point of tangency with Georgia.  Azeris had not yet 
responded to this offer as of noon April 7, according to 
Kasprzyk. 
 
¶3. (C) Kasprzyk confirmed that there had been an agreement 
reached between the two sides in Tbilisi on March 18, the 
essence of which was that all POWs should be handed back in 
short order, without the long (and lengthening) delays that 
have characterized recent cases.  He also added that 
President Aliyev, in Warsaw, had expressed irritation to one 
of his accompanying defense officials over the long delays 
that characterized recent exchanges, suggesting that this 
practice was not one of his design, or one that he approved 
of. 
 
¶4. (C) Kasprzyk said there was a problem in that the ICRC 
had, for quite some time, not been given proper access to 
prisoners taken by the Azeri side.  The ICRC had made some 
missteps in the past, and was viewed by some in Baku as an 
intelligence-gathering organization partial to Christian 
countries.  Apparently an ICRC rep had once asked for 
information about a POW's unit, and this was misconstrued. 
There was also an incident at a conference in Geneva in which 
an Azeri official had had his microphone cut off when he 
exceeded the allotted time; this too was misconstrued. 
Kasprzyk was ruminating about how best to get the ICRC 
function in these cases repaired, noting that, in addition to 
being contrary to the Geneva conventions, not to allow ICRC 
access to POWs was definitely dangerous for the mental health 
of prisoners.  He said that the Armenians did not impede ICRC 
access to Azeri prisoners, some of whom did not wish to 
return to Azerbaijan.  One such prisoner had been resettled 
in Norway, and the Azeris were sore about that. 
 
Monitoring the Line of Contact 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) Kasprzyk said another monitoring mission would 
commence this Monday (April 11).   Asked what more he could 
do to monitor the LoC, Kasprzyk said that, first, his mandate 
had never actually included monitoring; he had just started 
doing it because he thought it would be helpful.  Second, he 
had only five people to conduct monitoring missions, and 
thought it unlikely that the OSCE would provide either more 
people or more resources (for example, vehicles).  He said 
Azerbaijan had been searching for some time for evidence of 
Kasprzyk's authority to monitor the LoC, so far without 
success.  The Azeris were strongly opposed to any form of 
permanent monitoring, and were so sensitive about the issue 
that they would not permit him (Kasprzyk) to carry his GPS 
locator with him near the front lines.  In the main, he was 
certain, the Azeris were attempting to improve their 
positions and de-mine some of the Armenian mine-fields.  This 
put the two sides as close as fifty meters apart, and, 
especially at night, shooting naturally occurred.  N-K 
authorities told Kasprzyk that three Armenians had been 
killed, and that the number of Azeris killed might be as high 
as twenty in the recent skirmishes.  Kasprzyk said there was 
a definite danger that one of these incidents might spiral 
out of control, but he agreed with the Ambassador that the 
tensions of recent weeks appeared to have abated somewhat in 
the last few days.  Kasprzyk said that the agreement between 
the sides that had been signed in 1995 to regulate incidents 
on the Line of Contact could not be said to be in effect 
today; it was in abeyance. 
 
Russian Flight over the Caucasus? 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) During the lunch, Kasprzyk received a cellular call 
from Russian co-chair Merzlyakov, who was enquiring about 
flight clearances in the Caucasus.  In particular, he wanted 
to know whether Azerbaijan had the possibility of flying over 
Armenian territory to Nakhchivan.  Kasprzyk opined, without 
saying he was sure, that he imagined the Azeris had obtained 
this right in exchange for Armenia's right to fly to 
Istanbul.  (Note: here in Yerevan, we have the impression 
that Azeri aircraft use Iranian airspace to access 
Nakhchivan).  The Ambassador mentioned to Kasprzyk the report 
we had seen that a Russian "AWACS" had been prevented from 
flying south through Georgia two days ago.  (Note:We can 
think of no reason Co-Chair Merzlyakov would be involved in 
learning about flight clearances unless the flight had 
something to do with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. End Note) 
 
Future N-K Negotiating Activity 
------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Kasprzyk discussed with Merzlyakov the arrangements to 
meet at the U.S. Embassy in London on April 15, and noted 
that although there would be proximity talks, there might 
well be a dinner at which both Foreign Ministers would be 
present.  Looking further ahead to the Moscow and Warsaw 
meetings, Kasprzyk said he had advised the Russians to find 
just twenty minutes in Moscow to bring the Armenian and Azeri 
leaders together, just to keep their imprimatur on the 
process.  As for the Warsaw meeting, Kasprzyk floated the 
idea that President Saakashvili might be persuaded to play 
host, on the fringes of the May 16 Warsaw CoE summit, to a 
side-meeting of Aliyev and Kocharian, possibly outside Warsaw 
in a village called Konstantin where there was a lodge 
suitable to a very private meeting.  As a neighbor in good 
standing of both, Saakashvili could be the one to do this, 
Amb. Kasprzyk thought.  Kasprzyk noted that he would be 
seeing Amb. Mann in Tbilisi this Sunday. 
EVANS