This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 000916 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2015 
TAGS: PREL PTER YM COUNTER TERRORISM TERFIN
SUBJECT: YEMEN GWOT ASSESSMENT 
 
REF: STATE 60749 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1. (S) Summary.  President Saleh has logged some major CT 
gains and significantly improved security in Yemen since the 
post-9/11 forging of the U.S-Yemen GWOT partnership.  Recent 
successes include: the round-up of an emerging al-Qa'ida cell 
with plans to target the U.S. Ambassador, prosecution and 
conviction of the USS Cole and M/V Limburg terrorists, and 
success in the largest destruction program in the region. 
There continue to be frequent and troubling lapses in the 
ROYG's performance, including the release of extremists, 
failure to share information, and inaction on small arms and 
light weapons (SA/LW), as Saleh has sought to balance 
domestic political equities while ensuring that he extracts 
maximum benefit from the U.S. (read: aid) for his 
cooperation.  The ROYG can be helpful but almost always not 
as helpful as we would like.  It can be frustrating. 
Friction in the US-ROYG relationship is mitigated by the fact 
that, in objective terms, we are light-years ahead on core CT 
issues from where we were before 9/11. 
 
¶2. (S) We seek to institutionalize the gains of past 
engagement in order to transform a sometimes reluctant Yemen 
from an occasional friend into a full-time partner.  ROYG CT 
capabilities are growing, albeit modestly, as a result of USG 
assistance.  Progress will be slow, steady, and dependent on 
intensive personal relationships built through provision of 
USG training and equipment.  Here is how we propose to 
improve out cooperation with key ROYG allies in the GWOT. 
 
¶3. (S) Country Team strategy is to improve the performance 
and capabilities of Yemeni security organizations to support 
GWOT efforts.  Current USG-ROYG CT priorities are to: improve 
border and maritime security; control the flow of SA/LW and 
jihadists from Yemen to support terrorist activities in Iraq, 
KSA, and the Horn of Africa (HOA); enhance the ROYG's CT unit 
of choice, the Central Security Forces Counter-terrorism Unit 
(CSF-CTU); improve the ROYG's ability to target terrorists in 
Yemen; and, encourage the ROYG to implement much needed 
economic and democratic reforms. 
 
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Background: President Saleh and the GWOT 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Saleh,s decision to join the fight against 
international terrorism was no doubt influenced by U.S. and 
coalition boots on the ground in Afghanistan.  He continues 
to see value in an ongoing GWOT partnership, but can be 
counted on to leverage this cooperation into further U.S. 
military, security and development assistance.  He is a 
high-maintenance and highly opportunistic operator.  Saleh 
tends to focus on short-term CT solutions, preferring to make 
tactical decisions than to have a comprehensive policy on CT 
cooperation. 
 
¶5. (C) Saleh is a master at balancing competing interests and 
he weighs any USG CT request against appeasing domestic 
institutional, tribal and Islamic elements.  Saleh's 
balancing act has slowed or stalled U.S. efforts to elicit 
GWOT related cooperation. For example, such "internal 
sensitivities," combined with weak Yemeni financial 
institutions, are responsible for the ROYG's non-supportive 
posture on the UN action freezing Sheikh Abdul Majid 
al-Zindani's assets. 
 
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Border Security: Land and Sea 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) The establishment, training and partial equipping of 
the Yemeni Coast Guard (YCG) is a major U.S. security 
assistance success and the YCG's initial presence up and down 
the nation's coastline, focusing on critical points, has 
improved maritime security.  Currently the ports of Aden and 
Hodeidah are more secure than they were one year ago. 
However, Yemen's oil terminals in Ras Isa and Bir Ali remain 
vulnerable to terrorist attacks as the YCG does not have yet 
have the infrastructure to support patrols near these 
facilities.  The YCG has begun initial monitoring and 
interdiction of smugglers from the Horn of Africa.  The 
effectiveness of the USG-supported YCG is limited by its 
small size. 
 
