This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 QUEBEC 000046 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/11/2015 
TAGS: SOCI SMIG PGOV PREL EFIN ECON CA MO AG TS
SUBJECT: QUEBEC IMMIGRATION POLICY AT A CROSSROADS? 
 
REF: A. 03 MONTREAL 453 
 
     ¶B. 01 QUEBEC 111 
     ¶C. 97 MONTREAL 1775 
     ¶D. 94 MONTREAL 976 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: jstrudwick, conoff, Quebec City, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
1.(U) SUMMARY:  Quebec views its semi-autonomous immigration 
policy as a key instrument in maintaining its economy and in 
preserving its francophone identity.  But the province finds it 
hard to attract the kind of immigrants it wants and to retain 
those that it gets.  Over just the past six years the Maghreb 
has become the deepest pool for the emigrant francophones that 
Quebec has traditionally sought to attract.  But North Africans 
are prominent among the groups that have proven difficult to 
integrate into the Quebec labor market, and events since 9/11 
have posed added challenges to their social integration even in 
this highly tolerant society. 
 
2.(C) With Law 53, passed last summer, the Charest Government 
ostensibly broke over 15 years of bipartisan immigration policy 
by enabling Quebec to use geographic origin as one of the 
criteria in selecting immigrants, and, if needed, to suspend the 
processing of applications.  Though never publicly stated, the 
measure was aimed primarily at the massive number of 
applications from Morocco and Algeria, which have created an 
enormous backlog and threaten to dominate future immigrant 
inflow. The opposition Parti Quebecois opposed Law 53 as 
discriminatory, and it is yet to be seen whether the Liberal 
Government will actually use the new tools it offers.  The 
immigration issue in Quebec is usually on the back-burner, but 
when brought forward it uncovers not political choices, but 
rather contradictions in the values held by society as a whole. 
End Summary. 
 
---------------------------- 
Finding Future Quebeckers 
---------------------------- 
3.(U) Immigration is one of the few areas under concurrent 
Federal and Provincial jurisdiction under the Constitution Act 
of 1867, but Quebec is the only province to have seriously 
developed its capacity to influence the size and composition of 
its immigrant flow.  The Federal Government sets national 
immigration objectives, establishes criteria for Family 
Unification immigrants and Refugees, handles admissions at 
Ports-of-Entry, and applies statutory immigrant visa criteria 
relating to criminality, security, and health.  Ottawa consults 
with the provinces on most immigration policy and enters into 
agreements with them.  But Ottawa's accord with Quebec is by far 
the most extensive.  Under its most recent iteration (1991) 
Quebec sets its own immigration levels, establishes the 
financial criteria for sponsors, and runs the settlement and 
integration programs (partially funded by Ottawa).  No immigrant 
can be settled in Quebec without a Quebec Certificate of 
Selection (CSQ). 
 
4.(U) Quebec's most important tool has been its role in 
selecting "independent immigrants."   Unlike Family Unification 
migrants and Refugees (which are the subject of ongoing 
Ottawa-Quebec negotiations to insure that these 
Federally-selected individuals can secure a CSQ), the selection 
of independent immigrants is a purely Quebec responsibility. 
These are the individuals that are the key to Quebec's 
immigration objectives.  Quebec wants to select them on the 
basis of their anticipated economic and social contribution and 
adaptability to the province.  And Quebec wants to increase both 
their numbers and their proportion of the province's total 
immigrant intake.  For much of the 1990s these independent 
immigrants made up only about 40% of the inflow; in recent years 
their share has been deliberately increased to around 60%.  The 
key tool in the screening/selection process is a qualifications 
assessment which awards a range of points for adaptability, 
experience (especially time already in Quebec), languages 
(especially French), age, spouse's characteristics, training, 
employment, and children.  While Quebec immigration officials 
technically can use their judgment, most of the points are 
determined by resumes and credentials. 
 
5.(U) There has been a consensus in Quebec on the need for 
immigration since the latter 1980s.  Despite continuance of a 
high unemployment rate that had hitherto tended to restrict 
immigration, it came to be recognized that the sharp fall in the 
birth rate since the 1960s poses significant problems for the 
province's economy and social systems, as well as for the 
survival of Quebec's distinct identity in a more populous Canada 
and North America.  Quebec also hoped that targeted immigration 
would increase the overall skills, education, and capital of its 
population.  In practice, it hasn't yet worked out that way. 
Quebec finds it hard to attract the kind of immigrants it wants 
and to retain those that it gets.  The GOQ prioritizes investors 
and entrepreneurs, but gets far fewer applications than it wants 
(only about 10% of annual intake).  Most immigrants are 
"workers" but Quebec finds itself capping its intake, because it 
does not want to admit more immigrants than it has employment 
vacancies.  Immigrants with university and professionals degrees 
(which are admitted as "workers") have met resistance from 
Quebec associations and employers, and there are also legitimate 
concerns about the value of some foreign diplomas. 
 
