This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 000857 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS USOAS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EC OAS
SUBJECT: ENGAGING THE DIPCORPS ON ECUADORIAN STABILITY 
 
REF: A. QUITO 585 
 
     ¶B. QUITO 852 
     ¶C. QUITO 850 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reason 1.4 (b) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Representatives from Quito's largest 
foreign missions gathered April 18 to discuss the ongoing 
political crisis in Ecuador.  UN Judicial Rapporteur Leandro 
Despouy, who visited Ecuador March 13-18 (Ref A), weighed in 
via conference call.  As non-US diplomats here are wont to 
do, the majority of participants provided long-winded 
analysis of Ecuador's problems but offered few ideas on 
moving forward.  Poloffs introduced various suggestions on 
how diplomatic missions might help.  Gaining greatest buy-in 
was the issuance of a "Friends of Ecuador" communique, 
calling for opposition-GoE dialogue, restraint by public 
forces, and a commitment to crafting an independent, 
effective judiciary.  Support for an international mission to 
Ecuador was more tepid.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In late March, UN Mission Ecuador Director Mauricio 
Valdes called an urgent gathering of foreign diplomats and 
international organization officials.  The purpose was to 
provide a copy of the draft judicial independence report 
Despouy was then presenting in Geneva, and discuss next 
steps.  Chilean Ambassador Nelson Haddad hosted, with 
representatives from the embassies of the United States, 
Spain, Argentina, Brazil, Holland (representing the EU), the 
IDB, World Bank, UN FAO, and OAS attending.  Valdes requested 
a follow-up meeting April 18, and all but the Dutch and 
Argentines came; Despouy participated via telephone. 
 
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Big Talk, Small Action 
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¶3.  (C) Regrettably, the March performance proved the 
participants excellent analysts, but reluctant problem 
solvers (much like Despouy, in our opinion).  Ecuador's 
problems were Ecuador's alone, they claimed; Latin American 
diplomatic tradition ruled out involvement in neighbors' 
internal problems.  We disagreed.  Gutierrez welcomed counsel 
from foreign leaders, and expressions of support from Lagos 
or Lula might awaken the president to the gravity of the 
situation and the need for real negotiation.  Despite raising 
interest, the meeting terminated without formalized next 
steps. 
 
¶4.  (C) Attendees of the April 18 get-together were similarly 
averse to talk specifics (although Spain's representative 
arrived with his foreign ministry's April 16 declaration in 
hand).  The group agreed the situation had morphed from a 
judicial battle -- Congress's "institutional majority" having 
overhauled Ecuador's highest tribunals, perhaps 
unconstitutionally -- to a full-bore political impasse. 
Gutierrez faced a crucial week, with a handful of legislators 
already threatening renewed impeachment efforts.  Thankfully, 
representatives had dropped their "no foreign involvement" 
inhibitions, owing mainly to a recently-passed Congressional 
resolution that vacated the Supreme Court and requested 
"international oversight" over the selection of new justices 
(Ref B). 
 
-------------------------------- 
Keeping Our Counterparts on Task 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Seeing an opening, Poloffs urged their colleagues to 
display support for Ecuadorian political stability.  Topping 
their suggestion list was a declaration, to be issued by the 
"Friends of Ecuador," that would call for serious 
negotiations between political players, responsible behavior 
by GoE military and police, and a commitment from all to 
establish a working judicial system.  As a base, the document 
might use excellent statements earlier issued by the Embassy, 
UN, and Spanish MFA. 
 
¶6.  (C) Foreign leaders still had roles to play, they 
continued.  It was regrettable but reasonable that Chilean 
President Lagos had canceled his April 15-16 visit.  Getting 
Lagos here soonest was vital, however, in that it offered 
Gutierrez a wonderful opportunity to appear presidential and 
not petty.  In the meantime, a Lagos call expressing support 
and urging compromise looked promising; so too calls from 
Lula and Spanish President Zapatero.  Poloffs summarized 
Embassy actions in attempting to defuse the crisis, from the 
Ambassador's working breakfast with Gutierrez (Ref C) to 
Emboffs' calls on the GoE high command. 
 
¶7.  (C) Last, Poloffs sketched out a possible high-visibility 
international visit aimed at reducing political pressures and 
fomenting dialogue.  Despite a paucity of real results, 
Despouy's Ecuador tour had bought the president time and 
prompted hope that a negotiated solution was possible. 
Gutierrez needed similar relief now.  Recognizing that no 
international organization would intervene sans a GoE 
invitation, the Embassy was prepared to utilize its good 
offices in convincing the president such international 
intervention was needed. 
 
--------------------- 
A Cause for Optimism? 
--------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Chilean Ambassador Haddad noted President Lagos 
already had telephoned Gutierrez, apologizing for canceling 
his visit but hoping to reschedule soon; on the need for 
respect for democratic order and dialog, the Chilean leader's 
talking points differed little from ours.  Spanish diplomat 
Xavier Conde informed the group the EU had agreed to issue 
its own statement on Ecuador.  GoS Foreign Minister Moratinos 
had urged compromise in a call to GoE counterpart Patricio 
Zuquilanda, Conde revealed, and he would pitch to Madrid a 
potential Zapatero-Gutierrez telcon.  Cesar Ocampo, the OAS 
mission chief in Quito, agreed international "intervention" 
held promise, but, fearing competing, counter-productive 
initiatives, urged full coordination between organizations. 
The World Bank rep, noting he too had canceled a high-level 
official's visit to Ecuador, announced the organization's own 
statement would soon emerge, its call for compromise tracking 
closely with others.  Only the Brazilian DCM demurred, seeing 
little benefit from a Lula call (his Ambassador had been more 
positive during the March meeting, however). 
 
¶9.  (C) All considered a possible "Friends" resolution worth 
pursuing, although the IDB official recognized the difficulty 
of clearing language through a dozen entities.  UN Director 
Valdes volunteered to shepherd its preparation and approval. 
He would keep members apprised of progress at all times. 
Valdes also intended to meet with Guillermo Landazuri (ID), 
the author of the Congressional resolution calling for 
foreign observation over the Supreme Court selection process, 
in an attempt to clarify terms.  Concluding the meeting, he 
convoked an April 20 meeting of international judicial 
assistance donors, the USG included, to coordinate possible 
technical assistance. 
 
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COMMENT: 
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¶10.  (C) Those present at the March and April gatherings 
represent the cream of an otherwise cocktail-focused 
diplomatic crop.  While uncertain they'll soon take action, 
the attitudinal improvement -- from "we don't want to get 
involved" to "this is what we've done so far," convinces us 
our counterparts are worth cultivating.  With the savvy 
Valdes taking the lead, we are optimistic the "Friends" will 
generate at least a resolution draft.  Obtaining support for 
an international mission looks harder, however, owing to 
institutional rivalry -- Valdes himself blanched when we 
first raised a potential OAS role here. 
 
¶11.  (C) Yet Ecuador needs its neighbors' help.  Political 
polarization continues to worsen, with opposition Pachakutik 
announcing its intention to seek Gutierrez's impeachment, and 
protests now expanding outside Quito.  Should the dipcorps 
not back a multilateral mission, we are prepared to act solo, 
and already are consulting with WHA and USOAS colleagues on 
the possible value of an OAS "political peacekeeping" team in 
Ecuador.  In an April 19 telcon with the Ambassador, 
President Gutierrez welcomed support from abroad.  Should 
Washington approve in theory, our next step entails coaching 
the GoE on spin control, since the opposition could 
conceivably paint the visit as proof Gutierrez cannot govern 
Ecuador without outside help. 
KENNEY