This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 000748 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER EC VE ASEX
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ INFLUENCE SLIGHT, BUT GROWING 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 43965 
 
     ¶B. QUITO 680 
     ¶C. QUITO 589 
 
C...




id: 30154
date: 4/5/2005 19:14
refid: 05QUITO748
origin: Embassy Quito
classification: SECRET//NOFORN
destination: 05SECSTATE43965
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.



----------------- header ends ----------------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 000748 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER EC VE ASEX
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ INFLUENCE SLIGHT, BUT GROWING 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 43965 
 
     ¶B. QUITO 680 
     ¶C. QUITO 589 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (U) SUMMARY: Separated by only a thousand miles and led 
by ex-colonels from similar backgrounds, Ecuador and 
Venezuela nonetheless aren't closest of friends.  Commercial, 
cultural, and people-to-people ties are slight, compared to 
those of other near-neighboring countries.  There is genuine 
dislike between Presidents Gutierrez and Chavez, due mainly 
to the latter's Machiavellian manipulation of the personal 
relationship; the GoE leader thus shies away from most joint 
appearances and recently assured us he had no intention of 
visiting Caracas soon.  Ecuadorian media regularly lambaste 
Hugo's efforts to silence and/or co-opt Venezuela's fourth 
estate. 
 
¶2.  (S) Chavez is not without allies here, however. 
Ecuador's indigenous and traditional left are both numerous 
and potent; despite no personal affinity for the Bolivarian 
despot, they delight in his anti-imperialist, gringo-bashing 
message.  The GoV embassy is ably led and is utilizing Cuba's 
long-established Ecuador inroads to further Chavez interests. 
 Evidence seems to tie the Venezuelans to a spate of violence 
against the Gutierrez opposition, its aim to foment an even 
more violent response.  Finally, Ecuador's political 
cannibalism and general (and worsening) instability plays 
right into Chavez's hands.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Unlike his Havana Idol, No National Hero... 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (U) Ecuador and Venezuela would appear natural allies. 
Only southeastern Colombia separates them physically. 
History ties them together, as both formed part of Gran 
Colombia, the short-lived megastate arising upon independence 
from Spain in the early 1800s.  Each produces petroleum, 
although Venezuela's reserves dwarf Ecuador's.  And both 
feature ruling classes dominated by European-origin citizens, 
mestizo and mulatto masses, and marginalized indigenous and 
Afro-origen underclasses. 
 
¶4.  (U) Yet despite such similarities, country links are few. 
 Limited expat communities exist in each, for example.  Few 
direct flights connect Quito and Caracas.  While former 
Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) employees in 2004 provided 
advice to PetroEcuador executives on increasing production 
and profits in state-owned fields, they were in fact 
"ex-"perts earlier purged from the Venezuelan parastatal, and 
the initiative soon stalled.  Trade between the two nations 
is relatively small and tilts favorably to Venezuela.  And 
cultural and academic contacts are limited. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Hugo Chavez and Lucio Gutierrez were decorated 
soldiers later imprisoned for coup leadership.  Both 
rededicated themselves to acquiring their respective 
presidencies constitutionally, and both achieved success. 
Yet they are far from friendly.  Perhaps cognizant that a 
chummy relationship would alarm Washington, Gutierrez has 
attempted to keep his Caracas counterpart at arm's length. 
Chavez attended Gutierrez's January 2003 inauguration, for 
example, but was deprived of a useful photo-op.  Eighteen 
months later, when Quito hosted the OAS General Assembly, the 
Venezuelan embarrassed his host by leading large, "fuera 
Lucio" rallies not far from the assembly site.  Relations 
have since chilled further, thanks to Chavez's shenanigans 
surrounding their now-aborted Caracas summit (Ref B). 
 
 
¶6.  (U) Nor do media here cut Chavez much slack.  While 
reporting his antics and anti-American diatribe factually, 
the Venezuelan colonel rarely receives positive front or 
editorial page coverage.  Both print and broadcast outlets 
damn his efforts to emasculate Venezuelan media.  And when 
Gutierrez takes turns they consider dictatorial, commentators 
often tar him as "Chavez-lite." 
 