--------------------- 
Structural Conundrums 
--------------------- 
 
6.(U) Quebec's immigration ambitions are also afflicted by a 
number of vicious circles.  Immigration is often a spark to 
economic growth, but Quebec is economically less dynamic than 
some other provinces and consequently less attractive for 
Canada-bound migrants.  Like comparable regions in rust-belt 
America, Quebec has found few replacements for old manufacturing 
and raw material extraction industries.  Further, the province 
will soon be facing one of the more difficult demographic crises 
among Western societies, as its economically active population 
reaches retirement age, while the younger generations from four 
decades of low birth rates won't be numerous enough to pay the 
taxes and sustain consumption.  Immigration alone won't solve 
this problem, as Quebec would have to double its current annual 
intake (to 80,000) just to stabilize the population.  As 
Immigration Deputy Minister Raymonde Saint-Germain told us, 
Quebec's job market, housing stock, and social integration 
programs cannot handle that kind of volume even if the desired 
immigrants could be identified. 
 
7.(U) The importance of the French language also poses problems 
for Quebec's immigrant flow.  Over half of Quebec's immigrants 
are non-francophones in a province where French skills are vital 
to social integration and economic success.  This is especially 
true outside of the Montreal region where jobs are going 
unfilled.  Non-francophone immigrants also require significant 
public expenditures for language training and to provide family 
income while the training is going on.  Moreover, it is not 
unusual for non-francophone immigrants, after an initial year or 
so in Quebec, to move to an English-speaking province. 
Consequently, French skills are strongly weighted in the 
qualifications assessment, francophone applicant pools are 
attractive recruiting targets, and francophone applicants have a 
decided advantage. 
 
---------------------- 
Maghrebian Immigration 
---------------------- 
 
8.(U) For most of the 1990s, a stagnant economy, budget worries, 
and preoccupations about integration kept immigration levels 
flat.  But as the decade closed, things began to change, and in 
just the past few years immigration has sharply increased. 
 
(U) ANNUAL IMMIGRANTS TO QUEBEC (in thousands) 
1995    1996    1997    1998    1999    2000 
27.2    29.8    27.7    26.5    29.2    32.5 
 
2001    2002    2003    2004*   2005* 
37.5    36.6    40.4    43.5    46.5    *estimates 
 
9.(C) The intensification of civil conflict in Algeria in the 
late-1990s led to an increasing exodus of its more skilled and 
educated population.  Word of the Quebec option spread, both 
among private individuals as well as lawyers and immigration 
agents.  International social and economic conditions being what 
they are, the francophone populations of Morocco, Algeria, and 
Tunisia became the most fertile ground for would-be immigrants 
to Quebec.  Unlike francophone black Africans (who could not 
always meet the skills qualifications) and francophone Europeans 
(few of whom wished to emigrate), there are significant numbers 
of Maghrebians who can score selection points for language, 
skills, education, children, and who also are seeking a new 
place to live.  Applications increased sharply after 1999, and 
by 2003 over 70% of them were coming from North Africa, a volume 
which exceeded the overall Quebec immigration target. 
 
10.(C) Civil servants who received these applications noted the 
growth of the Maghrebian share of applicants.  They also were 
aware of significantly higher rates of unemployment and welfare 
support among Maghrebians (and black Africans), and found that 
in many cases, these applicants' French skills and school 
diplomas were over-rated.  The Maghrebian increases also raised 
the prospect that their large families would likely come to 
dominate the future flow of Family Unification immigrants (about 
20-25% of the total Quebec intake). Finally, after 9/11, 
security concerns made immigration officials more cautious in 
approving applications from the Islamic world.  To balance this 
flow, the Ministry stepped up recruitment efforts in Eastern 
Europe, East Asia, and, especially, Latin America, whose kindred 
languages promised more successful Francisation among a skilled 
immigrant pool, but modest success in these regions was dwarfed 
by the flood of applications from North Africa. 
 
11.(C) In 2002, the Immigration Ministry moved the processing of 
Maghrebian applications (including the large number of pending 
files) from Paris to Montreal.  Soon after the election of the 
Charest Government in April 2003, press reports began noting the 
slow processing times.  And by the end of the year the Ministry 
faced a scandal when it was revealed that it had been processing 
approximately the same number of applications for each of the 
four major regions: Africa, Europe, Latin America, East Asia. 
The result was an enormous backlog of Maghrebians while the 
other queues were cleared. 
 
