This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T  ROME 001389 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 25X1-HUMAN 
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IT ITALIAN POLITICS
SUBJECT: ITALY:  ARE BERLUSCONI'S TROUBLES MORE SERIOUS 
THAN HE BELIEVES? 
 
REF: A) 03 ROME 1143 B) 02 ROME 11 C) 03 ROME 757 
 
Classified By: THE AMBASSADOR, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (S)  Italian Senate President Pera alleged that President 
Ciampi, together with the center-left and Chamber President 
Casini, was plotting a "constitutional coup d'etat" against 
Berlusconi, attempting to force June elections.  In a 
separate, earlier meeting, however, Casini accused PM 
Berlusconi of "trying to give the government to the left as 
fast as possible" and insisted angrily that the PM "must face 
reality."  Pera, a loyal ally to PM Berlusconi, has in the 
past seen the sky to be falling when it was not.  Casini, 
however, is deeply ambitious.  Offered the Presidency of the 
Republic after Ciampi, he might be hard-pressed to resist. 
On balance, we are inclined to think that Berlusconi will 
regather his coalition and we will see a "Berlusconi Bis" 
government confirmed next week, but this remains a very 
uneasy alliance.   END SUMMARY. 
 
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PERA PREDICTS COUP 
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¶2.  (S)  Ambassador paid farewell courtesy calls on Senate 
President Marcello Pera (Forza Italia, FI) and Chamber of 
Deputies President Pier Ferdinando Casini (Union of Christian 
Democrats of the Center, UDC) on April 22 and April 21, 
respectively.  While Casini made clear that intra-coalition 
arguments were not resolved, Pera predicted direly that 
President of the Republic Ciampi, working with the left and 
Casini, was plotting a "constitutional coup d'etat" against 
PM Berlusconi with the goal of forcing the current government 
out and holding June elections.  Pera harkened to the role 
Ciampi played questioning U.S. deployment from Italy to Iraq: 
 "What he did to you in Iraq, he is trying to do to 
Berlusconi now."  (Ref A) 
 
¶3.  (S)  Pera told the Ambassador that he and Casini had each 
received a letter from Ciampi immediately prior to the 
Ambassador's arrival.  Pera believed the letter represented a 
threat to force elections in June.  (He did not show the 
Ambassador the letter; Pera only spoke of it.)  He had 
immediately telephoned Berlusconi to warn him.  Ciampi will 
be calling you in a few hours, Pera said he told the PM.  You 
must have your list of ministers in hand and you must tell 
the President that the confidence vote will be Tuesday. 
Although worried, Pera seemed to think such a strategy -- if 
it could be pulled off within the coalition -- could succeed 
in outflanking Ciampi.  He and the Ambassador briefly touched 
on various possibilities for a new line-up, and Pera implied 
a new list of ministers was workable, if all partners were 
willing.  (Note:  Berlusconi will see Ciampi at 18:30 local 
time.) 
 
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REDISTRICTING QUESTION 
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¶4.  (S)  Pera told the Ambassador that Ciampi's letter said 
Parliament should have "re-styled your constituencies."  Pera 
did not elaborate, but he thought this phrase represented a 
Ciampi threat to prevent a reconstituted Berlusconi 
government.  It is a reference to redistricting, which has 
not been an issue in Italy, except in one relatively 
noncontroversial context.  The 2001 law to permit Italians 
living abroad to vote (Ref B) requires electoral districts to 
be redesigned in order to create an "overseas district." 
There is no deadline for accomplishing this in the 
legislation.  One conclusion could be that the districts 
would have to be drawn before the next election.  If Pera's 
hypothesis is correct, Ciampi could have found an 
interpretation allowing him to assert that the Government's 
recent contingency plans for early elections violated this 
law, for example.  From our reading in-house, it would seem a 
weak case, but lawyers could presumably argue both sides. 
 
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CASINI BLAMES BERLUSCONI 
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¶5.  (C)  In the Ambassador's call on Casini the prior day, 
Casini said he had just quarreled with Berlusconi on the 
telephone.  (UDC Secretary Follini and Mario Baccini, former 
Minister for Public Administration, were leaving Casini's 
office as the Ambassador arrived.)  Not sounding like one in 
league with the left, Casini fumed that Berlusconi was 
"trying to give the government to (the left) as fast as 
possible.  We told him he must look reality in the face. 
Before, Italians were with you regardless of your merits. 
Now, they are against you regardless of your merits."  Casini 
asserted that "the political winds" were against Berlusconi. 
More calmly, he said that if Berlusconi would give voters the 
message he gave Parliament, admitting to problems and 
resolving to face them, he might regain their trust.  The PM 
also needed to develop a realistic plan, Casini said.  "We 
need a single party of the right," he added, "A grand 
moderate party, with no more divides."  The Ambassador asked 
if there was a program to which all four coalition parties 
could agree.  Three of the parties are close, Casini replied. 
 "The Northern League is the problem, and Berlusconi is too 
close to the League."  (Note:  Numerically, the coalition can 
likely survive without the League.  It would retain its 
majority in the Senate and be two votes shy in the Chamber, 
votes it could possibly gain from independents.  This is 
clearly not Berlusconi's preference.  The coalition loses its 
majority in both chambers without UDC.  End Note.) 
 
