This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000400 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON BM SN
SUBJECT: SINGAPORE PM LEE'S BURMA VISIT: BEATING AROUND THE 
BUSH 
 
REF: A. SINGAPORE 936 
 
     ¶B. SINGAPORE 911 
     ¶C. RANGOON 379 
     ¶D. RANGOON 358 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Singapore Prime Minister Lee visited Burma 
on March 30 and, contrary to international press reports and 
a preview by his foreign minister of an anticipated tough 
approach (ref A), he apparently did not directly urge Burma 
to give up its turn to chair ASEAN in 2006.  However, we're 
told, PM Lee was satisfied that his more ambiguous approach 
yielded an SPDC willingness to "take into account ASEAN's 
collective interests" and to discuss the issue at the 
upcoming ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in Cebu.  We have 
low expectations that "soft" ASEAN approaches will lead the 
SPDC generals to give up their much anticipated turn to chair 
ASEAN; they'll only do so on their own terms and in their own 
perceived best interests.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On April 4, Singapore Ambassador Thambynathan 
Jasudasen provided the COM and P/E chief with a readout of 
the March 30 visit to Burma of Prime Minister Lee Hsien 
Loong.  According to Jasudasen, PM Lee's "introductory" visit 
consisted of four parts:  a lunch with ten local businessmen 
closely linked to Singapore trade and investment; a meeting 
with Prime Minister Lt Gen Soe Win; a meeting with SPDC 
Chairman Sr General Than Shwe; and an official state dinner. 
 
"Give Us Your Dollars;" "Give Us Your Skies" 
 
¶3. (C) PM Soe Win, joined by four GOB ministers, gave PM Lee 
a standard SPDC lecture on regime activities and 
achievements, with a particular focus on economic issues. 
Singapore, Soe Win said, accounted for over $1.5 billion in 
investments in Burma, but the GOB wanted to reverse a 
precipitous decline in recent years.  PM Lee, taking on board 
input from the Rangoon-based businessmen, said that Burma 
needed to complete an investment guarantee agreement and 
address the problems of current investors before trying to 
secure new ones.  PM Lee also added that "there is severe 
competition for Singapore dollars, especially from China and 
India." 
 
¶4. (C) The two Prime Ministers also discussed tourism (Lee 
pressed for more open skies, noting that Laos and Burma were 
the only countries in the region where Singapore airlines 
were restricted to a single destination) and human resources 
training (Singapore has trained nearly 2,000 Burmese civil 
servants since 1991 and is prepared to expand the program if 
the GOB so desires).  On the East Asia Summit, PM Lee put 
forth GOS views that in order to distinguish the forum from 
"ASEAN Plus Three," the Summit should also include other 
countries such as India, Australia, and New Zealand.  Amb. 
Jasudasen said that PM Soe Win agreed on the need to be 
inclusive, but did not elaborate further, leaving "uncertain" 
the GOB's view on the precise mechanism for the Summit. 
 
Beating Around the Bush 
 
¶5. (C) Jasudasen noted that neither side specifically raised 
or mentioned the ASEAN chairmanship, scheduled to rotate to 
Burma in 2006.  Instead, PM Lee used a "business angle" to 
address the issue, suggesting that the region's economies are 
increasingly integrated and, consequently, more closely 
linked politically.  "Therefore," Lee told Soe Win, "within 
ASEAN, we can't put up walls."  PM Soe Win, according to 
Jasudasen, said that the GOB would "take into account" 
ASEAN's collective interests and the ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
"will meet and discuss these issues" in Cebu (April 10-12). 
 
¶6. (C) PM Lee's subsequent meeting with SPDC Chairman Than 
Shwe, who had been briefed by PM Soe Win on the latter's 
encounter with Lee, was a shorter, "though nearly identical" 
version of the Soe Win meeting.  Than Shwe told Lee that he 
was aware the two Prime Ministers had discussed "and agreed 
upon" various bilateral and multilateral issues.  Than Shwe, 
consistent with previous meetings with visiting officials 
(ref D), was joined by the SPDC's top brass (except for S-1 
Thein Sein, who was busy wrapping up the recent session of 
the National Convention), but dominated the meeting and was 
the only one who spoke from the Burmese side. 
Speak Loudly and Carry A Small Twig 
¶7. (C) The COM raised international press coverage of PM 
Lee's visit, noting that many reporters had characterized 
Lee's message to the SPDC as "urging" or "pressing" Burma to 
give up its rotation to chair ASEAN.  Jasudasen agreed that 
such an assessment was not entirely accurate, but said "it 
would be a never-ending task to correct every single media 
inaccuracy" and, he added, "this message helps domestically 
in Singapore where the PM is under pressure from members of 
Parliament to do something" about Burma. 
 
¶8. (C) Amb. Jasudasen assessed that "only three or four ASEAN 
countries" (Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and maybe the 
Philippines) would consider suggesting that Burma "step 
aside" in 2006.  Describing Singapore as "the hatchet man, 
always doing the dirty work," Jasudasen said that Laos, 
Vietnam, and Cambodia would vehemently object to any 
tinkering with the rotation "because they could be the next 
target" of concerns over human rights and democracy issues. 
 
Comment: Wink, Wink, Nudge, Nudge 
 
¶9. (C)  Amb. Jasudasen noted that PM Lee and PM Soe Win also 
held a 15-minute "four eyes" bilateral discussion without 
aides or interpreters and "it is not fully certain what was 
discussed."  While it is possible that Lee was unambiguous in 
his private tete-a-tete with Soe Win, the readout we received 
tells us it is more likely that Singapore soft-peddled the 
ASEAN chair issue with the SPDC and happily let the press 
characterize the GOS's approach as "pressure."  Jasudasen 
said that PM Lee was "quite satisfied" that the GOB had 
signaled an openness to take on board "ASEAN's interests" and 
is "prepared to discuss" related issues in Cebu. 
 
¶10. (C) The Burmese generals know that there is no ASEAN 
consensus on the issue of bypassing Burma for the ASEAN chair 
rotation.  They will use that to their advantage at upcoming 
regional meetings (Cebu and Kyoto) and we don't envision they 
will go quietly into the night on the basis of various 
"discreet prods" and "gentle nudges" (to quote a few press 
reports).  The only way we see the generals giving up their 
much-anticipated glory of chairing ASEAN is if they do so on 
their own terms and in their own perceived best interests. 
End Comment. 
Martinez