This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 002138 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2015 
TAGS: PREL PTER KWBG IS LE SY COUNTERTERRORISM GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: (C) EILAND OUTLINES STEPS TO PREVENT 
HIZBALLAH/IRAN ASCENSION IN LEBANON 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
. 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (S) In a March 23 meeting with Deputy APNSA Abrams, A/S 
Welch, and the Ambassador, National Security Advisor Eiland 
sketched out "preliminary" GOI thinking about the future of 
Lebanon after a Syrian withdrawal.  He described three 
scenarios for post-Syria Lebanon: democratic stability; a 
return to civil strife; or, Hizballah, possibly with Iran, 
filling the vacuum left by Syria.  Stressing that PM Sharon 
has not yet approved the suggestions, Eiland reviewed a long 
list of steps (para 9) that the international community could 
take, both before and after the upcoming Lebanese elections, 
to avoid the third scenario.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) National Security Advisor Giora Eiland presented what 
he called preliminary, uncleared ideas about the future of 
Lebanon in a March 23 meeting with Deputy National Security 
Advisor Elliott Abrams, NEA Assistant Secretary David Welch 
and the Ambassador.  The Prime Minister's foreign affairs 
advisor, Shalom Tourgeman, and Eiland's staffers, Gabi Blum 
and Eran Etzion, also participated. 
 
----------------------------- 
Lebanon: Post-Syria Scenarios 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3. (S) Israel shares the international goal of creating an 
independent, sovereign, secure and peaceful Lebanon, Eiland 
said, but the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, while 
necessary for this goal, may not prove sufficient.  He 
described three possible outcomes in Lebanon from the 
expected Syrian withdrawal: 
 
-- Lebanon becomes a stable, democratic state. 
 
-- Lebanon regresses to the civil strife of the 1970s. 
Several forces, he said, are trying to create this result, 
including the SARG, which will retain some influence in 
Lebanon even after the withdrawal of its troops.  He 
suggested that the SARG could use Hizballah or Palestinians 
in Lebanon to foment strife as a means of demonstrating its 
essential stabilizing role in Lebanon.  A group of 
Palestinians seeking to destabilize Lebanon recently moved 
from Syria to Lebanon, he said. 
 
-- Hizballah, or Iran operating through Hizballah, fills the 
vacuum created by the Syrian departure.  Factors that could 
contribute to this outcome include the existing Iranian 
presence in Lebanon, notably the Iranian Revolutionary Guard 
Corps (IRGC), and Iranian money; the fact that the Shia, 
representing about 35 percent of the Lebanese population, are 
the largest community in the country; the existing strength 
of Hizballah, which Eiland termed "the most effective 
military group" in Lebanon; and, Hizballah leader Nasrallah's 
status as what Eiland termed Lebanon's "most charismatic" 
figure. 
 
¶4. (S) Abrams questioned the likelihood of the second 
scenario, pointing out that Lebanon's Christian community is 
much weaker now than 30 years ago, and that Lebanon has 
become a different country since then.  Eiland responded by 
noting that Russian NSC Secretary Igor Ivanov, during his 
visit to Israel the week before, had reported hearing from 
Egyptian sources that the price of a Kalashnikov in Lebanon 
has recently soared from about $300 to $30,000.  Eiland 
commented that this apparent spike in demand indicated 
significant fear of civil strife among the Lebanese.  He 
noted as well his own experience as an IDF battalion 
commander in a Druze village near Beirut in the early 1980s. 
His forces, he said, tried to mediate in inter-communal 
disputes in the village, but the "hatred and cruelty" between 
the different Lebanese communities was "unimaginable."  No 
one, he asserted, can therefore say with certainty that 
inter-communal violence will not erupt again, despite the 
shared desire of the various Lebanese groups for a 
successful, independent Lebanon.  The Ambassador asked 
whether Eiland had any ideas for a strategy to head off the 
civil strife scenario.  Eiland replied that he had not yet 
thought through the question. 
 