¶7. (C)  Yemen and Saudi Arabia have announced joint efforts 
to tighten border security, but improvement and application 
has been limited and uneven.  The security of Yemen's land 
and maritime borders remains a priority concern.  Tackling 
land border security is beyond Yemen's current capacity along 
its long and largely unregulated boarder with Saudi Arabia. 
Eight days of joint maneuvers between Yemeni and Saudi 
military along the eastern border began on March 30 and is an 
noteworthy, albeit largely symbolic, step.  Successful 
control of the Yemeni-Saudi border will require active buy-in 
from the ROYG, and we should encourage the KSA to fund border 
security assistance to Yemen in the context of their border 
security initiative. 
 
¶8. (C) Post received 750,000 USD for the EXBS program, and 
plans to use the funds to provide training and equipment to 
the seriously under-manned, under-trained, and under-funded 
Yemeni Border Guards.  One of our first goals will be to 
provide basic training and to facilitate cross-border 
coordination and information exchange with the Saudis.  A 
mobile training team would be appropriate for providing 
border guard specific training.   In addition to specific 
training for border guards, MOI has requested tactical 
vehicles and night vision goggles.  For the ROYG to 
effectively monitor its borders to prevent weapons smuggling 
and terrorist activities, we must increase support for this 
program.  The ROYG must, in turn, demonstrate sufficient 
political will to eliminate any official involvement in 
weapons smuggling. 
 
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CT Cooperation with MOI - Success of CSF-CTU 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The training and equipping of the Ministry of Interior 
(MOI) Central Security Forces Counter Terrorism Unit 
(CSF-CTU) is a major USG security assistance program success. 
 The Yemeni Central Security Force (CSF) is a paramilitary 
counter-terrorism, emergency reaction, and counter-coup force 
that can provide reinforcement to the Yemeni armed forces. 
We have been hindered by long-standing Department policy that 
prohibits using FMF funds on paramilitary forces.  Its 
primary missions are internal security and counter-terrorism 
operations.  Within the CSF, only the Counter-Terrorism Unit 
(CSF-CTU) is tasked with the primary domestic 
counter-terrorism mission; no CSF units conduct defense. 
 
¶10. (S) The USG-trained CSF-CTU proved itself an elite cadre 
in a fight against the "Believing Youth8 movement founded by 
slain anti-American Shi,ite cleric Hussein Badr Eddine 
al-Houthi.  Last summer,s conflict was characterized by its 
long and bloody nature which, like the Abyan conflict in 
2003, took the ROYG and its armed forces by surprise. 
CSF-CTU was redeployed several weeks ago to the same region 
to put down a resurgence of the al-Houthi insurrection. 
Employing lessons and skills learned in the interim from USG 
trainers, reports from the field indicate that in the current 
fighting CSF-CTU forces are employing techniques to isolate 
insurgents and limit collateral damage.  Sources on the 
ground currently report that the CSF-CTU are effectively in 
the lead and working with the armed forces to use appropriate 
strategy and techniques to fight a well trained enemy 
unafraid to go on the offense, operate at night, and employ 
guerrilla tactics. 
 
¶11. (S) Currently, the ROYG is inclined to employ the CSF-CTU 
immediately to deal with any serious para-military situation 
in recognition of the skills they have developed from 
effective training and from experience gained.  Given the 
small size of this force, 150 soldiers, it cannot sustain 
more than a dozen or so casualties without a serious 
degradation of its capabilities.  We support the recent 
request of the CSF to expand its force.  Additionally, the 
country team supports strongly considering a similar proposal 
by MOD to help train and arm several special forces 
battalions of the regular army.  Having several professional, 
trained infantry battalions would permit the ROYG to employ 
them as a first line of defense instead of immediately 
deploying the elite CSF-CTU. 
 