------------------ 
Immigration Reform 
------------------ 
 
12.(C) In 2004 the PLQ government sought to tackle the 
immigration challenge head-on with a new Action Plan for 
2005-2007 and new legislation, Law 53.  The Action Plan stressed 
the challenge of rapidly and successfully integrating needed 
immigrants, and proposed a broad range of measures aimed to 
address those problems.  More succinctly, but no less directly, 
the Plan highlighted equity, integrity, efficiency, and 
transparency in processing, and the need to maintain diversity 
in the immigration inflow.  Law 53 itself was a brief, 
eight-page document consisting of short passages modifying 
existing legislation.  It reinforced the penalties for false 
documents, and gave the government powers to recognize and 
supervise immigration consultants.  But the heart of Law 53 were 
its provisions to allow the government to do legally what it had 
been trying to do informally over the previous few years: 
suspend processing of pending immigration applications and set 
immigration targets according to geographic areas.  Quebec, in 
effect, gave itself the tools to establish a quota (though the 
word is never used) for the Maghreb, and to channel its torrent 
of applications into a reservoir that might never be fully 
drained. 
 
13.(C) Law 53 was promptly decried by both immigrant-rights 
groups and the opposition Parti Quebecois.  Both attacked the 
law as discriminatory, and the PQ demanded to know how the 
immigration levels would be set and divided.  But the law passed 
and the only question now is whether the Charest government will 
use the new tools provided by Law 53 to reduce the flow of 
immigration from the Maghreb. In October, the Under-Secretary 
for Immigration and her team went off to Morocco for ten days to 
assuage concerns and explain criteria and procedures. In a 
January conversation, then-Minister Courchene told us that she 
wanted to clear the backlog and increase the number of 
immigrants.  And in a recent conversation with the CG, Deputy 
Minister Saint-Germain said that the GOQ will have to implement 
a processing schedule that is more transparent and predictable 
for the (fees-paying) applicant. 
 
14.(C) At this point, neither privately nor publicly is there 
talk of suspending processing.  The 2005 Immigration Plan, the 
first promulgated under Law 53 indicating geographic targets, 
anticipates no major change in the distribution of immigrants 
admitted.  Indeed, it projects a rise in Maghrebians selected: 
28% of the total, as compared with 18% in preceding years. 
(Given the backlog, even 28% is but a small percentage of 
applicants from that region. Media reports in mid-2004 indicated 
some 20,000 pending dossiers, the vast majority from 
Maghrebians.)  The Plan numbers suggest that the GOQ recognizes 
it will have to proceed slowly and carefully in implementing its 
new quota system.  And there is no sign of a decline of interest 
from North Africa. 
 
 
(U) GEOGRAPHIC ORIGIN OF IMMIGRANTS 
(as percentages of Total Admitted) 
 
        '99     '00     '01     '02     '03*    '05* 
 
America, Cent & South   13      13      15      15      18      12 
Europe, N/W/S   17      16      13      11      11      16 
Europe, East    9       8       9       14      12      14 
Asia, East & SE 18      16      17      13      14      13 
Asia, South     11      11      9       9       7 
Africa, North   14      16      20      20      18      28 
Africa, Other   8       8       7       7       7       1 
Middle East     5       5       5       5       7       6 
 
Total Immigration (,000)        29      32      38      38      40 
 37 
 
*2003 figures are estimates, 2005 figures are Selection Targets 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
15.(C) As in many Western societies, the immigration issue in 
Quebec is usually on the back-burner, but when brought forward 
it uncovers not political choices, but rather contradictions in 
the values held by society as a whole.  The GOQ historically, 
and the current PLQ government, has generally taken a firm line 
on social integration.  Three weeks ago, in a parliamentary 
forum (and in a subsequent letter to the press), International 
Affairs Minister (and one-time Immigration Minister) 
Gagnon-Tremblay noted the GOQ's opposition to the creation of 
Islamic family courts in Quebec, underlined the democratic and 
laic nature of Quebec society, and went on to remark that 
"immigrants who want to change our values can go elsewhere." 
But at the same time, Quebecers accept the need for immigration, 
recognize the difficulty in attracting immigrants, and place a 
high value on social tolerance.  Any measures that can be 
interpreted as racialist or profiling make prominent targets. 
After Gagnon-Tremblay's remarks, journalists promptly confronted 
newly-appointed Immigration Minister Lise Theriault, who 
reminded them of Quebec's (non-ideological) immigration 
selection criteria and rhetorically asked, "On what basis can 
one know if a candidate is a radical islamicist?"  A comparable 
situation exists on the security front.  While the GOQ publicly 
emphasizes that Federal (not provincial) officials are 
responsible for immigrant security checks, senior Quebec 
immigration officials told us that they quietly forward the 
dossiers of applicants with suspected terrorist or criminal ties 
to the RCMP or the provincial police. END COMMENT. 
 
 
 
 
 
FRIEDMAN