¶5. (S) Eiland contended that a strengthened Hizballah 
emerging from the Syrian departure from Lebanon could prove 
destabilizing both for Lebanon and "in the Palestinian 
context."  Should Hizballah enhance its political power in 
Lebanon without giving up its terrorist identity, it could 
establish the precedent of "a terrorist group with global 
reach" being accorded international legitimacy.  This model 
of a terrorist organization with a recognized political face 
could also affect the future status of Palestinian terrorist 
groups in the West Bank and Gaza.  It would also counteract 
the achievements of democratization in the Middle East. 
¶6. (S) Hizballah, after the Syrian departure from Lebanon, 
could also move to inflame the situation along the 
Lebanese-Israeli border, Eiland contended.  The only reason 
the border is now reasonably calm, he said, is that Israel 
and the international community effectively deter Syria from 
allowing Hizballah to act provocatively.  Once Syria is out 
of Lebanon, he asked, who will be accountable for Hizballah 
actions?  One "very possible" scenario immediately after the 
Syrian withdrawal is that Hizballah would decide to test 
Israel.  UN envoy Terje Roed-Larsen reported, Eiland said, 
that Assad told him that "the Blue Line could turn red" (with 
blood) after the Syrian withdrawal. 
 
¶7. (S) Eiland noted that one other troubling possibility 
resulting from the Syrian withdrawal could be that al-Qaeda 
begins to operate seriously from within the Palestinian 
refugee camps in Lebanon.  Up to now, he said, al-Qaeda has 
stayed out of the camps in deference to Syria. 
 
¶8. (S) Abrams asked Eiland to describe the actual means of 
pressure that Syria has been able to use to restrain 
Hizballah up to now.  While Iran has been the main party for 
providing arms and guidance to Hizballah, Eiland replied, 
Syria has acted as both the transshipment point for Iranian 
arms heading to Hizballah, and a supplier of arms to 
Hizballah in its own right.  The SARG, he said, provided no 
other assistance to Hizballah, other than "a certain 
umbrella."  He stressed that Hizballah does not depend on 
Syria for maintaining its military capability. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Strategies for Molding the Outcome in Lebanon 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (S) Stressing again that he was presenting "preliminary 
thoughts" only, Eiland presented a list of recommended steps, 
divided between the pre- and post-election periods in 
Lebanon, for the international community to take in order to 
effect a successful transition in Lebanon. 
 
Pre-Election 
------------ 
 
-- An international declaration linking recognition of the 
"legitimacy" of a newly elected Lebanese government to its 
commitment, made in advance of the elections, to the "missing 
elements" of UNSCR 1559 (i.e., the disarmament of all 
militias).  This expected commitment would include an 
explicit understanding that the existing status of Hizballah 
is only temporary. 
 
-- Continued pressure on Syria to complete its withdrawal 
before the elections. 
 
-- Pressure on Syria to restrain Hizballah and to sever its 
ties with the organization. 
 
-- Pressure on Syria not to send Palestinian militants to 
Lebanon, and to cut off assistance to them. 
 
(The pressure on Syria to restrain militant groups would 
include a clear threat to President Assad that he would be 
held accountable for the operations of armed groups.) 
 
-- Similar pressure on Iran, including through the EU-3 
negotiations.  Pressed on the advisability of bringing other 
issues into the dialogue about Iran's nuclear program, Eiland 
contended that the EU-3 negotiations with Iran have already 
gone beyond Iran's nuclear program.  Etzion specified that 
the EU-3 have raised Iran's support for terrorism in the 
dialogue. 
 
-- Monitoring of the elections in Lebanon. 
 
Post-Election 
------------- 
 
-- A clear international demand for the new GOL to implement 
UNSCR 1559 fully. 
 
-- Extension to the new GOL of a "grace period" between the 
elections and a final deadline (TBD) for the full 
implementation of UNSCR 1559.  The international community 
would recognize the legitimacy of the new GOL until the 
deadline.  Also during this grace period, the international 
community would reinforce the formal status of Hizballah as a 
terrorist organization (e.g., by adding it to the EU 
terrorism list), and refuse to deal with Hizballah. 
 
-- Should the new GOL fail to meet the international deadline 
for full implementation of UNSCR 1559, it would "lose its 
legitimacy," the impact of which would include non-engagement 
with the GOL and sanctions. 
-- As the GOI understands that dismantling Hizballah cannot 
occur "in one day," GOL implementation of UNSCR 1559 could be 
phased, but must stick to a clear timetable.  Chronological 
benchmarks for the GOL could include: 
 
¶A. Cessation of all hostile Hizballah activities in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. 
 
¶B. Cessation of all anti-Israeli activity along the Blue Line. 
 
¶C. A complete cut-off of all support channels to Hizballah, 
from both Syria and Iran; deployment of the LAF in all border 
passages to ensure the cut-off. 
 
¶D. Withdrawal of Hizballah militants from the Blue Line area 
and deployment of the LAF.  (Concurrent deployment of 
Hizballah and the LAF would be unacceptable.)  End of UNIFIL 
mandate. 
 