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IS A COUP IN THE WORKS? 
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¶6.  (S)  Pera has predicted that the sky was falling in the 
past; he tends to offer a pessimistic view of events when the 
political situation gets tense.  On the other hand, President 
Ciampi, while in most cases preserving the neutrality 
normally expected of Italy's President of the Republic, is 
more closely affiliated with the left then the right.  (In 
point of fact, this is true of most older Italian 
politicians, as the only "right" that existed in Italy until 
the emergence of Berlusconi's Forza Italia and the 
restructuring of Fini's National Alliance (AN) was the 
Fascist Party, AN's predecessor.)  He is also close to many 
of those in the former Christian Democrat (DC) party 
structure, until the 1990s "Tangentopoli" scandal THE power 
structure in Italy.  It is widely assumed that, as a cultured 
professional politician, Ciampi shares the distaste for 
Berlusconi held by many of Italy's (and Europe's) political 
elite.  Considered a brash, rich businessman, the PM is not 
what the political class considers one of its own.  Pera told 
the Ambassador that the PM "will have to go to Bermuda, or he 
will go to jail."  Pera's perceived Ciampi-Casini-left 
alliance "will get rid of" the PM, he insisted. 
 
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CASINI, UDC AND THE "GRAND CENTER" 
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¶7.  (S)  Casini is a man of expansive personal ambition; he 
wants to be either Prime Minister or President of the 
Republic.  He and his UDC colleagues, including Marco 
Follini, believe in the holy grail of the former Christian 
Democrats -- the dream of a "grand center."  For Casini, the 
dream would be even more alluring if he had a principle role. 
 In an April 22 meeting with the DCM on a separate subject, 
the PM's Diplomatic Adviser (and nominee for Ambassador to 
Washington) Giovanni Castellaneta, referred to those 
(unnamed) who "still have the dream of reconstituting the old 
DC."  Castellaneta categorized the notion as a "false dream;" 
history has moved on, he said.  We agree.  We see no logical 
reason for UDC to sabotage the governing coalition, unless it 
were to crassly jump ship and join the center-left.  Casini 
has said he would not do this.  If, however, Prodi came to 
him and said "Help the left take back Parliament, and you 
will be President of the Republic," what would Casini answer? 
 This could happen without UDC's specifically joining a 
center-left government. 
 
¶8.  (S)  If elections were called now, virtually all 
observers (with the possible exception of Berlusconi) agree 
the center-right would lose.  Voter dissatisfaction over lack 
of delivery on promised programs, and most importantly, 
perceived losses in economic standing, is high.  The dream of 
an UDC-led grand center, however, posits that UDC would draw 
back into the fold all former centrist Christian Democrats -- 
Francesco Rutelli's Margherita, members of FI, a few from AN, 
and others from hither and yon.  Are Casini and Follini 
convinced now is the time?  The numbers are not there for the 
"grand center" to take a majority.  Those who believe the 
search for this grail is motivating UDC, however, say the 
party does not seek a majority -- only enough to be kingmaker 
of the next governing coalition.  Logical flaws remain.  UDC 
has said it would not govern with the left.  If that is true, 
why follow the quest, eviscerating the only coalition UDC 
could join and leaving it on the sidelines -- maybe with the 
one-man prize of the Presidency?  Under all permutations of 
the grand center scenario, it strikes us that the Italian 
voters would see this for the blatant political maneuver it 
would be, and we wonder if they would reject out of hand the 
actors in the drama.  But perhaps a good salesman (and Casini 
is a skilled politician) could sell the product effectively. 
 
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ITALY IN IRAQ 
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¶9.  (S)  In both of the Ambassador's conversations, the 
subject of Italy's participation in Iraq arose.  Pera told 
Ambassador that if early elections come and Prodi wins, "he 
is guaranteed to pull Italian troops out of Iraq, just like 
Zapatero."  Casini, on the other hand, praised effusively 
Berlusconi's willingness to lead Italy into Iraq.  "It is the 
best thing this Government has done," Casini told the 
Ambassador, "And it is to Berlusconi's personal credit."  No 
one else could have done it, Casini said.  The Ambassador 
underscored the importance of what Italy and America are 
accomplishing in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere.  "We are 
changing the world, and Italy is at our side."  Casini echoed 
the Ambassador's conviction that our joint international 
efforts and Italian-American friendship were crucial. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶10.  (S)  On balance, we are inclined to believe that 
President Pera is experiencing another bout of philosophical 
"depression" about this fractious, fragile coalition's 
future.  We are inclined to think that, by heeding Pera's 
warning and exerting his utmost persuasion and tact, 
Berlusconi will regather his coalition and we will see a 
"Berlusconi Bis" government confirmed next week.  We cannot, 
however, entirely rule out Casini's ambition or UDC's quest. 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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	2005ROME01389 - Classification: SECRET