¶12. (C) The MOI has sought funding from LEGATT to provide 
basic services and training for a newly established 
counter-terrorism investigative unit (CTIU).  CT 
investigations have been predominately conducted by the PSO. 
The MOI CTIU consists of 100 investigator from MOI's Criminal 
Investigative Unit and is supervised by Colonel Hisham 
Ghazani, considered by FBI as "someone we can work with".  In 
December 2004 the CTIU disrupted an AQ cell in the early 
planning stages of preparing to attack numerous western 
targets and six suspects were arrested.  The CTIU is now 
working jointly with a team of FBI agents interviewing the 
perpetrator of an failed attack on the U.S. Ambassador. 
Country team believes that based on past successes in CT 
cooperation with MOI and Minister Alimi, there is great 
potential in strengthening our relationship with the CTIU. 
LEGATT is the action office, supported by the country team, 
in building a strong partner on CT issues. 
¶13. (SBU) USG GWOT efforts are hindered by Yemen's 
rudimentary fingerprint system and lack of a national 
database to store records.  Yemen has no system to maintain 
this critical biometric data when they are able to capture 
it, nor do the authorities have the skills to properly record 
prints or recover them from crime scenes.  Working with FBI, 
country team proposes the development of a searchable 
fingerprint system base on internationally exchangeable print 
standards as well as detailed crime scene investigation and 
evidence collection.  A local ability to properly process 
evidence would be a significant asset to GWOT investigations, 
as would the creation of a national database of known 
criminals.  FBI is prepared to provide the necessary 
equipment and training to Yemen, but post is still seeking 
DOS or other funds to cover the USD 4 million cost for 
implementing the program over three years. 
 
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CT Information Sharing 
---------------------- 
¶14. (S) The Political Security Organization (PSO) is 
currently the premier agency charged with CT in Yemen.  It is 
pervasive and paranoid.  The head of the PSO, Major General 
Ghalib al-Gamish is a close confident to President Saleh. 
Information sharing with the PSO is problematic, however, 
despite the fact that it is fully committed to preventing 
terrorist attacks in Yemen.  Gamish has cooperated closely on 
following several recent terrorist networks involving 
jihadists from Iraq, and we anticipate that cooperation on 
these and other CT related issues will continue.  We have 
seen the PSO coordinate with other governments in the region, 
and it usually takes action swiftly on CT related leads 
provided by the USG and other governments. 
 
¶15. (S) The ROYG and the PSO have taken stances which are 
contrary to USG security interests.  Specifically, the ROYG 
has released detainees associated with al-Qa'ida as part of 
its Ramadan amnesty in the last three years.  This year, 
however, the ROYG for the first time provided Post with an 
advance list of releasees, and agreed to continue to hold 
some, but not all, of the terrorism suspects.  The ROYG has 
also been intransigent on allowing USG investigators access 
to prisoners that we believe to be directly connected to AQ. 
Not only does the PSO refuse to share information collected 
on these individuals with the USG, but it insists that it has 
no information at all, despite holding and interrogating them 
for months or even years. 
 
¶16. (S) A relatively new organization, the National Security 
Board (NSB) is headed by Colonel Ammar Saleh, one of three 
nephews of the President.  Western educated, Saleh enjoys 
contact with many westerners and has worked closely with 
emboffs on a joint US-ROYG destruction program.  His decision 
making process on CT issues, however, needs maturing.  He is 
often shortsighted and opportunistic, much like his uncle, 
President Ali Abdullah Saleh.  The NSB significantly limits 
its staff and relies heavily on the PSO to execute 
operations.  Post believes, however, that with time, 
training, and assistance, the NBS could develop into a useful 
partner in the GWOT. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Terrorist Financing and Zindani: Need ROYG Action 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶17. (S) Despite nascent efforts to build an effective 
anti-money laundering regime, the ROYG's capability to stop 
the flow of money is extremely limited and ROYG officials 
tend to view terrorist financing as a problem more for 
regional neighbors than for Yemen.  Since the 2003 passage of 
a money laundering law, Central Bank officials, MFA contacts 
and representatives of private banks have made repeated 
requests for U.S. assistance to build their infrastructure. 
CBY capabilities are minimal and any assistance to build 
their financial intelligence unit and interagency 
capabilities would be welcomed. 
 
¶18. (C) As in some other areas of CT cooperation, the ROYG 
lacks the political will to take action on the freezing of 
Sheikh Abdul Majid al-Zindani's assets under his designation 
by the UN as someone giving material support to al-Qaida. 
The ROYG has used the excuse of requesting legal 
documentation on Zindani's culpability and Gulf charities 
mentioned above to delay further action, rather than comply 
with its responsibilities as a member state. 
Krajeski