-------------------------- 
But Not Lying Down, Either 
-------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Regardless, Chavez considers Ecuador a fertile export 
market for his Bolivarian revolution.  He is encouraged by 
genuine Ecuadorian admiration for Fidel Castro and the 
goodwill the Cuban regime's doctors, teachers, and coaches 
have earned, especially amidst highlands indigenous 
communities.  It's no secret Chavez bankrolls Uncle Fidel's 
activities hemisphere-wide.  Yet there are indications the 
Venezuelan wants more than silent partner status in Ecuador. 
 
¶8.  (S) Venezuelan destabilization-related activities have 
spiked in Ecuador since September 2004.  Perhaps an 
indication that Chavez has prioritized Ecuador, Oscar Navas, 
the GoV's ambassador in Quito, is a former Venezuelan Army 
colonel and Hugo confidant.  Embassy sources report increased 
contacts between GoV, Cuban, FARC, homegrown terrorist, and 
far-left political groups, a dangerous mosaic.  While not yet 
a coherent whole, the nascent subversion campaign bears 
watching. 
 
--------------------------- 
A Two-Front Order of Battle 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) Broadly, GoV efforts take two forms:  bolstering 
far-left, anti-U.S. political forces, and developing 
terrorists' capabilities in Ecuador.  Regarding the former, 
sources state that Venezuelan money and logistics back much 
of the anti-Free Trade Agreement opposition in Ecuador.  A 
key actor in the GoV effort is Venezuelan DCM Gustavo 
Bastardo.  Bastardo works closely with many Ecuadorian 
leftist groups in recruiting converts to the Bolivarian cause. 
 
¶10.  (S) The last twelve months have witnessed a low-level 
wave of political violence in Quito, impacting mainly 
Gutierrez's opposition but affecting government and allies' 
officials as well.  Unknown assailants fired shots at the 
homes and businesses of outspoken administration critics. 
Gunmen opened fire on a Congressional deputy as he drove home 
from work.  And ski-masked thugs at Quito's Central 
University (UCE) roughed-up former VP and current Gutierrez 
opponent Leon Roldos.  Ecuadorian police have made little 
headway investigating the seemingly unrelated crimes (Ref C). 
 However, reliable Embassy contacts claim UCE radicals are 
behind the violence campaign; our sources are but one piece 
of evidence short of linking it to GoV henchmen (the Chavez 
goal being to foment instability by provoking a drastic 
reaction from the Ecuadorian opposition). 
 
¶11.  (S) Even more ominous, the Embassy believes that GoV 
money has financed guerrilla training in Venezuela for 
Ecuadorian radicals.  Prior Quito reporting has detailed 
former Administration official (and Gutierrez brother-in-law) 
Napoleon Villa's efforts to establish Bolivarian Circle-like 
groups in Ecuador (Villa has mostly faded from the political 
scene, thankfully).  Another former Gutierrez insider, 
disgraced and disgruntled ex-Minister Patricio Acosta, 
publicly has admitted to attending FARC meetings, with 
Gutierrez, prior to the 2002 presidential campaign.  Acosta 
is a regular traveler to Caracas. 
 
----------------- 
Tasking Specifics 
----------------- 
 
¶12.  (C)  GoE visa/immigration requirements for Venezuelan 
passport holders:  Venezuelans neither receive special 
migration benefits nor face additional requirements.  For 
entry into Ecuador, for example, they need only to present a 
passport (with at least six months' validity) and a return 
ticket. 
 
-- The Embassy is unaware of any pre-existing or planned 
bilateral border security agreements between the Venezuelan 
and Ecuadorian governments. 
 
-- The Embassy is unaware of any pre-existing or planned 
bilateral information/intelligence sharing agreements between 
the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian governments. 
 
-- Mil-Mil cooperation between GoV and GoE forces is scant. 
At the highest levels -- the joint commander and service 
chiefs, for example -- Ecuadorians view ominously the overt 
politicization of the Venezuelan military, believing it 
grossly unprofessional and potentially destabilizing to the 
region.  Venezuelan attaches serve here, but they are not 
particularly active or high-profile.  There have been no 
recent bilateral military exercises between the militaries, 
and we are unaware of any planned bump-up in GoV military 
assistance. 
 
¶13.  (U) This message was coordinated with Embassy Caracas. 
KENNEY 

=======================CABLE ENDS============================