¶E. Turnover of strategic munitions held by Hizballah to the 
GOL. 
 
¶F. Dismantlement of all Hizballah military and terrorist 
capabilities.  Some/some individual members could be allowed 
to enlist in the LAF. 
 
-- Implementation of UNSCR 1559 must also include withdrawal 
of the IRGC and the dismantlement of all Palestinian 
militias.  Eiland commented that the SARG now exercises the 
only restraint on the Palestinian groups. 
 
-- A demand from the international community that Lebanon 
employ Western standards of combating terrorist finance and 
drug trafficking. 
 
-- International support for the Lebanese transition should 
include: 
 
¶A. "Reasonable strengthening" of the LAF, e.g. in training 
and capacity building. 
 
¶B. Economic assistance, but only if linked to GOL performance 
on 1559. 
 
¶C. A possible international stabilization force.  While the 
GOI would not have a role in this, such a deployment could 
affect Israel as a precedent for international action in Gaza. 
 
¶10. (S) Turning to the Israeli role in the strategy he 
sketched, Eiland commented that the GOI understands that the 
time is not ripe for an Israeli-Lebanese peace agreement, and 
that any Israeli comments about a possible agreement would be 
counterproductive.  The GOI is nevertheless ready to 
contribute to a successful transition in Lebanon through 
bilateral discussions on issues such as water and security; 
participation in regional economic projects, e.g., water, 
energy, or transportation; and, a cessation of overflights of 
Lebanese airspace once terrorist activity from Lebanon ends. 
 
¶11. (S) Eiland stressed that the GOI would not/not be willing 
to agree to any territorial concessions, such as at Sheba'a 
Farms, as part of any deals with Hizballah.  He said he made 
this point because UN envoy Terje Roed-Larsen has raised the 
issue. 
 
¶12. (S) Observing that Hizballah could see the strategy 
Eiland set forth as an existential threat, the Ambassador 
asked Eiland to assess how Hizballah might react.  Eiland 
replied that Hizballah cares most about its internal 
legitimacy within Lebanon.  Should it fully understand 
international expectations, Hizballah might willingly 
transform itself from a group that is more an Iranian tool 
than a Lebanese entity, to the opposite. 
 
¶13. (S) Welch asked Eiland whether precedents exist for 
integrating a militia such as Hizballah into a national army. 
 The GOI views integration of Hizballah into the LAF as too 
dangerous, Eiland replied, although the GOI could accept some 
individual Hizballah members joining the LAF.  The top 
priority in dismantling Hizballah, he stressed, is the 
removal of Hizballah's strategic military capability.  The 
group currently has enough rockets, many of which are based 
in populated areas, to cause significant damage to Israel in 
a short time. 
 
¶14. (S) The Ambassador commented that the strategy Eiland 
presented could prove too ambitious to be feasible.  Eiland 
responded that a strong GOL could be responsive to 
incentives.  Welch asked whether the GOI intended to present 
the strategy to anyone else.  Eiland said the GOI might 
present it to the French and Larsen once PM Sharon approves 
the overall approach. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Syrian Support for Terrorism, Border with Iraq 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶15. (S) Turning away from the Syrian role in Lebanon, Abrams 
noted that the U.S. has two other issues with Syria: its 
support for terrorism, and its failure to prevent insurgents 
from entering Iraq from Syria.  He asked Eiland about 
possible destinations for terrorist organizations now based 
in Syria should the SARG expel them.  Eiland pointed to what 
he said was the troubling precedent, from the 1970s, of Syria 
sending the headquarters of terrorist groups to the 
Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.  This outcome could 
repeat itself, he said, should a new GOL turn out to be weak. 
 Tourgeman noted that, according to Israeli intelligence, the 
terrorists who carried out the February 25 bombing in Tel 
Aviv received instructions to call Lebanon, not Syria, from 
their cell phones. 
 
¶16. (S) Abrams commented that Assad knows that he would have 
to deliver on Iraq, not just on UNSCR 1559, to satisfy the 
U.S.  This realization could lead Assad to conclude that he 
need not bother with 1559.  Eiland pointed out that prospects 
for the future of the Assad regime could be questionable 
following a "humiliating" Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. 
Noting that undermining the Assad regime is not U.S. policy, 
Abrams commented that the U.S. does not necessarily need to 
try not to undermine Assad.  He offered his personal 
assessment that destabilizing the regime would begin a 
process that would ultimately result in its fall.  Eiland 
concurred. 
 
¶17. (U) Abrams and Welch cleared this message. 
 
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